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A Looking Glass for Old and New Screens
Jaap Kooijman, Patricia Pisters and Wanda Strauven
Perhaps one of the longest videos on YouTube, In a Year with 13 Moons, is
dedicated to a very classic topic of film studies: auteur cinema. The video docu-
ments a 92-minute round table discussion of Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s
homonymous film at the New York Philoctetes Center for the Multidisciplinary
Study of the Imagination on 13 January 2007.1 One of the panelists is Thomas
Elsaesser, whose knowledge of German cinema in general and of Fassbinder in
particular is widely respected. Although Elsaesser’s performance on this new
medium is a contribution to traditional film studies, that does not necessarily
mean that Elsaesser considers YouTube and other developments of contemporary
screen culture as mere “remediations” of the film screen. On the contrary, be-
sides his ongoing passion for classical Hollywood and (European) auteur cinema,
Elsaesser has always kept a sharp eye out for historical, institutional, and techno-
logical changes related to audiovisual media. In January 2008, at an Amsterdam
conference on the video vortex of the Web 2.0 revolution, he proposed to picture
contemporary image culture as a living organism with cell growth and selection
(YouTube deletes or censors 20,000 videos daily, while 60,000 new ones are
added) which requires a different set of analytical tools than for the study of a
single masterpiece.2 This combination of cinephile passion for the silver screen
with its aesthetic and historical implications on the one hand, and mindfulness
of new developments in screen culture on the other, has always characterized
Elsaesser’s academic approach, making him one of the most important first-gen-
eration film scholars to have contributed to the establishment of film, television,
and media studies within academia.
Twenty years ago, in 1988, the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Am-
sterdam took the first steps toward the creation of a chair in Film and Television
Studies. A committee was established to investigate how the “new media” of film
and television could be studied as seriously as the written word from a huma-
nities perspective. Unlike the United States and a few other European countries,
Film and Television Studies had never been considered a full-fledged academic
discipline in the Netherlands, even though pioneers such as Janus van Domburg,
Jan Marie Peters, and Jan Hes had been teaching film since the 1940s, and the
department of Theater Studies at the University of Amsterdam had been offering
courses in film analysis and film history since the mid-1980s. In 1991, the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam appointed Thomas Elsaesser to the first chair of Film and
Television Studies in the Netherlands. Prior to his Amsterdam appointment, El-
saesser had initiated a film studies program at the University of East Anglia in
Great Britain. The University of Amsterdam press release at the time empha-
sized the uniqueness of the program in taking the audiovisual image as an object
of study.3 Likewise, in his opening speech on 6 November 1991, Elsaesser re-
ferred to the traditional study of literature, while at the same time clearly distan-
cing from it in terms of aesthetic parameters, institutional influences, and tech-
nological conditions that continue to evolve at such a rapid pace in the fields of
cinema and television. Whereas video recorders and television sets in the early
1990s were still fairly strange objects at the universities and laserdiscs seemed
futuristic, they are now considered as part of media’s archaeological past in the
classroom with its beamers, DVD players, and WiFi, where fragments from film
history and media culture at large can be “Googled” or seen on YouTube and
similar websites. The Film and Television Studies program that was established
in 1991 with 75 students has grown into the Media Studies department, which
currently counts around 1500 students and is one of the biggest departments of
the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Amsterdam. Many people have
contributed to this development, but Thomas Elsaesser, as a “founding father” of
the department, has played a crucial role in the various phases of its program
building.
The city of Amsterdam became not only Elsaesser’s new home where he both
worked and lived, but also a “playing field” for his conceptual thinking, which
spans from film historical mapping to new locative media applications. Fasci-
nated by the visible and the not-so visible traces of Amsterdam’s rich past of
movie theaters, traveling exhibitors, and film traders, Elsaesser has invited us to
take an interactive walk from the Muntplein to the Rembrandtplein along the
apparently insignificant Reguliersbreestraat to discover media-archaeological
connections between the porn shop windows and a Toshiba TV screen advertise-
ment, between the McDonald’s Restaurant (and its Disney placemats) and the
rooster of the French Pathé logo, between the pre-cinematic slot machines of a
casino and the imposing towers of the Tuschinski Theater; cinema’s history
seems to be everywhere.4
One year after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City,
Elsaesser wrote a memorial piece that once again positions us in the center of
Amsterdam, on the Rembrandtplein, to describe “what look[s] like a scene from
a Beckett play” and to reflect on the impact the new media have on our notion of
(social) “normality.” On the square that he crosses every evening on his way
home, he encounters two men who have nothing in common except for their
“behavior” in this public space: a homeless man and a business man are both
gesturing and talking to themselves, the former out of despair, the latter interact-
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ing with his hands-free mobile phone.5 The same Rembrandtplein now has a
huge plasma TV screen, forcing us to digest an endless stream of (commercial)
images. On the other side of the city, at the WTC’s Zuidplein, another enormous
screen has recently been installed: CASZuidas (Contemporary Art Screen Zuid-
as). The “opening hours” of this virtual museum are from 6 a.m. to midnight,
offering a daily program of works by local and international film and video ar-
tists. The target audience for this screen are the “managers and office workers,
students and academics as well as other inhabitants and users of the Zuidas.”6
Elsaesser’s knowledge of locative media practices has made him eager to develop
a 21st-century high-tech platform for the city of Amsterdam, where old and new
screens can be connected and where historical and theoretical research results on
media and mobility can be utilized in real time and space. This platform, which
Elsaesser would like to create in the near future, could then be used for (cultural)
tourism and city marketing/branding purposes, with the intention of showing “a
different Amsterdam.”7
In 2004, upon the occasion of Elsaesser’s 60th birthday, a book was published in
his honor. Die Spur durch den Spiegel: Der Film in der Kultur der Moderne, edited by
Malte Hagener, Johann N. Schmidt, and Michael Wedel, contains 33 essays by
internationally renowned authors, including Raymond Bellour, David Bordwell,
Siegfried Zielinski, and Slavoj Žižek, and pays tribute to Elsaesser’s contribution
to the field of film studies by focusing on the cinematic and the culture of mod-
ernity. Mind the Screen is a second tribute, which specifically focuses on Elsaes-
ser’s importance in the development of media studies in Amsterdam. The contri-
butors to this book have all worked with Elsaesser in Amsterdam at some point
in time: as PhD student, staff member, or colleague. Thus, Amsterdam serves as
the nodal point of an international network of the various contributing authors.
Furthermore, the book aims to cover the very broad range of media concepts that
a prolific author like Elsaesser has been involved in over the years. The contribu-
tions are thus not limited to (traditional) film studies, but also address issues
involving television studies, new media studies, art and cultural memory, system
theory, and telecommunications, as a looking glass for various screens, from the
archaeological pre-cinematic screen to the silver screen, from the television set to
the digital e-screen. The book is divided into three “acts,” which are organized
thematically rather than chronologically and mind the gap of medium specificity
by making consistent cross-references between the various media. Two more
playful “intermezzos” appear between the acts, consisting of scholarly essays.
These two contributions transform Elsaesser’s legacy into potential films in the
form of a screenplay, Catherine Lord’s “Scholars, Dreams, and Memory Tapes,”
which explores the underworld, and a storyboard, “Where Were You When?”8 by
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Bruce Gray, which pinpoints some important geographical coordinates between
Amsterdam and New York City.
The first act opens with three M-words that have been of great concern to
Elsaesser’s development in thinking the media: Melodrama, Memory, and Mind
Game. As a preamble to these concerns, Malte Hagener and Marijke de Valck
deal with the foundation of all academic work involving audiovisual media,
which is the passion for the moving image. They discuss the developments of
and transitions in (the concept of) cinephilia. The next two essays, by Warren
Buckland and by Sudeep Dasgupta and Wim Staat, revisit the “Tales of Sound
and Fury,” Elsaesser’s early-1970s essay that has been of great importance in the
(re)evaluation of popular film genres such as the Hollywood melodrama, which
until that point in time had been considered nothing more than mere shallow
entertainment. Buckland systematically reconstructs Elsaesser’s article, following
Rudolf Botha’s method of linguistic inquiry, in order to emphasize its significant
problem formulation, whereas Dasgupta and Staat investigate the legacy of the
article in contemporary film theory. Elsaesser’s work on melodrama and trauma
is also the point of departure for Tarja Laine, who examines the “spectorial logic
of shame” in Ingmar Bergman’s Skammen / Shame (1968), which is one of
Bergman’s most overlooked films. Inspired by a course she taught with Elsaesser,
José van Dijck recounts how their discussion of the interrelation between media
and memory gave shape to her concept of “mediated memories.” In “Running on
Failure,” Drehli Robnik analyzes how the notion of “productive pathologies,” al-
ready present in classical melodrama, is even more significant in the post-classi-
cal, post-Fordist cinema since the 1970s up to the mind-game films of the new
millennium. Pepita Hesselberth and Laura Schuster offer a close reading of two
such mind-game films, Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) and Code 46 (Mi-
chael Winterbottom, 2003), by focusing on the motif of a failing memory. Jan
Simons closes the first act by connecting the notion of “productive pathologies”
to both mind-game cinema and to the crisis paradigm that Elsaesser introduced
into media studies.
The second act is dedicated to the correlation between European cinema and
Hollywood cinema that Elsaesser has analyzed in great depth and in a variety of
ways. Floris Paalman opens this section with a discussion of system theory and
cultural ecology, which portrays Hollywood as a predator that “eats Europe’s ta-
lent, but in order to do so it also has to invest in it.” In the next essay, Dominic
Pettman looks at Werner Herzog’s Grizzly Man (2006) to argue how the Ger-
man New Wave auteur in this documentary presents the “bear life” of its main
character by confessing to the camera in an “autoscopic” way. Michael Wedel in
his case study focuses on another important German auteur, Fritz Lang, to dis-
cuss how Elsaesser’s notions of “historical imaginary” and “place of rupture” can
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reveal the true essence of Lang’s cinema better than the traditional and structur-
alist auteur theories. In her approach to the Europe-Hollywood connection, Patri-
cia Pisters compares the work of European auteurs Rainer Werner Fassbinder
and Paul Verhoeven, by examining their particular fascination with Hollywood
and the role played by women throughout history. In “Amsterdamned Global
Village,” Jaap Kooijman traces Elsaesser’s footsteps through the Reguliersbree-
straat and continues to explore the cityscape by looking at Dutch films set in
Amsterdam, based on Elsaesser’s concept of “karaoke Americanism.” Senta Sie-
wert analyzes the Turkish-German film Gegen Die Wand / Head On (Faith
Akin, 2004) by applying Elsaesser’s notion of “double occupancy” and focusing
in particular on the film’s use of pop music. In her discussion of global Holly-
wood directors, Melis Behlil challenges the traditional distinctions between Hol-
lywood and European cinema, and argues that Hollywood should instead be per-
ceived as a transnational cinematic space. Eleftheria Thanouli enters the post-
classical Hollywood cinema debate by applying Elsaesser’s five-step “what is dif-
ferent” formula to Inside Man (Spike Lee, 2006). Inspired by Elsaesser’s writing
on the “Wag-the-Dog” principle in advertising, Charles Forceville closes this act
by analyzing how bumpers that mark blocks of commercials on Dutch television
have changed over the years, gradually blurring the clear distinction between
commercials and television programs.
The third act brings together essays that place more emphasis on the historical
dimensions of Elsaesser’s work and is structured around the notions of Archae-
ology, Avant-Garde, and the Archive. Michael Punt offers us a media-archaeologi-
cal account of the laserdisc, arguing that the origins of cinema go back to the
early 18th century when the first modern orreries were designed. In “S/M,” Wan-
da Strauven describes a series of Futurist snapshots by which she aims to rethink
film history as a large network outside or beyond the entertainment industry.
Richard Rogers deals with surveillance theory with respect to contemporary “data
bodies” and consumer technologies such as mobile phones. In the next essay,
Mieke Bal draws connections between Elsaesser’s important essay on the trans-
formation of the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) images in the period between the
1970s and 1990s and her own concept of “migratory aesthetics.” Frank van Vree
also looks at the archival images of terrorism, but his analysis focuses on how
“indigestible images,” such as those of the Holocaust, are in danger of fading
away in the echo chamber of history. Julia Noordegraaf, on the contrary, argues
that archival images not so much fade away but actually allow us to gain new
perspectives, as she shows with her case study on colonial history in the work of
Dutch video artist Fiona Tan. Jennifer Steetskamp continues the discussion on
video art by examining the works of Harun Farocki and Johan Grimonprez
through the lenses of reenactment, appropriation, and “meta-television.” And,
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concluding this act, Jeroen de Kloet and Jan Teurlings offer a critical account of
YouTube and its Chinese variant Tudou by returning to some of the issues raised
by Thomas Elsaesser in the late 1990s, when the implications of digital media
convergence were only starting to take shape.
In European Cinema, Thomas Elsaesser recalls his first personal encounter with
the late Johan van der Keuken in 1993, just before the renowned Dutch director
was to begin filming his documentary Amsterdam Global Village (1996). El-
saesser tells Van der Keuken that he has been hired by the University of Amster-
dam to chair the Film and Television Studies program. Van der Keuken responds
by asking: “And what do you know about Dutch cinema?” Taken aback, Elsaesser
explains that the university is looking for a broad focus that will approach audio-
visual culture from an international perspective. But Elsaesser’s response cannot
prevent the meeting from turning into a “near-miss collision.”9 The irony of the
failed encounter between the filmmaker and the film scholar is not lost, however,
as each – in his own way – has succeeded in finding the global in the local and
has moved beyond Dutch parochialism into the transnational realm of cinema
culture, without dismissing its local significance. It is, therefore, fitting that
Mind the Screen is being published by Amsterdam University Press, which is also
the home of Elsaesser’s Film Culture in Transition series. With his work in and
about Amsterdam, Elsaesser has shown that Amsterdam is indeed a global vil-
lage, one of the hubs in a worldwide network of audiovisual culture where old
and new media meet in space and time.
Notes
1. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ri_1N3R7T-E>. Last viewed 10 Feb. 2008.
2. For an online summary of Elsaesser’s lecture, see Michael Stevenson’s blog: <http://
mastersofmedia.hum.uva.nl/2008/01/19/video-vortex-thomas-elsaesser-on-construc-
tive-instability>. Last viewed 10 Feb. 2008.
3. “Eerste Nederlandse Leerstoel Film- en Televisiewetenschap wordt geopend,” press
release, Media Studies archive, University of Amsterdam.
4. Thomas Elsaesser, “Inleiding: Hollywood op straat,” Hollywood op straat: Film en tele-
visie in de hedendaagse mediacultuur, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers
AUP, 2000) 15-18.
5. Thomas Elsaesser, “Where Were You When . . . ?”; or, “I Phone, Therefore I Am,”
PMLA 118.1 (Jan. 2003): 120.
6. <http://www.caszuidas.nl/site/main.php?page=about&id=1>. Last viewed 10 Feb.
2008.
7. Freely quoted from an internal report written by Thomas Elsaesser and Wanda Strau-
ven in March 2006, after their first orientation meeting with Waag Society.
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8. The source of Bruce Gray’s storyboard is Elsaesser’s aforementioned essay “Where
Were You When . . . ?” written upon the occasion of the first anniversary of the 9/11
attacks.
9. Thomas Elsaesser, European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood (Amsterdam: Am-
sterdam University Press, 2005) 193.
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ACT I
Melodrama, Memory, Mind Game

Cinephilia in Transition
Malte Hagener and Marijke de Valck
When discussing the concept of cinephilia, the first and perennial question that
inevitably comes to mind is what do we actually mean by cinephilia, this rare and
elusive feeling of nostalgic attachment to images, stories, and sounds, this
strangely elitist relationship to an art form that is still often derided as blatantly
commercial. As popular as the term has proven to be, at least since the Cahiers du
cinéma critics launched it as a battle cry in the 1960s, it seems hard to nail it
down to any foolproof definition. The problem of theoretically understanding
one’s libidinal, emotional, and affective attachment to a medium in its totality
has haunted many commentators, from Jean Epstein and Ricciotto Canudo in
the 1920s to Paul Willemen and Susan Sontag in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, argu-
ably no one has returned to the concept as consistently as Thomas Elsaesser, who
from his early writings for the Brighton Film Review and Monogram until today
has regularly theorized and written about cinephilia.
Elsaesser came of age as a cinephile during the 1960s, founding and running
a film magazine (Monogram), writing one of his earliest major articles on Holly-
wood auteurs while receiving his cinematographic education at London’s cine-
mas.1 Yet, unlike so many former cinephiles of his generation, while remaining
an ardent champion of Minnelli, Preminger, Sirk, Hitchcock, and Lang to this
day, he never resorts to any kind of cultural pessimism about the state of film
culture in general and the demise of cinephilia in particular. When Elsaesser was
confronted at the Cinephilia, Take Two: Re-Mastering, Re-Purposing, Re-Framing
conference with one hour of “old man’s mumble” by Dutch film critic Peter van
Bueren who complained about the state of the cinema, lamenting the downward
slope that film culture had taken ever since he was young, he exploded, ending
his fifteen-minute response with “Look at you, you old bag!”2 In fact, Elsaesser’s
cinephilia is alive and kicking precisely because it constantly adapts to the ever
changing circumstances of cinema. Or, to quote a famous line from a cinephile
film par excellence, Luchino Visconti’s Il gattopardo / The Leopard (1963), ci-
nephilia is a constantly evolving phenomenon: “Cambiare tutto, per non cambiare
nulla” / “If we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change.”
But we have still not answered the question of what cinephilia is. Instead of
addressing the question head on, maybe it is better to circumvent it for the time
being and approach it from a slightly different angle: firstly, by providing a short
archaeological sketch of cinephilia in terms of its generational logic, and sec-
ondly, by examining the various applications of cinephilia in the past. The under-
lying assumption here is that cinephilia has never been just a neutral term to
describe an emotional attachment to specific films or to cinema as a medium,
but that it has always been an ambivalent critical concept with which people have
tried to capture a specific mood of film experience while at the same time aiming
to articulate an ontology of cinema. If one includes the French discourse on
photogénie – promoted by intellectuals such as Louis Delluc, Jean Epstein, and
Emile Vuillermoz – as a direct forerunner of the debates on cinephilia (and there
are good reasons to do so), the idea has always exceeded and transcended a mere
description of a love for cinema, and should instead be considered an attempt to
conceptualize the medium on an immanent plane.3
Our assumption, then, at this point, will be that cinephilia does not permit any
fundamental doubt about the audiovisuality that has become so pervasive and
omnipresent in the world we inhabit. Because there is no external position, no
place where one can escape the mediated moving images, even our thinking has
become cinematic. In this sense, cinephilia might more closely resemble a set of
religious belief. Or, as Patricia Pisters has explained: “we now live in a metacine-
matic universe that calls for an immanent conception of audiovisuality and in
which a new camera consciousness has entered our perception.”4 Cinephilia
does not permit an external view to the cinema or a fulcrum from which to gain
an overview or complete picture, or an Archimedean viewpoint from which to
frame the medium. Cinephilia attempts to describe and conceptualize the totality
of cinema as precisely that: a totality. In the sense that cinephilia addresses the
boundlessness of the audiovisual universe, it might follow a gaming logic similar
to a “certain tendency” of contemporary cinema which Elsaesser has termed
“mind-game film” and in which questions of epistemological doubt and ontologi-
cal groundlessness are played out.5 But let us begin by delving into the history of
cinephilia because the archaeology of cinephilia is also the genealogy of the uni-
verse as meta-cinema.
Three Generations, Three Cinephilias
If there are, as Elsaesser has suggested, at least three generations of cinephiles
(roughly divided into three time frames – the 1960s, the 1970s-1980s, and the
1990s until the present), each with their own brand of cinephilia – then he him-
self belongs to all three of these generations equally.6 A generation is a temporal
concept which groups people according to their birth year in relation to the larger
cultural and historical shifts, although this seemingly simple classification sys-
tem has recently been criticized.7 By including elements of (Foucauldian-in-
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spired) genealogy and by mixing in psychoanalytical and literary concepts (elec-
tive affinities, adopted parents, oedipal rejections, etc.), the term “generation”
may assume a new meaning and urgency in a world governed by Ungleichzeitig-
keit (non-synchronicity). Applying it in this sense to cinephilia seems all the more
logical since both generation and cinephilia are also complex time-shifting de-
vices, as they elaborate a temporal logic that exceeds a clear-cut linear and chron-
ological order. In this respect, the generational logic with its unexpected returns
and repressed inheritances is not only similar to cinephilia, but also resembles
the twisted time structure of the melodrama. In his seminal piece “Tales of
Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama,” Elsaesser had already
located the central characteristic of the melodramatic tradition in American cin-
ema in its “structural changes from linear externalization of action to a sublima-
tion of dramatic value into more complex forms of symbolization.”8 In this re-
spect, melodrama, generational distinctions, and cinephilia are all conceptual
devices allowing the theorization of non-linear temporal structures.
Cinephilia, as Susan Sontag, Paul Willemen, and many others have reminded
us, is always already tinged with nostalgia, possible loss, and retroactive tempor-
alities.9 Of course, for decades, watching films and going to the cinema was
founded on the fleeting nature of its experience, each projection irrevocably
unique, and each image already irretrievably lost upon its appearance, so that
every film screening was a rare and cherished sensation that could not be re-
peated. Therefore, being a cinephile in the early 1960s in London for Elsaesser
meant “being sensitive to one’s surroundings when watching a movie, carefully
picking the place where to sit, fully alert to the quasi-sacral feeling of nervous
anticipation that could descend upon a public space, however squalid, smelly or
slipshod, as the velvet curtain rose and the studio logo with its fanfares filled the
space.”10 It was this attention to the unique circumstances of the screening as
well as the wish to retain the fleeting experience that emerged as one of the hall-
marks of the first generation of cinephiles.11 Other important writers on film
such as Antoine de Baecque became ardent cinephiles in the 1960s, as well as,
of course, the Cahiers du cinéma critics who went on to become directors: Fran-
çois Truffaut, Eric Rohmer, Claude Chabrol and, above all, Jean-Luc Godard and
Jacques Rivette. Thus, the first generation of cinephiles was, more than anything
else, a topographical movement that gravitated on a global level towards Paris,
and on a local level, towards the cinema of choice.
There is a certain overlap with the second generation that came of age in the
politicized 1970s, when many began to criticize cinephilia as a bourgeois exercise,
which kept people trapped in illusory cinematic worlds and away from the real
revolution that was happening out in the streets, which is illustrated rather am-
bivalently by Bernardo Bertolucci’s The Dreamers (2003). Here, the protagonists
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Matthew, Isabelle, and Theo are portrayed as typical first-generation cinephiles,
protesting the closure of the Cinémathèque Française, quizzing one another on
their film knowledge, and reenacting memorable scenes from their favorite films,
but being otherwise oblivious to the socio-political upheavals taking place just be-
yond the walls of their Parisian flat. The incestuous love triangle between an
American exchange student and French twins ostensibly alludes to the tainted
relation between Hollywood and French cinema. Set in 1968, the youngsters, ob-
sessed with cinema, each other, and their sexual awakening are brought back to
reality when a stone, perhaps thrown by a demonstrator in a street protest, breaks
the window and their idyll to their enclosed semi-fictional world.
In the 1970s, many disillusioned cinephiles began to wonder how people could
attach so much value (let alone energy) to films at a time when the cinema was
seen as an overpowering capitalist tool as Jean-Louis Baudry and others were so
eager to point out. The apparatus theory reacted to a perceived crisis in cinema,
which had been historically triggered by the development of new audiovisual
technologies and economically reinforced by changing audience habits and de-
mographics. It reacted with a kind of mournful response: in the face of the im-
minent decline of cinema as a whole, the nostalgic and loving gaze of the cine-
phile turns into a deeply felt, intense, and theoretically grounded hate-love
relationship. The vast majority of film theory in the 1970s, with its paranoid her-
meneutics – an epistemological conspiracy theory of the highest order – testifies
to a deep feeling of loss and betrayal because the object of their love did not
actually deserve their affection. This led to the transfer of the emotion from un-
conditional admiration to deep levels of mistrust. Given this perspective, the psy-
cho-semiotics of the 1970s became a kind of inverted cinephilia, a disappointed
love’s labor’s lost. The world as we perceive and inhabit it (in the cinema) could
no longer be trusted, and there was no easy solution, no position from which to
claim a newly found overview.
Despite the negative energy generated by the then contemporary film theory,
cinephilia persevered through the 1970s and 1980s, even though it now tended
to discard this label. Cinephiles of this generation, such as Australian film critic
Adrian Martin or Viennese film critic and director of the Austrian Film Museum
Alexander Horwath, found their cherished things and objets trouvés on late-night
television instead, and began circulating copies of rare videos in the early 1980s.
Strange rituals and eccentric characters abounded in this phase. There were ru-
mors about a cinephile who had to rent an extra flat just to store all of his video-
tapes – storage space became a real issue for the second-generation cinephiles
unlike the first generation (who depended on memories, and for whom cinephi-
lia was largely an imaginary collection) and the third generation (files no longer
took up physical space as their collections were now largely digital). Indeed, it is
22 Malte Hagener and Marijke de Valck
the second wave that stands between a supposedly “originary” cinephilia and a
(re)new(ed) cinephilia that emerged in the 1990s and has become a full-blown
movement ever since the millennium. The proponents of the third wave of cine-
philia frequent film festivals, but also watch DVDs, they download rare films
from the Internet, and communicate via blogs. This third generation of cinephi-
lia is only now fully emerging as they discover one another among the various
IMDb discussion boards, dedicated fan sites where the intricacies of the latest
Tarantino, Fincher, and Lynch movies are discussed, or in the blogosphere.12
Many triple jumps can be formed around these three generational moments,
which are never fully independent from one another and exist in a continuum,
blending into one another. In fact, these three stages continue to coexist not un-
like the classic psychoanalytic phases (oral, anal, and oedipal), even though they
seem overcome from the outside. The cinema listings for the first generation was
replaced by the TV guide for the second, which has since been replaced by p2p
file sharing services – which allows one to search a list of titles for a coveted film
one that is finally available. Indeed, to browse the various lists of titles (or draw-
ing up lists of one’s own) might be the cinephile moment par excellence, even
more precious than the encounter with the actual work. Whereas the first genera-
tion of cinephilia was marked by local trajectories and one’s favorite seat in a
specific cinema, the second wave was marked by international trajectories toward
specific festivals (Deauville, Rotterdam, Pesaro) and retrospectives, while con-
temporary cinephilia relies on the dispersed and virtual geography of the link
and the directory. Furthermore, each generation boasts its own preferred direc-
tors: while the first wave was weaned on Howard Hawks, John Ford, and Alfred
Hitchcock, the second was characterized by border-crossers such as Rainer Wer-
ner Fassbinder, Bertrand Tavernier, and Peter Bogdanovich; and the third has
broken down most of the geographical distinctions, so that David Fincher and
Quentin Tarantino are featured right next to Miike Takashi, Tsai Ming-Liang, and
Wong Kar-Wai, or Fatih Akin and Lars von Trier next to Apichatpong Weerasetha-
kul and Julio Medem. The first generation started their own film magazines, the
second now runs many of the major cinémathèques (i.e., Alexander Horwath),
while the third generation tends to run websites, digital film festivals, or mailing
lists.
The “Post-Classic” State of Cinephilia
Let us now turn to the contemporary shape of cinephilia. Perhaps one can effec-
tively adapt the concept of post-classical cinema to the notion of cinephilia, claim-
ing that the seemingly fundamental break distinguishing a classical from a post-
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classical cinephilia is perhaps less than clear, as both also share a lot of common
ground (as do classical and post-classical Hollywood films). Indeed, Elsaesser, as
a theorist of post-classical cinema, has argued for a less mutually exclusive and
binary division between the classical and the post-classical:
[T]he difference between classical and post-classical cannot be established on the ba-
sis of a binary opposition such as spectacle vs. narrative, nor, we suspect, any other
“either/or” construction of difference. One suggestion was that we may have to look
for a definition of the post-classical more along the lines of an excessive classicism,
rather than as a rejection or absence of classicism… [T]he post-classical … [is] a dis-
tinct mode: not only of representation and style, but also of production and recep-
tion.13
At this point we would like to propose a reframing of cinephilia, by defining post-
classical cinephilia as “classical-plus,” as it still adheres to the typical values of
cinephilia with lists of favorite films and auteurs, cherished styles and preferred
periods, while, at the same time, it has become something more and something
very different in how it uses contemporary technology and recent shifts in media
utilization. Like post-classical cinema, post-classical cinephilia is invested with a
series of transformations that diversify its manifestations. Post-classical narration
moves away from an overwhelming cause-and-effect logic, undermines the linear
trajectory, and complicates character development, to enjoy a large degree of free-
dom in presenting and relating various motives, and to revel in temporal and
psychological disorders, whereas post-classical cinephilia also appears to feel
freer in its selection of punctums. The classical preoccupation with locating the
evidence of authorial signatures in the mise-en-scène has been expanded in the
age of post-classical cinephilia; nowadays a scriptwriter like Charlie Kaufman, a
cinematographer like Christopher Doyle, a composer like John Williams, and a
genre chameleon like director Michael Winterbottom are all the objects of con-
temporary cinephile affection as much as any one director with a highly idiosyn-
cratic and recognizable style.
Post-classical cinephilia, in its relation to space and time, resembles the trans-
formations toward the multifaceted practices of post-classical cinema, such as
intensified continuity, fast cutting, and non-linear trajectories. Contemporary ci-
nephilia is no longer limited to cinémathèques and small art-house theaters where
regulars take their preferred seats. Alongside the spatial (local) specificity of the
movie-going tradition, new practices emerged that are spatially decentered and
that rely on various forms of technological mediation. Contemporary cinephiles
watch films not only on the silver screen, but also at home, which used to mean
on videotape, but, since the late 1990s, also on DVD and, into the millennium,
increasingly via the Internet (as well as on collector formats such as Blu-Ray and
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HD-DVD). The public space of the cinema was supplemented by the private
space of the home, the fixed schedule of theatrical programming was supplemen-
ted by the time-shifting devices of the remote control, the VCR, the rental ser-
vices, and downloading. While classical cinephilia demanded that one complied
with the schedules created by others, post-classical cinephilia allows much more
freedom to engage in cinephile activities at one’s own pace and leisure. Like post-
classical cinema, post-classical cinephilia is more of a hybrid, more diverse, and
maybe more self-reflective and self-referential than its classical counterpart.
Arguably, one of the most “classical” of contemporary cinephile practices is the
festival visit. This becomes particularly clear when we scrutinize the spatial and
temporal characteristics of film viewing at a festival. Unlike the new technologi-
cally enabled practices, film festivals revolve around classic theatrical immersion.
Festival visitors have to travel to specific sites if they want to see the films. More-
over, they have to adjust to the festival’s schedule and go through some (at times
great) trouble to see the movie(s) of their choice. The exclusivity of the festival
film screening and the effort required to be at a specific place at a specific time
in order to see the screening of one’s choice is reminiscent of classical cinephilia.
However, here too it is a kind of “classical cinephilia plus”: similar at the core, but
different in its manifestations. Cinephiles who frequent film festivals could go
both to the smaller, peripheral festivals and the larger, more popular festivals.
They are attracted by the films, but are also lured by the whole festival atmo-
sphere. In fact, festivals often use their specific location as an attraction because
they have to compete with each other in terms of the global space economy, as
Julian Stringer has convincingly shown.14
This means that even if the exhibition format of festivals appears to be similar
to the theatrical immersion model of classical cinephilia, it points simultaneously
to the influential dynamics of spatial competition, city marketing, festival brand-
ing, and urban programming that have also become part of the cinephile experi-
ence. The theatrical immersion that takes place at film festivals is much more
spectacular than its classical prototype. Black boxes are replaced by open-air
screenings in town squares, on beaches, and in forests, while the local settings
of the festival are also taken into consideration; exotic locations such as ski re-
sorts (Sundance), war zones (Sarajevo), and remote locations (Midnight Sun)
benefit from additional (spatial) appeal. However, not unlike Elsaesser’s argu-
ment regarding the classical/post-classical cinema divide, the relation between
traditional theatrical immersion and festival screenings should not be seen in
oppositional terms – a mutually exclusive disjuncture between an exhibition si-
tuation in which the attention is exclusively focused on the films vs. one in which
the context itself is foregrounded – but rather as a specific historical cultural
practice and its aggregation. Post-classical cinephilia wants to have its cake and
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eat it too – see the film and see it in the context of spectacular surroundings,
experience the text as well as its context.
Another typical manifestation of contemporary cinephilia is the video installa-
tion that uses fragments culled from cinephile objects of worship. Regardless of
whether we are talking about Douglas Gordon’s 24Hour Psycho (1993), Matthias
Müller’s Home Stories (1990), Johan Grimonprez’s Looking for Alfred
(2005), or Harun Farocki’s Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik / Workers Leaving
the Factory (1995), these works all engage the material of classical cinephilia,
which is still charged with libidinous desire and for that reason recognizable and
attractive, yet liberated from their immediate context, thus also available (both as
material and as cultural signifier) andmarketable.15 It is as if it is only now that we
are finally able to make these forays into the shambles of our everyday existence,
which Walter Benjamin anticipated in the 1930s for cinema in his Artwork essay.
However, we have also come to realize today that the shambles of our everyday
existence involves nothing more than fragments of the audiovisual universe of
the twentieth century, to which there appears to be no outside. Even a seemingly
banal and quotidian activity as leaving a factory is already presented to us in a
mediated format, as another film. Although the cinematic installation is typical
of post-classical cinephilia, it still manages to take us on a guided tour across the
immanent plane of our media universe, demonstrating how much of our identity
and past has indeed been shaped by film, television, and media in general.
From this fact we could conclude that any theoretical division between classical
and post-classical cinephilia should also be understood as an indication of the
weight that historical developments exert, under the influence of which, cinephi-
lia is turned into several historically defined practices. As our opening anecdote
demonstrated, some will belong to only one generation, while others – like El-
saesser – will belong to many. The former will be quick to judge any change as
degeneration, while the latter is capable of embracing change. For example, the
latter are able to see technological innovation and new modes of production and
reception as opportunities for rejuvenating one’s personal cinephile experience.
It is precisely because disagreement on what qualifies as cinephilia will continue
to rage that cinephilia remains a contested concept, heavily debated in academic
discourse, discussed in public debate, and a favored topic for flaming someone
online or denouncing face-to-face.
Cinephilia as an Approach
The question that remains to be answered despite this archaeological sketch of
cinephilia as both practice and discourse is how to approach the study of cinephi-
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lia. Is it enough to focus on its historical practices, to present taxonomies of gen-
erations and types of cinephiles? Is it sufficient to merely uncover the discursive
maneuvers and (dis)agreements? Or, should we also be endeavoring to get to the
heart of the cinephile emotion? As the very word “cinephile”makes unmistakably
clear, love is at the heart of cinephilia. But can one ever really theorize love? As
Jenna Ng argues: “[Cinephilia] is ultimately a phenomenon that is deeply subjec-
tive and personal. It cannot be fully contained in objective theory, and that is its
glory.”16 But one aspect has become clear; that there is a thin line between cine-
philia as a concept and cinephilia as an individual emotional experience. We be-
lieve that one reason why cinephilia has proven to be such an enduring concept –
it has survived several decades and periodically manages to reinvent itself – may
have to do with the fact that it forms a bridge between the biographical and the
theoretical. Many film scholars must consider their own enthusiasm for certain
films, directors, or genres as being terribly estranged from the proper way of
thinking, talking, and writing about cinema. Ever since the Cahiers du cinéma
critics began elevating cinema to that of an accepted art form, one has been able
to justify one’s own emotional attachment to cinema by pointing to established
figures whose example one follows. So cinephilia allows one to follow one’s libi-
dinal instincts while simultaneously being taken seriously. The concept of cine-
philia occupies this middle ground, which allows for the transformation of a per-
sonal obsession into a theoretical preoccupation. We are left to wonder whether
this might also be the reason for the importance of anecdotes which inhabit the
middle ground between the personal (specific) and the abstract (general), which
are often held together by a joke or some kind of slippery slope of meaning.
If we consider this work of transference where anecdotes are able to operate on
a more abstract level, then cinephilia is indeed characterized by a constant dou-
ble-movement between the biographical and the theoretical, the singular and the
general, the fragment and the whole, the incomplete and the complete, the indi-
vidual and the collective. At this point we can return to the question of a metho-
dology for studying contemporary cinephilia by asserting that any approach
should engage these double-movements while accepting the concept of cinephi-
lia as a centripetal force. In this way we may be able to scrutinize concrete histori-
cal forms and periods of cinephilia as practices while also understanding the
mystical, illogical, and intangible aspects of cinephila as love.
Elsaesser’s thinking on the concept of cinephilia includes a particularly useful
view of how the biographical and theoretical (and historical for that matter) can
be combined. We have already established that the understanding of cinephilia
involves memory, imagination, and the anxiety of possible loss. Like Paul Wille-
men and Susan Sontag, Elsaesser has hinted at the overtones of necrophilia in
cinephilia, connecting one’s lived presence with his or her past experiences. Be-
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cause cinema is comprised of moving images that exist only in the fleeting mo-
ment during projection, it is undead by nature. However, it affects the spectator
in the present and ultimately comes alive in one’s memory. There is an obvious
similarity to Deleuze’s time-image here, because he envisioned a crystal image as
the partitioning of time into memory and past. However, Elsaesser understands
that the temporal registers that define the moment of cinephilia also have a sig-
nificant psychoanalytic dimension, a quintessential strategy that links personal
obsessions and theoretical reflection.
Elsaesser not only distinguishes between generations of cinephiles, but also
identifies three distinct psychoanalytic temporalities that can be at work in cine-
philia at any given moment: 1) the oedipal time of François Truffaut, for example,
which adopts André Bazin and Alfred Hitchcock in order to attack “le cinéma de
papa,” 2) the lover’s discourse time as conjugated by Roland Barthes, and 3) the
strictly mediated time. Elsaesser’s “method” for explaining the ambivalent feel-
ings that troubled cinephilia in the mid-1970s can be characterized as a close
reading of the confusing presence of these three temporalities (simultaneously):
By 1975, cinephilia had been dragged out of its closet, the darkened womb-like audi-
torium, and revealed itself as a source of disappointment: the magic of the movies, in
the cold light of day, had become a manipulation of regressive fantasies and the place
of the big male escape from sexual difference… It is not altogether irrelevant to this
moment in history that Laura Mulvey’s call to forego visual pleasure and dedicate
oneself to unpleasure was not heeded.17
Occupying the middle ground between the biographical and the theoretical, El-
saesser identifies these “disenchantments” – the doubt, ambivalence, and disap-
pointments that tainted the love for cinema – as significant drives for cinephilia.
Cinephilia has always had a darker side. The gap between what is expected and
what will be experienced, the anxiety of being disappointed, seems to be an es-
sential precondition for a cinephile experience. Film lovers have always feared
that the latest movie by a favorite auteur will not live up to their expectations. In
other words, they tend to prioritize memory and imagination, and define their
affectionate “loving” relation with the cinematic subject primarily in the past
tense. As Elsaesser has argued, the major advantage of this temporal deferral is
that it allows the cinephile to maintain a sense of self in the face of the over-
whelming power of the cinematic experience. Instead of simply losing control
and letting oneself be carried away by scopophilic thrills or perverted fantasies,
the mechanism of disenchantment ensures that the cinephile performs an intel-
lectual – or at least individual – act to maintain this bond. If one pursues this line
of thinking, one could of course also claim the opposite: that cinephilia is not
about love at all, at least not in the sense of a mutual bond of affection, but more
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like a form of (narcissistic) identity formation that responds to the (subconscious)
needs of individuals who happened to have chosen the cinema as their means of
distinction. But let us not forget the level of penetration of cinema into our every-
day lives, homes, and minds. We live in a cinematic age and are thoroughly ac-
customed to the cinematic mode of perception. Cinephilia, one could argue, be-
fits our time, as it presents a totality while being smooth and malleable enough to
change with the whims and desires of new generations of film lovers.
Coda
Some have questioned whether the idea of loving a medium more or less uncon-
ditionally is still fathomable in a time when cinema, although still important cul-
turally, is less so as an agenda-setting medium – functioning more like a bill-
board in time, which provides advertising space for the latest “content” to be
marketed as a DVD, a TV series, a computer game, and/or a toy.18 Or, as Homer
Simpson put it so succinctly (as always) in the recent The Simpsons Movie (Da-
vid Silverman, 2007): “Why be so stupid and pay for something at the cinema if
you can have it for free on television?” Our argument has been that the “movie
mutations,” as Rosenbaum and Martin have aptly dubbed the transformations
that are occurring worldwide in cinephilia today, should not be seen as degenera-
tions of an authentic classical cinephile practice, but instead as a “natural” evolu-
tion of a cultural practice that is firmly intertwined with historical conditions.19
Thus, instead of one, there is room for many cinephile generations. In this situa-
tion, it is not simply the medium, but also our intimate connection to the meta-
universe of moving images that matters.
Therefore, another response would be that cinephilia – and by extension the
cinema as a whole – is capable of offering the spectator an experience that has
become the norm for contemporary media culture. Thus, even if we are watching
a film at home on a large flat screen with a multi-speaker system or on the move
on a laptop with headphones, the cinema experience remains as a norm and
yardstick, but it is also internalized and fantasized. As we noted earlier, there is
no outside to the audiovisual universe, we all inhabit a world that is saturated by
the media, its images and stories, its celebrities and formats. However, it is only
at the cinema where we can fully comprehend and absorb this fact of life that has
been theoretically elaborated, but not yet completely understood. In fact, the re-
cent popularity of Deleuze’s books on cinema may hint exactly at this juncture
since his central premise is that the cinema is immanence.
Deleuze has sometimes been criticized for following the orthodox Parisian ci-
nephilia style, especially in what he chooses to write about in his books on cin-
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ema. Perhaps, instead of accusing Deleuze of being an old-fashioned cinephile,
who has merely taken his cue from the Cahiers du cinéma critics and pimped it
with pseudo-philosophical jargon, as his detractors would have it, one should see
him more as a contemporary cinephile whose work on cinema is, at least in some
respects, a blog avant la lettre. His cinema works open up a dialogue with the
canon of the first wave of cinephilia, but from a position where he was one of the
first cinephiles to realize that there is no outside to cinema, no transcendental
perspective, that there is only immanence. Instead of sticking to a dogmatic exeg-
esis of holy scripture like the more traditional Deleuzians would, one should view
his books on cinema as screening notes and blogger’s comments. One can com-
pare Deleuze’s books on cinema to a blog and the community of Deleuzian scho-
lars to the blogosphere on at least three levels. Firstly, his texts create an almost
endless surface to surf on, a textual plane that might leave some marks, para-
graphs and elisions, but is not structured strongly along any hierarchical lines. A
typical blog does not have page breaks and dipping here and there, while De-
leuze’s work creates a similar feeling of a seemingly endless stream of thoughts
and observations. Secondly, and related to this, Deleuze’s lateral thinking is akin
to the web logic of linking and thereby creating your own context at any given
moment. Of course, his idea of the rhizome has been applied to Internet logic
that favors non-hierarchical and non-linear connections over strong top-down or-
ganization. Thirdly, and taking its cue from here, the community of Deleuzian
scholars show some similarity to the blogosphere in the way that cross-referen-
cing prevails, thus creating a complex layer of overlapping texts. In these ways,
Deleuze, like Elsaesser, and possibly inadvertently, has always already been a post-
classical cinephile.
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Theorizing Melodrama
A Rational Reconstruction of “Tales of Sound and Fury”
Warren Buckland
On one of my many visits to Thomas Elsaesser’s home in the center of Amster-
dam, I took down from his library shelves the complete run of the two journals
he edited between 1968 and 1975 – the Brighton Film Review and Monogram. As I
leafed through the journals I witnessed, issue by issue, the progressive develop-
ment of an increasingly sophisticated critical discourse on the cinema, as well as
the emergence of the journal editor’s influence and reputation. Volume 1 no. 1 of
the Brighton Film Review (4 December 1968) is modestly subtitled “A Fortnightly
Guide to the Cinema in Brighton.” The film reviews are modest in scope, consist-
ing primarily of auteurist readings of a director’s dominant themes and styles.
The first issue includes Elsaesser’s review of Anthony Mann’s Bend of the Riv-
er, Otto Kruger’s review of Polanski’s Knife in the Water, and Elsaesser’s re-
view of Michael Powell’s Tales of Hoffman – a review which, we are informed
at the end, was (bizarrely) published in a shortened version in Wine Press.
Of course, as any cinephile knows, Otto Kruger is the name of a character actor
who played the stereotypical German in many Hollywood films of the 1940s and
1950s (including Sirk’sMagnificent Obsession). Kruger did not change careers
and become a film critic. Instead, what happened is that the editor, working sin-
gle-handedly to try to fill the pages of the first issue of the Brighton Film Review by
writing most of the reviews himself, occasionally used some pseudonyms. I ima-
gine that the editor also typed up the first issue by himself on – judging from the
quality of the typing – an old, portable Underwood or Royal typewriter.
By the time the Brighton Film Review became Monogram in April 1971, the typ-
ing had given way to typesetting, and the agenda had broadened beyond the
scope of auteurism and film reviewing. This shift is apparent in “Tales of Sound
and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama,” (or “Tales” for short) which
Elsaesser published as the lead essay in Monogram no. 4 in 1972.1 Moreover, this
essay not only took Monogram to a new level of analysis and sophistication, it
influenced a whole generation of film scholars, demonstrating the explanatory
power of historically informed criticism and Freudian psychoanalysis in the ser-
ious examination of one of the most neglected genres (at that time) in film stu-
dies – the Hollywood family melodrama. Just as Robin Wood cited Shakespear-
ean themes in his analysis of Hitchcock’s thrillers as a way of conferring legiti-
macy on what was perceived in the 1960s to be light entertainment films,2 so
Elsaesser cites eighteenth-century forms of European melodrama and Freudian
psychoanalysis (and uses a Shakespearean title) to legitimize his study of what
appeared to be one of the most frivolous and superficial genres of classical Holly-
wood cinema.
In this short paper, I aim to rationally reconstruct “Tales of Sound and Fury” to
both determine what it is stating and how it states it. In terms of my reasoning
strategies, I shall use Rudolf Botha’s philosophical study into the conduct of in-
quiry to analyze the way Elsaesser formulates conceptual and empirical problems
and how he solves them.3 I focus on problem formation because I have been
convinced by Botha’s (and Larry Laudan’s4) argument that the rationality of an
argument is based on its problem-solving effectiveness. Arguments are impor-
tant, therefore, to the extent that they provide solutions to conceptual and empiri-
cal problems. Botha focuses on problem formation in linguistic inquiry, although
his analysis is, of course, applicable to other fields of research as well. I have
already used Botha’s work to analyze the formation of problems in film theory –
most notably in my chapter “Film Semiotics” in Toby Miller and Robert Stam’s
edited volume A Companion to Film Theory, in my review of Francesco Casetti’s
Inside the Gaze, and also in my rational reconstruction of Tom Gunning’s “Cin-
ema of Attractions” paper.5
Botha lists four activities that are involved in formulating theoretical problems:
(a) analyzing the problematic state of affairs; (b) describing the problematic state
of affairs; (c) constructing problems; and (d) evaluating problems with regard to
being well-formed and significance.6 This list is based on the distinction between
a “problematic state of affairs” and “problems.” Whereas the former refers to an
aspect of reality a theorist does not understand, a problem formulates what a
theorist needs to do to resolve the problematic state of affairs. This includes un-
derstanding and gaining insight into the general nature or specific properties of
an object that has not been previously examined (or not examined adequately).
In carrying out (a), an analysis, the researcher must know exactly what is pro-
blematic, isolate each component of the problematic state of affairs, determine
how they are interrelated, and identify the background assumptions informing
his or her inquiry, such as the nature conferred upon the object of analysis.
In carrying out (b), a description, the problematic state of affairs must be accu-
rately recorded and formally described. For Botha, this involves three processes:
(i) collecting data; (ii) systematizing data; (iii) symbolizing the results.7 In collect-
ing data, the researcher must determine whether it is the data or the researcher’s
theory that generates the problematic state of affairs. Systematizing data involves
the activities of classifying, correlating, and ordering. These activities enable the
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researcher to identify common properties among data, put similar data into
classes, and determine the relations between the classes. Finally, symbolizing in-
volves representing data in a concise and accurate manner. By carrying out these
procedures, the theorist ensures that his or her description is genuine, correct,
and comprehensive.
In carrying out (c), the constructing of problems, the researcher employs sev-
eral different concepts (since a problem is made up of concepts) to solve the
problematic state of affairs. Botha identifies four types of concepts involved in
the construction of problems (here I have modified his list to fit film studies):
phenomenological concepts, which concern factual data and are intuitively
known; filmic concepts (which Botha calls grammatical concepts), general back-
ground assumptions concerning the nature of individual films; cinematic con-
cepts (which Botha calls general linguistic concepts), which concern background
assumptions about the nature of film; and meta-theoretical concepts (which
Botha calls meta-scientific concepts), which concern the aims and nature of theo-
retical inquiry.8
In carrying out (d), the evaluation of problems, Botha recognizes that only
problems satisfying the criteria of being well-formed and significance are rele-
vant problems worth pursuing. A well-formed problem is one that is solvable –
in other words, is based on correct assumptions and is clearly formulated. A sig-
nificant problem is one that expands our existing knowledge of film. A problem
may, therefore, be well-formed, but may not be significant.
Authors do not necessarily formulate and write out their research in the man-
ner made explicit by Botha’s systematic and logical steps; these steps are the pri-
vilege of the philosopher. This adds indeterminacy to the analysis of any text in
terms of Botha’s categories. Furthermore, the stage of research I concentrate on
here, the formation of problems, is only one stage – albeit one of the most impor-
tant – in the development of research. Other stages include: giving descriptions
of the object of study, giving explanations, making projections, justifying hypo-
theses, and so on.
A Rational Reconstruction
a. Analyzing the Problematic State of Affairs
The essay has a literary title that alludes to the following lines from Macbeth:
… it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury
Signifying nothing.
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The subtitle (“Observations on the Family Melodrama”) is less literary and more
informative, identifying the main object of investigation – the family melodrama
– and hints at Elsaesser’s method of investigation – namely, “observation.” I shall
take Elsaesser’s identification of his own research as inductive observation ser-
iously, and examine the status of his inductive arguments.
After the Shakespearean title, the opening paragraph shifts registers and
quotes from a Douglas Sirk interview, in which the director is asked about the
color scheme in his filmWritten on the Wind. Sirk replied:
“Almost throughout the picture I used deep-focus lenses which have the effect of
giving a harshness to the objects and a kind of enameled, hard surface to the colors.
I wanted this to bring out the inner violence, the energy of the characters which is all
inside them and can’t break through.” (43)
For Elsaesser, this quotation encapsulates “how closely, in this film, style and
technique [are] related to theme” (43). The Sirk quotation and Elsaesser’s com-
ment on it reveal one set of theoretical background assumptions behind “Tales”:
a traditional auteur analysis focused – as all auteur analyses do – on a particular
director’s distinctive visual style and thematic concerns. At first the essay seems
to address a very common problem in film criticism – the relationship between
style and theme (in Sirk’s films). Yet the subtitle phrase “Family Melodrama”
suggests that the essay will offer a more in-depth investigation into the themes
of a film genre, of which Sirk’s films are a mere subclass. The phrase “Family
Melodrama” in fact hints at a different set of theoretical background assumptions
behind the essay – it echoes Freud’s term “family romance,” thereby suggesting a
Freudian reading of the genre’s themes.
In the second paragraph, Elsaesser identifies the problematic state of affairs he
addresses and the objectives he aims to pursue:
My notes want to pursue an elusive subject in two directions: to indicate the develop-
ment of what one might call the melodramatic imagination across different artistic
forms and in different epochs; secondly, Sirk’s remark tempts one to look for some
structural and stylistic constants in one medium during one particular period (the
Hollywood family melodrama between roughly 1940 and 1963) and to speculate on
the cultural and psychological context which this form of melodrama so manifestly
reflected and helped to articulate. (43)
The problematic state of affairs the essay addresses is generated by a property of
the data (the color scheme of Written on the Wind), but is not limited to that
data. In other words, the essay promises more than a traditional auteur analysis
of one of Sirk’s films. In the Brighton Film Review and Monogram, Elsaesser wrote
traditional auteur analyses of directors such as Vincente Minnelli and Nicholas
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Ray. But from “Tales” onwards, his theory, methods, and problems became more
general. In “Tales,” Elsaesser calls his more general problem “an elusive subject,”
to be pursued in two directions: a general investigation that transcends a single
medium, epoch, and country; and a focused, delimited investigation into one
type of film in one country during a specific period of time (the Hollywood family
melodrama between 1940 and 1963).
The essay’s problematic state of affairs to be analyzed is the “melodramatic
imagination” perceived from both a general and specific perspective. Elsaesser
describes it as elusive, no doubt due to its abstract, conceptual status, and be-
cause it has never been studied in any depth before in film studies. What more
can be said about the relation between style and theme, or how the characters’
interior states of mind are expressed in film style? Elsaesser’s primary innovation
is to graft the concept of the melodramatic imagination onto this traditional issue
in film studies. Rather than abandon the study of style and theme in film, Elsaes-
ser digs deeper: he begins by drawing parallels between the film melodrama and
the history of the European novel and drama, in which individual heroes interna-
lize class conflicts and turn them into personal struggles. He also speculates on
the influence of Freudian psychoanalysis on the Hollywood film melodrama,
although he draws back from proclaiming any direct influence (59).
As we shall see in the next section, Elsaesser’s primary source of data derives
from canonical literary and dramatic texts from Europe, and half a dozen melo-
dramas from Hollywood. There is a clear bifurcation of the essay’s direction (sig-
nified in the title’s Shakespearean overtones and the first paragraph’s quotation
of Sirk): historical European high culture vs. contemporary American mass cul-
ture. Justifying their juxtaposition is going to be a fundamental rhetorical strategy
of “Tales.”
b. Describing the Problematic State of Affairs
Elsaesser’s general concern is to investigate the genealogy of the “melodramatic
imagination” in the novel (especially the eighteenth century sentimental novel),
various forms of drama (especially the romantic drama), the ballad, street songs,
and the opera in England, France, Germany, and Italy between the late medieval
period and the early twentieth century (44-45). Elsaesser argues that the message
to be found, in particular, in the eighteenth-century sentimental novel and the
romantic drama is that “they record the struggle of a morally and emotionally
emancipated bourgeois consciousness against the remnants of feudalism” (45).
Moreover, this struggle is represented, not through a general class conflict, but
through individual heroes who interiorize the conflict and turn it into a personal
struggle. This creates a radical ambiguity in the melodrama between its function-
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ing either as subversive social and political commentary, or as mere escapism
(47). But however it functioned, melodrama “served as the literary equivalent of
a particular, historically and socially conditioned mode of experience” (49).
Elsaesser’s specific concern is to identify “some structural and stylistic con-
stants in one medium during one particular period (the Hollywood family melo-
drama between roughly 1940 and 1963)” (43). These constants serve as the orga-
nizing principles behind the data, the underlying traits that confer unity on a
series of films within a delimited space and time. This is a question of genre,
indicating that Elsaesser is transcending the boundaries of auteur criticism by
combining it with its complement, genre criticism. Whereas auteurism privi-
leges what is specific, unique, unusual, inventive, exceptional and challenging in
a film or small group of films, genre criticism privileges what is general, stan-
dard, ordinary, typical, familiar, conventional, average and accepted in a film or
group of films.
One central dimension of film genre criticism deals specifically with the col-
lecting of data to be classified, correlated, ordered, and measured, and then sys-
tematized into a genre or universe of genres, without distorting the data. Elsaes-
ser classifies, correlates, and orders what he considers to be the dominant
structural and stylistic constants of family melodramas made between 1940 and
1963:
– The characters’ central dramatic conflicts – or inexpressible internal contra-
dictions – are not externalized as action (as in the Western and film noir), but
remain internalized, unreconciled, and sublimated “into décor, color, gesture
and composition of frame, which in the best melodramas is perfectly thema-
tized in terms of the characters’ emotional and psychological predicaments”
(52).
– This perpetual internalization of inexpressible contradictions leads to “a con-
scious use of style as meaning” (54).
– The perpetual internalization of inexpressible contradictions also leads to ma-
sochistic tendencies of self-pity and self-hatred in the characters, usually in
the form of alcoholism (65).
– The family melodrama “records the failure of the protagonist to act in a way
that could shape the events and influence the emotional environment …: they
emerge as lesser human beings for having become wise and acquiescent to
the ways of the world” (55).
– The melodramas of Ray, Sirk, and Minnelli deal with “an intensified symbo-
lism of everyday actions, the heightening of the ordinary gesture and a use of
setting and décor so as to reflect the characters’ fetishist fixations” (56).
– The plots of melodramas have a distinct rhythm: “A typical situation in Amer-
ican melodramas has the plot build up to an evidently catastrophic collision of
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counter-running sentiments, but a string of delays gets the greatest possible
effect from the clash when it does come” (60).
– The plot can either be “objective” (with no central hero, but an ensemble of
characters) or “subjective” (it emanates from a single consciousness) (63).
– Family melodramas “concentrate on the point of view of the victim” (64).
– “In Minnelli, Sirk, Ray, Cukor and others, alienation is recognized as a basic
condition, fate is secularized into the prison of social conformity and psycho-
logical neurosis, and the linear trajectory of self-fulfillment so potent in Amer-
ican ideology is twisted into the downward spiral of a self-destructive urge
seemingly possessing a whole social class” (64-65).
– Family melodramas have exaggerated, compressed narratives (see below, un-
der “phenomenological concepts”).
– Family melodramas manifest irony or pathos: “Irony privileges the spectator
vis-à-vis the protagonists” (in other words, irony is created by means of omnis-
cient narration); “Pathos results from non-communication or silence made
eloquent … where highly emotional situations are underplayed to present an
ironic discontinuity of feeling or a qualitative difference in intensity, usually
visualized in terms of spatial distance and separation” (66).
Elsaesser concludes that characters in Hollywood family melodramas experience
the impossible contradictions of the American dream, with the result that these
films “record some of the agonies that have accompanied the demise of the ‘affir-
mative culture’” (68).
Elsaesser examines the Hollywood family melodrama both synchronically and
diachronically. Synchronically, he constructs a system of structural and stylistic
constants that define the genre of the Hollywood family melodrama (although it
is unclear whether Elsaesser thinks all of these properties are necessary to define
this genre) from the inductive observation of half a dozen films. Diachronically,
he constructs a historical argument suggesting that many of these structural and
stylistic constants can be traced back to eighteenth-century European melodrama.
This historical dimension of his argument offers a plausible explanation for the
occurrence of these constants, the historical conditions of their possibility. Elsaes-
ser establishes a causal link between eighteenth-century European melodrama
and the Hollywood melodrama, implying that both manifest the melodramatic
imagination. He also identifies the agents who establish this causality – script-
writers and directors: “any discussion of the melodrama as a specific cinematic
mode of expression has to start from its antecedents – the novel and certain types
of ‘entertainment’ drama – from which script-writers and directors have bor-
rowed their models” (43). In addition, he argues that the predominance of Freu-
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dian psychoanalysis in post-World War II American culture also influenced the
form and themes of the Hollywood family melodrama (58-60; discussed below).
c. Constructing Problems
In constructing problems, which involves solving the problematic state of affairs,
Elsaesser briefly comments on the phenomenological dimension of film, and
uses a number of filmic concepts, that is, general background assumptions con-
cerning the nature of individual films (especially melodramas, of course). He
uses very few cinematic concepts (background assumptions about the nature of
film itself), but makes a number of meta-theoretical comments concerning the
aims and nature of theoretical inquiry.
In terms of phenomenological concepts, Elsaesser mentions the “raw” experi-
ence of the melodramatic film: “when in ordinary language we call something
melodramatic, what we often mean is an exaggerated rise-and-fall pattern in hu-
man actions and emotional responses, a from-the-sublime-to-the-ridiculous
movement, a foreshortening of lived time in favor of intensity – all of which
produces a graph of much greater fluctuation, a quicker swing from one extreme
to the other than is considered natural, realistic or in conformity with literary
standards of verisimilitude” (52). Elsaesser aims to go beyond this experience
and explain its occurrence by identifying melodrama’s constants, and by arguing
that film creates a specific melodramatic experience, because of its compression
of long novels into standard feature-length films (especially in the films of Min-
nelli and Sirk).
In terms of filmic concepts, Elsaesser formulates a number of propositions
concerning the nature of silent and sound films (50-52) before examining the
nature of the Hollywood family melodrama (listed under (b) above).
In terms of meta-theoretical concepts, we have already discovered under (a)
“Analyzing the problematic state of affairs,” that Elsaesser pursues his problem –
the “elusive subject” of the melodramatic imagination – in two directions: a gen-
eral investigation and a focused, delimited investigation. He immediately adds a
few other meta-theoretical comments: his study is not historical in any strict
sense of the term, nor is it exhaustive in its breadth due to the unavailability of
the films (back in the pre-video and pre-DVD days of film studies). He therefore
delimits his research, by indicating that he will develop a general theoretical ar-
gument on the basis of the close viewing of half a dozen films, but especially
Written on the Wind. His own understanding of these delimitations is two-
fold: “it is difficult to see how references to twenty more movies would make the
argument any truer. For better or worse, what I want to say should at this stage be
taken to be provocative rather than proven” (43). He implies that his argument is
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driven by the data, and that the data at this stage are sufficient for supporting the
truth conditions of his theoretical propositions. But, at the same time, he ac-
knowledges that his theoretical hypotheses (like all hypotheses) are defeasible in
nature and alterable upon the discovery of additional data (the viewing of addi-
tional films).
The inductive nature of Elsaesser’s argument is most clearly expressed in the
tentative way he states his hypotheses and conclusions – which, in all inductive
arguments, are not logically entailed in the propositions of the argument, but are
always open to revision. Elsaesser’s tentative stance is expressed in his use of
hedges (adverbs and auxiliary verbs that modify the knowledge claims stated in
the propositions of the argument). On one single page we find the following
hedges (in italics):
Even if the formmight act to reinforce attitudes of submission, the actual working-out
of the scenes could nonetheless present fundamental social evils.
All of this is to say that there seems a radical ambiguity attached to the melodrama.
[M]elodrama would appear to function either subversively or as escapism.
The persistence of melodrama might indicate … (47).
In sum, the propositions and conclusions of an inductive argument are not
meant to be universally true. Instead, they are probable and acceptable according
to whether they explain the evidence, and whether they constitute solutions to the
problems.
Although based on inductive observation and historical analysis, the essay is
also informed by Freudian psychoanalysis. “Tales” is important because of its in-
novative use, in 1972 (three years before Laura Mulvey’s seminal “Visual Pleasure
and Narrative Cinema”), of Freudian psychoanalysis to analyze the textual struc-
ture and underlying themes of a film genre. But Freud is used in the essay not
only as a source to analyze textual structure and deep thematic meanings. He is
also cited as a possible cause (along with eighteenth-century European melodra-
ma) of the formation of the Hollywood family melodrama: “More challenging,
and difficult to prove, is the speculation that certain stylistic and structural fea-
tures of the sophisticated melodrama may involve principles of symbolization
and coding which Freud conceptualized in his analysis of dreams…” (59). These
principles of symbolization include Oedipal narrative conflicts plus the figures of
condensation and displacement. Elsaesser uses Freud in an attempt to explain
why and how inexpressible internal contradictions become sublimated into set-
ting and décor:
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Melodramas often use middle-class American society, its iconography and the family
experience … as their manifest “material,” but “displace” it into quite different pat-
terns, juxtaposing stereotyped situations in strange configurations, provoking clashes
and ruptures which not only open up new associations but also redistribute the emo-
tional energies which suspense and tensions have accumulated in disturbingly differ-
ent directions. (59-60)
d. Evaluating Problems with Regard to Being Well-formed and
Significance
“Tales” demonstrates that Hollywood family melodramas certainly do not signify
nothing, nor do they consist of tales told by an idiot. Elsaesser successfully estab-
lished melodrama as a significant object of study in film studies, via a dual his-
torical and theoretical analysis. It is via the lenses of history and theory that El-
saesser formulated a well-formed problem: How and why the melodramatic
imagination occurs in the structure and style of a specific Hollywood genre, and
how and why its mise en scène manifests a character’s inexpressible internal con-
tradictions. Elsaesser also helped legitimize Freudian psychoanalysis as a theory
and method of analysis, mainly by demonstrating that it can account for the unu-
sual textual structure of the Hollywood family melodrama, and generate knowl-
edge on a deeper level than thematic criticism and thus solve problematic states
of affairs. Besides formulating a well-formed problem, Elsaesser also formulated
a significant problem, one that influenced an entire generation of film scholars,
ensuring that “Tales” would emerge as a classic reference point for all subsequent
studies of film melodrama.
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Of Surfaces and Depths
The Afterlives of “Tales of Sound and Fury”
Sudeep Dasgupta and Wim Staat
Introduction
In the previous chapter, Warren Buckland pointed out that Elsaesser’s “Tales of
Sound and Fury” has become a key text for film scholars who resist the idea that
Hollywood melodramas are superficial and not worthy of any in-depth analysis of
style and meaning. “Tales of Sound and Fury” has become, in Buckland’s words
“a classic reference point.” The present chapter attempts to prove Buckland right
in two ways: in the context of contemporary cultural studies and in Elsaesser’s
own recent work.
In the first part of this chapter, Wim Staat traces two of Elsaesser’s more recent
conceptual contributions to the study of Hollywood cinema to “Tales of Sound
and Fury.” He suggests that Elsaesser’s background in comparative literature, in
“true” comparatist spirit, can be taken as the cue for a reading of “Tales of Sound
and Fury” through a text that in its own right and in its own field has also become
a classical point of reference, Eric Auerbach’s “Odysseus’ Scar.” This comparison,
as exemplified by Pedro Almodóvar’s Hable con ella / Talk to Her (2002),
shows that Elsaesser’s stand on post-classical Hollywood, and his lesser-known
poetics of Hollywood Fehlleistungen (parapraxis), were prepared by “Tales of
Sound and Fury.”
In the second part of this essay, Sudeep Dasgupta presents a contemporary
version of Hollywood melodrama, Todd Haynes’ Far From Heaven (2002), as a
case in point for the relevance of Elsaesser’s article. “Tales of Sound and Fury”
has been instrumental in the reconsideration of style in women’s genres and for
resisting a Europe-versus-Hollywood divide in film studies. This reconsideration
has emphasized the importance of a formal analysis of a text’s aesthetics. The
focus on aesthetics, and in particular the place of formal elements in the produc-
tion of meaning and experience of a text, is significant given that the problematic
turn to audience studies and sociological categories within Media Studies was at
the expense of textual analysis.
1. Parapraxis and Parataxis Signifying Nothing
Throughout his career, that began in the late 1960s with a piece on Vincente
Minnelli to a very recent article on Forrest Gump (Robert Zemeckis, 1994), Tho-
mas Elsaesser has taken mainstream films seriously. With a PhD in Comparative
Literature (1971) it is not surprising that Elsaesser refers less to sociology or eco-
nomics than to traditions of literary criticism and art history. Given the relatively
short history of film studies, it is also not surprising that film scholars are re-
cruited from elsewhere, from fields like comparative literature, for example,
which in part explains the strong foothold that film studies has in the huma-
nities. In Elsaesser’s list of publications, however, there is no indication of a tra-
jectory away from comparative literature towards film studies. From his earliest
publications on, it appears that he has not written anything that is now consid-
ered outside – what has become, partially through Elsaesser’s publications – the
field of film studies. On the other hand, as much as all of his publications have
always belonged to film studies, his comparative literature background has never
been explicitly abandoned. In fact, it continues to reveal itself, and not just para-
digmatically in general attitudes towards the function of academic criticism, but
sometimes also unexpectedly, for example, in his claim that Forrest Gump
should not be considered some average white boy, but rather an African-Ameri-
can, who has remained the unacknowledged protagonist in American history.
Elsaesser grounds his argument for what is accomplished by Gump’s failed re-
cognition, his Fehlleistung (“parapraxis” in English), in the fact that we as viewers
begin to acknowledge what has been left out in American history, in the clues the
film itself gives for Gump’s blackness.1 He points out – and this is where his
comparative literature background comes to the fore – that Forrest Gump is pre-
ceded in American literature by the controversy concerning the voice of Mark
Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, and by William Faulkner’s Absalom Absalom!, books
that have made their readers identify – often without their knowledge – with a
black protagonist.
The first part of Elsaesser’s best-known article, “Tales of Sound and Fury: Ob-
servations on the Family Melodrama” (1972), is yet another token of comparative
literature scholarship. These pages place Hollywood melodrama in European me-
lodramatic traditions reaching back to at least eighteenth-century pre-Revolution-
ary French novels and nineteenth-century French and English fictional accounts
of the modern experiences of industrialization and political upheaval. Moreover,
as the comparative literature plot thickens, the article’s title is yet another invoca-
tion of Faulkner, whose novel The Sound and the Fury (1929), in its turn, referred
to Macbeth’s Tomorrow soliloquy: “Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player /
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage / And then is heard no more. It is a
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tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury / signifying nothing” (Act V, scene
v). It makes one wonder what insight the idiot’s achievement through failed sig-
nification might bring, or has already brought to the field of film studies. For
Elsaesser in 1972, obviously it is not Forrest Gump who is telling these tales, it
probably is the cinema as such. Paradoxically, while cinema appears to be “sig-
nifying nothing,” one can still write about its achievement.
Paratactic and Syntactic Styles in Comparative Literature
Within the field of comparative literature, there is a canonical text that resembles
“Tales of Sound and Fury” in a number of ways. It has also been much antholo-
gized, has also been paradigmatic in a young field, more specifically, in the Eng-
lish-speaking comparative literature departments, also values style above author-
ial intention, and also deals with the contradictions inherent in “lowly” popular
texts filled with over-determined fragments, full of sound and fury, signifying
nothing. This text is “Odysseus’ Scar,” which forms the opening chapter of Erich
Auerbach’s Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, and sheds
an interesting light on Elsaesser’s article, precisely because of how it takes the
tales of real but shadowed and poor players seriously, giving us, in hindsight, an
intriguing clue to what Elsaesser was after.
“Odysseus’ Scar” establishes a dichotomy of styles via the close reading of two
exemplary texts: Odysseus’ homecoming in Homer’s Odyssey and the story of
Abraham in the Old Testament. Homeric narrative style, Auerbach claims, does
not differentiate between foreground and background. Nothing remains hidden,
every element of the story is present in the plot: “Homeric style knows only a
foreground, only a uniformly illuminated, uniformly objective present.”2 There
are neither shadows in the background nor personal perspectives in Homer’s
work, through which recounted episodes from the past give depth to the present.
For example, it is Odysseus’ scar that enables his housekeeper to recognize her
master beneath his disguise. However, as soon as the scar is mentioned in the
text, a long digression follows involving how he received this scar. Auerbach
points out that it would have been easy to present this digression in the form of a
personal recollection by Odysseus, so that the story of the boar that caused the
scar could be easily integrated into the scene of recognition. However, Auerbach
claims, “any such subjectivistic-perspectivistic procedure is entirely foreign to
Homeric style” (7). Homeric episodes are always presented in their own fixed
time and space, there’s no need for any interpretive activity that would put the
different episodes into an integrated perspective.
The story of Abraham, on the other hand, does require some interpretative
activity: “the decisive points of the narrative alone are emphasized … time and
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place are undefined and call for interpretation” (11). The Bible is “fraught with
background” (12), and it is up to us to relate the experiences of our own lives to
what remains unexpressed in the text. Whereas Homer seeks “merely to make us
forget our own reality for a few hours” (15), the Bible asks us to relate to the sug-
gestion of the “heavy silence” (11) that arises between the father and the son, after
the father has been ordered to take his son’s life. In later chapters, Auerbach
characterizes the style that only recognizes the present, as “paratactic,” which is
already circumscribed in “Odysseus’ Scar” as follows: “a continuous rhythmic
procession of phenomena pass by, and never is there a form left fragmentary or
half-illuminated, never a lacuna, never a gap, never a glimpse of unplumbed
depths” (6-7). By contrast, a style that does differentiate between foreground and
background, the style of the functional hierarchy of surface structures and “the
depths of the picture”, is called “syntactic” (9). It is the style of the organization of
the Old Testament’s concealed meanings.
These two styles are the “basic types” detailed in Mimesis (23). With its depic-
tions of life as “enacted only among the ruling class” (21), Homeric style belongs
to antique literature, along with the classical tragedies. The subject matter of
Homeric poetry clearly conforms to the prescriptions of a classical elevated style.
Even if Odysseus is presented as a beggar in order to prevent his being recog-
nized upon his return, Auerbach insists that, “the poor beggar Odysseus is only
masquerading” (18). In clear contrast, the Bible’s protagonists are not noblemen
in disguise; indeed, “Adam is really cast down, Jacob really a refugee, Joseph
really in the pit and then a slave to be sold” (18). It would seem then that Homeric
parataxis is the embodiment of classical elevated style and Biblical syntaxis as the
epitome of “low” style. However, for Auerbach, the Homeric and Biblical styles
are not as divergent as “the rule of the separation of styles” (22) seems to suggest.
Indeed, Homer’s poetry, with its “leisurely descriptions of everyday happenings”
conflicts with the rules of the elevated style to which classical tragedy belongs.
And “the two realms of the sublime and the everyday are not only actually unse-
parated but basically inseparable” in the Bible (22-23). Neither Homer nor the
Bible follow the rule of the separation of styles according to which the realism of
daily life characterizes comedy, and heroic elevation characterizes tragedy.3 What
remains distinct, however, despite Auerbach’s undoings of his earlier distinc-
tions, is that Homeric parataxis, with all of its events located in the foreground,
still appears to be “displaying unmistakable meanings” and that Biblical syntaxis
with its unexpressed suggestions can still be characterized by its “need for inter-
pretation” (23).
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Freud in the American Home
Elsaesser claims that the post-World War II Hollywood family melodrama is un-
mistakably marked by “the fact that in those years America discovered Freud.”4
In the section “Where Freud left his Marx in the American home,” Elsaesser
analyzes the implications of Freud’s popularization. On the one hand, many
symptoms or marks appear to require an interpretation that assembles them into
the integrated perspective of, for example, the diagnosis of hysteria. The aes-
thetics of manifest excess exhibited in symbolically charged props, color-coded
studio light plans and costumes, and melodically enhanced exhibitions of affects
could then be interpreted as a syntactically organized arrangement of latent con-
tent. However, on the other hand, these latent meanings are certainly not unmis-
takable, nor are they on display. These are not the marks that Freud left behind in
the American home. What does appear to be on display in Written on the
Wind (Douglas Sirk, 1956) is Kyle Hadley (Robert Stack) “making unmistakable
gestures with an empty Martini bottle in the direction of his wife.”5 What is un-
mistakable, Elsaesser suggests, is that the film knows that its 1950s audience,
nursed on Freud, takes pleasure in recognizing “an unconsummated relationship
… when two brimful glasses remain untouched on the table.”6 These objects of
excess do not signify anything hidden; there is simply nothing being unveiled.
The images of excess and their over-determination do not require the interpreta-
tion of symptoms in order to diagnose Kyle’s sterility as representing the moral
bankruptcy of the Hadley dynasty or, by extension, American society at large.
First and foremost, excess and over-determination are not signs of latent subver-
sion on the part of Sirk or even the melodramatic genre as a whole. What is
excessive, first of all, is that the images are, as Laura Mulvey has pointed out,
“extraneous to the story.”7 After Kyle is diagnosed with “a correctable weakness”
– “believe me, you’re not sterile… and there is hope, real hope” – his staggering
walk from the drugstore is delayed by the images of a small boy riding a rocking
horse in front of the store. Mulvey claims that “the over-determined nature of the
image, the vulgar Freudianism [will] register with the audience, which then re-
acts with self-conscious laughter and the amusement of ‘I See!’”8 The audience is
in on the joke.
Elsaesser, in 2002, reminded us that films with an Oedipal trajectory, inter-
pretable, to be sure, by critics and academics, often also carry their Freud on their
sleeves. This occurs “when our own theory or methodology suddenly turns up in
the film itself, looking us in the face.”9 Elsaesser’s prime example here is Die
Hard (John McTiernan, 1988) in which the protagonist John McClane’s (Bruce
Willis) “vulnerability is graphically shown,” unlike classical cinema in which
male “Oedipal wounds have remained symbolic, the bodily envelope largely un-
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affected.”10 McClane’s bleeding bare feet are in plain sight; “how can one not
think of the name of the mythic hero, and the impediment to which he owed his
name: Oedipus, the club footed.”11 Die Hard is, therefore, considered paradig-
matically post-classical, not because it replaces classical cinema (usually chrono-
logically confined to 1917-1960) but rather because it adds to it a “knowingness
about itself as self-display.”12 Of course, presenting Die Hard as a paradigm of
post-classical film in Studying Contemporary American Film is a provocation in the
context of the prevailing derision of Die Hard as a mere spectacle. Even more
provocative in its anachronism, however, is the notion that Elsaesser is rekindling
an argument he developed some thirty years earlier. In retrospect, we should say
that the Hollywood family melodrama has always been post-classical.13
Depths of the Surface
Thus, we should be more precise about these tales of sound and fury. The Holly-
wood family melodrama is not so much signifying nothing at all; rather, it is al-
ways also signifying nothing. To wit, the irresistible interpretation of symptoms
into an integrative whole, syntactically belongs to the melodramatic style. Syntac-
tical style, however, does not exclude parataxis: the unmistakable gestures on dis-
play always paradoxically signify nothing but uncompromised presences as well.
The digression of the images of Kyle Hadley observing a boy on a rocking horse,
can surely be explained away by means of an integrative interpretation. Kyle’s
troubled look accompanied by ominous music as he observes the boy, then,
would signify doubts about Kyle’s fatherhood which will be confirmed later on in
the film. But as Auerbach points out, “the first thought” of the exclusively classi-
cal viewer “that this [digression] is a device to increase suspense, is, if not wholly
wrong, at least not the essential explanation of this Homeric procedure” (4). In-
deed, “the digressions are not meant to keep the reader [viewer] in suspense, but
rather to relax the tension” (4), that is, if the viewer is in on the paratactical joke.
In other words, the pathos of Kyle Hadley’s predicament, his “silence made elo-
quent,” as Elsaesser characterizes it,14 does request audience participation, but
not the kind that is produced by suspense, i.e., the urge to warn the hero of the
dangers we are already aware of. Instead, we are asked for an emotional involve-
ment that cannot be anything but ironic vis-à-vis the character’s anxiety. Thus we
laugh to relax the tension.
Elsaesser’s point in describing the melodrama as leaving behind Marx while
introducing Freud into the American home seems to be that the theories of class
struggle fraying ways of interpretation for Hollywood melodrama are succeeded
by Oedipal trajectories. But it is not that the melodrama can no longer be inter-
preted along the lines of broader social conflicts, although the melodrama does
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indeed seem to demand less Marxian and more Freudian interpretations. In-
stead, what Elsaesser appears to pursue is the idea that, on the surface level of
the Hollywood melodrama, Freud was already there, and that the intellectual ef-
forts of recognizing the relevance of Freud – or Marx for that matter – are not the
critical achievement of academic interpretation. Elsaesser does not so much re-
sist certain interpretive frameworks; in fact, “Tales of Sound and Fury” actually
demonstrates their relevance. Instead, Elsaesser was already resisting in 1972
what thirty years later he would describe as “the prevailing notion that attention
to surface must mean being intellectually or emotionally ‘shallow.’”15 The corol-
lary to such an investment in the unmistakable gestures on the surface of the
film text is a stance in the debate concerning analysis and interpretation in film
studies, a discussion of which features prominently in the conclusion of Studying
Contemporary American Film. Of course, the very fact that post-classical film dis-
plays and sometimes even psychoanalytically names its own symptoms “may it-
self be a form of defence and disavowal,”16 requiring, as a trumped-up symptom
of repressed meanings, yet another round of interpretation. Nevertheless, the
digressions in melodrama may also resemble paratactic Homeric poems, which
Auerbach claims “conceal nothing … no teaching and no secret second meaning.
Homer can be analyzed … but he cannot be interpreted” (13). In other words, we
should be analyzing these digressions, not interpreting them. Note, however, that
Elsaesser’s occasional leanings towards the analysis of parataxis in “Tales of
Sound and Fury,” not unlike Auerbach in “Odysseus’ Scar,” do not come at the
expense of interpretation. There appears to be no “either … or.”
Subversive Escapism
The contemporary melodrama Hable con ella / Talk to Her (Pedro Almodó-
var, 2002), which is about idly talking (signifying nothing) to comatose patients,
is an example of paratactic sound and fury, in this case involving the traditional
Spanish love song “Cucurrucucú Paloma” (performed by Caetano Veloso), a song
of passion about the reincarnation of a heart-broken lover in the form of a dove.
On the one hand, the song is syntactically organized into the film as the recollec-
tion of one of the protagonists; on the other hand, all three-and-a-half minutes of
the song are found in the film’s diegesis, most of it in an actual performance by
Veloso. Moreover, its paratactical presence is contrasted with a yet another recol-
lection (a memory within a memory) shown in superimposed, fragmentary
images next to the protagonist’s face, as illustrations of the verbal rendition of
his recollection. The images suggest a screening of the past within the protago-
nist’s mind, a clear example of images being syntactically integrated into a perso-
nal perspective. The song, by comparison, is not a sideshow slideshow; it is not in
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the background, and it literally appears in the same light as the protagonist’s
actions. The song, or better yet, Veloso’s singing, in all of its abundance, is clearly
there for us to enjoy. What is “excessive” here – and in this scene it is the equiva-
lent of the pop Freudian symbols found in the Hollywood melodramas of the
1950s – is the filmmaker’s campy indulgence of the knowing audience with the
“truth” of tear-jerking songs. It is tempting to interpret the memories this song
conjures up as being induced by the protagonist’s relation to the lyrics, as they
are about the possibility of souls reaching out over the boundaries of death, af-
firming the advice to always “talk to her.”
But, in a way, the song is more immediately unmistakable than that, as it also
signifies nothing, because it is a digression that slows down the unfolding of the
story without creating suspense. It will, however, in Auerbach’s words, “court our
favor” (15). But then again, is that all it achieves? Is this forgetting of our own
reality, this bewitching of the senses (14), all that this concrete example of not-
signifying-by-way-of-excess creates? Is forgetting its Fehlleistung? For if that was
the extent of it, then cinematic melodramas would more resemble the melodra-
mas of the French Restoration “providing escapist entertainment with little social
relevance.”17
What is the parapraxis of melodramatic parataxis? The answer to this question
may help us to understand what is characteristic about “the persistence of the
melodrama,” namely the way in which melodrama “has … taken note of social
crises” and displayed “a healthy distrust of intellectualization and abstract social
theory.”18 For, if we qualify this distrust of intellectualization and theory as sub-
versive, not so much with respect to societal demands for conformity, but rather
vis-à-vis interpretations, be they of Marxist, Freudian, or cultural studies signa-
ture, then there will be no more contradiction concerning the significance of
melodrama. Although we may have first thought that melodrama functioned
“either subversively or as escapism,”19 we will now see that melodramatic cinema
can be both subversive and escapist at the same time. We will be able to recog-
nize it as such, when we take note of Elsaesser’s seemingly self-evident descrip-
tion of melodrama “as a particular form of dramatic mise en scène, characterized
by a dynamic use of spatial and musical categories, as opposed to intellectual or
literary ones.”20 When Lucy (Lauren Bacall) “in an oleander-green dress is just
about to disappear behind the curtains” in Written on the Wind, just after a
funerary black silk ribbon has blown across the concrete pavement, Elsaesser
points out the “emotional resonance” of mise en scène parallels. He calls it a “non-
dramatic sequence,” a scene with “no plot significance whatsoever,”21 a scene
filled with, what he in later pages would call: eloquent silence, i.e., pathos. The
song in Talk to Her achieves a similar resonance. But the real parapractical sig-
nificance of these scenes is that we, as academic critics, have come to realize that
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in our urge to interpret, we are subverted by these abundant presences of para-
taxis. We ourselves are implicated by the melodrama. This is the parapraxis of
parataxis in cinematic melodrama: we are always already, even if we may think
we are just analyzing and not interpreting yet, too late to pick up on what the
melodrama has already achieved.
2. Style as Meaning
The previous section emphasizes a certain mode of analysis in Elsaesser’s read-
ing of melodrama, which has been characterized as “over-signification.” Psycho-
analysis literally takes place on the surface level of the film, and Elsaesser avoids
the stock practice of plumbing the depths of a text, to salvage meaning through
interpretation. Instead, for him, meaning appears on the surface, itself a symp-
tom of the popularization of Freudian psychoanalysis in the United States. If the
abundance of surface meanings and the redundancy of a depth-hermeneutic is
one aspect of his influential reading of melodrama, another aspect of his reading
of melodrama can be characterized as the instability of meaning, and the ambiva-
lence of the signification of melodrama. Meaning cannot be easily read from the
text; rather, style, another surface phenomenon that “signifies nothing,” becomes
the condition of possibility for the destabilization of meaning. Elsaesser argues
that directors like Vincente Minnelli and Douglas Sirk “encouraged a conscious
use of style as meaning, which is a mark of what I consider to be the very condi-
tion of a modernist sensibility working in popular culture.”22
Aesthetic Ambiguities
In “Tales of Sound and Fury,” popular melodrama and modernist aesthetics are
not mutually exclusive. Indeed, if modernism distrusts realism and the surface
meanings in film, then Elsaesser’s argument that melodrama is also modernist
points in a different direction. Surface meanings are not necessarily fixed; in-
stead, Elsaesser’s emphasis on the materiality of signification in film, from the
use of sound and color to mise-en-scène, highlights the disruption of any easy
reading off the surface of the visual. As he puts it, in describing one such aes-
thetic strategy “[T]he feeling that there is always more to tell than can be said leads to
very consciously elliptical narratives proceeding often by visually condensing the
character’s motivation into sequences of images which do not seem to advance
the plot.”23 By drawing attention to the stylistic rendering of a narrative, he opens
up the door to the importance of analyzing the particular formal qualities of the
film text, the construction and deployment of images, and the innovative use of
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sound, that makes the dramamelodrama.Melos as the musical accompaniment to
dramatic progression indicates the role of the material (formal) supports of film
language that are placed into a relation with the production of meaning through
sound and image. He thus argues that “this type of cinema depends on the way
‘melos’ is given to drama by means of lighting, montage, visual rhythm, decor,
style of acting, music.”24 One would expect that “melos” serves as the faithful
handmaiden to drama, such that material elements function to unambiguously
signify meaning to the audience. That is, a representationalist logic of realism
would determine the way “melos” gives itself to drama (the coincidence of stylis-
tic and thematic content).
What is innovative in Elsaesser’s argument is his identifying a modernist sen-
sibility in the use of style, in relation to meaning. That is, “melos” gives itself to
drama as enigma, and as an ambiguity where the “what” of the content cannot be
easily related to the “how” – that is, the aesthetic mode of the film has a destabi-
lizing agency of its own that clouds the desire to explain away the language of
film itself. The ambiguity triggered in the reading of a melodramatic text through
stylistic features such as music, and color, produces a perplexed response – “the
feeling that there is always more to tell than can be said,”25 or what Marcia Landy
calls the “What happened?”26 question. Style as meaning thus calls attention to
the importance of the formal analysis of melodrama in order to address the am-
biguities of meaning. Style as meaning is the indetermination of meaning.
In her analysis of Todd Haynes’ films, Marcia Landy draws attention to pre-
cisely this indetermination of meaning produced by a thwarted and inscrutable
relationship between signifier and signified. Unlike Elizabeth Anker’s under-
standing of melodrama as a genre “which employs emotionality to provide an
unambiguous distinction between good and evil,”27 it is precisely the ambiguity
of film in its formal qualities that leads Landy to argue that Haynes’ films “desta-
bilize normative responses to the world that conventional forms of cinematic
representation produce.”28 Even the representation of emotion must pass
through an aesthetic that invites speculation rather than clear meaning – as
Haynes puts it, “You laugh, but you’re not really interested in the story or the
ideas or the emotions. It’s not helping you identify with the film; in fact, it’s
keeping you outside of it in ways that provoke ... thought.”29 This sense of aliena-
tion and distance from the text as a result of the anti-realist filmic style is seen in
its most pronounced fashion in Far from Heaven (2002), Haynes’ homage to
Sirk’s All That Heaven Allows (1955). In Haynes’ film, what Elsaesser identi-
fied as the oddness of the aesthetic, the insistent drawing of the spectator’s atten-
tion to the artificiality of the filmed situation, the stilted gestures, the use of color,
exemplifies his argument about style as meaning. To simply fix the meaning of
Haynes’ film as a melodrama about the emptiness of marriage (Cathy and Frank),
52 Sudeep Dasgupta and Wim Staat
homosexuality (Frank), alcoholism (Frank), and inter-racial desire (Cathy and
Raymond) is to ignore the mode in which these issues are represented. The style
of the film accompanies, actually produces the thematic content, triggering a
“why?” response in the spectator. This interrogative position for the spectator is
produced by the enigmatic quality of the style and was one mode through which
modernism aimed to broaden the political question of social critique.
The cold reflective surfaces of the suburban home, the brilliant shine of
Cathy’s dresses, the agonizingly slow movement of the camera, and most ob-
viously, the use of artificially brilliant color focus our attention onto the film as a
destabilizing and necessary medium through which one must pass before ascrib-
ing meaning. The theatricality of the characters’ behavior heightens the artifice of
the film, and its insistence on drawing our attention to itself as film does little in
Elsaesser’s terms “to advance the plot.” “Style” here needs to be seen as the mode
through which the concrete practices of filmmaking underline their presence to
destabilize a realist visual epistemology. This focus on style in film studies, which
Elsaesser called attention to in melodrama, had the merit of drawing attention to
the specificity of the film medium itself, the work it does, and does to us as spec-
tators which, as I shall argue later, was almost lost when film began being char-
acterized in terms of social categories such as “women’s genres.” By focusing on
style and its relation to meaning production, I argue that a clearly political mode
of analysis was being offered, which was later diluted when film as a specific mode
of presentation was sacrificed to another kind of politics based on social categories
(identity politics) and reception studies. Landy, in referring to another of Haynes’
films, Velvet Goldmine (1998), argues that the film is not “about identity poli-
tics ... the production of ‘positive’ images of homosexuality.”30 She goes on to
point out that “it is an exploration of vision and the incommensurability of the
visible and the expressible so critical to understanding the destabilizing nature of
media.”31 Landy brings up two issues which I consider crucial to the value of
Elsaesser’s reading of style in melodrama as meaning. Firstly, she underlines the
specificity of film as a medium and its potential to destabilize meaning and pro-
voke thought. This argument, where the experience of an artwork is a cognitive
experience of the uncertainties of knowledge was underlined by Theodor Adorno
and avoided what later were to become the modes of interpretation, where an
artwork’s form was sacrificed to the straightforward theories of referentiality and
eventually to “audience readings.”32 Secondly, Landy extrapolates the question of
artifice and the materiality of style in Elsaesser’s reading of melodrama, by high-
lighting how the medium of film complicates and questions “identity politics.”
Films, when understood in terms of formal play and experimentation, are not
only about who is represented (women, homosexuals, immigrants, etc.) but also
about how the medium of cinema and its stylistic strategies complicate the pro-
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cess through which we ascribe meaning – that is, it complicates the fixation of
images as being “about” a particular category of person. This second point is
crucial, in relation to melodrama, because it impinges on how certain forms of
feminist media studies were to develop, a point I will elaborate upon below.
Theoretical Implications
By highlighting the importance of style as a modernist dimension of melodrama,
a number of conclusions can be drawn about its importance. Firstly, Elsaesser’s
argument, which centralizes aesthetics in analyzing the social meaning and poli-
tical importance of melodrama, reverses and disturbs the spatialization of film
criticism, which has traditionally produced a bifurcated space of Hollywood “clas-
sical narrative,” on the one hand, and European “art” cinema and its aesthetic of
playfulness, on the other. His argument, which entails a modernist sensibility
(read the European avant-garde) within popular culture (Hollywood), twisted the
doubled-space of Europe/America and their respective aesthetics, and provided a
useful corrective to the assignation of national cinemas to specific cultural forms.
He argues, in his reading of Minnelli, for example, that the existential theme of a
character is explored filmically by exploring “the philosophical questions of free-
dom and determination” (which are central to melodrama) by focusing inven-
tively on “the aesthetic problem of how to depict a character who is not constantly
externalizing himself into action, without trapping him in an environment of
ready-made symbolism.”33 Thus the “melos” refuses to give the drama a “ready-
made symbolism,” which in turn, gives the film an enigmatic character by for-
cing the audience to ask what the relationship is between the Hollywood film’s
style and its thematic content.
Secondly, the implications of Elsaesser’s reading of style reformulates an ana-
lysis of excess. Here that excess is identified stylistically rather than in terms of
“over-emotionality,” the traditional understanding of “women’s films.” The style
of melodrama skews any referential theory of representation and meaning, pro-
ducing ambiguities that exceed our attempt to seek a conventional correlation
between signifier and signified. In Terry Eagleton’s terms, “meaning has leaked
from the signifier.”34 It approached the question of “excess,” which has tradition-
ally been connected to over-emotionality, in the formal characteristics of the text
itself. That is, rather than identifying the modernist, and therefore politically pro-
gressive potential of melodrama with the subjective excess of over-emotionality of
the characters portrayed, Elsaesser’s argument suggests that it is necessary to
analyze the excessive, that is, non-conventional and enigmatic character of the
style of the film itself. Moreover, the value of this reading of stylistic excess is that
although it draws attention to the “materiality of the signifier,” thus “in the way
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that ‘melos’ gives to drama,” it does not turn the social importance of melodrama
into a purely formalist aesthetic. In other words, the link between aesthetics and
meaning remains a very important question for the political significance of melo-
drama. Elsaesser’s emphasis on style does not become merely a politics of style, a
course arguably pursued most enthusiastically by the Tel Quel group. Elsaesser’s
reading, on the contrary, still keeps the question of meaning, interpretation, and
referentiality in play. His argument concerning style simply reorients the rela-
tionship – rather than choosing between either the signifier (style), which coin-
cides with signified (meaning), or a purely formalist aesthetics of “materialism,”
he maintains the tension by continuing to investigate the nature of the relation-
ship between the formalist play on style and the social intelligibility of the narra-
tion. The importance of this relationship between style and meaning is that it
combines an interest in the marking of aesthetic modernism, with an expansion
of this focus to include a genre of cultural production – the Hollywood melodra-
ma – which had until then been excluded from serious considerations.
In addition to the materiality of excess and counter-intuitive disruption of geo-
graphical delineations of aesthetics and ideology, Elsaesser’s reading also pro-
vided some pointers for further research, some of which were picked up, while
others were not. A third line of inquiry might investigate how the disciplinary
developments in visual cultural analysis explored the growing importance of
what came to be called “women’s genres.” Research in the areas of film studies
and cultural studies that focused on such genres as melodrama in film, soap
opera on television, “women’s” magazines, and the like developed along roughly
two lines, which were sometimes related. In cinema studies, melodrama became
identified with the analysis of female subjectivity, the role of popular cultural
forms in the production of sexist stereotypes, and a critique of patriarchy and
ocular-centrism. Texts could be clearly identified as patriarchal. Style is generally
considered as secondary to the meaning of the text. When the analysis of the
representation of women focused on the question of style, the result was that the
link between style and meaning was usually either unproblematically perceived,
or simply ignored. Maria Laplace, for example, opens her otherwise convincing
reading of Now Voyager in terms of consumerism and the historically specific
discursive construction of femininity by stating that for “feminists interested in
how cinema constructs female subjectivity and female desire, it is necessary to
move away from purely formal analysis of the internal workings of a film text to a
more historically specific analysis of the relation of text to content.”35 While she
is right to relate the film text to its place in a broader historical discursive forma-
tion, this desire to move away from formal analysis runs the risk of leaving the
text behind. The necessary critique of patriarchy downplayed the possibility that
the communication of sexist ideologies of gender might be jammed by the enig-
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matic quality of the medium doing the communicating.36 That is, the question of
filmic style was reduced to an argument about conventional forms of significa-
tion that produce patriarchal ideologies. The “style as meaning” argument, in
other words, dissipated into analyses of subject positioning. Hollywood melodra-
ma was identified as ideological and patriarchal, and this aesthetic of manufac-
tured reality was accepted as more or less successful. The specificity of the work-
ing of the text, of style as meaning, and its relation to history, is sacrificed in the
process. The increased importance of historical analyses of discourses outside the
text, while crucial to convincing analyses of the politics of popular culture, led to
an almost complete eclipse of formal analyses in other fields.
In cultural studies, for example, the move toward ethnographic critique and
the interpretation of audience readings, dissipated the materiality of the text and
the ambiguities of signification. One text was replaced by another, so that the
object of study became the text produced by the audience. As a reaction to the
perceived “high cultural” argument that denied women readers “pleasure” and
ascribed all power to the patriarchal discourse of the text, cultural studies became
an analysis of demographic categories (young women, subcultures, etc.) and their
practices of meaning-production. The legitimate importance that was simulta-
neously placed on spectatorship came at the expense of any engagement with the
specificity of style and the possibility that the text in question might call itself into
question, that its meaning was not clear, whatever audiences made of it. Femin-
ism in cultural studies gained on the one hand what it lost through the other. By
becoming more narrowly focused on audiences and “resistant readings,” a thor-
oughly legitimate analytic reorientation nevertheless unnecessarily ended up lim-
iting itself. In the process of evaporating the text and the complicated relation-
ship between style and meaning, another mode of orienting the political
importance of popular culture was lost. Elsaesser’s argument of “style as mean-
ing” began pointing towards the relevance of analyzing the link between aes-
thetics and politics through the exploration of this modernist sensibility in popu-
lar culture, which was later erased in the increasingly polemical debates between
“high” and “low” culture.
The relationship between the materiality of style and the meaning of the film
text, which Elsaesser highlighted by problematizing the relationship between the
two, did find its specific disciplinary articulation within the field of art history. At
least one tradition of broadly Marxist art history continued to pay close attention
to the specific materiality of the art work, and its relation to historical context and
political power.37 Elsaesser’s argument about the enigmatic quality of the “melos”
in melodrama, and the fact that in some films, the style often avoids “readymade
symbolism” and produces images whose concrete materiality destabilizes an easy
ascription of meaning, can also be related to Jacques Rancière’s approach to art in
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general, and film in particular.38 In his analyses of films like Eisenstein’s Star-
oye i novoye / The General Line (1929) and Godard’sHistoire(s) du Cinéma
/ History(s) of the Cinema (1998), Jacques Rancière takes the pure materiality
of the film image and the non-signifying concreteness of objects in the frame
seriously, however, like Elsaesser with regard to melodrama, he does not sacrifice
this focus on style to the analysis of meaning. His approach to the aesthetics-
politics question very precisely extends what Elsaesser calls a “modernist sensi-
bility,” even though Rancière rejects terms like modernism. Rancière, like Elsaes-
ser, resists the temptation to either erase style through a realist argument, or
focus only on style through a formalist aesthetics. His film analyses focus on the
interplay between (film) language, thought and the world, and thus develop in an
interesting direction similar to what Elsaesser noticed, and complicated, in his
reading of style as meaning in melodrama.
Elsaesser’s reading of filmic style in melodrama paved the way for film to be
taken seriously in its materiality as form. The value of this reading of form resides
in the way in which it is tied to a historical and social analysis. Elsaesser’s focus
on form eschewed the temptation of formalism (Clement Greenberg, for exam-
ple); rather, it linked a close attention to the specificity of film to broader ques-
tions of power, subjectivity, and history. Furthermore, by undercutting the divi-
sion between classical Hollywood narrative cinema and European modernist
film, Elsaesser’s essay pointed forward towards the discussion on the viability of
concepts such as national cinema and national identity. “Tales of Sound and
Fury” is a crucial text in Elsaesser’s oeuvre not just for the salience of its argu-
ment but for the way it foresaw what were to become important developments in
film studies, for the years to come.
Notes
1. Elsaesser points out that the presentation of what is lacking, i.e., the scandal of Amer-
ican history, cannot be fictionalized through what would be a counterbalancing act of
offering us “the good black American”; the only modus available is the Fehlleistung,
for this is only way that we can come close to historical truth: “denn sie [die Fehlleis-
tung] allein entspricht den historischen Wahrheit” (Thomas Elsaesser, “Geschichte
(n) und Gedächtnis: Zur Poetik der Fehlleistungen im Mainstreamkino am Beispiel
von Forrest Gump,” Experiment Mainstream? Differenz und Uniformierung im populären
Kino, ed. Irmbert Schenk, Christine Rüffert, Karl-Heinz Schmid, and Alfred Tews
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Failed Tragedy and Traumatic Love in Ingmar
Bergman’s Shame
Tarja Laine
Sometimes everything seems just like a dream. It’s not my dream, but
somebody else’s that I have to participate in. What happens when the one
who dreamt us wakes up and feels ashamed?
– Eva (Liv Ullmann)
Shame is painful. Shame is mortifying. Shame is essential. As I have shown else-
where, shame is more than an emotion.1 Shame is a concept that can be placed in
a theoretical framework of interlinked concepts, and, by so doing, shame can
reveal the inner consistency, social dynamics, and affective bonds within the
work of art and between the work of art and its spectator. However, I seem to
keep on returning to shame, or perhaps it is shame that keeps on returning to
me. As a devotee of shame, I think that it is important to examine the value and
necessity of this emotion and thus, as I was told right after having defended my
PhD dissertation, it would be a shame indeed if I was done with shame. One
such illustration of “shame as necessity” can be found, for instance, in Gilles
Deleuze’s ethology, where “you do not know beforehand what good or bad you
are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a
given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination.”2 This “ethological
condition” of human experience explains why some people are more vulnerable
to shame than others. It could also explain why, in conditions of war, some peo-
ple lose their humanity and others do not.
An exploration of the disintegration of humanity in war, Ingmar Bergman’s
1968 film Skammen / Shame bespeaks this ethological condition and the failure
of action related to it, a situation in which the individual cannot help but continue
doing something but in ways that contain the inability or unwillingness to take
action. The film is, therefore, best approached as a melodrama of “failed tragedy”
that, according to Thomas Elsaesser’s definition, confronts its characters with a
tragic universe, but ultimately denies them any sense of resolution. As a result, a
traumatic mode of spectatorship can be found at the heart of failed tragedy,
which is rendered palpable in Bergman’s films such as Tystnaden / Silence
(1963), Persona (1966), and especially Viskningar och rop / Cries and Whis-
pers (1972), where (like in Shame, as I shall argue) Bergman makes possible
“those imperceptible transitions between past and present, inner and outer
space, [traumatic] memory, dream and anticipation which also give contemporary
post-classical cinema its intellectual energy and emotional urgency.”3 The emo-
tional urgency of failed tragedy is shame, since shame is the association par ex-
cellence of a (moral) failure with the self that brings about a traumatic configura-
tion of indicative (what is) and conditional (what could have been) for the person
in shame. Shame, therefore, also structures the traumatic mode of spectatorship
epitomized in the logic of failed tragedy of Shame.
It is therefore perhaps surprising, and certainly undeserved, that Shame is one
of the least known films in Bergman’s oeuvre, a film defined as a masterly vision
of war that has “the inevitability of a common dream.”4 Harshly shot in black-
and-white by Sven Nykvist and set in Sweden in the clutches of an imaginary
(and apparently meaningless) civil war, Shame depicts Jan (Max von Sydow) and
Eva Rosenberg (Liv Ullmann) living a relatively peaceful existence on an island
that has so far been saved from the destruction. Jan and Eva’s sense of security
ends abruptly when their island is invaded. Unable to control or comprehend the
situation, Jan undergoes a transformation from a useless, annoying coward to a
brutal killer, but without any purpose other than contempt and aggression toward
other war victims, thereby epitomizing the prototype of the traumatized male
who communicates his symptoms through violence and rage.5 As James Max-
field observes, “He has been potent to destroy, not to create … [his] survival leads
only to physical and spiritual death.”6
The film opens with a black frame over which the title sequence appears,
played to the pattering of gunfire, deformed voices, and bursts of distorted radio
stations. In the first scenes, the husband and wife go through their morning
routines, the noises of which all sound exaggerated. In the distance, church bells
clang ominously. The phone (which is supposedly out of order) rings repeatedly
like a warning bell of the events yet to come, but there is no one on the other end
of the line. In a similar scene, Eve’s dialogue with Filip (the fisherman, later the
leader of the partisans, and even later the boatman for the refugees) is drowned
out by rushing water. Throughout the film, sound resists the attractive valence of
the visual, often preceding the image and forcing it to abandon its expected con-
text. As a result, there is no singular, stable, privileged point of audition but a
traumatic position of displacement, torture, and conflict; a sound that “does not
reassure but perplexes.”7 The sound of approaching troops – roaring planes, ma-
chine gun fire, explosions – are displaced sounds, at first only aurally present in
the scenes. Violence invades through the order of sound, taking on a centrifugal
force of its own, while the spectators are forced to stay with Jan and Eva who are
clearly powerless to do anything about their lives falling apart.
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This becomes an experience that only the state of trauma can explain, an en-
during devastating event that overwhelms the individual and disables him or her
from coping emotionally with and acting on the traumatic situation. Jan’s shock
takes on an especially numbing form and results in a trauma that cannot be over-
come, which is “so irretrievable in terms of temporality, event and body”8 that not
only is Jan powerless to act, he does not even have the desire to act despite the
disastrous nature of the situation. Both Jan and Eva are depicted as victims,
groundlessly accused by both sides in the war of collaborating with the enemy.
They are shown in scenes of violence and emotional confrontation over which
they have no individual control or agency except the “power” to helplessly give in
to them. Sound plays an important role here; it effectively denies Jan and Eva the
power to act, and, even more importantly, it relates trauma to shame insofar as
shame also represents the failure of self with a sensed inability to take control,
leading to a devastating situation of hopelessness in the first place and to abusive
violence in the second.
The silence that abruptly follows the first battles fails to bring relief to Jan and
Eva, and the spectator. The silence, broken only by the sounds of singing birds,
remains disturbing, since it epitomizes both Jan and Eva’s powerlessness to deal
adequately with the situation, as well as their inability to discuss their emotions.
Because they cannot translate their trauma into words, they are “forced to look at
each other, and to realize that the only honest feeling they have about their rela-
tionship is shame.”9 The close-ups of Eva and Jan’s blank faces staring individu-
ally, without interaction, into nothingness reveals “the fear of the face confront-
ing its own nothingness,”10 its own shame. The face is the site of shame, and
Bergman’s shots of the faces expressing shame mirror Eva and Jan’s relationship
that is now changed forever. However, the fact that their relationship is recog-
nized as such comes a moment too late and, as a result, is transformed into a
traumatic mode of love. Their love is traumatic because it signifies a temporality
of regret, which is characterized by bad timing, missed opportunities, or dislikes
for personal actions, past and present. The traumatic love that exists between Eva
and Jan also connects shame to the notion of failed tragedy in the conditional
sense of “if-only,” as a tension that highlights the inevitability of their present
actions.
The Realm of If-Only
In his book Melodrama and Trauma, Elsaesser defines the genre of melodrama in
terms of the temporality of regret, as a genre of “if-only” that always contains the
seeds of a painful and shameful inner torment. It is this state of “if-only’ in
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Shame that links shame to trauma, while Eva and Jan’s love becomes a traumatic
mode of love inasmuch as it exists only in that shameful realm of “what could
have been.” It is already evident in the beginning of the film that Jan and Eva can
barely tolerate each other, with Eva frequently appearing almost disgusted with
Jan. Eva escapes this situation by becoming overtly assertive while Jan daydreams
and turns to nostalgia. Jan, upon awakening, recalls a dream: “I dreamt we were
back in the orchestra again, rehearsing the 4th Brandenburg Concerto – the 4th
movement. All that is happening now is behind us. We only remembered it as a
nightmare.” Before the war, Jan and Eva both played violin in the national phil-
harmonic orchestra, which serves as a symbol for the “if-only” realm throughout
the film. Later in the film, Jan discusses Pampini (the maker of his violin) with
Eva, and as he takes up the bow to play it, he suddenly stops because it sounds
too awful: “My hand is completely ruined,” he says.
The violin, like a number of other antique articles, serves as the witness of the
realm of “if-only” in the past, reminding Jan and Eva of the love that could-have-
been theirs in the future. The montage sequence of Jan and Eva’s visit to Fredrik
Lobelius’s shop includes close-ups of antique objects which are further empha-
sized with the nostalgic sounds of an 18th-century Meissen musical box. This is
followed by a reaction shot of the apparently sentimental Jan and Eva escaping
into that realm of “if-only.” However, it is not only the past, but also the future
and even the present that represent various “if-only” realms in the film. Eva’s first
encounter with Filip by the stream, for instance, evokes the mode of “if-only” in
the present because it is concealed from both the spectator and from Jan at the
aural level. Like Jan, we do not know the precise nature of Filip and Eva’s relation-
ship. Suddenly we see Eva happy, smiling, beautiful, but the sound of rushing
water is all we hear. In this scene, Eva is depicted in another, unattainable realm
beyond Jan’s reach, and, paradoxically, it is this unattainable state that makes Jan,
in his own words, feel that he is really in love with Eva again.
The future “if-only” manifests itself in the impossible or insignificant plans –
under the existing conditions – that Jan and Eva have: that of learning Italian and
rehearsing their music. While eating lunch and drinking Fredrik’s wine (a rare
luxury), Eva brings up the topic of children as a possible remedy for their failing
marriage, after which Jan and Eva end up making love. This is the last serene
moment in the film. The harmony ends abruptly with the sound of booming
guns and roaring fighter planes spewing fire and annihilation, permanently de-
stroying their plans, hopes, and longings. “It is good that we do not have chil-
dren,” says Eva unhappily afterwards, “We will never have children.” The time
for self-deception is over. The encroaching evidence of war forces Jan and Eva to
finally take stock of their situation and realize that their life together as they once
knew it has been nothing but a delusion – and a shameful one at that. Later on in
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the film, as they are waiting to be interrogated by some soldiers who have sus-
pected them of treason, Eva asks: “What happens when the one who dreamt us
wakes up and feels ashamed?”
Why shame? Why this emotion and not some other one like grief (over the loss
of love) or anger (about their lack of control over the situation) or guilt (about
being a war survivor)? I think that the answer is best formulated in Silvan Tom-
kins’s definition of shame:
[S]hame operates only after interest or enjoyment has been activated; it inhabits one,
or the other, or both. The innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction of
interest or joy. Such a barrier might arise because one is suddenly looked at by an-
other who is strange; or because one wishes to look at, or commune with, another
person but suddenly cannot because s/he is strange; or one expected him to be famil-
iar but he suddenly appears unfamiliar; or one started to smile but found one was
smiling at a stranger.11
According to Tomkins’s definition, shame is not necessarily related to some vio-
lation of social norms (even though it often is), but to the fact that shame can
appear only when the individual has shown an interest in someone or some-
thing, and when that interest has been rejected. This connects shame to love
insofar as interest often involves a desire for connection, which is love recipro-
cated. Therefore, love always involves the fear that love will not be mutual, and
this contains the potential for shame. The catastrophe in losing one’s love is not
necessarily the loss itself but the deeply shameful experience of the rejection of
interest; in other words, the state of “if-only.” Jan and Eva’s love is shameful be-
cause it only exists in this “if-only” realm, which is: in a past that is lost forever, in
the impossible future, and in the self-deceptive present. But Jan and Eva cannot
express their shame in words and thus learn to cope with it, which, again, leads
to a traumatized love. Traumatic love, then, is precisely the shameful and painful
love of “what-would-have-been.”12
After the calling of the war truce, Eva’s love affair with Jacobi (the mayor) adds
yet another dimension to the trauma of love. They kiss passionately in front of
Jan, and even though Eva seems to have entered into the affair solely to obtain
various commodities and presents in exchange, Jan is deeply hurt because her
affair allows Eva to escape from him again to that “if-only” realm where he is
denied entry. When the partisans break Jan’s violin and burn down their house,
things once again change dramatically. The realm of “if-only” turns out to be just
an empty state, “the negative power that displaces lost humanistic values” where
“no authentic love is any longer possible” and where “life does not make sense
anymore.”13 Authentic love is no longer possible because it was never there in the
first place. Bergman’s film would seem to suggest that traumatic love is the only
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kind of love available to us, because it speaks of a more general failure of love, a
loss that in Ronald Barthes’s Lover’s Discourse is defined as the only origin of love:
Similarly, it seems, for the lover’s anxiety: it is the fear of a mourning which has
already occurred, at the very origin of love, from the moment when I was first “rav-
ished”. Someone would have to be able to tell me: “Don’t be anxious anymore –
you’ve already lost him/her.”14
Hence, for Barthes, there is no basis for love other than loss, and that self-decep-
tion is therefore built into the very heart of love, becoming “a sine qua non of
love.”15 However, the instant that Jan recognizes their love as such arrives one
moment too late for him to be able to react in a constructive manner; instead, he
acquires a taste for violence in the name of survival. First he shoots Jacobi and
later murders a child soldier apparently for no reason except to steal his boots.
But, in Jan’s violent rage for survival, he destroys himself as shame begins to
gnaw at him with doubts concerning his humanity.16 The film’s final images of a
boat of refugees in a sea of dead bodies in the static, compositional arrangements
that are so characteristic for Bergman are among the most despairing in film
history, arousing negative emotions that cannot find an outlet through action.
These paralytic images are unable to transform emotion into action; instead,
they introduce the experience of trauma, suggesting that since loss is the origin
of love (and thereby the source of all inhumanity), there is no hope for mankind.
Traumatic love contains no seeds of hope, only seeds of torment, except in the
guise of self-deception, escapism, and bad faith.
The Spectatorial Logic of Shame
How are we, as spectators, to respond to these images? These are inexplicable
images that call for a failed, traumatic mode of spectatorship, firstly because we
are involuntarily confronted by them, and secondly because we, like Jan and Eva,
are denied a resolution or any sense of relief. It is significant that throughout the
film we do not see the acts of violence (they always occur offscreen), only the
results, of which the final images of corpses floating on the sea are the most
powerful ones. The only exception to this is the scene of Jan shooting Jacobi, but
this is filmed from a distance. In this way, the camera denies us both our role as
“privileged witnesses” to the action and an outlet for our emotions through cath-
arsis (it is always already too late to act).17 As a result, our emotions become en-
during, bespeaking the traumatic reality of violence. But at the same time, the
film denies its own process of creating meaning and its “mastery” over the events
it depicts and thus, by so doing, shames its own world (and, accordingly, we are
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never told the reasons for the war). Geoffrey Nowell-Smith has defined melodra-
ma as a failure of representation, a genre that has a built-in impossibility of a
“happy ending.”18 Yet, as Elsaesser points out, melodrama also calls for the “fail-
ure of spectatorship” that needs to be defined as traumatic. The definition for the
failure of spectatorship is trauma not only because it cannot be articulated, but
also because it refuses to connect to memory, resulting in a crisis of experience
and confining the spectator to the eternal recalling of the traumatic event.19
Furthermore, this failed mode of spectatorship is paradoxically the only suc-
cessful mode of spectatorship, since it is a solution for what Elsaesser calls the
“new economy of experience” where “shortcuts, blackouts and gaps are what
saves the self from an otherwise ruinous psychic investment in the multitude of
events observed, of human beings encountered, of disasters and injustices wit-
nessed – which no personal memory nor even public history could encompass or
contain.”20 In other words, trauma is, oddly enough, a protective mode of specta-
torship that does not shatter (as Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit suggest21) but
“saves” the spectator from the “spectatorial logic of shame”22 that can be found
in Shame in a transformational sense where the stage is set for the flooding of
the spectator by the shame that is rendered elliptical.23 Trauma saves the specta-
tor from the immediacy of experience, on the one hand, through a process of
substitution, which absorbs the shame, and through a process of distancing, on
the other. Similarly, traumatic love “saves” the lover from the loss that is the true
origin of love, the shameful “if-only” condition. The loss that is at the heart of
love thus describes a more general failure of love that is the source of all in-
humanity, making the full circle complete for the eternal return of shame. It is
no accident that the trauma of love and the shamefulness of war (shameful in its
meaninglessness) go hand in hand in Shame, since the discourse of both love
and sovereignty exists only in the form of self-deception, and this is why Shame
remains as topical today as it was when it was made.24 Shame assumes a numb-
ing form in Bergman’s film, resulting in trauma and depression, neither of
which can ever be overcome. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has argued that (traumatic)
shame can have transformative power, that shame can become a source of crea-
tive expression and transformational energy.25 But the failure of love in Shame
means that there is no way out of the enclosing circle of shame, and, as a result,
shame loops back upon itself, becoming “the generalized ‘foundational’ moment
of any individual’s sense of identity and person-hood, and thus the basis of his/
her life’s narrative and source of its ultimate meaning.”26
In the film’s final scenes, the outcomes of this failure of love are either suicide
(symbolic) in the case of Filip or starvation in the cases of Jan, Eva, and the rest of
the refugees. Leonard Kaplan’s notes that, in these scenes, Bergman “shows us a
world where guilt and shame ceased to affect human response. He shows us a set
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of consequences where such emotions no longer motivate [responsible action].”27
In relation to this, Berenice Fisher views shame “not as a mark of our inadequacy
but as a sign of our commitment to act, as a mark of the tension between the
present and the future, as a touchstone for understanding when we expect to
achieve and how.”28 For this reason, Shame contains the possibility for the circu-
lation of shame as a cinematic experience linked to ethics. The ethical dimension
of Shame is the individual responsibility for the self and for the other, which
rests upon a principle other than that of citizenship, the state, or the nation;
namely, it depends on “an ontology of being-with-one-another … an ontology for
the world.”29 The Deleuzian ethology introduced at the beginning of this essay
also insists that one must take the other into one’s world while respecting the
other and his or her relation to the world. One must welcome that other regard-
less of who he or she is and whatever beliefs and values he or she might possess,
and even regardless whether he or she hates one or not.30 When one fails to live
up to this ideal of responsibility for the self and for the other, shame eventually
sets in.
This is also how shame circulates in Shame, as the discerned inability to act
upon the tension between the present and the future, which is also felt by the
spectator “in the flesh” – in the affective operations of the body and the senses
whilst one engages with the film. Thus we see that at the heart of Bergman’s film
there is the hope that shame will be acknowledged in the mode of self-reflection,
as a question of moral agency and as a willingness to live up to one’s chosen
ideals. As Sartre noted, ethics are free acts, which are not ethical if they are not
enacted. We can consciously choose to bring others along into our world as we
accept loss and the dreadful possibility that our choice will not be reciprocated,
the possibility of the shameful “if-only” which lies at the heart of love. Only then
can shame gain transformational power that both acknowledges and turns away
from the eternally returning trauma in which shame originates. But this requires
a certain awareness of shame that the characters in Shame do not possess, which
renders them unable to act on their shame, and leaves them vulnerable to the
traumatic mode of love. In other words, Eva and Jan become imprisoned in their
own existence, fixed in the mode of self-deception, because they have lost the
power to love and to act. The failure of love becomes a failure to be, except in the
always-unattainable, shameful realm of “if-only”.
The spectators, however, do have the option to become aware of shame by
viewing the film not merely as a representation of nihilism, but as an expression
of self-assessment that may encourage them to take responsible action in their
own lives when necessary.31 In this sense, Shame can be seen as a mirror held in
front of the spectators, which forces them either to assume the reflected image or
to alter it, and thus break the circle of shame, allowing for something new to
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emerge. This emergence is not framed as a haunting sense of nostalgia (as it was
for Jan and Eva), but as a future-oriented acknowledgement that we, too, are vul-
nerable to traumatic love and thus all too prone to escape either into self-decep-
tion or into self-destruction, where shame can then make its eternal return.
Furthermore, this acknowledgement opens up an avenue for responsible self-de-
termination that, nevertheless, takes us outside of ourselves. Shame depicts an
egocentric, starving world of individuals concerned only with their own survival
and motivated solely by the trauma of love. But this is precisely the process that
allows the film to become ethical, since it demands recognition of the shame that
is the result of traumatic love. In the end, Shame appeals to a responsible, loving
commitment of the self to the other as the only option to true freedom and
humanity, since love (as open totality) assumes the capacity of all individuals to
participate in the community of each and every one.
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A Snapshot of Remembered Experience
José van Dijck
“Media and memory” was the title of a graduate course that Thomas Elsaesser,
myself, and two other colleagues initiated at the University of Amsterdam’s de-
partment of Media Studies in 2004. After deliberating whether the term “media-
tion of memory” might better cover the proposed contents of this course, we
decided upon the juxtaposition of the two central concepts in the course’s title:
media and memory. Nevertheless, the course’s underlying tenet was that media
and memory are not separate entities – the first enhancing, corrupting, extend-
ing, or replacing the second – but that media invariably and inherently shape our
memories, warranting the term “mediation.” The course covered a range of scho-
larly perspectives on how personal memory feeds on media technologies, and
how collective memory is defined by the media’s shaping powers. Over the years
of teaching this course, the concept “mediation of memory” gradually evolved
into a more precise theoretical framework for analyzing the co-construction of
memories and media. Through a series of conceptual refinements, I worked the
premises of the course into a book which eventually settled on the concept of
“mediated memories.”1 Elsaesser’s theory played a substantial role in the devel-
opment of the book’s main argument. This essay reconstructs “the making of” a
concept. It is the academic equivalent of the director’s cut on DVDs – scenes
which reveal how the film came into being. In this story, media and memory
finally come together, due to the intervention of many actors (students, col-
leagues, and scholars) who shaped the plot. The happy ending to this story is
captured in a snapshot. A sample analysis of this photograph will illustrate the
functionality of the concept of mediated memories.
Media and Memory
Memory and media have conventionally been regarded as a hierarchical binary.
Since the days of Plato, who viewed the invention of writing and script as a de-
generation of “pure” memory (meaning: untainted by technology), every new
means of outsourcing our physical capacity to remember has generated resent-
ment.2 Most scholars acknowledge the continuation of memory’s “technologiza-
tion” – a term powerfully argued by Walter Ong – from manual and mechanical
means of inscription, such as pencils and printing presses, all the way to modern
electronic and digital tools.3 However, these scholars often only refer to the more
recent stages as “technologically mediated.”
With the advent of photography, and later film and television, writing was tacit-
ly transformed into an interior means of consciousness and remembrance,
whereupon electronic forms of media received the “artificial” label. The rise of
electronic images is often blamed for the decline of the printed word, while writ-
ing began being considered a more “authentic” container of past recollection – an
irony likely to recur with each new generation of technologies.4 The rise of elec-
tronic “external” memory has, however, also been applauded, an appreciation of-
ten based on the very same bifurcated models. Marshall McLuhan’s influential
theories on electronic media considered these technologies as the “extensions of
men,” which signaled the unprecedented enhancement of human perceptual ca-
pacities: photography and television were augmentations of the eye, whereas
audio technologies and radio extended the ear’s function. Similar dualities can
be observed in more recent debates, particularly in those that discuss how mass
media infiltrate collective memory. To this disjunction we should add the ten-
dency to define memory in ambiguous media terms: either as tools for inscribing
the past or as an archival resource. For instance, when French historian Pierre
Nora laments the enormous weight of media versions of the past on our historio-
graphy, he basically regards collective memory as a giant storehouse, an archive,
or a library.5 Jacques Le Goff takes exception with this conceptualization by point-
ing out that media representations form a filter through which the past is artifi-
cially ordered and edited – manufactured rather than registered.6 It is simulta-
neously a means of inscription and an external repository, so that media are
considered apparatuses for production and storage, modeled on the mind’s sup-
posed capacity to register and store experiences or impressions.
The vision of printed and electronic media as replacements for human memory
reverberates in expressions like this one by historian Raphael Samuel: “Memory-
keeping is a function increasingly assigned to the electronic media, while a new
awareness of the artifice of representation casts a cloud of suspicion over the
documentation of the past.”7 Even if unarticulated, dichotomies often inform
scholarly assessments of the media’s role in the process of remembrance. On the
one hand, media are considered aids to human memory, while, on the other
hand, they are perceived as a threat to the purity of remembrance. As an artificial
prosthesis, these technologies can free the brain of unnecessary burdens, thus
creating more space and energy for creative activity; but as a replacement, they
can also end up corrupting memory. Media are thus paradoxically defined as in-
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valuable yet insidious memory tools – a paradox that may arise from the tendency
to simultaneously insist on the division between memory and media, and yet
conflate their meanings.8
Mediation of Memory
Wading through the classics of media theory, we missed out on an important line
of scholarly thinking that reflects on the innate intertwining of media and mem-
ory. A distinct number of scholars, primarily from the cognitive and social
sciences, but also working in anthropology and cultural history, have done re-
search in the area of the “mediation of memory.” For a better understanding of
how memory and media interact, it was necessary to weigh the strengths and
weaknesses of this concept, which is used both in relation to personal reminis-
cence and collective memory. Psychologists point to the inextricable interconnec-
tions between acts of remembrance and its specific mediated objects through
which these acts materialize. Annette Kuhn claims that photographic images,
“far from being transparent renderings of a pre-existing reality, embody coded
references to, and even help construct, realities.”9 Photographs never represent a
fixed moment; they work to fix temporal notions and relations between past and
present. Steven Rose, a British scientist who discusses the physiological complex-
ity of human memory and consciousness at length, makes the case that mnemo-
nic aids, such as photos or videos, are often confused with our individual mem-
ories to such extent that we can hardly distinguish between the two.10 And
anthropologist Richard Chalfen, in his study of how home media help commu-
nicate individual perceptions of self to others, argues that our “snapshots are
us.”11
A similar notion of “mediation” can be found among historians discussing the
infiltration of mass media in collective memory. British sociologist John Urry, in
his essay “How Societies Remember the Past,” explains how electronic media
intrinsically change the way we create images of the past in the present.12 Mass
media, according to popular culture historian George Lipsitz, embody some of
our deepest hopes and engage some of our most profound sympathies; films,
records, or other cultural expressions constitute “a repository of collective mem-
ory that places immediate experience in the context of change over time.”13 Media
like television, and more recently computers, are devices that produce, store, and
reshape earlier versions of history.
We can witness this contrived interlocking most poignantly at the metaphori-
cal level; the “mediation of memory” refers equally to our understanding of med-
ia in terms of memory, as illustrated by the historians’ aforementioned accounts;
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and our comprehension of physiological memory in terms of media, evidenced
by the many metaphors that relate to various aspects of human memory. Ever
since the invention of writing tools, but most noticeably since the emergence of
photography in the nineteenth century, the human capacity to remember has
been indexed in daily language by referring to technical tools of reproduction.
Dutch psychologist Douwe Draaisma, who researched the historical evolution of
memory metaphors extensively, notes that media are a special conceptual cate-
gory for envisioning memory’s mechanics.14 For instance, the term “flash bulb
memory” – the proclivity to remember an important moment in full detail, in-
cluding its circumstances, time, and place in which the message was received –
derived its signifier from the realm of photography. In the twentieth century, the
terminology of film and video began to invade the discourse of memory and
memory research: life is said to be replayed “like a film” in the seconds prior to
death, and psychologists have extensively examined the phenomenon known as
“deathbed flash.” By the same token, we are now firmly grilled by the media’s
convention of visualizing a character’s recollection of past experiences as a “slow-
motion replay” or as a “flash back.” Metaphors are not simply a way of saying
something, but conceptual images that structure and give meaning to our lives.15
As media have become our foremost tools for memory, metaphorical reciprocity
signals their constitutive quality.
Mediated Experience
While co-teaching the course on media and memory, I gradually came to under-
stand that, however compelling and valid the “mediation of memory” concept
was, it hinged on a few premises that seriously restricted its explanatory scope.
First, an exclusive focus on either home media or mass media often presumes a
symbiotic union of home media with personal cultural memory, and of mass
media with its collective counterpart; such rigid distinctions hamper a fuller un-
derstanding of how individual and collective memory are shaped in conjunction.
Second, even though most theories acknowledge the convergence of memory and
media, the “mediation” concept frequently favors a single vector: media shape
our memories, but we seldom find testimony of media being shaped by memory,
indicating an implicit hierarchy. Let me address each of these conceptual defi-
ciencies in more detail.
It is practical to assume that personal cultural memory is generated by what we
call “home media” (family photography, home videos, and tape recorders),
whereas collective cultural memory gets produced by “mass media” (television,
CDs, DVDs, and professional photography). But that simple division, even if it is
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functional, is also conceptually flawed, as it obscures the fact that people derive
their autobiographical memories from both personal and collective media
sources. Media sociologist John Thompson, who highlights the role of individual
agency in media reception, explains the hermeneutic nature of this relation-
ship.16 He argues that “lived experience,” in our contemporary culture, is inter-
laced with “mediated experience.”Mediation, then, comprises not only the media
tools we wield in the private sphere, but also the active choices of individuals to
incorporate parts of culture into their lives. Experience is neither completely
“lived” nor entirely “mediated,” as the encounter between the two is a continu-
ously evolving life-project to define the self in a larger cultural context. What
makes mediated experience different from the lived experience of two hundred
years ago is the fact that individuals need no longer share a common locale to
pursue commonality; the growing availability of mediated experience creates
“new opportunities, new options, new arenas for self-experimentation.”17 If we
accept a preliminary distinction between home and mass media, we not only fail
to account for media shaping our sense of individuality and collectivity in con-
junction, but we equally obscure how individuals actively contribute to the collec-
tive media that shape their individuality.
The second deficiency in the “mediation of memory” concept concerns the
implied hierarchy between external and internal memory, or in plain terms, be-
tween technology and the mind. Understandably, our metaphors often explain
the invisible in terms of the visible and knowable; that is why the mysteries of
mental processing are often elucidated in terms of media technology – technol-
ogy that is at once transparent and mechanically predictable. But how about turn-
ing the vector back on its arrow: could our development and use of various media
technologies be informed by the perceptual mechanisms, the sensory motor ac-
tions that underlie memory formation?18 An intricate aspect of remembering is
that mental perceptions – ideas, impressions, insights, feelings – manifest them-
selves through specific sensory modes: sounds, images, smells. The media we
have invented and nursed to maturity over the years incorporate a similar ten-
dency to capture ideas or experiences in sensory inscriptions, such as spoken or
written words, still or moving images, recorded sounds or music. One memory
rarely encompasses all of the senses, because we tend to remember by selecting
particular ones. For instance, we may recall a mood, locale, or era through a par-
ticular smell (e.g. Marcel Proust’s madeleine, or the smell of apple pie in the oven
that may trigger the image of your mother’s kitchen on Saturday afternoons), or
we may remember a person by his nasal voice or her twinkling eyes.19 The same
holds true for memories captured through media technologies. Rather than ex-
haustive recordings, we commonly select a specific evocative framework within
which we store a particular aspect of memory – a still photograph to store visual
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aspects, or a diary entry to retain interpretative details and subjective reflection, a
video to capture the movement of baby’s first steps. We have a large variety of
preferred sensory and medial modes at our disposal to inscribe specific mem-
ories, but the intriguing question is: do the media technologies available dictate
which sensory aspects of an event we inscribe in our memory, or do our sensory
perceptions dictate which medium we choose to record the experience?
Mediated Memories
After I had come to dismiss the notion of memory’s “mediation,” I needed an
alternative concept. One of Thomas Elsaesser’s articles offered the missing link
in my theoretical concatenation of mind, technology, and culture. Thus far, I had
argued that instruments of memory inscription privilege particular sensorial per-
ceptions over others and, to some extent, define the shape of our future recall.
And yet, even if media technologies privilege a particular sense (photography
prefers sight, tape recorders sound) that does not mean there is a one-to-one
relationship between the sensorial aspects of memory and the preferred record-
ing instrument. On the contrary, a still picture may invoke the sound of a child’s
laughter long after that child has grown into an adult. Most people have uncon-
scious preferences for a particular mode of inscription. For instance, they favor
moving images over still pictures or oral accounts over written ones. Although
part of that propensity is undoubtedly rooted in individual mindsets, another
part is inevitably defined by the cultural apparatus available and socially accepted
at that time. But this apparatus is far from static. Each time frame redefines the
mutual shaping of mind and technology as one is always implied in the other.
The brain stipulates the camera as much as the camera stimulates the brain.
Mediated experience, as Elsaesser notes, has become a generalized cultural con-
dition:
In our mobility, we are “tour”-ists of life; we use the camcorder with our hands or
often merely in our heads, to reassure ourselves that this is “me, now, here.” Our
experience of the present is always already (media) memory, and this memory repre-
sents the recaptured attempt at self-presence: possessing the experience in order to
possess the memory, in order to possess the self.20
In other words, memory is not mediated by media, but media and memory mu-
tually constitute our everyday experiences. Media and memory inscribe and
transform each other.
It was at this point that I decided to replace the term “mediation of memory”
with “mediated memories,” a term that offered a more comprehensive prism for
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understanding the mutual shaping involved in personal and collective cultural
memory. Based on Elsaesser’s insight, I defined mediated memories, the key
concept of my book, as “the activities and objects we produce and appropriate by
means of media technologies, for creating and recreating a sense of past, present,
and future of our selves in relation to others.”21 Mediated memory objects and
acts are crucial sites for negotiating the relationship between self and culture at
large, between what counts as private and what as public, and between indivi-
duality and collectivity. As stilled moments in the present, mediated memories
reflect and construct intersections between past and future – remembering and
projecting lived experience.
Indeed, people deploy media technologies to create a repository of autobiogra-
phical reflections of self, of family, and perhaps of larger circles beyond the im-
mediate private sphere. They wield photo and video cameras, computers, pens
and pencils, audio techniques, and so on, to record moments in which “lived”
experience intermingles with “mediated experience.” During later stages of re-
call, they may alter the mediation of their records so as to relive, adjust, change,
revise, or even erase previously inscribed moments as part of a continuous pro-
ject of self-formation. Concrete mediated memory objects stand for encompass-
ing acts of memory; collections of mediated objects, stored in shoeboxes, often
become the material and symbolic connection between generations whose per-
ception of “family” or “self” changes over time, which is in part due to social and
cultural changes, and in part dependent on the intergenerational continuity each
family member brings into this heritage. Beyond immediate family circles, mate-
rial inscriptions may become part of a larger project, for instance, a documentary,
and thus add to a shared collective remembrance.
Through the looking glass of mediated memories, I could magnify the inter-
sections between personal and collective, between past and future, and between
mind, technology, and culture. Mediated memories involve individuals carving
out their place in history, defining personal remembrance in the face of larger
cultural frameworks. Individuals make selections from a culture that surrounds
them, yet they concurrently shape that collectivity we call culture. Cultural mem-
ory, hence, is not an epistemological category – something we can have, lack, or
lose – and neither is mediation the inevitable effacement, distortion, or enhance-
ment of human memory. Rather, cultural memory can be viewed as a process and
performance, the understanding of which is indispensable to the perennial hu-
man activity of building social systems for cultural connectivity. Mediated mem-
ories reflect this cultural process played out by various agents – individuals, tech-
nologies, conventions, institutions, etc. – whose acts and products we should
examine as confrontations between individuality and collectivity.
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Snapshot
The “making of” a concept elucidates how a theory came into being – a concate-
nation of insights building on each other and shaping a new concept that can
subsequently be challenged by other scholars. Such is the nature of academic
knowledge building: a theoretical universe in which all phenomena are con-
nected through the combined eyes and brains of people making connections.
After a journey that took me through various disciplines, I finally settled on
mediated memories as a useful concept to theorize why and how people use
media technologies to remember. The marriage of two distinct themes into an
inextricable knot is not the happy end of a simple story; on the contrary, the un-
ion remains volatile, prone to new insights, to social and technological develop-
ments. In the meantime, I can only show the value of a concept by elucidating
how it yields specific new insights.
There is a widely distributed picture showing Thomas Elsaesser standing
amidst a group of some ten colleagues and PhD students from the Amsterdam
Department of Media Studies. Their smiling faces and their clothing betray a
happy celebration of which Elsaesser is clearly the focus. It was taken on 6 Sep-
tember 2006, in the reception hall of the Maagdenhuis, the University of Am-
sterdam’s main building. The photograph was taken just after the opening cere-
monies for that academic year. Elsaesser had just received the Queen’s Medal of
Honor in appreciation for his work as a distinguished film scholar. Still a little
befuddled by the unexpected honor bestowed upon him, he let us take the pic-
ture. We cleared the area, grouped around him, gave him flowers, and all smiled
for the photographer. This picture obviously connotes a staged act, a ceremonial
posing for the eye of a camera that was arranged to inscribe this glorious mo-
ment.
As an act of memory, the digital photograph connotes more than a stilled mo-
ment in the past, as it actually connects Elsaesser’s individual experience of this
moment to the collective experience involved in the staging of this act. My mem-
ory is distinctly defined by that collective act, but needless to say, my reconstruc-
tion of it remains highly idiosyncratic. Preparations for this ceremonial photo-op
had already commenced years earlier. Since we wanted to extend our apprecia-
tion for Elsaesser’s work beyond the informal circuit, we followed official guide-
lines that pushed our application all the way up to the Queen. Many known and
unknown hands were implicated in this process, and when the word finally ar-
rived, our biggest concern was to keep the positive decision and preparations for
the ceremony a secret. When we arrived at the ceremony site, on a pretense in-
volving the university’s chancellor, Elsaesser still had no idea what was about to
happen. The goal of all this fuss only began to dawn on him when he was called
78 José van Dijck
up on the stage. Everything was scripted, including the photograph taken at the
end of the ceremony, and Elsaesser found himself playing a lead role in a film he
had never seen. His and our experience of the present was already a (mediated)
memory, as the cameras were ready to roll and turn a private experience into a
public event.
As an object of memory, the photograph (perhaps more than the Queen’s me-
dal itself) signifies a token of our appreciation. When I look at it again, I see a
smiling Thomas Elsaesser surrounded by a grinning group of colleagues who
have managed to bring a secretive process to a happy end and keep the surprise
party a surprise. I also see a guru standing among his disciples, a teacher leading
his pupils. Moreover, I see a man fathering a new generation of children and
grandchildren – in the metaphorical sense; a functional family that even during
its dysfunctional moments maintains a strong sense of unity with regard to the
outside world. It reminds me of a typical family photo I keep stored in one of my
old shoeboxes. The photo has many symbolic levels, which trigger a number of
memories of a collective past that leads up to this single moment. I am sure the
snapshot will have an impact on future memories. Every time I look at this photo,
my memories of the moment will change, simply because the present projects
altered interpretations of self and the world upon the stilled object. Memories,
like the self and the world, are always in transition, and that is why media are
transitory even if they are static.
This particular snapshot is possessed by many different people, as it was dis-
tributed widely via the Internet. But those memories are exclusively mine; they
are not Elsaesser’s, not those of my colleagues. To my mind, the mediatedness of
this memory stands out more than anything. Citing Elsaesser again: “this mem-
ory represents the recaptured attempt at self-presence: possessing the experience
in order to possess the memory, in order to possess the self.”22 Our lives are not
mediated by media, nor are they simply informed by media. Pictures, videos, and
other artifacts do not replace, distort, or confirm memories. We are who we are
because we have constructed our experiences and our memories through and in
media. Those media are part and parcel of our selves. We do not take photo-
graphs to help us remember (or, seen from a different angle, to prevent us from
forgetting) our past; we take and use pictures to construct a past. Each time I look
at this picture of Elsaesser and his colleagues, the past whips up a story of “me,
now, here.” Every picture is a still in the “making of” the present.
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Post-Fordism, Post-Politics, Parapraxis, and Cinema
Drehli Robnik
Yesterday’s Misfits: Post-Fordist Mind-Game Cinema
In the Foucauldian section of his reading of The Silence of the Lambs, Thomas
Elsaesser interprets the Buffalo Bill character as a kind of over-achiever who:
literalizes the invitation to self-improvement and “self-storage” which contemporary
society addresses to its subjects as consumers. ... Bill becomes a subversive, because
wholly dedicated, worker at the site of body- and self-commodification. By taking the
system more seriously than it takes itself, he is in the vanguard of a particular form of
consumption, that of self-expression turned “self-fashioning,” engaged in the perma-
nent bricolage art of identity formation.1
The Foucauldian move here is the shift from a notion of power as repressive to a
conception of power as productive, mining populations and subjects for ever new
energies, and as modulating, i.e., flexibly adapting to any aberrations in the beha-
vior of the governed, and thus as capable of integrating such disturbances into an
expanded, intensified system. Thus, highlighting the usefulness and dutifulness
of Bill’s acts of self-observation and self-perfection, Elsaesser arrives at the con-
clusion that “[t]he line between the criminal (the extreme embodiment of the
system itself, which takes the system at its word) and the resister/contester of
the system ... becomes a fine one indeed.”2
This logic according to which the transgression enriches the norm and ex-
pands its rule is also at work in other recent studies of Elsaesser on what, for
some duration, he labeled “post-classical cinema.” In two essays on different in-
carnations of Hollywood’s ambiguous “newness,” the emphasis is on logics of
production (rather than docile self-commodification, as in Bill’s case), placing
two moments in the recent history of American mainstream cinema within the
genealogy of the regime of capitalist accumulation known as post-Fordism. First,
in his introduction to the reader on New Hollywood Cinema, Elsaesser proposes
an alternative to the canonical, fetishizing critical/cinephile view of New Holly-
wood as oppositional to the main current of American cinema. He suggests see-
ing maverick or underground filmmakers and cinematic practices as “pilot fish,”
as an avant-garde preparing and rehearsing Hollywood’s move from an overall
Fordist logic, which restricts film images – what they render perceptible as well
as their production and consumption – to routinized disciplines, into a post-For-
dist logic capable of valorizing deviations and rule-breaking, for instance, by way
of the paradoxically standardized exception called the “blockbuster.” In this view,
not only did the “counter-cultural” experimentation within American popular cin-
ema help to modernize a Hollywood in crisis (however vaguely), it also “played” –
rather than worked – through its images new, more flexible norms of meaningful
subjectivity and sociality. With his outlook on cinema as a site for the rehearsal
and capitalization of social productivity, Elsaesser writes of Hollywood circa 1970
as “harvesting and harnessing the counter-cultural energies (including their anti-
social excesses) for new kinds of work, especially in those sectors where, accord-
ing to Hardt and Negri, economic and cultural phenomena can no longer be dis-
tinguished” and as “giving, for instance, the psychopath (as well as other margin-
alized, pathologized or criminalized existences, including ‘hippies’) a potentially
valuable function in periods of transition.”3
Second, there is the cultural logic and epistemology of the “mind-game film,” a
recent phenomenon within Hollywood as well as global mainstream cinema.4
Elsaesser cautions against a – cognitivist/narratological – reduction of these
films’ textual bifurcations, phenomenological ambiguities, and retroactive dy-
namics (the built-in necessity to [re-]read them from their surprise endings, as in
Shyamalan’s The Sixth Sense). Not to reduce the playful weirdness of mind-
game films to mere deviations from the norms and normality of commonsense
story-telling is a precondition to Elsaesser’s interpretation that sees the mental
states of protagonists, largely unframed and encompassing all of the film’s articu-
lation, as “productive pathologies.” Reading films here opens up an ethos of con-
fronting sense-making potentials of insane thinking. The overall “‘avant-garde’ or
‘pilot’ or ‘prototype’ function [of mind-game films] within the ‘institution cin-
ema’” is “to train, elaborate and, yes: ‘test’ the textual forms, narrative tropes and
story motifs that can serve such a re-negotiation of the rules of the game.”5
Pathologies such as paranoia, understood as a hypersensitivity to changes in the
environment, or the amnesia of Memento’s protagonist who practices self-pro-
gramming by inscribing his body – and even Buffalo Bill’s compulsive self-obser-
vation and self-fashioning – manifest their productivity as tactics and subjectiv-
ities suitable for the labor and power regimes of post-Fordist network and control
societies.6
If we regard these points as amounting to the formula that yesterday’s distur-
bances and failures are today’s assets and high-level performances, then Elsaes-
ser also gives us his second thoughts on these schematics. The assessment that
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New Hollywood’s “misfits, rebels and outsiders were necessary for ‘the system’ to
first adjust and then renew itself,” he intimates, “may be too neat – or cynical”;
and he hopes that it is “not too cynically [put]” to state that Hollywood’s “auteurs
drew their self-understanding from identifying with the ideology of the European
artist (or the freewheeling spirit of the Corman operation and the various coun-
ter-cultures), while at another level they also played the role of the pilot fish.”7
Cynicism is a term and a stance worth pondering in the context of Elsaesser’s
writings on cinema’s role within mediatized social life; we reencounter it (in
brackets) in his dense 2001 essay on trauma theory: “[T]rauma theory would be
called upon to rescue interpretation and hermeneutics from the relativism of
‘there is no hors-texte,’ from the fundamentalism of the ‘authentic experience’
but also from the (cynical) tyranny of the ‘performative,’ since trauma poses the
enigma of interpretation as a negative performative.”8 The cynicism which El-
saesser has in mind here is the “genealogical” appropriation and reworking of
pasts in the service of the successful performing and fashioning of present med-
ia-cultural identities. As an antidote to this, Elsaesser’s philosophy of cinema and
media history offers an “archeological” ethos willing to encounter the irreducibly
insisting, irritating virtualities of non-appropriated pasts and presents.9
There is also a certain cynicism that Elsaesser’s own argument seems to be
willing to risk. To quote again from the essay on the mind-game film: “Read
‘politically,’ in the light of Foucault, mind-game films would show how percep-
tual or somatic faculties released or manifest by illness are ... ‘socialized’: ... the
illness is made to work, fitting a body (through its mind no longer ‘in control’)
around a new set of social tasks and political relations.”10 Elsaesser’s position
certainly differs from the American pop sociology he refers to, in which, under
the headline “Everything Bad Is Good for You,” sophisticated HBO series and
mind-game films are advocated as educational tools for the young, effective “in
adapting the working population to the social technologies that promise their
economic survival, maintain civic cohesion and assure America’s hegemonic po-
sition in the world.”11 Pointing to such instrumentalist notions of pedagogy-
through-media as well as to Foucault’s theory of governmentality and Deleuze’s
concept of the control society, Elsaesser, at the end of his essay, wants to leave
open the question of whether cinema is “part of the solution” or “part of the
problem.”12
In avoiding a formalist reductionism of cinema’s social role as well as a cine-
phile/film-critical longing for a film art untainted by capital, Elsaesser, however,
emphasizes cinema’s usefulness to a post-Fordist, flexible adaptation to a degree
that his argument seems to feed into an “economistic” determinism (“culturalis-
tically” rearticulated as it may be) which pertains to neo-liberal ideology as well as
to Hardt and Negri’s ultra-left celebration of the skilled, knowing “multitude.”
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What is evaporated in this system-theoretical affirmation of weird cinema train-
ing people to be normal according to new rules is the very category of politics
which Elsaesser invokes with his claim to read mind-game films politically with
Foucault. One can object to this claim with Jacques Rancière’s philosophy of pol-
itics as a “subjectification in disagreement,” that the management of the well-
ordered knowledge and productivity of subjects is not an issue of politics, but of
the “police,” in the expanded, Foucauldian sense of government and bio-power
which Rancière draws on.13
Trauma as Metaphor and Failure Taken at Its Word
Elsaesser’s project to highlight the successful contribution of cinema to a well-
performing machinery of post-Fordist capitalism comes quite close to that unlim-
ited capacity for revaluation and appropriation which is labeled “cynical tyranny
of the performative” in his trauma theory essay (cf. supra). In order to draw a line
here and to dissolve an all-too neat equation of the pragmatics of cinema with the
smooth functioning of social energies, one can, however, turn to another Elsaes-
serian concept outlined in his writings on trauma and terror. The concept of
“failed performance,” loosely derived from the Freudian Fehlleistung and ex-
panded into a cinematic/mediatized “poetics of parapraxis,” points to a pragmatic
orientation which differs from the mere functioning and “success stories” of gen-
ealogical identity-formation.
Looking at mind-game cinema’s “productive pathologies” from the vantage-
point of the parapraxis – that which, etymologically, is not yet a praxis or is a
praxis besides itself – what comes to the foreground is what these concepts have
in common. They both act as media for rendering a problem visible, sensible – as
“early warning systems” with respect to the way in which mental insanities fulfill
in an excessive way demands made by governmental power (which, Elsaesser
notes, also gives Buffalo Bill’s efforts their “subversive” edge) and as a mode of
reading media images in constellations, as in the following quotation: “[The med-
ia] culture of confession and witnessing, of exposure and self-exposure ... has
made trauma theory the recto, and therapeutic television (also disparagingly
called trash TV) the verso of democracy’s failure to ‘represent’ its citizens’ perso-
nal concern in the public sphere.”14 Turning a metaphorical media image (TV
culture’s notorious “survivors” of experiences ranging from political violence and
natural disaster to childhood consumption habits or long periods of illness and
even to the time spent in jungles or in re-created 1950s school environments as
candidates of TV shows) and a metaphorized concept (trauma) into each other is
the becoming-thought-image of a question which in Elsaesser’s writing comes up
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almost as frequently as the “recto/verso” diagram: What is the problem or trauma
to which this or that media image offers itself as a solution or symptom?
Reading media through trauma means deciphering a crisis of political belong-
ing. All the self-confessed “traumatized” and self-stylists of reality-TV who, sob-
bing or screaming, display a survived life crisis or a frivolous enjoyment indicate,
in Elsaesser’s perspective, not a genealogical “carnival of identities,” but a loss of
possibilities for democratic representation. It is exactly there that we find a trau-
ma, or (which amounts to the same thing) the blind spot of a perception which
sees trauma everywhere. Or, as Elsaesser puts it in connection with media
images of recent German history, while trauma culture might have become the
most comfortable way for German society to speak to itself, there is a genuine
trauma, an unrepresentable absence, to be deciphered in the 1968 generation’s
obsession with working through (the Nazi past) and the 1989 generation’s fancy
for playful appropriation (of images left behind by history, including periods of
political violence): the widespread loss of any belief in the possibility to contribute
to a changed world through individual or collective public action.15 Instead of this
lost pragmatics, the present metaphorical extension of the notion of terror serves
to label as “terrorist” various attempts to reclaim public activity (swallowing up
what once was called “resistance”); at the same time, the universalization of trau-
ma has firmly established the idea that history and politics (or rather: historical
experience driven from a well-policed course by the immodesty of politics) pro-
duce nothing but victims. For this situation, Elsaesser introduces the image of
terror and trauma as “Siamese twins” of political discourse – the semblance of a
pre-given, complementary opposition, into which, however, the concept of para-
praxis can intervene. Failed performances in politics and in cinema (which we
will turn to in a second) are successful in that they, however inadvertently, avoid
the extremes of traumatic paralysis and excessive terrorist action, while at the
same time marking and keeping open the site which these extremes attempt to
occupy: that of meaningful, purposive action. Thus, parapractical action testifies
to the still existing, or rather insisting, hope that public action and politics can be
possible (again).16
Although Elsaesser intimates a perspective on terrorist acts reminiscent of Sla-
voj Žižek’s messianistic invocation of the 9/11 attacks as stand-ins for a genuinely
revolutionary rupture in the continuum of neo-liberal policing, his analysis is far
more complex and reflexive in confronting head-on terrorism as a phenomenon
of media culture.17 In his study of two semi-documentary German films on the
legacy of the RAF, the West-German Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction),
and its political terrorist acts during the 1970s, he marks politics as exactly that
which insists beyond the closure of a “post-Fordization” logics. The argument
goes as follows: First, there is the “double failure” of the RAF, “as artists and as
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political activists.” Politically, the RAF failed because, instead of mass mobiliza-
tion, they were “merely able to engender ‘imaginary’ identifications around
either bank robberies, prison break-outs and killing sprees, or designer labels,
rock music and fast cars.”18 Artistically, they failed because their “conceptual art”
version of a politics of the street, while attempting to render intelligible (post-)
urban security spaces cleansed of democratic activity, ended up producing spec-
tacles of a “dangerous lifestyle” that served as blueprints for today’s playful pop-
appropriations of left-wing militancy and terrorism (as in Che Guevara or “Prada
Meinhof” clothing). There is even the cynical view, which Elsaesser cites, in
which the RAF appears as outright useful, an invention of the bourgeois state in
its move towards the “information society,” legitimizing all sorts of “curtailment
of civil liberties.”19 As he points out:
What this “mirroring” of the state by the RAF flattens is the underlying dynamic of
identification: not the kind of imaginary identification ... on the part of the RAF’s
political or pop sympathizers, but the act of symbolic identification … [T]he RAF took
the state at its word, mirrored the demand made upon the individual by the state,
accepted the symbolic mandate that is implied in being a citizen.20
This is how a mere post-Fordist logic – failed performances become useful to a
system renewing itself through integration of disturbances – gives way to a para-
practical argument. Seeing the RAF as taking the state at its word points towards
the performance of a failure, the exposure of a problem (similarly, reading Buffa-
lo Bill as taking the system at its word exposes the coercive dimension of self-
perfection). What becomes visible-as-legible in this thought-image of the RAF
performing the state through failure is, for instance, the “missing people” (a no-
tion put forward by Deleuze), the absence of the manifestation of a legitimizing
popular will on the part of the terrorists as well as on the part of the state, both
proclaiming themselves as representatives of the people. In the face of such a
crisis of representation, Elsaesser’s concluding argument aims at the formation
of a political subject via a failure of belonging:
It must have seemed to the RAF that it was only by putting themselves outside the
law that they could constitute a “political group,” and again, not in the practical sense
of organizing a non-authoritarian Wohngemeinschaft, or in the formal sense of regis-
tering as an extra-parliamentary opposition, a sort of NGO for internal affairs, but in
the sense of being political subjects and constituting a “we.”21
It is important to note that what counts in the RAF’s “making the act of becom-
ing ‘criminals’ the founding gesture of its group identity”22 is not its embracing
of a rebel lifestyle, but its very breaking with lifestyle, its tearing loose from a
culturalist and identitarian definition of subjectivity – in this case: from the post-
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1968 counter-cultures of hippie collectives and student communes and their
sense of being on the right side by virtue of their organization and stylization of
the everyday. So, “what sort of ‘we,’ what group identity, is symbolizable in a civic,
political sense?”23 With this question that Elsaesser raised in the conclusion of
his RAF essay, especially when faced with foundationalist attempts at nullifying
the very question in the form of identity politics and new nationalisms, the con-
nection of Elsaesser’s concept to Chantal Mouffe’s and Jacques Rancière’s the-
ories of democracy comes to the fore (the latter being explicitly referenced in the
formulation of the question). In order to trace that connection, it is rewarding to
turn to Elsaesser’s early writings on the politics and aesthetics of mainstream
cinema; in them, we retrospectively, perhaps even retroactively, re-encounter the
issue of a performative “we” that impersonates a rupture, the subjectification of a
failure, a “we” that “blew it.”
Failure and Fuller
In 1971, in the first issue of the film magazine Monogram, Elsaesser already pon-
dered the question of what mainstream cinema teaches people. Under the head-
line “Why Hollywood?,” he opposed the contempt which then-current counter-
cultures had for American movies and argued in favor of Old Hollywood. In its
classical period, American film served as an “education of sensibility,” taking
characters as well as audiences “from simple impulse to experience of complex-
ity” and to acknowledging “the impossibility of instantaneous gratification.” In
contrast to classical Hollywood’s teaching of sublimation, contradiction, and – as
a category of experience more resonant in his “traumatological” writings – delay,
Elsaesser detected a celebration of “outbursts of unmotivated and wholly irra-
tional violence” in contemporary American cinema as “evidence of an unsubli-
mated energy” (The Wild Bunch), as well as an artistically nihilistic opportu-
nism in which “essential contradictions are being slurred over by a cult of the
aesthetically pleasing” (Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid).24
The latter critical point reappeared four years later in a better known Mono-
gram article, which already in its title seemed to announce a future key concept:
“The Pathos of Failure” was diagnosed as the predominant narrative and ethical
stance of Hollywood’s youth-oriented road movies circa 1970; these films re-
flected “the experience of a rebellion whose impulse towards change aborted”
and “the moral and emotional gestures of a defeated generation,” increasingly
resorting to the self-pity of those who feel their identity denied by the establish-
ment.25 Apart from the recurring critical verdict on Hollywood’s catering to
hip(pie) audiences by undialectically glorifying a rebel-as-loser habitus, there is
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also a similarity in the concluding arguments of the two Monogram articles. In
1971, Elsaesser wrote about Easy Rider:
And just as in the classical movie, the hero learns something from his quest about
himself and about the world, so Billy and Captain America learn the lesson of total
failure – that they cannot live among the hippies, that the American South is murder-
ous, and that, in short “we blew it.” Given the present ideological climate, such an
admission may seem the sign of a new realism.26
Elsaesser was quick to add that such a bitter, self-devastating “realism” had been
the very starting point for films by Nicholas Ray in the classical Hollywood and
was therefore not something invented by New Hollywood. Even more significant
in this context is how the “Pathos of Failure” article ends on a note similar to this
realism implied in the admission of total failure. In his 1975 text, Elsaesser sees
the slow-motion car race that becomes a “burning” of the image in the projector
at the end of Two-Lane Blacktop – the road movie planned by its producers as a
successor to Easy Rider’s triumph and ending up as a huge commercial failure –
as a “revaluation of physical reality,” with “the momentum of action [giving] way
to the moment of gesture and the body.” The last sentence of the article reads:
“[T]he unmotivated hero and the pathos of failure will be the two negatives that
result in a positive.”27
Two negatives under whose sign a new, post-heroic but also post-political valor-
ization of reality announces itself, with the body in its action-thwarting givenness
acting as a “positive”: we can see this pair as early – dare I say embryonic – in-
carnations of Elsaesser’s “Siamese twins” trauma and terror. On the one hand, we
have the embracing of universalized traumatization, resulting in passivity, paraly-
sis, and self-pity. On the other hand, we have the terrorist perversion of the genu-
ine act, corresponding to, well, if not the moment of gesture and body, then cer-
tainly to those Wild Bunch-like outbursts of unmotivated, unsublimated energy
and instantaneous fulfillment which in 1971 Elsaesser saw as taking the place of
Hollywood’s temporalization of image and experience by way of delay. What at
the time appeared to be nihilistic is in retrospect legible as an “early warning
sign” of the formation of a new socio-aesthetical regime of revaluating reality
and revalorizing its profitable energetic potentials, a post-Fordist logic centered
on (“repressively”) desublimated self-enjoyment, on the authenticity of rebels and
on the “wild” productivity of band- and bunch-like teams in creative industries.28
Or should we, taking the masculinity crisis and psychotic violence of The Wild
Bunch’s Westerners as an optical device, even see a link between Easy Rider’s
self-pitying hippie cowboys biking across the prairies dressed in suede and
leather, and a self-fashioning post-Fordist Buffalo Bill dressed in women’s skin?
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Wherever this takes us, it seems that the detour – from the ethical act of poli-
tical subjectification via breaking with social and cultural belonging to New Hol-
lywood’s unmotivated heroes – has brought us to a dead end: It seems that the
“We” that impersonates a failure has taken us, more inescapably than before, into
the closed circuits of a genealogy of a post-Fordist subsuming of any-life-what-
ever. Again, one should call upon the poetics of parapraxis to wrest, rescue, and
reclaim the dimension of the political in its non-givenness from this closure. I
suggest turning to an even earlier Elsaesser text to find the concept of a film
aesthetic of performed failure that goes beyond both the cultural habitus of self-
victimization and the ethos of a self-realization so anxious to be “fully” expressed.
What is beyond the full is Fuller, the American filmmaker of that name, por-
trayed as a subject of political cinema in an essay first published in 1969 by the
then 26-year-old Thomas Elsaesser.
In his essay, simply titled “Sam Fuller’s Shock Corridor,” Elsaesser starts out
with finding in Fuller a concept of subjectivity that contrasts with the classical
American movie hero. Instead of an individualist relationship to the self and the
world, there is in Fuller’s protagonists
a sense of inquisitiveness which often gives way to a kind of obsessive fascination. …
the logic of their actions is that of a strictly internal, existential purposiveness: to
penetrate into unknown territory, to go behind enemy lines, or to desert to the enemy
altogether. ... Parallel to the action, we therefore witness a process in which [an] ex-
ternal necessity (the mission, the goal) is validated existentially. For what do these
characters care about Communism, the war in Indochina or Korea, the American
Civil War, the Sioux nation – if not because invariably their fight becomes purely and
simply a question of survival?29
Fuller’s 1957 Run of the Arrow is Elsaesser’s implied reference when he men-
tions the Civil War and the Sioux, and although his essay has Fuller’s Shock
Corridor as the main object of inquiry, this western is a good example of the
kind of political existentialism it was aiming for. Run of the Arrow is about a
Southern rebel soldier who, right after the Civil War, joins the Sioux nation – not,
however, for any “foundationalist” reason, such as a culturalist fascination with
an allegedly unalienated fullness of Indian life, as invoked in Dances With
Wolves. Rather, the “Johnny Reb” character becomes a Sioux because he refuses
to accept the surrender of the Confederacy to the United States; he prefers se-
paration to union, splits from his people who have decided to make their peace
with the enemy, lives in the desert as a traveling one-man-war, and only joins the
Sioux – as a white man and thus their enemy – after being captured by them and
surviving the ordeal which gives the film its title. Being granted a Sioux identity
as a reward for not having died at their hands, he accepts it because they are the
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enemy of his enemy (the US military). Nevertheless, he gives up his Indian life
and wife at the end when he finds himself unable to bear the sight of the tribe
torturing a captured Union officer and relieves his sworn enemy from his suffer-
ing by shooting him. So the outlaw is an Indian because he refuses to be a US
citizen and ends up being part of the United States, as his Sioux wife tells him,
purely because he is unable to remain a Sioux. Significantly, he is not a self-pity-
ing, New Hollywood-style outsider; rather, the way in which Rod Steiger plays
him makes him appear as unlikable in his high-pitched, self-pitying hate-ser-
mons. Devoid of any positive qualities to found a rebel identity or imaginary
identification upon, he becomes a political subject according to a logic similar to
the RAF’s founding rupture: by not-belonging, by tearing himself loose from a
cultural habitus. In this he accepts the symbolic mandate of being a representa-
tive. As Elsaesser writes (with regard to Shock Corridor’s split-subject protago-
nist): “The schizophrenic, traitor to reality, is the true hero of America, because
he alone is representative by taking upon him the cross of contradiction.”30
Elsaesser’s point on heroic schizophrenia (a version of “productive pathology”
– or a verso to its recto?) is the result of an argument about America’s rational,
freedom-desiring impulses demonstrating the irrational and oppressive nature of
that society. We might read here a philosophy of history in the vein of the Dialec-
tic of Englightenment. Actually, it is Herbert Marcuse whom Elsaesser quotes re-
garding the concept of the American “enemy within.” The reference to Marcuse,
a key thinker of the events of 1968, can be seen as a theoretical linkage from
Critical Theory to a Deleuzian/Guattarian ethics of the “schizo,” which Elsaesser,
from today’s perspective, seems to invoke by in fact anticipating it.31 Let us, how-
ever, retrace at this point the connection between Elsaesser’s political aesthetics
of cinema and philosophies of (radical) democracy: It is vital that the quest for
self-knowledge on which the Fuller hero embarks and his representative role –
his readiness for a position which the RAF took up as an impossible one – that,
in short, Fuller’s politics are not based on a liberal phenomenology of the rational
pursuit of individual interest. Elsaesser writes that in Fuller’s films, “commun-
ism is not an ideological notion, not even primarily a political one, but an existen-
tial one.”32 This political existentialism refutes a reductive understanding of poli-
tics as a choice between offerings in favor of a radical concept of politics as a
milieu of existence and as the genuine production of a subject. This is a subjecti-
fication as the event of a political appearance, to use Rancière’s terms, a subjecti-
fication in disagreement and disidentification. Or, to put it in Mouffe’s ontologi-
cal vocabulary of “the political,” Elsaesser’s view of Fuller’s cinema as one in
which the Western subject positions him/herself in a precarious relationship
with, and thus in acknowledgement of, an “enemy” (not an “other,” because there
is no “self” to presuppose or rediscover) subscribes to an “agonistic” definition of
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politics in categories of the irreducibility of public passions, or affects, and of the
performativity of adversarial we/they distinctions.33 “[T]here can be no question
of Fuller’s heroes being ‘objective’ about Communism. Indeed, I would claim
that they have to be violently anti-communist, racists, maniacs, etc., in order to
encounter the ‘other,’ the alternative on a sufficiently intense emotional level,”
Elsaesser writes, and he calls this “the didactic-provocative nature of Fuller’s cin-
ema.”34
The issue of cinematic teaching is brought up here with a focus on neither the
rehearsal of flexibilization nor rationalization; in the latter respect, Elsaesser’s
position in 1969 differs from contemporary critiques of cinematic ideology –
from attempts to rationalize images that “naturalize” power relations, a project
inspired not least of all by a wish to “sanitize” cinema, to “put it right.”35 Instead,
Elsaesser offers a theory of a productively “wrong” and ostensibly “inadequate”
cinema, which is later rephrased as the poetic of parapraxis. What Elsaesser’s
more recent writings on performed failure refer to as “strangely adequate discre-
pancies,” “conceptual slapstick,” or “slips of the tongue” as “camouflaged articu-
lations” with respect to New German Cinema, could be analyzed in Verboten!,
Shock Corridor or other Fuller films. Fuller’s B-movies are dedicated to disrup-
tions in the sensible, to non-identitary subjectifications and self-founding
“speech-events” (Rancière). This aesthetic of the “democratic act” sheds some
light on what passes as “political film” in today’s American or German main-
stream cinema.36
Belonging Twice Over: A Body Too Much
To conclude with a recent piece of “unsane” cinema, let us briefly turn once more
to Siamese twins; not exactly to Elsaesser’s discursive Siamese twins of terror and
trauma, however, but to the protagonist(s) of the Farrelly Brothers comedy Stuck
On You (2003). At first sight, the film may seem a mere joyful rehearsal of post-
Fordist diversity management, a lesson in flexibilization in which two men con-
joined at the hips take the place given to pilot-fish and other hippies in New
Hollywood. The twins first perform admirably as high-speed “burger flippers” in
their diner, and later one of them (!) has an acting career in a TV detective series,
co-starring with Cher and dragging his brother along, who is rendered invisible
with the help of blue-screen camera technique. But it eventually becomes clear
that the film is less about “productive pathologies” and disabilities functioning as
empowerment, or rather, it is so only by way of disturbing the count of parts of
the social body: the actor brother’s career has no obvious relationship to his han-
dicap (unlike the Rain Man model where talent neatly complements a pathol-
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ogy), and, generally, disability in Stuck On You does not translate into an iden-
tity with an “evident” foundation. Rather, the status of the twin’s “god-given Sia-
mese...ness,” as Cher puts it in the film, is precarious with regard to its meaning
as a phenomenon: from scene to scene, from one encounter to another, it seems
to shift from visible to unnoticed, from significant to negligible.
When, in one dialogue, the twins are addressed as “Siamese twins,” and one of
them objects: “We’re not Siamese! We’re American!,” we have, in the nutshell of
a keyline, the affirmation of citizenship over foundational identity, the embracing
of the “United States” in every sense as the manifestation of a political subjectiv-
ity. Performing a failure in this case implies insisting on the urgency of the ques-
tion of what it means to say “We” politically, to refuse “having understood” what
the adequate, well-founded, culturalizable group identity is. It means taking the
system, or rather its irreducible democratic dimension, at its word by taking a
meaning literally, thus escaping metaphorization as in Deleuze’s aesthetic of “lit-
eralness” and parapractically, mimetically, overidentifyingly playing stupid to ren-
der a problem visible. Conceived as a political subject or two that cannot be quan-
tified, the non-Siamese twins could be appropached along the lines of Elsaesser’s
interpretation of Fassbinder’s episode in the omnibus film Germany in Au-
tumn; instead of a proper symbolization of bodies, they confront, assault us with
the gross materiality of “a body too much.”37 This “too much,” this embodied
excess of being exposed and connected to a community, inescapable being “Stuck
On You” as state of the union, is what distinguishes political subjectivity as “be-
longing twice over: belonging to the world of properties and parts and belonging
to the improper community” from a rebel stance of not-belonging to which the
economy of cultural identities has so many places (of work) to offer.38
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Into the Mind and Out to the World
Memory Anxiety in the Mind-Game Film
Pepita Hesselberth and Laura Schuster
Enter
What would you do if you knew the future? Would you erase me? When you
don’t have a memory how can you remember who to trust? Change one thing,
change everything. Reality is a thing of the past. Remember the future. Some
memories are best forgotten. Can you miss someone you don’t remember? You
are not who you think you are. If you thought it was just a trick of the mind,
prepare yourself for the truth. Get ready for the ride of your life. Into your body,
under your skin, beyond your senses.
These are just a few of the taglines used to promote a variety of contemporary
highly self-reflexive mainstream films – respectively, Donnie Darko (Richard
Kelly, 2001), Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry, 2004),
The I Inside (Roland Suso Richter, 2003), The Butterfly Effect (Eric Bress
and J. Mackye Grube, 2004), The Matrix (Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1999),
Paycheck (John Woo, 2003), Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000), Code 46
(Michael Winterbottom, 2003), Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998), Déjà Vu (Tony
Scott, 2006), Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven, 1990), and eXistenZ (David Cro-
nenberg, 1999). These films are thematically as well as aesthetically preoccupied
with the rewriting of time, memory, and agency, and they are all well-known ex-
amples of the “mind-game film,” as this “new tendency” has recently been
termed by Thomas Elsaesser.1 Their scenarios include perceptive delusional dis-
orders, surveillance societies, memory erasure, scientific experiments, virtual
reality games, cyborgs, and supernatural phenomena. Despite the variety of the
scenarios, however, one binding feature is that all these stories abandon the no-
tion of one reliable, absolute reality, mostly by presenting a non-actual story world
such as a future scenario (sci-fi) or by narrating themselves through the percep-
tion of a distorted protagonist (psychological delusion/ghost story). Moreover, the
films do not fully resolve ambiguities in their story and, with increasing fre-
quency, remain open-ended, which allows for the existence of unconventional
phenomena such as paranormal activity or multiple realities. Time is presented
as manipulable, either in terms of chronological or subjectively experienced tem-
porality, and/or as a somehow incoherent or ambiguous time-space continuum.
The past and future are often portrayed as highly subjective domains that can be
accessed, erased, re/designed, or modified.
Many film scholars have tried to get a grip on these films. Some have referred
to them as “non-linear,” “parallel,” “circular,” “disordered,” “episodic,” “cubist”
and “multiple-draft narratives,” “punk” or “puzzle films,” “twist movies,” and
“techno-cinema,” whereas others have approached the issue more in terms like
“neobaroque cinema,” “narratography,” and “temportation.”2 Corpuses differ
and approaches vary greatly, but a central question seems to haunt academics:
how do we come to terms with this particular trend of films, which are decidedly
self-referential about time and invoke sophisticated media literacy on the part of
the viewer? Although often informed by aspects such as narrative complexity,
circularity, or techno-fascination, the films seem most crucially defined by the
mind-tricks and the games they play on the perceptions of audiences and charac-
ters alike, as Elsaesser stresses: “crucial items of information are withheld or
ambiguously presented” to protagonists and/or spectators, for instance when
events are presented through the delusional or otherwise aberrant perceptions of
a character. Many mind-game films do not fully untangle a given mystery, some-
times even allowing for the existence of multiple realities and parallel worlds.3
Memory anxiety forms a distinctive preoccupation within the mind-game para-
digm. Films like Dark City, Memento, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless
Mind, Paycheck, and Code 46 revolve around the reworking of memory in re-
markably explicit ways. Their release and subsequent success suggest a some-
what troubled fascination in contemporary western culture with concerns about
memory and memory loss in the age of omnipresent storage media. This fascina-
tion intimates a concern about the media as an assault on or at least weakening of
subjectivity, as if a pervasive media presence disempowers subjects and makes
them passive. At the same time, however, personal memory is often presented as
a unique trait or utility that warrants individuality, spurs desire, and produces
agency under threatening or chaotic circumstances. It is this particular tension,
this trouble with memory within the mind-game “tendency,” that we wish to ad-
dress here.
We will examine Memento and Code 46 as two extremes of mind-game plots,
in which reality’s ambiguity is usually motivated either by a protagonist’s dis-
torted observations or by large-scale deception, technological modifications, or
supernatural phenomena taking place within the filmic diegesis. This distinction,
we will argue, is of particular relevance to those mind-game films concerned with
memory matters. It roughly corresponds with what Elsaesser has termed the die-
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getic “in here” and “out there” disruptions, which prompt investigations on the
nature of cinematic storytelling:
[S]uch disruptions, especially when attributed to the world “out there,” rather than to
our subjective (“in here”) perception of it, pose a double challenge to spectators. The
films may tell us something about one of the fundamental attractions, but also con-
tradictions that the cinema embodies, namely that it fashions credible worlds by ma-
nipulating our perception of time and space (through editing, montage, narration).4
There are several other reasons for bringing Memento and Code 46 together
when investigating popular, contemporary explorations of the relationship be-
tween media, memory, and agency. First of all, what is striking about both films
is their multilayered narrative structure. They are what we could call recollection
narratives, as the act of recollection seems to be incorporated into their narrative
strategy. The films thus exemplify the preoccupation with the process of memory
and the question of agency on a diegetic level.
Secondly, the preoccupation with memory is channeled through apprehen-
sions about memory loss. In Memento, Leonard’s condition – damage of his
short-term memory system – prevents him from creating new memories. In
Code 46, a subversive romance leads to the medical removal of the protagonists’
memories of one another, without their knowledge of the intervention.
Thirdly, the topics of personal memory – materialized in personally imprinted
mediated memory objects – and memory loss are examined in explicit relation-
ship to agency. In recent debates about new media, the concept of agency has
often been employed to elucidate the aesthetic pleasures associated with so-called
interactive narrativity.5 However, we believe that the films central to this investi-
gation address a more fundamental and philosophical problem of agency, by rais-
ing profound questions about the difference between events happening in me
and to me in the “acts of memory.”6 By focusing on memory as an activity, in
other words, on acts of memory, Memento and Code 46 offer opposing views as
they investigate and debate the difference between event-causation (the view that
our actions are caused by prior events which necessitate their occurrence) and
agent-causation (the view that we have the capacity to initiate events, the power
to cause or to refrain from causing initial events to happen). It is this particular
exploration of agency through the films’ investigation of memory acts, memory
loss and memory objects that we will concentrate on.
And finally, memory and agency in both films cannot be separated from pro-
cesses of selection and narrativization, from recording technologies, or from the
body as a recorder and source of information. We suspect that in the way that
Memento and Code 46 present personal and mediated memory, they mimic the
ongoing process of narrativization taking place in our minds anytime we process
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personal memories. Here, memory and manipulation travel across various med-
ia. As Elsaesser stated during one of his Amsterdam lectures on media and mem-
ory, “Memory is essentially discontinuous: not the accumulation and ordering of
information but gaps, forgetting, and substitution.”7 Thus, rather than following
the common argument that the films first and foremost signify a current concern
with the general reliability of our perceptions amidst the continuous creation and
exposure of artificial images, the key questions we wish to address are how ex-
actly memory functions within and how it affects these films’ narratives, as well
as how it relates to issues of media, information, agency, and subjectivity.
In Here
Memento tells the story of Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce), a former insurance in-
vestigator in search of the man he believes has killed his wife and inflicted him
with severe head trauma, which prevents him from storing new memories. The
film is most renowned for its partially reversed narrative structure. Leonard’s in-
vestigation is depicted in color sections that are presented in reverse chronologi-
cal order. Intervening sections in black and white show us clips of Leonard’s
“authentic” memory prior to the attack, presumably chronologically, as well as
fragments of telephone conversations with an anonymous caller in his hotel
room, which take place after the attack.
When the character Natalie (Carrie-Anne Moss) in Memento is introduced, it
is hard to read her hostility, and we need subsequent scenes to provide us with
answers as to what caused this hostility, not to mention answering questions re-
garding her origins, her role and her interests. It is true, of course, that flash-
backs or informative suspense – narrative clues revealed or explained out of
chronological order – often fulfill similar functions, and this would have ex-
plained Natalie’s enigmatic intervention, had the narrative order not been re-
versed. The point is, however, that there is a distinction between narrative tenses.
Although a flashback introduces an element of memory, it actually presents us
with an event from the past. In contrast, in the case of Memento, the film does
not recollect for us but rather provokes anticipation of future past events: instead
of triggering a “what happens next,” it prompts speculations about “what hap-
pened before” this or that event. According to Janet Harbord, this disturbance of
the “forward propulsion of cinematic time” is typical for contemporary cinematic
play on time’s irreversibility. “More than in a flashback, the structural challenge
of these films is the twinning of epistemology with ontology: what does it feel like
to move back in time, how does retrospective knowledge inform our experi-
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ence?”8 The film thus underscores the link between memory and agency in its
narrative plot, while simultaneously questioning the nature of that link.
This line of inquiry is staged by means of the conception of recollection that
forms the foundation of the film’s narrative. Recollection is presented as a con-
scious act, in which the past is actively tied into present events and, as such, is
prolonged into the future. Memory is presented as a dynamic process of appro-
priation, association and translation of the past (in)to the present. Past events do
not remain intact: remembrance shifts their shape, their meaning, and their sig-
nificance. Memory is thus portrayed as an activity imposed on the past – one that
can be characterized as a violent intervention. But the relation between the pres-
ent of such acts and the past that is subjected to them is also reversible.
Memento claims that, in order to act, one needs memories: memories provoke
actions, and thus make diegesis possible. But although the mediated memory
objects give Leonard agency in the sense that they enable him to act, his greatest
exercise of power lies in his ability to distort the objects that facilitate his never-
ending story. As such, the film does not simply explore the conditions of mem-
ory, but a Sartrean tension between the concept of agency and the idea of total
freedom. It opposes post-WWII idealizations of freedom as the most essential
feature of human happiness, the view that total freedom results in total chaos,
and that, instead, human happiness relies on the limits we set for ourselves on
that freedom.
It may seem paradoxical that a film that advocates an active conception of
memory would simultaneously criticize an idealized interpretation of agency as
total freedom. But the film, thanks to its narrativity and visuality, can do some-
thing that for example philosophy cannot do so easily. Thus, instead of present-
ing a linear argument, it fabricates an argumentative loop around the connection
among media, memory, and agency: media facilitates memory facilitates agency
facilitates media and so on. It is because Leonard can remember that he can act,
and, because he can act, he can create mediated memory objects, and mediated
memory objects, for their part, trigger memories.
One of the key concerns of Memento is the paradox of memory and amnesia
as simultaneous means of dealing with the world around us, a paradox pointedly
addressed by Andreas Huyssen in his reflection on contemporary memory cul-
ture, Present Pasts. According to Huyssen, our (western) obsession with public
and private memorization must be read as an attempt to come to terms with our
growing sense of a temporal instability and spatial fragmentation of the world we
inhabit.9 We counteract the ever-increasing informational and perceptual over-
load with acts of memory, while simultaneously, “the more we are asked to re-
member in the wake of the information explosion and the marketing of memory,
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the more we seem to be in danger of forgetting and the stronger the need to
forget.”10
There is a scene in which Leonard is frantically looking for a pen to write
something down, something that will remind him of what has just happened.
Outside we hear a car door shut, Leonard looks up, and Natalie walks in, severely
beaten. He freezes and asks her what happened. When she tells him that she has
been beaten up by some guy named Dodd because of something Leonard told
her to do, he tends to her bruises and assures her he will take care of the situation
– a future event to which we have at that point already been a witness. We find
out only later that it was actually Leonard himself who beat Natalie up, an assault
to which she provokes him when he refuses to act as her hit man. Only Leonard’s
hesitant glance at his own bruised hand in the following scene hints at the inci-
dent that preceded this.
This example is one among many that shows how the film challenges the
equation of agency equaling total freedom. It is Leonard’s amnesia that allows
other characters in the film to manipulate him into doing things, while still al-
lowing him to believe that he is acting of his own free will. Although his amnesia
may not prevent him from acting, it does prevent him from having control over
his own actions. Simultaneously, however – and again this is emphasized by the
film’s reverse narrative structure – it is suggested that events other than the ones
presently conceived in his own mind have no effect on him, simply because they
have ceased to exist. When Natalie asks him what the use would be to kill the
man who murdered his wife and “took away his fucking memory,” since he will
never remember it anyway, Leonard points out that “Just because there are things
that I don’t remember, doesn’t make my actions meaningless. The world doesn’t
just disappear when you close your eyes, does it?” However, it is precisely the
opposite that is suggested, because it is due to the fact that there are some things
that Leonard cannot remember that his actions actually become meaningful.
This is underscored by the film’s appalling final scene, which renders all of
Leonard’s subsequent – for us previous – actions and decisions morally corrupt.
He has just been confronted by Teddy (Joe Pantoliano) with the possible but
probable idea that he has fabricated his long-term recollection of his wife. She
may, in fact, not have been murdered, and he has probably made the whole thing
up to cover up a truth he cannot handle, and further provide him with a vengeful
purpose in his life. He leaves behind some clues that will eventually lead him to
killing the man called Teddy, as we know from the opening scene. After that he
willfully destroys the photo of another man he has just killed, a man he initially
thought was his wife’s murderer. He then heads out in his car and contemplates:
“I have to believe in a world outside my own mind. I have to believe that my
actions still have meaning, even if I don’t remember them. I have to believe that,
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when I close my eyes, the world’s still here.” He closes his eyes, the image flick-
ers and we see fast-moving images of the streets around him, his eyes still closed,
interspliced with images of his wife leaning against his shoulder, a tattoo with the
words “I’ve done it” clearly visible on his chest as he continues: “Do I believe the
world’s still here? Is it still out there?” He opens his eyes, with earlier events by
this time probably already deleted, he looks around and states simply “Yeah.”
The notion of trauma needs to be considered at this point. Leonard’s loss of
memory was caused by a violent event that appears to have traumatized him.
According to Leonard, he was hit in the head, which fractured his skull, as he
attempted to prevent the rape and murder of his wife. According to Teddy, his
wife survived the assault but subsequently lured Leonard into helping her com-
mit suicide by repeatedly asking him to shoot her up with her daily doses of
insulin as she could no longer handle Leonard’s condition. In either case, the
amnesia or damage to Leonard’s short-term memory system is thus caused by
and is constitutive of his trauma. It is both fuelled by his so-called authentic
memories of “her,” as much as it is a safety valve for keeping these “false” true
memories from breaking the surface. As such, it is a classic example of traumatic
recall.
In the case of Leonard’s version of the story, the repressed traumatic event of the
rape and murder of his wife is mechanically re-enacted as drama in the staging of
his investigation and his vengeance. In the case of Teddy’s version, the traumatic
experience of killing his wife is not so much repressed as it is dissociated: it is
split-off into the story of Sammy Jenkis, a story Leonard keeps repeating over the
phone to someone unknown.11 Although, if it is placed “outside” himself, it can
be re-enacted, it cannot be re-incorporated into his own story. As Thomas Elsaes-
ser asserts, Leonard’s trauma is a prosthetic trauma and as such, a protective trau-
ma that serves as a shield against another trauma.12 In both cases, the traumatic
event – regardless of whether it was John G. or Leonard himself who killed his
wife – cannot lose its hold over its subject, Leonard. Traumatic events cannot
become a memory because they resist narrativization, and they persist in the
present because Leonard lacks narrative mastery. But ultimately it is Leonard
who turns it into a solitary event: he kills his only witness, Teddy, and in a newly
inscribed tattoo, he instructs himself never to answer the phone again. So, even
though Memento makes explicit statements about the necessity of memory as a
device which enables you to live and defines who you are, memory loss is pre-
sented as an act that also facilitates rather than negates agency.
Thus, even though the film suggests that one needs memories in order to act,
memory loss is not necessarily presented as a form of de-agenting. On the con-
trary, it is presented as a skill, as a unique way of dealing with information, which
Thomas Elsaesser has referred to as a “productive pathology” for dealing with
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contemporary culture’s “stripping of long-term memory” and the “program-
ming” of short-term memory.13 Within the mind-game film, time and agency,
memory and identity “become an issue, not only because of an abundance of
data, but because an apparent pathological, somatic or ‘sick’ response to complex-
ity, coincidences and chaos proves to be the more successful strategy.”14
Out There
In contrast to Memento, Code 46 enlarges the “condition” of inconsistent mem-
ory into a futurized technocracy, where authoritative control and intervention in-
terfere with its efficient use, and where the possibility of manipulation extends
the unreliability of personal memory into the field of objective information.
Furthermore, the film posits memory as a substitute or fix for diegetic incoher-
ence, but at the same time, takes a highly ambivalent stance toward the possibi-
lity of memory as a source of agency.
In a brief synopsis of its over-packed plot, Code 46’s “near future”15 scenario
presents an American corporate fraud investigator, William (Tim Robbins), tra-
veling to Shanghai to put an end to the forgery of travel documents at an interna-
tional visa-issuing organization. His instant attraction to the culprit, Maria (Sa-
mantha Morton), however, causes him to ignore her crime, and the two embark
on a brief romance. Weeks later, William is sent back to Shanghai because the
fraud activities have continued, and he discovers that Maria has been hospita-
lized. An investigation reveals that their fling resulted in a pregnancy which, un-
beknownst to her, was aborted along with her memories of William because the
two are unfit genetic partners for sexual reproduction. Their intuitive love, how-
ever, continues, and the couple makes an unsuccessful attempt to flee the sys-
tem. By the end of the film, William has returned to his (married) life, and Maria
has been expelled from society to live as an outcast in a vast desert wasteland,
presumably the result of global warming.
Code 46 is an interesting mind-game film because it very ostentatiously blurs
the distinctions between memory and information, subjective and objective re-
gistrations, coherence and fragmentation. The constant interplay of remembered
and recorded events renders any distinction between the two problematic, and
perhaps irrelevant. Both systems follow a similar logic of fragmentation and se-
lection, and together produce the coherent tale of an illicit love affair in a society
where risk minimization motivates genetic engineering, social exclusion, and in-
vasions of privacy. The film itself comprises an unusually large selection of narra-
tive fragments. Cinematography, editing, and mise-en-scène add to a collage-like
collection of imaginative sequences. Knowledge, then, is manufactured and pro-
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claimed rather than being inherently true. In this sense, the inhabitants of Code
46’s world are subject to pre-selected and fragmented information as much as
the film’s spectators are.
What happens to memory and information in Code 46 could be called cross-
memory, a term also used for remote-access ict solutions, where it denotes sys-
tems and capabilities that can exchange information or operations and access
virtual memory beyond the range of a simple network.16 With regard to Code
46, this principle serves to indicate not only that memory functions mostly as
information, but also that personal memories extend well beyond the individual
mind. In the film, memories and the “codes” of identity are dispersed throughout
the body: in the eyes, the fingertips, even tone-deafness. Intrapersonal exchanges
of memory and information are equally common; William carries an “empathy
virus” (a biological-software add-on enabling a degree of mind reading) that
opens other people’s subjective minds and memories for him to scan for infor-
mation.
Memories can be stored into fully external “address spaces.” Even after an in-
voluntary, unnoticed abortion and memory erasure (in itself an act of cross-mem-
ory intervention, effaced by the “relocation” of Maria’s childhood memory of sur-
gery), Maria’s intuitive love for William remains stored within a prescient dream,
to which she regains access only much later. Maria has a memory album into
which she uploads precious memories from the vantage points of her physical
presence in their actual locations. It is this album that allows her to regain her
memories of William after their medical removal – firstly, because through the
album, William can prove his previous presence in her life. Digitally stored mo-
ments are able to prove subjective recordings, which become objective documen-
tation again, while abortion and amnesia go hand in hand. All information is
manipulable, thus making the subjective nature of personal memory irrelevant.
Both information and memory are equally absolute or equally subject to change.
The embodied mind, then, becomes a medium, a recording technology with
its own mode of data processing, compatible with other forms of information.
Moreover, memory does not reside solely in the mind, but also manifests itself
throughout the human body. The circumstances provided by the peculiar infor-
mation/control society sketched in Code 46 perfectly support N. Katherine
Hayles’s suggestion that “in certain contexts the body itself becomes a medium
at the same time as it is in-formed by other media.”17 In Winterbottom’s film,
memory is essentially de-localized from the brain where we tend to position it,
and not only travels across the body but also across media.
In Code 46, both objective information and subjective or personal memory are
unstable and instantaneous. As much as this threatens conventional demarca-
tions, it also prohibits a clear sense of agency. Individual agency and choice are
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only possible if an agent has enough information to act in a meaningful and
effective manner. For both Maria and William, ubiquitous supervision by insur-
ance authorities (the downside of cross-memory practices) largely determines the
distribution of agency. If necessary, individual memories will be altered in order
to better meet international policies of risk minimization. Memory and desire
motivate individual acts, but both become permeable as soon as they collide with
society’s rules and interests.
All the same, Code 46 defers to such dystopian pessimism with a great belief
in the agency of the human soul and its partial immunity to technology-induced
tampering: the romance between William and Maria survives even after her
memory of him is erased. Love thus becomes the one possibility for total free-
dom, and serves as a major cause for individual agency in the age of memory
manipulation. Eventually, however, the system has its way. Maria loses her citi-
zenship and retains all of her memories, with full private autonomy but no power
to act whatsoever. William is restored to his prior life as a married fraud investi-
gator, oblivious to the fact of his affair with Maria.
Through Code 46’s cross-memory practices, memory distortions, connec-
tions, and utilities run from “in here” to “out there,” across media, and across
bodies. This can empower and/or disempower depending on the context, or con-
comitantly, as in the various conflicting sorts of agency presented. Prior to the
romance, Maria embodied subversive agency by forging travel documents in her
employer’s laboratory, mostly to the advantage of others. Her choice of a freedom
to act results in the authorities removing her from society and denying her any
sort of practical agency, which results in her spending her days re-living the past
and repeating “I miss you.” Maria is left with her memory intact, full autonomy,
and a position outside society. In contrast, by erasing his most recent memories,
the authorities have decided that William should return to his previous life, with
his social agency restored but with a restricted freedom to act. Agency in Code
46 cannot be defined as something one has, lacks, or desires. And if a rebellious
romance is regarded as the ultimate act of agency possible within the parameters
of this society, it comes at a dear price.
In fact, Maria’s agency arguably manifests itself at an entirely different level.
The filmic information facilitates an alternative reading in which she imagines
the entire story as a defensive fantasy screen against her near-unlivable actual
life, as an outcast of society, wandering through the desert (Baudrillard’s “Wel-
come to the Desert of the Real” is at least as salient here as it is in The Matrix).
Maria’s remembering or perhaps imagining a past romance would then motivate
the entire film, which at least grants her the indisputable agency of a narrator.
This, in turn, reminds us that film itself is as discontinuous and fragmentary as
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personal memory, and that, moreover, both arrive at coherence only by their very
discontinuity.
With information becoming increasingly unreliable, personal memory be-
comes a troublesome motivation for agency. Though memory can constitute a
sense of agency even under the circumstances of Code 46’s control society, the
result is always contingent and dependent upon the approval of authorities.
Memory here contaminates and interferes with a clear sense of agency: it always
has a hidden agenda, and sometimes proves counterproductive.
However dependent upon the specific parameters of its story, Code 46’s atten-
tion to memory interference does have a greater relevance. Without heeding its
dystopian warning, we may simply observe that by presenting distorted mem-
ories in a fashion mimicking these distortions (the experience of characters
whose perceptive systems have been altered by either mental or technologically
induced trauma), the film reminds us not to take memory for granted. Media,
memory, and agency are all presented as matters dealing with information, selec-
tion, and choice. As a consequence, all three are susceptible to alteration or dis-
tortion. A porous memory here may reflect contemporary uncertainties regarding
the omnipresence of intrusive and sometimes fabricated information; it thus be-
comes a protective shield for the traumatic impact of information overload. As
such, the film demonstrates that what we think we objectively remember is al-
ways already informed by memory, desire, or the mind’s eye, and possibly by
external agents imposing their purposes onto ours, regardless of whether or not
a camera – or any other kind of manipulative technology – has had anything to do
with it.
Exit
The diegetic differences between the “in here” and “out there” distortions of per-
ception and memory largely account for the varying impact and results of mem-
ory disorder in Memento and Code 46, respectively. Whereas Memento’s “in
here” structure of memory distortion allows for an efficient and opportunistic
use of memory processing, the same tactic proves a poor substitute for coherence
in the “out there” manipulability of people’s lives in Code 46. There, personal
memory is a specific kind of information which is beholden to the same condi-
tions of digital memory or information so that manipulation (permutation, relo-
cation, duplication) is easy, and its implementation in goal orientation only
further dismantles the fixed notions of subjectivity and agency. Moreover, mem-
ory in Memento offers both protagonist and spectator an escape from the harsh-
ness of time-space causality and an ambiguous refuge in the sense of causality
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that is entirely subjective and synthetic, whereas, in Code 46’s society of control,
subjectivity is synthetic to begin with. The manipulability of subjects’ entire lives
prohibits any effective use of personal memories, goals, or desires; the pursuit of
these inevitably leads to one’s ostracism from organized society.
In their epistemological and ontological disruptions of what we generally as-
sume a causally ordered reality, governed by the rules of time and space, both
films somewhat betray the gain we expect from narrative fiction cinema: the plea-
surable ordering of staged events to which we can relate but from which we al-
ways remain at a safe distance. The destabilization of precisely these factors in
films such as Memento and Code 46 creates particular subjectivities. The frailer
a film’s diegetic reality, the more subjective experience and memory are pushed
forward as sources of information. Memory steps in where time-space causality
loses ground, but never quite makes up for the loss. Thus, perhaps memory is
crucial to subjectivity here simply because time-space causality fails to deliver in
these chaotic, fragmented story-worlds.
Furthermore, in both films, memory interrelates with the body, with external
objects, and with recording technologies – from handwritten remarks, tattoos,
and Polaroid photography in Memento to a wide variety of audiovisual gadgets,
flat screens, and surveillance recorders in Code 46. What is interesting about
these materializations of memory vis-à-vis the films’ explorations of memory acts
and memory loss is the fact that they propose fiction as the ultimate tool for recol-
lection and our conceptions of time and memory. This corresponds with the sug-
gestion that human beings need the fiction of time and space, of cause and effect,
in order to imagine agency, which is brought to the fore, as we have tried to
demonstrate, by the films’ narratively fixed focus on remembering and forgetting
as reciprocal activities. Memory acts, memory loss, memory objects, and cross-
memory practices are thus presented as the sine qua non of subjectivity in the age
of omnipresent storage media.
And so we circle back, via Elsaesser’s hint that cinema fashions credibility out
of manipulation, to an earlier discussion on fragmentation and discontinuity in
memory and film. In the late 1980s, Friedrich Kittler famously proclaimed the
demise of individual memory under the increasing omnipresence of electronic
storage media: “Once storage media can accommodate optical and acoustic data,
human memory capacity is bound to dwindle. Its ‘liberation’ is its end.”18 Kittler
notes that, in any transcriptive process of media storage, and probably without
our awareness, something is inevitably lost; not only is there a decline in our
faculty to remember, but also a loss of fullness and detail due to the threshold
logic of binary information. This notion basically pervades our two films on the
simplest levels: both ponder the pseudo-truths produced by the imperfect storage
of information or experience, in the human mind and so too in recording media.
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In their concern about the importance and unreliability of personal memory,
these two – but also other – mind-game films involving memory matters tell us
something about cinema and recording by enlarging the possible manipulations
of inconsistent memory: they show how recording and personal memory can
interfere with, or be a substitute for, one another. In the selection and narrativiza-
tion of fragmented events, they zoom in on a “technical” aspect that relates the
cinema to the mental processing of information and memories, the impossibility
of a full account, and the necessity of fragmented perceptions.
Mary Ann Doane poses a related argument specific to early cinema. Benjamin
and Freud, she states, have shown how consciousness reveals its function in
modernity as a “stimulus shield” against rupture, shock, and contingency that
“would, of course, be tougher, more impenetrable, in a highly developed techno-
logical society.”19 Doane argues that in modern societies, cinema functions as a
protective buffer against information overload, which is far more effective than
our own minds.20 Because cinema only records brief intervals of (staged) time
and often adds the selective process of narrativization, “time is produced as an
effect, at least in part to protect the subject from the anxieties of total representa-
tion generated by the new technological media.”21
In a similar vein, Thomas Elsaesser has stated that cinema contains the poten-
tial infinity and contingency of modern-day informational data-flows, and as
such, functions to mask the epistemological impact of modernity on the Carte-
sian subject. Narrative cinema, and classical narrative cinema in particular, can
create a buffer against the shock or trauma of real-life disorder(liness). The me-
chanisms of narrative and cinema are of equal and supplementary importance
here: both arguably please us simply by virtue of their merit of turning random
chaos (the Lacanian Real, or the arbitrariness of reality) into order and causality
by implementing demarcations in time and space. Narrative generally promises
to “make sense,” cinema adds the comfort of a very concrete pre-selection in a
seemingly continuous reality: the recording of moving states and energies in
time.
Yet, Elsaesser notes that somehow this principle has begun to fail us. Classical
narrative cinema at once masks and admits to producing the Cartesian subject, as
representation has become “the phantasm of the subject, needed to maintain a
semblance of identity (Žižek), in order to protect the ‘schizo-subject’ (Deleuze)
from ‘noise’ (Kittler).”22 In contrast, the contraventions and aberrations of con-
temporary mind-game films reveal the symptoms of the strains of classical repre-
sentation and the kinds of (goal oriented) agency associated with it. The mind-
game film, Elsaesser asserts, corresponds to a different modality of agency and in
particular with a parapractic agency (“the poetic justice of ‘Fehl-Leistungen’”) in
which the locus of agency is ambivalent and multitudinous, oscillating between
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the subjects’ consciousness and consciousness-less images endowed with
agency.23
In the figure of Leonard, however, the divide between subject and object col-
lapses. He is both subject and object, both a goal-oriented re-action hero whose
goal lacks a clear-cut indexical referent and an “action”-image, a data-processor, a
memory object. As such, Memento – still departing from the “safe” place of re-
presentation – reflects on the “performative presence” of the cinematic image
itself, where every performance is liable to loss of control, contingency is produc-
tive (or fatal) and every performative act risks the resistance of both objects and
subjects.
Memento’s closed circuit, or the fact that there is no “out there” to the “in
here” reality of the medium, resists resolution or closure. Leonard’s repetitive re-
programming of his own mind constitutes something of a causative feedback
loop. His status as a medium within the filmic text in a way transgresses all the
blurred boundaries between the subjective/objective registrations and the mind/
body or mind/machine relations in Code 46. These blurred boundaries indicate
the fluidity of information streams and suggest a “near future” filled with fasci-
nating interactions between all of the above. However, the insistent belief in a
truth outside mediated consciousness or memory ensures that the ubiquitous
technological mediation in Code 46 will remain somewhat externalized. Mem-
ento more fully exploits the convergence of mind and medium. Leonard’s pecu-
liar presence and agency in the film testify to any medium’s capacity to chart and
problematize subjectivity through the phantasmatic subjectivities it produces – a
capacity that the mind-game film in particular is endowed with.
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A Critical Mind
The Game of Permanent Crisis Management
Jan Simons
Crisis Management
If one were to run Thomas Elsaesser’s almost uncountable number of publica-
tions through a tag cloud generating program, chances are that one of the items
to emerge most prominently and dominantly would be the noun “crisis.” At first
glance, this might be the logical and unavoidable consequence of the increasingly
faster pace of changes in the very subject of his writings. Over the last few dec-
ades, cinema first became inextricably intertwined with television and electronic
media and was soon engulfed by the so-called digital revolution. This is well
documented by the Cain, Abel or Cabel? book, which Elsaesser co-edited with Kay
Hoffman in 1998. Its subtitle already hinted at a possibly altogether different
future for The Screen Arts in the Digital Age.1
These changes are reflected in the large variety of names that film studies have
had over the last two decades: from film studies; to film and television studies; to
film, television and new media studies; to eventually – but probably not finally –
simply media studies. These nominal changes also brought a number of more
substantial changes in theories, methods, and paradigms: semiotics, narratology,
textual analysis, and psychoanalysis gradually gave way to other approaches like
cognitive theories, post-structuralism, deconstructivism and postmodernism,
feminism and gender studies, visual studies, cultural studies, phenomenology,
identity politics, “new” film history, ethnography, and even network theories and
game theory. The “digital revolution,”moreover, transformed film (and photogra-
phy) from media that were supposed to represent reality into objects of skepti-
cism and distrust. And all this happened within a period of less than two decades,
and to many a skeptic, it made media studies look like a discipline desperately
seeking an object, a theory, and a method. One of the most academic disciplines
that has flourished the most over the past two decades is at the same time also
one of the most crisis-ridden.
For Thomas Elsaesser these circumstances proved to be a fertile ground to
develop a unique style of intellectual crisis management because, in his view, a
crisis is not a disturbance of an ideal course of events by external causes (i.e.,
adverse parties or simply ignorant outsiders) but rather a productive force to be
exploited in order to enhance the actualization of possible futures that are vir-
tually present yet repressed in the actual state of affairs. From this perspective,
crisis management is not a kind of emergency policy necessitated by external
events beyond one’s control, but instead a productive method necessary to un-
leash the potentialities enclosed within a given state of affairs. Elsaesser embo-
dies the “critical” politician for whom crisis management means that one should
not only always be on one’s guard for the possible causes of a crisis in order to
prevent it, but that, in quiet times when there are no apparent reasons for con-
cern, one should be prepared to actually provoke a crisis oneself. For him, the
term “crisis management” itself has a fairly unusual meaning: it is not the man-
agement of a crisis, but rather management by crisis. In this approach, crisis is
not an emergency one must get under control, or an anomaly that must be intel-
lectually mastered. On the contrary, a crisis is not the object of management but
an instrument of management, a management tool. A crisis is a state of affairs
that should be precipitated or even provoked in order to open a Pandora’s box.
Management by crisis seems to draw upon the lessons of chaos theory in the
sciences, from which it has learned that the most interesting and vital processes
in nature occur “far from equilibrium.”
This sort of crisis management is first and foremost an intellectual endeavor.
For a “management-by-crisis” approach, a crisis is not an objectively given state
of affairs but the result of a particular reading of that state of affairs. Since a crisis
is not independent of how a state of affairs is being perceived, conceptualized,
and discussed, a critical crisis manager is quite capable of detecting the symp-
toms of a crisis where others only see order and stability, or to locate a crisis at
another location than others might, and to define it in altogether different terms.
Since a crisis is above anything else a clash of concepts, it entails the promise that
it can be intellectually and politically managed; the critic’s crisis is an intellectual
construction.
Management-by-crisis is by no means a negative enterprise. On the contrary, it
is productive because its aim is the discovery and unleashing of unexpected fu-
tures in the present and the rewriting of the past in the process. Management-by-
crisis thus gives way to new “possible futures” as well as yet uncovered “virtual
histories” that become visible only from the vantage point of these possible fu-
tures. For management-by-crisis, then, the present is always pregnant with multi-
ple futures and at least as many pasts. In order to sense these potentialities, the
critic must approach the present as an archaeologist approaches an excavation
site. Like the latter, who only has fragments, shards, and ruins to work with to
(re)construct the possible histories that came before and after the moment the
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excavation site became frozen in time, the critic must be prepared to scatter the
superficial and apparent coherence that received notions and traditional narra-
tives seem to guarantee and start from scratch.
Since the futures and histories the critic discovers are only possible and virtual
and not necessary and factual, management-by-crisis can become itself an easy
target of criticism. Its readings are necessarily speculative and, to a certain extent,
beyond criticism itself, because it can answer any objection by proposing other
possible readings and by pointing out that the consensual description is just one
of many possible accounts. Because the management-by-crisis approach scatters
an agreed upon coherence and offers no alternative solid foundations on which
to build a new consensual narrative, it is often perceived as a negative and even
destructive meeting of “terror and trauma.”2 This criticism, however, denies the
fundamentally ludic dimension of management-by-crisis: it is first and foremost
a “mind game.”3
Complex Crises
According to the OED, the word “crisis” basically has two meanings: it can be
used to refer to “a turning point,” “a watershed,” “a point of no return,” “a mo-
ment of truth,” as well as to more negatively charged situations such as “an emer-
gency,” “a disaster,” “a catastrophe,” or a “calamity.” Both meanings are, of
course, not mutually exclusive but rather complement each other. Disasters, cala-
mities, and catastrophes are generally the outcome of chains of events that have
reached “a point of no return”; a “turning point” is often the point at which a
chain of events takes a dramatic turn, usually for the worse, or it is the point at
which one is inevitably forced to face the “truth” and make a decisive choice or
else accept “disaster.” Crises are generally points at which major interests are at
stake, either because they have come under the threat of external dangers or be-
cause they are in the grip of opposing forces. In its common sense, the word
“crisis” carries connotations of fate, inevitability, threat, danger, and awe, which
inspire extreme events. It is no coincidence, for instance, that in narrative theory,
a “crisis” is the result of a disturbance of a disturbance of a balanced initial state
usually brought about by forces of “evil,” which has to be overcome by the inter-
vention of a hero whose mission consists of restoring the initial equilibrium.4 If
one is right in assuming that narrative structures are part of the cognitive equip-
ment with which human beings try to come to grips with the world,5 this canoni-
cal narrative structure is a sufficient indication that in a common sense under-
standing, a state of stable equilibrium is “good” and desirable, whereas the
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disturbance of an equilibrium is being experienced as something “bad” and un-
desirable.
This common sense and consensual feeling about equilibriums and crises is
not shared by everyone. In chaos theory, for instance, a crisis is the point where a
chain of small and often hardly perceptible events become magnified and turn
into a major turbulence. Such a turbulence often manifests itself as a disaster in
the commonsense meaning of the term “crisis,” such as a hurricane, an earth-
quake, an avalanche, or a flood. But it can also be the symptom of a phase transi-
tion in which a system enters a new state in which it acquires new properties, as
when, for example, under certain conditions a system changes from a gas (e.g.,
steam) into a fluid (e.g., water) and under yet other conditions into a solid (e.g.,
ice). More interestingly perhaps, these crises or phase transitions are also often
bifurcation points at which a system can choose to go in one of two directions,
with either choice inaugurating a new state in which the system’s properties have
irreversibly changed.6 These bifurcation points correspond to the “turning
points,” “crossroads,” “watersheds” and “points of no return” that make up the
first of the two broad senses of the word “crisis.” But, because a crisis can force a
system into a new state in which it reorganizes itself and acquires new proper-
ties, these bifurcation points can be “sources of creativity and innovation,” as
Nobel Laureate and pioneer of complexity theory Ilya Prigogine calls them.7
Since creativity and innovation occur at crisis points where a system is driven
“far from equilibrium,” systems that are “close to equilibrium” are not the most
interesting ones for complexity theorists.8 What makes bifurcation points inter-
esting is first of all that the “choices” a system will make are not predictable be-
cause they are sensitively dependent on the minutiae of the initial conditions that
can never be fully known (as captured by the famous Butterfly Effect according to
which the small changes created by the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in Beijing
in April may cause a tornado in the Atlantic in August9). Second, the new proper-
ties a system will assume are not reducible to its properties in the previous state.
The system may display dramatic transformations at a macroscopic level (e.g., a
fluid changes into a solid) while at the microscopic level, few changes occur at all.
And thirdly, since the changes a system undergoes during the transition of one
phase into another are irreversible, the system’s itinerary through the “state
space” of all possible configurations it might assume can be reconstructed: a sys-
tem thus produces its own “memory.” However, the past that the system records
depends on the futures it has “chosen” at successive bifurcation points. At bifur-
cation points, the “arrow of time” (Prigogine) does not necessarily point in one
single direction.
Complexity theory has come up with a model for understanding and reasoning
in regard to the dynamics and effects of a crisis that is quite different from tradi-
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tional common sense notions of crisis. In spite of its analogies with the scientific
theories and models of complexity theory, this model is expressly not an expert
theory of complex phenomena. It is rather what the cognitive linguist George
Lakoff would call an “Idealized Cognitive Model” (icm).10 icm’s are “quick and
dirty” ways of defining what is accepted as the most representative case of an
experiential domain, and most of the time they do their job.11
Management-by-crisis also seems to be based on an idealized cognitive model
which represents a folk theoretical version of complexity theory. In the format
George Lakoff devised for icm’s, it goes roughly like this:
the icm of complex criticality
1. A crisis is the result of the interaction of multiple chains of small events.
2. Small changes can have great consequences.
3. A crisis is a transition to a new state with new properties.
4. The properties of the new state depend on the changes that caused the crisis.
How does management-by-crisis bring to bear the icm of complex criticality
on domains as divergent as film theory and history? In order to see this, it might
be convenient to summarize the management-by-crisis approach in a few rules-
of-thumb:
the crisis paradigm
a. An equilibrium is an exceptional state; change, noise, and interference are
part of a system’s normal state of being.
b. Crises are brought about by the non-linear effects of multiple interactions and
unforeseeable feedback-loops between small, ordinary and unremarkable
events.
c. Crises cannot and ought not to be prevented but should instead be welcomed
– and if necessary even fostered – as opportunities for innovation and change.
d. Since the future is not a given, the past is not either. History, therefore, does
not provide lessons for the future, but, instead, the future imposes the neces-
sity of reconsidering the past.
e. Crisis management is itself part of the system in crisis; in order to come to
terms with a crisis, crisis management must reconfigure itself, its intellectual
toolkit and its view on a system’s future and past development.
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A Crisis Paradigm for Media Studies
One could point out the structuring effect of the icm of complex criticality and
the crisis paradigm in many of Elsaesser’s numerous, wide range publications.
One could demonstrate how it operates in his writings on the digital revolution,
the crisis of representation, the European Cinema and the Hollywood blockbust-
er, the Holocaust and contemporary German culture. How precisely does it apply
to Elsaesser’s approach to the most hotly debated crisis in cinema, the “digital
revolution”?
For a long time, the “institution cinema,” as Christian Metz once called it,12
seemed to be a relatively stable system. Once it had learned “to speak its lan-
guage,”13 with its technological apparatus maturing with the introduction of
sound, and its modes of distribution and exhibition, the system changed very
little for almost a century. According to the grand narrative of cinema history –
nowadays revised by “new film historians” of whom Thomas Elsaesser is a pro-
minent representative14 – the system cinema found itself at a bifurcation point at
the very beginning of its history when it had to “choose” between the illusionism
of Méliès or the “realism” of the Lumière brothers. After a short period of “turbu-
lence” in the era of the “cinema of attractions,”15 the system cinema settled into
an “equilibrium state” of the classical narrative fiction film with its propensity for
verisimilitude, linear causality, and narrative closure.
According to this consensual account, this “homeostasis” was broken exactly
one century after its mythic birth in Paris with the arrival of new digital technolo-
gies. These technologies severed the indexical bond between the photographic
image and its referent and dissolved cinema’s (and photography’s) ontological
realism, thus pushing the system “far away from equilibrium” and throwing it
into a crisis from which it was hard to imagine that it could ever recover. Accord-
ing to Lev Manovich, cinema had again become “a particular branch of paint-
ing.”16 Others saw a “waning” of classical narrative and verisimilitude and a “re-
loading” of the cinema of attractions in the resurgence of special effects
techniques prompted by digital technologies.17 After this first century, or so the
story went, the magician Méliès had finally moved center stage and had pushed
the documentary-oriented Lumière brothers to the margins of cinema, in other
words, this was the end of cinema “as we knew it.”
This canonical version of the history of cinema’s first century is obviously
structured by the commonsensical model of crisis. In this story, the cinema sys-
tem’s normal state is an equilibrium (the dominance of classical cinema), major
changes are caused by major events (the invention of the cinématographe, the
introduction of sound, the rise of television, etc.), and major events are bound to
cause major crises (digital technologies were predicted as the end of cinema).
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The response to this perceived crisis is accordingly that either one tries to prevent
the imminent crisis by totally rejecting anything digital (the Dogma 95 Manifesto
was generally hailed as a response to the special effects Hollywood blockbuster18),
or one accepts the unavoidable, imminent end of cinema (as, for instance, Lev
Manovich seems to have done), or one simply denies that anything of importance
has actually happened at all, as David Bordwell does, for instance.19 How does
this perceived crisis look from the point of view of the crisis paradigm?
One might start by challenging the assumptions that cinema is a stable system
and that a major event like the coming of digital technologies should have such a
major impact. In the midst of the upheaval around the “digital revolution,” El-
saesser pointed out that “much of the digital revolution around the cinema has
at its heart a familiar commodity, the narrative feature film, mainly identified
with Hollywood,” which was “still the ‘killer application’ for many of the new
developments.” Instead of precipitating the end of cinema, the digital revolution
was, according to Elsaesser, “the totem-notion around which a notoriously con-
servative industry is in the process of reorganizing – and this usually means re-
inventing – itself, in order to do much the same as it has always done.”20 This
last sentence goes further than merely observing that the film industry kept
doing business as usual. Elsaesser points out that the “digital revolution” did not
disrupt the state of equilibrium of cinema because there had never been such a
state in the first place because what is meant by the conservative film industry
“doing the same as it has always done” is actually always “reorganizing” and “re-
inventing” itself. The system cinema has always been “away from equilibrium”
and it has always had to respond to major and minor crises by acquiring new
properties. Therefore, the “digital revolution” is not an “exceptional state” but a
new opportunity for the system to re-create and reinvent itself.
The assumption that the advent of digital technologies is the major cause of
the turbulent state that cinema currently finds itself in needs to be qualified. As
a technology, an industry, a service, a commodity, a mass medium, and global
cultural artifact, cinema is, after all, at the crossroads of many “chains of events”
that not only affect cinema itself, but also interact with each other through nu-
merous connections and feedback loops. For instance, Elsaesser points out that
television played as important a role in boosting the “art of the record” as film
and photography, that in an age of media conglomeration, the cinema experience
has become part of a larger “event-scenario” (what nowadays would be called a
“cross-media event”), that “going to the movies” has become part of a larger lei-
sure time experience, and one could add to these developments the processes of
globalization, the collapse of Communism, deregulation policies, demographic
shifts affecting cinema audiences, the rise of new digital supports and distribu-
tion channels, the rise of the “home cinema,” the emergence of computer games,
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the coming of YouTube and other DIY film sites, and many more developments,
shifts and transformations that affect cinema in one way or another and keep it
“away from equilibrium.” To single out the advent of digital technologies as a
single or major cause for the onset of a new phase transition is nothing but an
arbitrary reduction of the complexity of the very system cinema.
Instead of asking what lessons can be learned from the history of cinema in
order to be able to better predict its future, Elsaesser turns the question around
and asks what the ongoing transformations teach us about cinema’s past.21 This
rethinking of the past from the point of view of the present is not aimed at recon-
structing in hindsight a new teleological explanation of cinema’s current state.
Elsaesser’s idea of rethinking the past is, on the contrary, an invitation to go time
traveling “back to the future,”22 not to revisit the past with today’s knowledge of
yesterday’s future, but rather to look back from that past into its future from the
vantage point of today’s uncertainties. In a bold gesture, he reinvents the figure
of Louis Lumière by locating him at the junction of technological, industrial, cul-
tural and aesthetic developments in the nineteenth century, while in passing re-
minding the reader of the doubts he and other pioneers of the moving image had
about the future of cinema. At the same time, he confronts the Lumière brothers’
films with the expectations of their contemporary audience as well as with a
formalist reading suggested by late-twentieth-century avant-garde filmmakers
and film critics like Burch. With this “non-linear”methodology, and the reminder
to his readers of Lumière’s obsession with stereoscopy and symmetry, Elsaesser
manages to turn Louis Lumière, the patron saint of documentary realism, into a
magician, or rather, in today’s terms, “the cinema’s first virtualist.”23 Contrary to
a common sense belief that digital technologies had made Méliès the master of
the new media, Elsaesser argues that Lumière had always been a Méliès-type.
The question mark in the title of the Lumière essay is not without its signifi-
cance, however. Elsaesser has no intention of proposing his construction of Louis
Lumière as cinema’s first “virtualist” as the correct alternative to the erroneous
icon of cinematographic realism. If the latter image of Lumière is the result of a
retrospective projection of later developments of the cinema system as its “des-
tiny,” then so is Elsaesser’s “virtual Lumière.”24 The “ghost” evoked by Elsaesser’s
nonlinear methodology is a Lumière that was unknown and even unknowable to
the historical Lumière himself, because the latter found himself at the watershed
of numerous past “event chains” he could not possibly have been aware of, on the
one hand, and numerous possible yet unknown futures, on the other. For this
same reason, this virtual Lumière is necessarily a conjectural and speculative Lu-
mière since not only are all of the histories that converged in his persona un-
known to this historical Lumière, but they will also continue to remain partially
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unknown to the future historian. The reconstruction of Lumière can only be vir-
tual, provisional, and conjectural.
However, as Elsaesser once wrote, even though “everything connects, not
everything goes.”25 As historian Niall Ferguson has noted, virtual histories are
“not mere fantasy: they are simulations based on calculations about the relative
probability of plausible outcomes in a chaotic world.”26 The lesson to be learned
from this virtual Lumière are not the possible alternative choices and alternative
futures he was confronted with, but rather that nowadays in the era of the digital
revolution every critic, theorist, filmmaker, and new media artist finds himself in
the position of a virtual Lumière. Therefore, there is more to be learned from the
uncertainties of the virtual Lumière than from his no less virtual counterpart in
traditional teleological accounts of film history.
Elsaesser’s crisis paradigm, then, does not look back into the past in the hope
of finding answers to contemporary problems in other periods that were faced
with similar questions. Instead, his nonlinear methodology creates positive feed-
back loops that make the uncertainties of today reverberate with those of the past
to conjure up the once possible futures that are today’s virtual histories, in order
not only to stress the precarious and contingent nature of the present, but also to
open up the state space of the future as a playground with numerous trajectories
to choose from.27
Management-by-Crisis as a Mind Game
The crisis paradigm requires a certain intellectual mindset which can perhaps
best be characterized by what Elsaesser calls “productive pathologies.”28 What
these pathologies, that manifest themselves in contemporary “mind-game films”
as paranoia, schizophrenia, and amnesia have in common is a mental state that
“suspends our usual categories of sane/insane and enables patients/agents to
discover new connections, where ordinary people operate only by analogy or anti-
thesis,” endows them with “special insights into patterns, where ordinary mortals
see nothing but chaos or contingency” – a feature that Elsaesser has pointed in A
Beautiful Mind (Ron Howard, 2001). These pathologies “seem to liberate and
create new connections, establish new networks,” but these new networks are not
random but “contained and constrained within a protocol.”29
As Elsaesser has pointed out, these pathologies in mind-game films are often
connected to a traumatic incident in the protagonist’s personal past. Since these
“productive pathologies” are a response to an experienced or perceived emer-
gency they provide a model for management-by-crisis. After all, these pathologies
keep their patients/agents permanently on their guards for the returning, re-
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peated or renewed manifestation of a traumatic incident and makes them per-
ceive and experience their environments as permanently “under crisis.” But they
are also productive because “by shifting perspectives and generating horizons
with a higher degree of complexity, [they] can lead to new kinds of knowledge.”30
These pathologies, then, fit the icm of complex criticality and the crisis para-
digm based on it perfectly.
As the context in which Elsaesser discusses these productive pathologies al-
ready suggests, they also have a ludic – though not always necessarily funny –
dimension. In mind-game films, either a disturbed character “is being played
games with without knowing it,” or a pervert protagonist plays games with other
characters, or “it is the audience that is played games with.”31 These are the char-
acteristics of the critical crisis manager who must always suspect that unknown
forces will play tricks on him but who must also be willing to play games with
others and to surprise his observers.
In order to play his mind game, the critical crisis manager must clear his view
of perceived narratives, theories and explanations of a situation that might pre-
vent him from detecting the symptoms of an imminent crisis in a timely fashion.
The first idea he has to get rid of is the “intentional stance,” which explains ac-
tions in terms of the psychological, ideological, or political motives of the agents
involved.32 Since the critical crisis manager is fully aware that he is himself the
playing ball of unknown forces, he must realize that this also goes for everybody
else. If the crisis manager fosters a healthy dose of paranoia, his suspicion is not
directed at others personally, but rather at the forces moving their actions behind
and beyond their intentions. The critical crisis manager does not assess a situa-
tion in terms of subjective goals and desires, but rather in terms of forces that are
translatable in terms of codes, programs, and strategies. Instead, the actions of
others should be seen as moves in a game the actors might not even be aware of
that they are playing and to which the crisis manager must calculate his best
response.
Because the critical crisis manager calculates his actions as moves in the game
he suspects are happening behind the actions of his counterparts, he is often
seen as not responding to the intentions, wishes and beliefs of those who have to
deal with him. Thus, the strategic actions of the critical crisis manager are some-
times experienced as traumatizing and even terrorizing, and this perception is
partially justified. Since he makes moves in a game other players are often not
aware that they are playing, his moves may catch others unawares and leave the
latter incapable of interpreting and explaining the situation at hand. It leaves
them speechless, so to speak, and with the feeling they are being played with.
However, if the critical crisis manager causes shock and awe, he does so to make
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their perspectives and attitudes shift as well, in order to liberate the field for new
possible futures.
The policies of the critical crisis manager are sometimes a source of pity and
fear, but more often, also of amusement and entertainment. To the critical obser-
ver, they contain the lesson of permanent uncertainty and the expectation of in-
finite opportunities for possible futures. Paraphrasing the conclusion of the Lu-
mière essay, in one of these futures we will call upon Thomas Elsaesser’s “ghost,
his virtual self, whom we summon, finally, only in order to help us better know
ourselves.”33
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The Cheetah of Cinema
Floris Paalman
Bochum, 10 December 2004. Evening. We took the same train back to Amster-
dam after we had attended a workshop on industrial films. This is how I went
home, while Thomas Elsaesser was already at home. When we got on the train
he apologized for taking a separate seat, as he had to prepare something. How-
ever, after a while he approached me, to discuss something of “strategic impor-
tance.” He asked me if I was still interested in swarms, emergence, and systems,
as I had indicated when I applied for the position of PhD candidate. When I
joined the Cinema Europe research project at the end of 2002, the group was
working on new methodologies. Much attention was being paid to “cutting edge”
insights from other scientific disciplines. We got to explore “big theory,” concern-
ing such issues as globalization and network theory.1 In this perspective Elsaesser
handed me some print-outs from the website of an organization called Calresco,
which deals with complexity theory. I said that I did not yet know how to connect
it to my work on film and architecture. Think about it, he said, and if it seemed
interesting, I could use the material for a presentation at the PhD seminar.
Complexity and Systems
Calresco turned out to be an international think tank and platform for the promo-
tion of complexity theory as a multidisciplinary concern, directed by the British
physicist and computer scientist Chris Lucas. Complexity theory emerged partly
from system theory, which was first developed within the natural sciences, but to
some extent within the social sciences as well, as, for instance, in the work of
Niklas Luhmann.2 According to Luhmann, societies are systems, with various
subsystems, which regulate their input and output through preconceived chan-
nels. As such, Luhmann also frames media. The function of media is to provide
knowledge about the world. Observations are checked and channeled through
protocols and routines, in order to become news, entertainment or advertise-
ment. However, media do not merely (re)present, but actually create their own
world. At the center of Luhmann’s theory is the issue of autopoiesis (i.e. self-crea-
tion), which is at stake when a system functions as a black-box, that is, blind to its
own environment. Its output is its input. Luhmann offers a way out of subject-
centeredness and representation, into the domain of functions. This escape en-
compasses functions within the system and functions of media within larger en-
vironments (i.e. other systems). In one of his last articles, written in 1997, Luh-
mann describes the world as an autopoietic system as follows:
[A] re-entry leads to an unresolvable indeterminacy. The system cannot match its
internal observations with its reality, nor can external observers compute the system.
Such systems need a memory function (i.e. culture) that presents the present as an
outcome of the past. But memory means forgetting and highly selective remember-
ing, it means constructing identities for re-impregnating recurring events. In addi-
tion, such systems need an oscillator function to be able to cross the boundaries of all
distinctions they use, such as, being/not-being, inside/outside, good/bad, male/fe-
male, true/false etc.3
Culture is for society what memory is for an individual. To be able to remember,
identities need to be made, which means images and forms, in other words, cul-
tural expressions such as cinema and architecture among many others. To create
these forms, the (collective) mind needs the oscillator function. Luhmann con-
tinues:
To be able to separate memory and oscillation, the system constructs time, that is, a
difference of past and future states, by which the past becomes the realm of memory
and the future the realm of oscillation. This distinction is an evolutionary universal.
It is actualized by every operation of the system and thus gives time the appearance
of a dimension of the ‘world’. And if there are sufficient cultural guarantees for con-
ceptualizing time, the distinction of time re-enters itself with the effect that past and
future presents, too, have their own temporal horizons, their own pasts and futures.4
Luhmann’s view seems to correspond to the ideas of physicists like Julian Bar-
bour who argue that time basically does not exist5. According to Luhmann, it is
simply created by the system, and ultimately by the human mind, which be-
comes manifested through culture. Luhmann did not really emphasize this argu-
ment, but it seems to be of crucial importance. It differs from a mere functional-
ist understanding of society, of which system theory has often been accused,
offering latitude to a theory of change. Luhmann died shortly after writing this
article, so he was unable to elaborate on his own thoughts. The idea of the oscil-
lator function actually allows for elaboration in terms of complexity theory.
Attractors, Bifurcations, and Iterations
Some of the premises of complexity theory are very different from system theory.
Whereas system theory frames preconceived channels to regulate the operations
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within a system, almost mechanistically, complexity theory, on the contrary, deals
with issues of adaptation, change, and chaos. Random events and “noise” stimu-
late the emergence and development of things, and consequently complex orga-
nizational forms come into being. Moreover, the behavior of individual actors can
have major effects on the entire system.6 These things together create certain
development paths, which are irreversible, leading to entropy, which in turn gen-
erates its own sense of time.
A crucial notion within complexity theory is that of “attractor.” It is a “preferred
position for the system, such that if the system is started from another state it will
evolve until it arrives at the attractor, and will then stay there in the absence of
other factors.”7 A major risk of “borrowing” conceptual tools from other disci-
plines is that it remains simply a matter of translation, and so does not develop
insights or elaborate new concepts. However, to some extent, the act of transla-
tion is necessary to recognize certain patterns and to be able to connect certain
phenomena to others. To that purpose, one could call the convention of classical
Hollywood cinema the main attractor of American filmmaking. A film follows a
narrative format, based on individual desire and an oppositional force that is
overcome (the protagonist – antagonist structure). It usually goes together with
continuity editing that respects the axis of action. Foreign filmmakers that come
to Hollywood will most likely adapt to these conventions. Similarly, the primary
attractor of Bollywood, to give another example, is the convention of Masala,
which is the mix of at least one star, six songs, three dances, action and comedy
based on a love story following a protagonist-antagonist structure. Film genres
are also systems with their own attractors, like thrillers with their obligatory sus-
pense.
In the development of a system, attractors change, which in their turn change
the whole system. Again, we face the risk of translation, which may simply result
in a confirmation of existing paradigms by dressing them in new conceptual
cloths. We should therefore wonder what it means to speak of a “phase” and a
“phase change.” Could we say that experimentation and technological innovation
were the attractors of early cinema, as a system,8 and that a phase change oc-
curred when narrative cinema became the new attractor? We should also consid-
er what it means that different kinds of systems developed next to that of narra-
tive cinema, like that in the Soviet Union. In this case, we might identify the
Kuleshov montage principle as an “attractor” to generate meaning by association
rather than by narrative. After the definitive establishment of sound film in 1929,
the entire system of cinema, including that of the Soviet Union, gradually
evolved. Different systems developed in the USA, Europe, India, Japan, and else-
where. We could also indicate other moments of “phase change,” for example,
when television was introduced. In such cases, we could possibly also use other
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complexity theory concepts , like “bifurcation,” which is the ongoing splitting of a
system. This leads to chaos in “terms of entropy, where chaos and complexity are
hard to distinguish.”9 Bifurcation is fundamental for the emergence of complex-
ity. In the case of the introduction of television, several types of production that
had previously been the realm of cinema, such as news reports, travelogues and
city impressions, educative and informational films, among others, became the
realm of television.
Bifurcation also seems to be at stake when considering the various kinds of
audiovisual programs, genres and styles that have appeared and which have de-
liberately used the various audiovisual media that became available over time.
This continued when video was introduced, ranging from home videos to art
video production and video installations to new distributional modes for feature
films. Cable television should be mentioned here as well. Nowadays, with the
availability of digital media, cinema has, above all, become “home cinema.”How-
ever, movie theaters will also continue to exist, for the release of new films, for
social events and festivals, and as an alternative distribution circuit (the reverse of
what it had once been). Cinema has become more diverse in format and recep-
tion, and so have its form and language. It allows new visual cultures to emerge,
for example, the popular cinema of West Africa (on video/DVD), with Lagos as its
epicenter.10
Several transitions that can be observed here are the so-called “iterations” that
cycle “between the available behaviors,” which is a phenomenon associated with
bifurcation. If we take the documentary, for example, we can clearly see that it
has continued to move between cinema and television. But also feature filmmak-
ing has shown this type of pattern. It might be through these concepts that we are
able to frame cinema in a different way than we used to do, by looking at the
relationship between different media and between different kinds of produc-
tions, by taking into account different ways to address audiences and for different
purposes. By looking at these connections we can consider the way that television
stations support cinema by showing films and co-producing them. Television
also sponsors film festivals; the Dutch VPRO, for example, has been one of the
main sponsors of the International Film Festival Rotterdam for many years now,
as well as the daily newspaper De Volkskrant, among others. From the perspective
of complexity theory, we should consider whether this situation of television sup-
porting cinema could not have ended up the other way round, historically, with
the development of television being supported by cinema, if the system had de-
veloped according to other attractors. What kinds of perspectives can be gener-
ated via complexity theory, as an alternative to the linear evolution that relies on
technological, economic, or even political determinism? Is it possible to consider
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other histories that could also have happened, but just did not happen – by coin-
cidence, or for structural reasons?
Environment and Interconnected Media
At this point, we should establish a connection with the concept of Medienver-
bund, which Elsaesser developed with respect to the cinema and architecture of
Frankfurt in the 1920s and 1930s.11 In addition to manifestations of architecture
and urbanism, city planner Ernst May used media like film, photography, and
graphic design to promote the ideas of Das Neue Frankfurt. Instead of merely
dealing with specific avant-garde expressions, it encompassed an avant-garde
strategy in which different media fulfilled complementary or additional func-
tions, serving a similar purpose and reinforcing each other. We could learn about
their common agenda if we took one medium and analyzed its connections, to
discover its relationship to the built environment and to the social institutions
that inhabit it. To that end, Elsaesser has argued in favor of researching “AAA”:
Auftraggeber (commissioner), Anlass (reason), Anwendung (use). This strategy al-
lows networks come to the fore, instead of just the aesthetic virtues of avant-
garde cinema and architecture. These networks cross various media, genres, and
categories. Hence an “ecology” that encompasses cinema and urbanism is drawn.
This ecology, one can imagine, is itself a kind of Medienverbund. Eventually, as
Lev Manovich has argued, there may even be a “convergence” of various media,
and of media and space, which he has called “augmented space,”12 which could
be considered a radical instance of Medienverbund.
To some extent, this relies upon ideas from “media ecology,” but instead of
drawing a media landscape, I would explore the promises of complexity theory
by linking the content of media productions to their conditions, that is, to consid-
er functions of media within a broader socio-cultural environment. To that end,
we should consider the more specific notion of complexity theory, that of “stig-
mergy,” which, according to Calresco, is:
The use of the environment to enable agents to communicate and interact, facilitat-
ing self-organization. This can be by deliberate storage of information (e.g. the
WWW) or by physical alterations to the landscape made as a result of the actions of
the lifeforms operating there (e.g. pheromone trails, termite hills). The future
choices made by the agents are thus constrained or stimulated dynamically by the
random changes encountered.13
Stigmergy is first and foremost about random changes, but self-organization oc-
curs when “stigmergic local knowledge” is used to coordinate the behavior of a
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collection of agents, which is the definition of a swarm.14 This means that self-
organization takes place when the environment is molded to accommodate coop-
eration. This can also be understood as an infrastructure that is created by and
under the control of the system itself.
We can compare it to approaches based on the notion of “habitat.”According to
Ulf Hannerz:
The habitat offers both resources and constraints; it is defined with reference to par-
ticular agents, so that the habitats of different agents may overlap either more or less,
within the landscape as a whole; and the habitat is emergent and transitory. It is not
by definition linked to a particular territory. To what degree it actually turns out to be
so depends on the conduct of the agents concerned. In more sociological terms, the
habitat of an agent could be said to consist of a network of direct and indirect rela-
tionships, stretching out wherever they may, within or across national boundaries.15
Hannerz, in elaborating on habitat, frames the global society by employing the
concept of “global ecumene” as “an open fairly densely networked landscape.”16
This notion is based on the work of the anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, who re-
ferred to the ancient Greek term “ecumene” (oikoumene), which means “the en-
tire inhabited world as the Greeks then understood it.”17 Through the notion of
“global ecumene” it is possible to frame various kinds of networks, each with its
own scale and features, while cross-connections between them are not excluded.
Cultural Ecology
The link between Ulf Hannerz and Alfred Kroeber could be elaborated through
the notion of “cultural ecology” that was coined by the anthropologist Julian Stew-
ard in 1955.18 Steward had been a student of Alfred Kroeber. In a similar way, he
took the environment into consideration as a major factor in the emergence and
development of culture. Although it was an important current until the 1980s, it
disappeared as soon as global issues came to the fore. It is, however, akin to com-
plexity theory, and it makes it possible to link the work of social scientists like
John Urry and those working in the field of media ecology to a firm tradition
within cultural anthropology.19 This is not only to anchor socio-cultural develop-
ment in spatial practices and to emphasize the role of the environment, but above
all to establish the interrelationship between different institutions and other
kinds of actors, within a system, and between different systems.
To understand cinema as a global phenomenon, it is not enough to merely
identify the attractors of each system separately. It would be more fruitful to think
in terms of interdependencies and co-evolution. To that end, we should look at
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ecosystems. At the beginning of the 20th century, for example, the Polish started
to reduce the number of lynxes in the forests of Bialowieza because they thought
that lynxes were too harmful for the rest of the wildlife. The consequence was
that too many herbivores now survived, so that much of the vegetation was de-
stroyed, and animals such as the deer began to degenerate.20 Another example is
the cheetah and the Thomson’s gazelle in East Africa, which are two of the
world’s fastest animals only because of co-evolution.21 As the gazelle became fas-
ter, so did the cheetah. In comparison, Hollywood can also be considered a pre-
dator. It eats Europe’s talent, but in order to do so it also has to invest in it. This
creates a relationship that is both competitive and cooperative. However, a chee-
tah has to rest for about twenty minutes after it has chased its prey at top speed,
and it is during this time that a lion or hyena might come along and steal its prey.
If Hollywood is the lion, who would be the cheetah? Film theory? Or should we
keep it to the lynx, which has upon occasion been spotted in the Netherlands
since the 1990s. Is it coming from Germany?
The example of the lynx has revealed its function in a larger environment. We
could similarly identify the functions of cinema as a cultural system within so-
ciety at large. A common point, following Walter Benjamin in the 1930s, is the
assumption that cinema has provided a model for modern life. Moreover, it has
been a catalyst of modernization through the modes of perception.22 It links up
with a vast discourse on cinema in relationship to aesthetics as well as cognitive
functions. One of the most radical theories in this respect is that of Fredric Jame-
son, who framed cinema as a geopolitical aesthetic mapping of the political un-
conscious.23 Here economic functions come to the fore as well; cinema is a factor
in the development strategies of cities and countries, and a factor within globali-
zation as well.24 Recalling Luhmann, cinema is also a matter of collective struc-
tural coupling. In comparison, a more orthodox view within film studies frames
cinema as an alternative for reality, but Arjun Appadurai has, probably uninten-
tionally, refreshed it by connecting it to the reality of migration.25 While cinema
may lead to new life patterns, Appadurai has addressed the notion of the media
informing daily life, to simultaneously control and to redress it. This is related to
the notion of “monitoring,”26 which can be applied to understand where we are
going and how. This brings us back to Luhmann; like culture in general, cinema
has both a memory function and an oscillator function. This allows us to live in a
timeless universe to explore irreversible destinies, to understand that humans get
older, revolving around the sun, while we try to make sense of the innumerable
other turns we make in life.
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Social and Material Factors
The functions of cinema in society at large are interrelated with the attractors of
that society. In fact, there might be a complex set of different interconnected
attractors and functions; since a “complex system can have many attractors and
these can alter with changes to the system interconnections (mutations) or para-
meters.”27 Hence, it is also necessary to find the cultural equivalent of ecological
parameters. It seems problematic to maintain the biotic-abiotic dichotomy, since
the abiotic usually also implies human involvement. It could, however, serve as a
starting point by replacing the dichotomy with “social” and “material” factors.
Some of the social factors may include: population density, the labor force, age,
education, cooperation, competition, incorporation, and migration. Some materi-
al factors may include: source material, capital, facilities, technology, environ-
ment (city), and infrastructure. If one of these factors changes, it affects the cul-
tural ecology as a whole. This is merely a preliminary outline of a possible
direction, and to make these factors conceptually productive they should be
tested and refined. Nevertheless, we should, by way of hypothesis, think of the
possible implications of such a theoretical perspective.
With regard to social factors, density usually guarantees a high level of interac-
tion, but connectivity may be the actual factor involved here. Population numbers
nevertheless have an effect on the level of the labor force. A very important demo-
graphic factor in cultural ecology is age. Youth, for example, can provoke the
emergence of important new movements within cinema. After age comes educa-
tion, which implies different kinds of (output) values and interactions. Is it true
that Hollywood produces mostly films for average audiences in both the USA and
Europe, and elsewhere, while European cinema produces relatively more films
for the elite among them? Would Hollywood begin producing more art films if
European cinema stopped?
After that we have professional education and professional exchange. This con-
cerns both cooperation and competition. Competition seems an important stimu-
lant, but only to cause more cooperation in the next phase, which could even-
tually lead to incorporation. These dynamics are, at least to some degree, at work
in the relationship between Hollywood and Europe, as Elsaesser has suggested in
different terms in his book European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood. Here
he has problematized the paradigm of “national cinema.” As a notion, it is chal-
lenged by international (co)productions, but also by shared markets for distribu-
tion. According to Elsaesser, European cinema is usually defined in contradis-
tinction to Hollywood, with the latter being framed as an antagonistic entity with
mainly commercial aims, which seeks to monopolize the market and spreads bad
taste, whereas European cinema is often considered to be “art.”28 This, according
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to Elsaesser, obscures the dynamics between the systems of European and Amer-
ican cinema. Rather than thinking in terms of “national cinema,” Elsaesser pro-
poses the notion of “double occupancy”: belonging to two entities or powers at
the same time.29 “Double occupancy” not only clarifies the interactions between
systems, but also the particular phenomena related to these systems, such as
migration.
Migration could be added here as a factor, either as a cause of competition or to
encourage cooperation, whether we are dealing with migrating professionals or
ethnic communities. Furthermore, migration also seems to be an important fac-
tor for the generation of “source material.” This can be illustrated within contem-
porary European cinema by the relatively large numbers of successful film-
makers with a mixed background.30 When we are dealing with source material
we are already in the realm of material factors, which concerns not only images,
ideas, and values, but also funding, as well as the provision of other facilities,
which can also generate new developments. An example is the emergence of
Rotterdam as a media city after the introduction of funding regulations and the
establishment of accommodations in 1995. Technology is related to the factor of
facilities. Technological changes are usually paralleled by other developments
that may constitute either the reason or the result of these changes, or both. Fi-
nally there is the physical environment. Ideas emerging from different cultural
and social realms may circulate within a given environment. Big cities usually
serve in this capacity, but smaller cities and various different urban configura-
tions, albeit ones with sufficient infrastructure, can also be included. While big
cities remain centers of film production, the other smaller urban areas may cause
a gradual shift, either by the forces of co-production or by organizing festivals,
workshops and conferences – like we did in Amsterdam in June 2005 with the
conference Cinema in Europe: Networks in Progress. Are there other significant
factors that should be considered and does an approach like this offer a more
profound understanding of cultural emergence and the role that media play in
it? Furthermore, how do media-specific features relate to these factors?
The outline of cultural ecology should be further explored and tested, both
conceptually and empirically. To that end we should continue to research film in
connection with various kinds of institutions, with varying articulations of, for
example, social institutions, economic exchanges, political strategies, or cultural
values, that are somehow embedded in a certain environment, but with the op-
tion for the lynx to cross borders, and practice double occupancy. In my own
research, I have first of all articulated the environment itself, in spatial terms,
through the relationship between film and architecture and urbanism, in a speci-
fic location, which is Rotterdam. Other cities may come under consideration in
this way as well, along with different geographical entities. Elsaesser has already
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done this for Frankfurt, in connection with other nodes of a larger network. It
now seems that he is interested in the Netherlands, not just as an empirical case,
but as conceptual merchandise with a considerable value that allows space and
image to converge into an “augmented medium.”
Spring 2006. Elsaesser asked me to tape the television program Te Koop: Ne-
derland / For Sale: The Netherlands, (Kees Brouwer, 2006), which was part
of the VPRO series De Toekomst / The Future.31 The program focused on an
imagined future in which cities are sold as a package deal of real estate objects – a
matter of extrapolated current city marketing practices. I put the tape in his pi-
geonhole. After a month or so he wrote me back (2006/05/03): “Floris, // many
thanks for the tape of the City for Sale! // Just discovered it in my huge pile of
mail. // Thomas.” I replied a couple of minutes later: “a nice sample of poetry
you have sent me,” to which he immediately reacted: “As to the rhyme, it’s like
Molière, but in reverse: I didn’t know I spoke verse.” By way of conclusion, let’s
subject this reverse (or re-verse) to a subversive close reading, in the tradition of
ASCA and in the spirit of Molière.
In Molière’s comedy Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (1670), a shopkeeper has made
a fortune and wishes to seduce a pretty aristocratic woman. To cultivate his mind
he has employed a professor of philosophy, who asks him what kind of letter he
wants to write her – in prose or in verse. The shopkeeper, Monsieur Jourdain,
wonders if there are any other options besides prose or verse; what is it called,
for example, when we have ordinary conversations? It is prose, the professor an-
swers. Monsieur Jourdain is astonished: “Upon my word, I have been speaking
prose these forty years without being aware of it; and I am under the greatest
obligation to you for informing me of it.” In the reverse, Elsaesser is the shop-
keeper. For his shop, he is interested in cities for sale, like Berlin, London, Am-
sterdam, Vienna, Stockholm, and New York. He has sold the old cinematic city
and wants to buy new ones (after Frankfurt). Since he has made a fortune, he
now flirts with the higher echelons of capitalism, which is to some extent of an
anthropological nature. What actually ends up happening we will only know
when the cheetah of cinema enters the city. (What about Amsterdam’s zoo Artis,
can we expect it there at a certain moment? The conditions are promising, with
film producer Haig Balian being its current director...)
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Bear Life
Autoscopic Recognition in Werner Herzog’s Grizzly Man
Dominic Pettman
Love and Death in the Grizzly Maze
To recognize oneself in the other, who appears alternatively as one’s
opponent, one’s accomplice and one’s double, is almost the cinematic theme
par excellence.
– Thomas Elsaesser1
The year 2006 was a big year for snuff movies. Not only did Australia’s self-
appointed “crocodile hunter” Steve Irwin find himself on the wrong end of a
stingray barb, but Werner Herzog’s remarkable Grizzly Man debuted on the
Discovery Channel.2 In the first case, the footage of the fatal moment has been
safeguarded by Irwin’s widow and daughter, who together continue his dubious
legacy in plucky showbiz style. In the second case, the footage of the deathly
instant is missing for two reasons: the lens cap over the camera was not removed
during the attack, and Herzog decided not to include the audio itself in his own
film (although, in a crucial scene, he does show himself listening to the gruesome
soundtrack on his headphones).
Herzog’s documentary explores the life and death of Timothy Treadwell, who
styled himself as a “samurai” and “kind warrior”: a champion and friend of the
grizzly bears in the Alaskan hinterlands. Treadwell spent thirteen summers
camping alone in the Katmai National Park; five of those summers he brought
along a video camera, capturing over one hundred hours of raw footage. After
Treadwell’s death (usually flagged as “tragic”), Herzog – who has always been
drawn to people on the periphery of their species-being – then carefully edited
this footage of the “grizzly” man interacting with the camera, with the local fau-
na, and with his own inner demons. These often manic monologues were then
spliced with Herzog’s own interviews and commentary from friends, family and
other people who crossed Treadwell’s path.
Herzog’s voice-over notes:
Having myself filmed in the wilderness of jungle, I found that beyond a wildlife film,
in his material, lay dormant a story of astonishing beauty and depth. I discovered a
story of human ecstasies and darkest inner turmoil. As if there was a desire in him to
leave the confines of his humanness and bond with the bears. Treadwell reached out
and seeked [sic] a primordial encounter. But in doing so he crossed an invisible bor-
derline.
Several critics noted the dramatic irony inherent in this project; namely, that Her-
zog functions as a kind of omnipotent, semi-visible bard, shaping the material he
has been given into a narrative with a particularly queasy and uncanny momen-
tum. “I will die for them,” says Treadwell, gesturing toward a group of bears early
on in the film. “But I will not die at their claws and paws.” And yet our protago-
nist is far from oblivious, as on other occasions, when he seems to relish flirting
with his own possible violent end. “Love ya, Rowdy,” he says to of his favorite
bear. “Give it to me, baby.” Then to the camera: “I can smell death all over my
fingers.”
As this potent quote suggests, Treadwell (and we must also note the irony of
such a last name, given his rather reckless foray into a landscape where even
anglers fear to tread) was at the mercy of a psyche pulled in two different direc-
tions: the life force of the libido, and the siren song of the death drive.3 Indeed, I
would add two other agonistic elements at work here: that of the confessional,
and the spectacle (spliced together, in what Thomas Elsaesser calls “autosco-
pia”4). This fused form of knowing-as-looking, or vice versa, stems from “the
narcissistic and nostalgic pleasures derived from the cinema as cinema.”5 In
other words, autoscopia is a modern form of introspection, highly mediated by
cinematic images, whether the viewer-subject is actively engaged in producing
these images or not. Clearly this process is complicated further when the prota-
gonist is also in some senses the director, who in turn is the initial audience – as
is the case in Grizzly Man.
The viewer is tempted to psychoanalyze Treadwell, to discover the mystery of
motivation. Why would anyone give up the “creature comforts” of Los Angeles
for the creaturely discomfort of a tent in Alaska every summer, in order to com-
mune with a nature which at any moment could tear you to pieces? Herzog tact-
fully resists this temptation, or at least never voices his opinion concerning psy-
chology explicitly. Instead, he leaves it up to the editing process to make
connections between Treadwell’s statements, his often bewildering behavior, and
troubled relationship with other humans.
In one revealing scene, Treadwell walks and talks to his camera, clearly need-
ing to unload certain issues regarding his sexuality:
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I don’t know why girls don’t want to be with me for long. I’m very good in the . . .
you’re not supposed to say that. But I am. . . . I always wished I was gay – would’ve
been a lot easier. You know. You could just ping ping ping. Gay guys have no problems.
They go to restrooms and truck stops and [laughs] perform sex, and it’s so easy for
them. And stuff. But you know what, alas, Timothy Treadwell is not gay. Bummer. I
love girls. Girls need a lot more, you know, finesse and care and I like that a bit.
When it goes bad and you’re alone . . . you can’t rebound like when you’re gay. I’m
sure gay guys have trouble too. But not as much as one goofy straight guy like
Timothy Treadwell. Anyway, that’s my story.
Herzog is quite discreet in allowing Treadwell to speak for himself here; and yet
the evidence accumulates that the guardian of the grizzlies “doth protest too
much.” Indeed, Treadwell’s contradictions and mood swings qualify him as a
classic “unreliable narrator.”6
Homosexuality is never mentioned again in Grizzly Man, and yet it is flagged
in the rather camp antics of Treadwell (an obsession with his hair, diva-like voice
and attitude, references to Starsky and Hutch, etc.), and the biographical de-
tails which emerge as the film unfolds. One cannot help but wonder if an attrac-
tion to men, and a revulsion of this attraction, led Treadwell to flee his family in
Long Island, change his name, abuse alcohol and other drugs, and ultimately
seek spiritual solace in the wilderness. Indeed, the vulgar interpretation would
be that Treadwell is simply displacing his repressed homosexual urges on to lar-
ger hairy creatures than you find in the West Village – after all, the label “bears”
refers to a hirsute subdivision within gay male culture.
It would be a mistake to discount old-fashioned denial as part of the equation.
However, this is not by any means the end of the story. Rather, the key to under-
standing Treadwell’s fascination with animals, and indeed the general public fas-
cination which greeted Grizzly Man, is the slippage or overlap between human
sexuality and bestiality, under the gaze of the camera. “I love you. I love you. I love
you,” says Treadwell, to not only the bears, but also the bees and foxes. Indeed,
this mantra – spoken emphatically, as if his life depended on it – is what struck
me most when first viewing Herzog’s film. Love is pronounced over and over,
dozens of times. “I’m in love with my animal friends,” says Treadwell. “I’m very,
very troubled. It’s very emotional. It’s probably not cool even looking like this.
I’m so in love with them, and they’re so f’d over, which so sucks.” In another
scene, Treadwell is clearly aroused by a fight between two bears who he knows as
Mickey and Sergeant Brown, over Saturn, “Queen of the Grizzly Sanctuary” (aka,
“the Michelle Pfeiffer of the Bears”). On another occasion, our intrepid environ-
mentalist is excited by the fresh feces of Saturn, as he grasps it in his hands. “I
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can feel the poop,” he says, in ecstasy. “It’s warm. . . . It was just inside of her. It’s
her life. It’s her.”
It is necessary to register the interplay between sexuality and technology on
this invisible borderline between humans and (other) animals. In other words, I
seek to designate Treadwell’s camera as not only the recording instrument which
allows us access to his remarkable story and experiences, but as a catalytic agent
on equal footing with this grizzly man and the grizzly bears themselves.
Herzog is extremely sensitive to the different Treadwells who inhabit the film’s
footage. There is Treadwell the director, Treadwell the actor, and Treadwell the
narrator, to name just three. In one scene, our protagonist seems to lose his grip
on his own sanity, as he violently curses and denounces the park authorities and
other visitors, who he believes are actively pursuing and persecuting him. “His
rage is almost incandescent. Artistic,” waxes Herzog, in a voice-over. “The actor
in his film has taken over from the filmmaker. I have seen this madness before
on a film set [referring to Klaus Kinski]. But Treadwell is not an actor in opposi-
tion to a director or a producer – he’s fighting civilization itself. It is the same
civilization that cast Thoreau out of Walden, and John Muir into the wild.”
At other moments, Herzog is deeply touched by Treadwell’s ability to capture
unexpected and resonant images of the environment: “I too would like to step
in to his defense,” says the documentarian in his German accent, “not as an
environmentalist, but as a filmmaker.” He then goes on to sing the praises of
someone who can coax cinematic moments from the natural world “that the stu-
dios and their union crews could never dream of.” Indeed, as a wild fox and her
cubs seems drawn to the camera, Herzog notes: “There is something like an
inexplicable magic of cinema.”
Herzog is not interested in magic for its own sake but in people; but only
insofar as they skirt and often plunge over the edges of their race and place.
Thus, he shares the conviction of his compatriot, Peter Sloterdijk, that the real
question is not what the human is (since this posits an unverifiable essence), but
where the human is.7 This twist on the usual formula can be read either spatially
or temporally. Or rather, at the intersection between this now inherently technical
continuum.
Where indeed is the human? Is it something that flares up during moments of
compassion, only to disappear when self-interests are compromised? Is it an on-
tological property found nesting in condominiums, or slums, or space stations,
or caves? Or is it an unstable element which needs precise criteria and conditions
to emerge? Does it, in fact, cut across current taxonomic species lines, as is the
case when we seem to communicate with dogs, horses, or elephants? Are we, as
the philosophers might ask, merely simulating these conditions of emergence in
a controlled experiment? Moreover, is that which we call “the human” really con-
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fined to the invisible souls of Homo sapiens? Is it projected onto the historical
development of these souls, as relentlessly figured in speech, text, and (moving)
image? And finally, if humans are the tool users par excellence, then has our quin-
tessential property not been outsourced to objects (as Bruno Latour suggests)?
When approached from the perspective of these broader questions, Herzog’s
valorization of the cinematic apparatus, qua “nature,” leads to a kind of media
Zen problem. If a human dies in the forest, was he or she really a human? In
other words, if something isn’t captured on film, did it really happen? (One won-
ders, for instance, if Treadwell talked as much during the first eight expeditions
to Alaska when he didn’t have a camera.)
“Sometimes,” the director notes,
images develop their own life. Their own mysterious stardom. Beyond his posings,
the camera was his omnipresent companion. It was his instrument to explore the
wilderness around him, but increasingly it became something more. He started to
scrutinize his innermost being, his demons, his exhilarations. Facing the lens of a
camera took on the quality of a confessional.
Treadwell refers several times to a pantheon of deities from world religions, pray-
ing for rain so the grizzlies can find fish, and also praying for forgiveness (or at
least validation), from above. “If there is a God,” states Treadwell confidently, “He
would be very pleased with me. If He saw how much I love them. … It’s good
work. … I will die for these animals. I had no life. Now I have a life.” (Soon after
he adds the caveat: “Lord, I do not want to be hurt by a bear,” suggesting that
Treadwell would rather have died by the bullet of a poacher or ranger, as a martyr,
than by the claws of those he adores.)
At this point we might return to the structuring absence of the film: the grue-
some mauling by “bear 141” on a bleak October day in 2003. In fact, there is
another significant aporia here; namely, the presence of Amie Huguenard –
Treadwell’s girlfriend, whom Herzog calls “the great mystery” of the one hundred
hours of film footage. The traumatic soundtrack of the attack tells us that she
bravely tries to fight off the bear which has grabbed Treadwell in his hungry
maw. (The fact that the camera was on, but the lens cap still in place, suggests
that the device was always poised to record, and yet this attack was too swift and
unexpected to capture visually.) Huguenard thus both complicates and reinforces
the autoscopic semiotic square which I’m attempting to set up between sex,
death, confession, and spectacle; since she clearly shied away from the last two,
in order to morally support Treadwell’s embrace of all four.
Bear Life 157
On Reserves and Resemblance
Man is nothing other than technical life.
– Bernard Stiegler8
During the First World War, Sigmund Freud made the following observation in a
lecture at the University of Vienna:
[I]n the activity of phantasy human beings continue to enjoy the freedom from exter-
nal compulsion which they have long since renounced in reality. They have contrived
to alternate between remaining an animal of pleasure and being once more a crea-
ture of reason. Indeed, they cannot subsist on the scanty satisfaction which they can
extort from reality. … The creation of the mental realm of phantasy finds a perfect
parallel in the establishment of “reservations” or “nature reserves” in places where
the requirements of agriculture, communications and industry threaten to bring
about changes in the original face of the earth which will quickly make it unrecogniz-
able. A nature reserve preserves its original state, which everywhere else has to our
regret been sacrificed to necessity. Everything, including what is useless and even
what is noxious, can grow and proliferate there as it pleases. The mental realm of
phantasy is just such a reservation withdrawn from the reality principle.9
I take this quote from an essay by Hubert Damisch, who provides the timely
reminder that “the creation of a psychic realm of ‘fantasy’ and the institution of
national parks are perfectly analogous,” since “both satisfy the same need, topo-
graphical if ever one was, to see constituted, as a reaction against the exigencies
of the reality principle as manifested in mental life as well as in geography, a
domain and a field of activities free of its grip.” Nature reserves and national
parks are thus, spatially liminal zones, cartographic states of exception, which
allow citizens to “experience” the Great Outdoors. Significantly, this experience
must be without any violent disjunction from the daily movements and rituals of
urban or suburban life. Which is why Damisch notes the important caveat, that
“the ‘animal of pleasure’ to which the parks were meant to appeal is supposed to
cohabit peaceably with the ‘rational animal’.”10
In contrast to “the wild,” reservations and parks are nature tamed; like bears
which have been caught, trained and forced to dance. Of course, there is a differ-
ence between the simulations of Olmsted and Vaux, and the annexed territories
of somewhere like Yellowstone or Katmai: a difference based on the qualitative
effects of scale. Whereas the former is domesticated through design, the latter is
processed through the lens. Since national reserves and parks are, on the whole,
too large or too costly to sculpt into aesthetic functionality, it is left up to the
158 Dominic Pettman
postcard industry and photographers like Ansel Adams to document and “cap-
ture” the pristine and indifferent beauty of the landscape.
Treadwell’s instinct to bring his camera to the Katmai National Park can be
traced back through the plethora of nature documentaries which have helped
narrate the nation since the invention of film. It is in such places, “reserved” for
our civilization’s fantasies of freedom (like a table “not too close to the band”),
that we enframe ourselves in the camera lucida of the outdoors.
Indeed, it is relatively easy for “civilized” men to reflect upon their human
qualities in the asphalt jungles of the naked city. That is to say, even in the dehu-
manized environments of film noir, the dilemmas in which the characters find
themselves speak to the pathos of self-consciousness and meta-cognition. We
may sometimes behave like animals, but the story is only worth telling to the
degree that we’re tormented by a surplus or exceptionalism to the animal state.
We may be poor, but we are not poor-in-world. And thus, we are responsible for
the worlds we make, and the situations we therefore find ourselves in. Remorse
and sarcasm are the twentieth-century urban coping mechanisms, providing a
metallic sheen to the more bucolic modes of mourning and melancholy.
In contrast to the metropolitan lens, a camera in the wild bears witness to the
human extracted from his natural (i.e., artificial-cultural) element. We asked ear-
lier, “where is the human”? And now we can answer this question: wherever there
is a constitutive technology of self-recognition. Whether that technology is a camera, a
gun, a broken-in horse, a wife, or the US Constitution itself matters less than the
capacity to register, record and transmit this recognition. (Remembering Freud’s
dictum that we never learn something new, but remember something we have
forgotten. A comment that becomes even more apposite on the collective level of
culture.)
Bernard Stiegler notes that there are three forms of memory for living beings.
The first is genetic (DNA), the second is individual (experiential), and the third is
technical (inscriptive or prosthetic). This last type is obviously the kind that hu-
mans excel at, being the foundation of pedagogy and other key modes of cultural
transmission and reproduction. “Technics,” insists Stiegler, “is a process of trans-
mission: from the flint to the video camera.”11
What Giorgio Agamben calls the “anthropological machine” – that is, an opti-
cal mechanism of perpetual self-questioning affirmation – would be impossible
without the interlocking of these three types of memory. According to Agamben,
one of the most important engineers who worked on the maintenance and up-
grading of this machine was Carl Linnaeus, “the father of modern taxonomy.” It
was Linnaeus’s ongoing, neo-Aristotelian “division of life into vegetal and rela-
tional, organic and animal, animal and human” elements that created a “mobile
border” within vital humans, “and without this intimate caesura the very decision
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of what is human and what is not would probably not be possible.”12 Historically,
the anthropological machine fuses various incongruous or oxymoronic elements
together: the soul and the body, the pulse and language, the natural and the
supernatural, the terrestrial and the divine. It is a complex soldering operation,
which proceeds through capture and suspension. Agamben’s vital task is to un-
hinge these rusting articulations, and “ask in what way – within man – has man
been separated from non-man, and the animal from the human?”13
Speaking as a “naturalist,” Linnaeus concludes that he “hardly knows a single
distinguishing mark which separates man from the apes, save for the fact that
the latter have as empty space between their canines and their other teeth.”14 In
other words, even the inventor of the Dewey Decimal system for sentient crea-
tures could find no “generic difference” between “us” and our evolutionary cou-
sins. This leads to something of a paradox, since the human sciences are usually
credited with rationalizing and standardizing important differences, and sweep-
ing away the fanciful overlaps of more superstitious times, in which “the bound-
aries of man are much more uncertain and fluctuating than they will appear in
the nineteenth century.”15 And so Linnaeus is obliged to class Homo sapiens as a
“taxonomic anomaly, which assigns not a given, but rather an imperative as a
specific difference.”16 According to Agamben, this results in a maxim: “man has
no specific identity other than the ability to recognize himself.” In other words,
“man is the animal that must recognize itself as human to be human.”17
Thus, Homo sapiens “is neither a clearly defined species nor a substance; it is,
rather, a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human.”
Further, “the anthropological machine is an optical one … constructed of a series
of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees his own image always already
deformed in the features of an ape.”18 The underlying principle of the modern
anthropological machine is that the human “resembles” man, and must recog-
nize itself in a non-man in order to fully identify with that resemblance.19 This
“transience and inhumanity of the human” traces the same border that Timothy
Treadwell flirted with and eventually succumbed to: a border “at once the separa-
tion and proximity – between animal and man.”20
Agamben finishes his meditation on a supremely enigmatic note, linking the
current crisis of the anthropological machine with the immanently sexual trans-
cendence of its operation. For Agamben, sexual fulfillment is “an element which
seems to belong totally to nature but instead everywhere surpasses it.”21 Sex,
along with food, is a key area where the human is forced to acknowledge its
animalistic aspect. Hence the amount of effort lavished on “sexuality” and “eroti-
ca” (not to mention “cuisine”), in order to convince ourselves that we are in the
realm of the cooked, rather than the raw. Cameras are increasingly penetrating
the previously sacrosanct, domestic spaces of the kitchen and the bedroom. Eat-
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ing disorders and sexual pathologies emerge out of the modern apparatus identi-
fied by Foucault; that being the constant managerial pressure for the subject to
articulate, delineate, interrogate and sublimate their own subjectivities. Just as
bears were said to lick their young into shape, humans do the same, although
not with their actual tongues, but with language (which, in French at least, is the
same word, langue). And, increasingly, with cameras.
Sex is no longer something we do, but something we have. Something we are.
A burden. A stowaway in the modern soul.
Walter Benjamin wrote that “technology is the mastery not of nature but [the]
mastery of the relation between nature and humanity.”22 Confession is a social
technology with a long and effective history, a device which became increasingly
detailed and codified by the new professions which appropriated its economical
approach to information gathering and population control. Confession moved
from the confessional to the clinic, the courtroom, the couch, and – eventually –
the movie camera, and now the webcam. One cannot remove sexuality from the
equation, since, as I have argued elsewhere, the historically produced libido is
“the goat in the machine.”23 Moreover, as Žižek argues, the camera “not only
does not spoil jouissance, but enables it.”24 This observation stems from the case
of pornography, but can be extended to any domain where the sexual is enhanced
or encouraged by the spectacle; since “the very elementary structure of sexuality
has to compromise a kind of opening towards the intruding Third,” towards an
empty place which can be filled in by the gaze of the spectator (or camera) witnes-
sing the act.25
Taking his cue from Walter Benjamin, Agamben looks forward to a disman-
tling of the anthropological machine through a novel form of erotic ontology:
“the hieroglyph of a new in-humanity.” This rather messianic configuration
would usher in “a new and more blessed life, one that is neither animal nor hu-
man,” saving us from our cosmic agoraphobia; allowing us to play out in the
open without fear.26 But this is to play the dangerous – or at least rather passive
– waiting game of the “to come.”
My own theory is that Timothy Treadwell was driven to the open of the Grizzly
Maze not only in a futile attempt to escape his repressed sexuality (i.e., his hu-
manness), but because he was rejected by the warm and sticky embrace of the
Spectacle. Treadwell’s parents trace their son’s most significant trauma to his
most bitter disappointment at the hands of his own kind: coming in second for
the role played by Woody Harrelson in the 1980s sitcom Cheers – this, after
appearing as a contestant on Love Connection. “That is what really destroyed
him,” says the father somberly in Grizzly Man. “That he did not get that job on
Cheers.” This may sound glib. And any good psychoanalyst would not trust a
word parents say about their children. However, I hope it is clear that this piece
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of the puzzle makes perfect sense in the light of my argument that gives equal
status to the camera as the creatures it enframes.
A mere ten years before the unveiling of the first movie camera, Nietzsche
wrote: “To breed an animal that is entitled to make promises – surely that is the
essence of the paradoxical task nature has set itself where human beings are con-
cerned? Isn’t that the real problem of human beings?” Mnemotechnics, and the
violence they entail for the subject obliged to remember, can stretch in both di-
rections. It can go backwards, as a married person who has promised fidelity well
knows. But it can also go forward, in the promise of a glorious and triumphant
future. Great expectations, like all things human, have a technical basis.
Walking Out of the Black Forest
[Herzog] admits no ordinary victims, merely super-victims.
– Jan Dawson27
Finally, we return to Thomas Elsaesser, who has provided us with one of the most
useful maps for circumnavigating Herzog’s films in his book New German Cin-
ema. For while this study was published in 1989, and the director has since made
several significant films, the fundamental argument – that Herzog’s protagonists
are usually “overreachers” or “underdogs” or a combination of both – holds true
for the continuing trajectory of his oeuvre. In that sense, Treadwell’s imbrications
of loneliness, homelessness, isolation, and fear make him a classic protagonist
for a Herzog movie. Elsaesser is concerned with contextualizing Herzog’s obses-
sion with the extreme, the marginal, and the outside, within the extended Ger-
man Romantic-historical tradition, and its particularly troubled culmination in
the mid-twentieth century. His insights, however, are applicable to the more on-
tological register that I have been focusing on, especially since Treadwell is not
burdened with the same cultural baggage as Kasper Hauser or Stroszek, and yet
he is a kindred spirit to these figures, with a similar set of symptoms.
Elsaesser writes: “Herzog’s characters are unattached and total individual-
ists.”28 We have seen that Treadwell’s onscreen persona fits this description, de-
spite the repressed presence of his girlfriend. What is more, his attempt to inte-
grate with the world of the grizzly bears was not only a “heroic effort and
endeavor in a mockingly futile situation,”29 but perhaps “a necessary spiritual
exercise”30 in the face of existential and sexual panic. Elsaesser links this panic to
a nationalist-Oedipal drama concerning bad father images and good father surro-
gates; most clearly with the human tabula rasa of Kaspar Hauser (an inverse En-
lightenment figure, acting as a foil for the complete collapse of Enlightenment
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ideals after the Second World War). However, Herzog seems to have “worked
through” this crisis configuration during the 1970s and 1980s, to a more inclu-
sive, global perspective on hubris and overreaching in the years since. Lektio-
nen in Finsternis / Lessons of Darkness (1992), Rad der Zeit / Wheel of
Time (2003), The White Diamond (2004), and, of course, Grizzly Man all
attempt to capture humanity at the intersection between the heroic and the banal,
the sublime and the hopeless. This is not to claim that Herzog has somehow
transcended his Germanness, along with the heavily mustached dead that weigh
like a nightmare on his own brow, since artists will never escape the radioactive
half-life of the culture which created them. (Unless they are indeed Kasper Hau-
ser.) Rather, it is to observe that in terms of chosen protagonists and scenarios,
Herzog asks the same set of questions concerning identity, akrasia, meaning
making, and survival strategies of people of different backgrounds.
Elsaesser observes:
Herzog’s heroes do not merely exclude the world of the ordinary, the space where
most human beings organize their lives, but exist in a void because of a determina-
tion to investigate the limits of what it means to be human at all. Between man-as-
god and man-as-beast, Herzog’s films oscillate in a perpetual search for an existential
and metaphysical truth which can only be a divided or dialectical quest. For the neat
division between super-man and sub-human in his films is only apparent; there is a
constant communication between the two poles.31
If Herzog’s films are indeed “the haunted quest for the paternal image,” then
Treadwell found this image not only in the grizzly bears, but in the camera eye
which rarely blinked as it watched – and perhaps judged – his confession. (Like
any compassionate father, it could not watch his son be killed. It covered its eye,
rather than its ear.)32 The God-Father that Treadwell prays to, while simulta-
neously disavowing, is reincarnated inside the machine which allows him to
autoscopically recognize his own accursed humanity.
Timothy Treadwell fled the trappings of culture for the trap of nature. But he
could not resist bringing his teddy bear and his camera; both of which create a far
bigger footprint than any eco-tourism operator could measure.
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Bear Life 163
3. Strangely, the lead character in the B-movie Cherry 2000 (Steve De Jarnatt, 1987) is
named Sam Treadwell. This film is also about a man who prefers the eroticized com-
pany of non-humans; albeit a cyborg female, rather than a grizzly bear.
4. Elsaesser 209.
5. Elsaesser 209.
6. It is tempting, albeit rather uncharitable, to see in Herzog’s title a sly pun, in which
the “grizzly man” refers to the protagonist’s tendency to grizzle or whine.
7. Peter Sloterdijk in a talk at the Cardozo School of Law, 18 April 2005.
8. Bernard Stiegler. Quote taken from The Ister (David Barison and Daniel Ross,
2004).
9. Freud in Hubert Damisch, The Skyline: The Narcissistic City (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2001) 132.
10. Damisch, The Skyline 143. The reservations inhabited by Native Americans or Abori-
gines expose the projected status of indigenous peoples, caught between the chthonic
and the cultivated.
11. Stiegler in The Ister.
12. Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Of Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attall (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 2004) 15.






19. I refer the reader to Agamben’s book for the more intricate Heideggerean aspects of
his argument, especially in relation to captivation, revelation and Dasein, especially
chapters 10-14.
20. A useful analogy might be that of the border town, which is often ironically more
“patriotic” than the capitals of any given nation, since the latter are nestled in the
bosoms of secure identities. That is to say, identity reinforcement occurs and radiates
more vigorously from the threatened edge, rather than emanating outward from a
perceived geo-political center. Of course, it is also the place where blending and pro-
miscuity are likely to occur.
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Fritz Lang, Double Vision, and the Place of Rupture
Michael Wedel
Inside Film History
With the notion of the “historical imaginary,” Thomas Elsaesser has suggested a
forceful figure of thought to re-conceive of cinema’s place in and contribution to
the formation of history and cultural memory. More specifically, the notion has
helped to overcome a number of conceptual deadlocks in rethinking the history
of German cinema, beset as this national cinema is by questions of continuity
and discontinuity, ideological over-determination and political representation,
historical trauma, and new beginnings. Thomas Elsaesser takes Weimar cinema,
the most celebrated period of German film history in view of its peak artistic
achievements but also its most controversial period with regard to its social im-
pact and political meaning, as the looking glass through which German cinema’s
complex correlations to national (and international) society and culture at large
are reconsidered: “Unique among film movements, Weimar cinema came to epi-
tomize a country: twentieth-century Germany, uneasy with itself and troubled by
a modernity that was to bring yet more appalling disasters to Europe.” In looking
at films from the Weimar period through the prism of the historical imaginary, a
“Möbius strip is forming before one’s eyes, which catches a nation’s history in a
special kind of embrace” whose powerful grip seems to have the alluring power
of renewing its strength for every subsequent generation of cinephiles and film
historians alike. As such, Elsaesser contends,
Weimar cinema is not just (like) any other period of German cinema, it is this cine-
ma’s historical imaginary, which suggests that it is “the German cinema and its dou-
ble”: in fact, it became a Doppelgänger of its own pre-history: foreshadowed in the
“kino-debate” of the 1910s, it shadowed the Nazi cinema that selectively tried to (dis)
inherit it in the 1930s. On the other side of the Atlantic, in the 1940s, it legitimated –
almost equally selectively, as film noir – the work of German émigré filmmakers,
before it was dug up again in the 1970s, to lend a historical pedigree to the New Ger-
man Cinema of Syberberg, Herzog and Wenders.1
Among the many merits of Elsaesser’s elaboration of the notion of the “historical
imaginary” as a cultural temporality evading traditional notions of chronological
progress or retrospective teleology, one may notice, on the one hand, that its par-
ticular logic of self-definition and otherness cuts across the art cinema / popular
cinema divide that has always been such a strong stratagem in writing the history
of German cinema; and, on the other, that – rather than discarding the basic
assumptions from Siegfried Kracauer’s From Caligari to Hitler and Lotte Eisner’s
The Haunted Screen2 – it consciously builds on, works through, and takes further
the conclusions to be drawn from their two seminal accounts of Weimar cinema.
A central insight taken from Kracauer and Eisner, and easily one of the greatest
conceptual achievements of Elsaesser’s notion of the “historical imaginary,” can
be seen in its capacity to locate Weimar cinema’s cultural influence, its historical
meaning and socio-political dimension, in the specific aesthetic form of the films
themselves. It is not (only) on the level of their narratives and modes of produc-
tion, taken to be symptomatic, but in the concrete cinematic articulation and the
degree of self-reflexivity that
the films usually indexed as Weimar cinema have one thing in common: they are
invariably constructed as picture puzzles. Consistently if not systematically, they re-
fuse to be tied down to a single meaning. … Kracauer’s Möbius-strip effect is … due
to a set of formal and stylistic devices, whose equivalences, inversions and reversals
facilitate but also necessitate the spectator constructing “allegories of meaning.” …
Apart from the ambiguity after which all art strives, Weimar cinema’s rebus images
– readable, like Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit picture as either the one or the other, but
not both at the same time – have to do with mundane matters of film economics and
marketing, with the film industry and its objectives and constraints. These function
as the “historical symbolic,” the limits and horizons that outline and yet vanish in the
historical imaginary.3
Far beyond qualifying merely as some descriptive term for the aesthetic complex-
ities and manifold cultural inscriptions and re-inscriptions of Weimar cinema,
the “historical imaginary” as it is conceived by Elsaesser also forms a meta-theo-
retical horizon, the fantasy formation and dialectical contraption, to hold more
common empirical modes of film historiography in check. The duplicity restored
to the films also folds itself onto the heuristic efforts of the film historical dis-
course it has given rise to. The latter in turn appears less authoritative or objec-
tive and closer to its object, affected – as much as it may seek to deny it – by
cinema’s phantasmagorial powers and therefore becoming part of a mutual his-
torical logic and cultural formation.4 In its meta-theoretical implications, the idea
of a “historical imaginary” offers an effective tool for deconstructing the implicit
myths and underlying fantasies behind film historical reasoning and causation,
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the building of traditions and the formation of a cultural heritage, while, at the
same time, it acknowledges their very determining power as the founding im-
pulse and ultimate justification of why we should care for not only writing but
“doing” and even “living” and “experiencing” the history of the cinema: “The cin-
ema is part of us, it seems, even when we are not at the movies, which suggests
that in this respect, there is no longer an outside to the inside: we are already ‘in’
the cinema with whatever we can say ‘about’ it.”5
In what follows, I would like to trace the reverberations of this conceptual shift
in film historiographical thinking and consider some of the consequences that
can be drawn from it. With the example of one of Weimar cinema’s iconic direc-
tors, Fritz Lang, I will use the theoretical framework of the “historical imaginary”
in order to point towards the degree to which it transcends not only traditional
ideas of cinematic authorship as a revelation of the artist’s personality (e.g., in
Patrick McGilligan’s biographical study of Lang), but also adds an important di-
mension to accounts of the auteur as textual effect and discursive agency, most
recently and most vigorously put forward in relation to Lang by Tom Gunning.
The Enigma of Fritz Lang
The spell of fascination emanating from the figure and the films of Fritz Lang
has remained one of the most forceful and enigmatic.6 Elsaesser characterizes
Lang as “the most flagrantly intelligent as well as self-reflexive representative of
the enlightened false consciousness,” which philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has
identified as the ultimate index of the Weimar culture’s quintessential modernity:
“Lang could have been on Sloterdijk’s mind when he says that we need a ‘logical
and historical “cubism,” a simultaneous thinking and seeing in several dimen-
sions’ if we are to understand ‘the Weimar symptom.’”7
On an international scale, neither Alfred Hitchcock nor Jean Renoir, with
whom Lang is often compared and whom he both influenced and was influenced
by, have proven as difficult in having their artistic signatures recognized in tradi-
tional terms of stylistic continuity or biographical self-reference.8 There are just
too many shifts and outright breaks that seem to mark Lang’s career: from his
silent epics Der müde Tod / The Weary Death (1921) and Die Nibelungen /
Nibelungen (1924), his science-fiction fantasiesMetropolis (1926/27) and Die
Frau im Mond / Woman in the Moon (1929), crossbreeding popular kitsch
sensibility with stark symbolism (and therefore often improperly associated with
German expressionism9) through his experiments with early sound technology
and the thriller genre in M (1931) and Das Testament des Dr. Mabuse / The
Testament of Dr. Mabuse (1932) to the almost classical, but increasingly bleak
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American genre pieces of the 1940s and 1950s, the West German remakes: Der
Tiger von Eschnapur / The Tiger of Eschnapur (1959) and Das indische
Grabmal / The Indian Tomb (1959); and sequels: Die 1000 Augen des Dr.
Mabuse / The Thousand Eyes of Dr. Mabuse (1960). For the majority of
critics, especially in Germany and Great Britain, Lang’s career appeared to de-
scribe the parabola of a decade-long decline after he left Germany (and his sec-
ond wife and co-author of most of his German films, Thea von Harbou) at the
peak of his creative power. What followed is commonly characterized as a dra-
matic loss of artistic vision and control within the constraints of the Hollywood
studio system, culminating in nostalgic pastiche and self-parody towards the end
of his filmmaking life.
Film scholars have not ceased to hunt for a common denominator unifying
this body of work, looking for the hidden key with which to unlock the myster-
ious core of the Langian universe. Along the lines of traditional auteur theory,
Patrick McGilligan, in his recent biography, believes to have found Lang’s “Rose-
bud” in a personal trauma caused by the violent death (was it suicide or a cov-
ered-up murder?) of his first wife Elisabeth Rosenthal, which occurred after she
had caught Lang and Von Harbou in the act of making love in Lang’s Berlin
residence. For McGilligan, this early incident pre-shadowed Lang’s obsession
with love triangles, covered-up murders, and personal guilt, which pervades al-
most all of his films.10
Only a few years after the publication of McGilligan’s book, the curators of the
Fritz Lang exhibition held in Berlin in 2001 were able to present new pieces of
evidence regarding the circumstances of the death of Elisabeth Rosenthal on 25
September 1920. These were still unknown to McGilligan at the time he was
writing his biography and include a document confirming police registration of
Rosenthal’s funeral, issued by the criminal investigation department on 29 Sep-
tember, and the application form for her burial at the Jewish cemetery in Berlin-
Weißensee dated 1 October, which records the cause of death as “shot in the
chest, accident.” To the curators of the exhibition and the authors of the accom-
panying book, this entry, in connection with the conspicuous absence of other
official documents, suggests neither murder nor suicide, but a third scenario:
The word “accident” in connection with such an unusual death caused by a shot in
the chest might also mean: there was a struggle in the apartment during which one
party tried to prevent the other – who in the heat of the moment was about to commit
a crime – from pulling the trigger, but the gun went off, firing the fatal shot.11
Whatever the traumatic impact of this early experience might have had on Lang’s
artistic development, McGilligan’s spectacular re-grounding of Lang’s major
themes and cinematic obsessions in an incident occurring early in his “real” life
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can be seen as being driven by exactly the opposite logic of a (cinematic) effect
desperately seeking its (real life) cause. All too clearly, this temporally inverted
logic of “life imitating art” seems to be shaped by an imaginary that wants to
identify the biographical “origin,” “historical reality” and psychological Ur-Szene
of the key dramatic triangulation of pleasure, violence, and guilt that Lang’s cin-
ema has been working through and made to be felt so “real” over and over again.
The irony behind this particular historical imaginary lies in the fact that it ulti-
mately corresponds to Lang’s repeatedly stated desire to survive in his films
alone. Lang has always refused to reveal too much of his personal life to profes-
sional interviewers and film historians - a behavior which has led to infinite spec-
ulations based on a handful of biographical legends carefully planted by Lang
himself.12 “Tell her some nice lies about me,” he once suggested to an old lady
friend whose daughter was interested in what kind of a man he was. This stance
might well come to represent Lang’s motto regarding all things personal.13
Double Vision
In another recent attempt to unravel the conundrum posed by trying to bring
together Lang and his films, constructing, as Foucault would call it, the “funda-
mental” but always imaginary “unit of the author and his work,”14 Tom Gunning
has rooted his speculations not so much in biographical research, but in theore-
tical reflection. Following a structuralist approach to the idea of the cinematic
auteur, he is less interested in Lang as a biographical person than in the artistic
persona “Fritz Lang” inscribed in and to be read from his films. Thus recon-
structed and placed within the cultural context of 20th-century media modernity,
Gunning’s “emblematic” Lang re-emerges with a historical agency of much wider
implications than reflected by any study of his artistic background or personal
surroundings. For Gunning, the imprint Lang has left behind in his work con-
sists above all in the invitation to closely read and reflect on his films, whose
representational economy and mode of address are consequently defined as alle-
gorical, in the sense given to the term by Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kra-
cauer: hieroglyphic images to be contemplated and deciphered by the reader be-
yond their literal (narrative) meaning.15
Gunning’s analysis of Lang’s cinematic meditations on modernity’s basic ef-
fects – the commodification of culture and the alienation of subjective experience
– looks beyond the traditional level of thematic or stylistic continuities. What
Gunning identifies as the driving force behind Lang’s cinema is the concept of
the “Destiny-machine” which over the years has taken on various narrative forms
and audiovisual materializations: Gunning’s catalogue of instantiations includes
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the hourglass and the watchman’s cry in The Weary Death; the “Gesänge” fate-
fully sub-dividing the two-part Nibelungen; Moloch and the recurring steam
whistle in Metropolis; the false bottoms, spinning wheels and locked doors in
Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler / Dr. Mabuse: The Gambler (1921/22); the urban
cobwebs of criminal control systems, counter-information highways and inter-
secting phone calls in M, The Testament of Dr. Mabuse, and The Big Heat
(1953); the media dissemination of individual identity in Fury (1936), You Only
Live Once (1937), or While the City Sleeps (1955); Chris Cross’s gold watch
timing his manipulation of the electricity circuit in Scarlet Street (1945); the
eternally returning, floating corpse in House by the River (1950); the “unholy”
architecture of the ancestral house in Secret Beyond the Door (1948) and of
the Hotel Luxor in The Thousand Eyes of Dr. Mabuse.
According to Gunning, the ultimate image of the Destiny machine in Lang’s
films is the clock, a machine whose rationale is by definition beyond the control
of individual characters.16 As much as his famous master criminals and media
moguls, obsessed painters, novelists, and architects believe in their intellectual
and technological mastery of the Destiny machine and the course of the narra-
tive, all of Lang’s characters are inescapably caught in the workings of a cinematic
system controlled by Lang alone. This hidden hierarchy is built into every single
Lang film, introducing a struggle between different narrational agencies, which
traps not only its characters but also its audience in a complex game of deception
and recognition. Here, Gunning seems to align himself with Elsaesser, for
whom: “To see, to know, to believe … is the triad whose contending claims on
perception and reason the radical skeptic in Lang never ceases to play off against
each other.”17
Whereas, according to Gunning, Lang’s films occasionally grant glimpses into
the structure of the Destiny machine in rare “visionary moments,” both charac-
ters and viewers of a Lang film find themselves in an unreliable world scattered
with false traces and misleading tracks, plunged into an unstable universe full of
black holes sucking the individual onto ever deeper layers of contingency.18
Along a parallel line of thinking, Elsaesser relates the “mesmerizing or hallucina-
tory effects on spectators so often attributed to Lang’s film” to be the result of two
kinds of violence: “the film viewer’s interpretative violence, and the violence of
the film’s resistance to interpretation.”19
The emblematic place of the individual – character and viewer – within Lang’s
cinema would therefore exactly not be that of Mabuse at the switchboard of power
and control. As Gunning suggests, the signifier of the real power behind Lang’s
narratives is rather to be found in the many images of rooms emptied out of
individual characters by a Destiny machine executing a dark scenario of moder-
nity to which they have fallen victim. Hence, these images of absence in Lang’s
Constitutive Contingencies 171
cinema would also be the moments where the presence of the director is most
strongly felt.20 Gunning’s re-readings of Lang’s major films re-conceptualize an
understanding of the prominent features that have made them classics, but they
do not turn the terms of the debate – evolving around fatality and paranoia, orna-
mental abstraction, narrative duplicity and identity in disguise – completely up-
side down. His fascination with Lang’s films, as that of most of his predecessors,
still revolves around what Elsaesser also identifies as their “overriding concerns
…: the relation of vision to knowledge, of knowledge to power, of power to false-
hood, and of duplicity to the pleasures of complicity, of ‘being in the know.’”21
In other respects, it is also interesting to note the degree to which Gunning’s
paradoxical dialectics of authorship relate to Elsaesser’s reading of Lang. But even
more instructive are the subtle, yet essential differences. On the one hand, Gun-
ning’s notion of a negative authorship seems to be in tune with Elsaesser’s obser-
vation that in Lang’s films “it is artifice that triumphs even more than ‘evil,’” and
that it is this “underlying doubleness of gesture,” the high degree of artifice and
stylization, mimicry and parody, that both hides and reveals the author’s signa-
ture under/in a layer of self-reflexive disguise.22 On the other hand, with the
mechanical and anonymous Destiny machine put in place of any enunciative act
directly attributable to Lang, Gunning seems to re-introduce another instance for
which Lang’s cinema is bound to become “the ultimate metaphor”23 – not of
tyranny, as for Kracauer, and not even of the cinema experience itself, as it was
for the French critics of the 1950s and 1960s, but of technological modernity. It is
precisely in order to avoid this notion of metaphorical or negative unity that El-
saesser introduced Sloterdijk’s “enlightened false consciousness” as the “place of
rupture” itself, which “implies that the opposite of disguise is not truth, immedi-
acy or ‘authenticity,’ but rather, whatever it takes to instantiate this symbolic, that
is, the condition of possibility of discontinuity, disjuncture, non-identity.”24
The Place of Rupture
The idea of authorship has always been one of the most prominent shapes that
the “historical imaginary” can take in order to convey upon a group of films a
certain sense of meaning and coherence. The attempt, famously suggested by
Michel Foucault, to recognize the mark of the author in “the singularity of his
absence,” to “locate the space left empty by the author’s disappearance … follow
the distribution of the gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings this disap-
pearance uncovers”25 has led to the question of Lang’s authorship anew in the
paradoxical terms of the performance of disguise and permanent deferral, resid-
ing, for Gunning, in the allegorical lure of modernity’s in-between-spaces of
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mediation, and, for Elsaesser, in the interstices, the fissures and frictions of cin-
ematic discourse itself: places of rupture and instances of contingency which
mark what one could describe as the “historical real” and instantiate the episte-
mological horizon for all possible figurative meanings and imaginary invest-
ments.26 This shift in emphasis and perspective would suggest an interpretation
of Lang’s films not so much as emblems of modernity as such, but rather to
study the material fabric from which their textualities emerge as “allegories of
their own problematic existence,”27 archaeological layers indexical of their con-
crete time and place in history beneath the level of the symbolic.
That these historical markers, on the level of their material composition, are
also openings towards the possible futures of a film and its director has been
demonstrated by Elsaesser perhaps nowhere more compellingly than in his book
on Metropolis. The film was shown in Lang’s intended (and now lost) version
only once to a select audience on 10 January 1927, before it was immediately
dismembered, cut, and re-edited into different national and international release
versions. As Elsaesser suggests, it is exactly the uncertain, “un-authored,” and
“un-authorized” material and thus textual status of Metropolis that has turned
the film into something like a “ruin-in-progress,” re-sampled and re-appropriated
by almost every new generation ever since, renegotiating, reinventing, and rein-
vesting, paradoxically enough, the status of its director as auteur along the way.28
By way of conclusion, I would like to take my clue from a moment of rupture
occurring in a less prominent example from Lang’s oeuvre. It is to be found mid-
way through The Thousand Eyes of Dr. Mabuse, Lang’s last film as a director.
The film’s central couple, the American millionaire Henri B. Travers and Marion
Menil, the woman he loves and who has fallen in love with him but who is still (if
involuntarily) part of a criminal scheme devised against him, sit at a table in the
bar of the Hotel Luxor where most of the film’s action takes place. Their conver-
sation, held in front of the conspicuous backdrop of a wall decorated with rectan-
gular wooden panels and buzzing ornaments of dots and broken lines producing
a moiré effect of smaller rectangular units, is exposed to and monitored by the
film’s master criminal via a system of surveillance technologies originally in-
stalled in the hotel by the Gestapo before World War II, as we learn towards the
end of the film. This fact, known to Marion, is revealed to the spectator in a cut-
away to the monitor in the secret catacomb of the hotel. Here, the TV image
briefly collapses and breaks down into lines and dots of static interference,
strongly reminiscent of the designs on the wall behind the couple. Via a zoom
into the reconstituted image on the monitor, the camera view jumps back to the
hotel bar. Marion and the millionaire briefly go for a dance, before they return to
their table, this time captured by the camera from a position inside the decorated
wall that has previously been seen behind them. The disorienting rupture occurs
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when we next get a shot of Marion from her soon-to-be lover’s point of view with
a completely different pattern of more harmonic and body-like, though angular
and abstract, shapes surrounding her face and upper body.
It is easy to discover in this sequence of shots the typical Langian labyrinth of
subjective looks and uncanny gazes, the self-reflexive mise-en-abyme of Jugendstil-
design and the tyranny of mediated perception. In the logic of the film itself, the
workings of this cinematic labyrinth are bound back to the double legacy of the
Nazi past and the criminal energy of the Weimar period’s Dr. Mabuse: the tem-
porality of a historical imaginary, superimposing political and cinematic history,
is literally turned into the spatial arrangement of a “double occupancy” defining
the state of the present as the uncanny Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen and
mutual interference of a multitude of (audio)visual regimes.29 But rather than to
simply understand this sequence as being structured around the frozen space
and static architecture of the Hotel Luxor as Destiny machine, it could also, and
perhaps more productively, be interpreted as the moment of rupture itself: the
instant of contradiction and epistemological shock in what first appears to be a
blunt instance of false continuity on Lang’s part but which may very well form
what Elsaesser, in a passage already quoted, describes as “the condition of possi-
bility of discontinuity, disjuncture, non-identity” in order to “instantiate [a new]
symbolic.”
To “follow the distribution of the gaps and breaches” and “watch for the open-
ings” the disappearance of the author uncovers, as Foucault suggested, would
then mean to think of the internal and the external, the contingent effect and its
transcendental point of reference and coherence as being caught in the differen-
tial image of self and other, co-existing in the spacing between them but never
coinciding: a “double vision and a dialectical reflex,”30 the spatial design and tem-
poral configuration of a parallax non-identity.
From the constitutive ambivalence of the place of rupture as such, an oeuvre’s
authorial “identity” can only emerge as the vanishing point of a “historical ima-
ginary” that constantly renegotiates and ultimately suspends the levels of the
“historical symbolic” (the norms of textual articulation imposed by the industrial
structure) and the “historical real” (the materialities of cinematic discourse).
Within this logic, the idea of authorial identity, therefore, needs to be considered
in terms of its “constitutive outside,”31 both in relation to its historical “others” of
industrial norms and media materialities, but also in respect to its temporal dis-
location as the hegemonial reading strategy of an interpretive community, freez-
ing chaos, as Lang himself envisioned, into a formula.32 As with all sedimented
hegemonial articulations, one might conclude, this mode of understanding film
history is, however, not only constitutive in providing some primary meaning and
significance to a cultural practice and body of work. It is also contingent insofar as
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it necessarily remains inside its own fantasy formation and open to be over-
turned by others.33
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Lili and Rachel
Hollywood, History, and Women in Fassbinder and Verhoeven
Patricia Pisters
Although the films of Fassbinder, Herzog and Wenders in the seventies were as vital
and formative a film experience as Godard, Sirk and Minelli had been during the
1960s, they were also a shock. They returned me to the country I had left the year
the Oberhausen Manifesto was published, but they opened wounds, memories and
regrets that reached beyond cinema and brought a dissatisfaction and restlessness
which I soon recognized as the depressive disposition of a whole generation. The
book is dedicated to those who know the intellectual rewards and emotional ravages
of such disposition, and who believe in the cinema, nonetheless.1
In the introduction to his seminal book on New German Cinema, Thomas El-
saesser confesses that the subject of this book is of more than scholarly interest
to him and that the images from this important film movement are not just an
event in film history but also relate in complex ways to German history itself, and
therefore to the personal life of (German) spectators and film scholars alike. A
few years later, Elsaesser would return to New German Cinema and questions of
history and identity, this time more specifically through the lens of Rainer Wer-
ner Fassbinder’s oeuvre. In Fassbinder’s Germany, one of the (many) networks of
complex relations that Elsaesser connects Fassbinder’s films to is the threefold
relationship between European cinema and Hollywood, German history and the
representation of women.2 When I saw Paul Verhoeven’s Zwartboek / Black
Book (2006) in a theater in Amsterdam, appreciating it much more compared
to its critical reception in the Netherlands, Elsaesser’s Fassbinder came to my
mind, and I was struck by the similarities between the German and the Dutch
director’s ways of dealing with history through their female protagonists: Lili and
Rachel, but also Maria and Agnes, Lola and Fientje.3 In this essay, I will argue
that in spite of their considerably different film styles and different national back-
grounds, Fassbinder and Verhoeven meet where Hollywood, history, and women
come together.
Europe-Hollywood-Europe-Hollywood-Europe
Fassbinder and Verhoeven are both European filmmakers with a great admira-
tion for Hollywood. Although Fassbinder often repeated that he wanted to make
Hollywood films in Germany, and he expressed his admiration for Douglas Sirk’s
melodrama both in writing and in his own films, actually moving to Hollywood
became a serious consideration after his international co-production Despair
(1978) and the international success of Die Ehe der Maria Braun / The Mar-
riage of Maria Braun (1979).4 When Fassbinder died in 1982 this option was
to remain an unrealized desire forever.5 Paul Verhoeven is bound to Hollywood
in several ways. Ever since his short film about the Dutch navy,Het Korps Mari-
niers / The Royal Dutch Marine Corps (1965), which was shot as a 23-minute
“blockbuster avant-la-lettre,” he has been much more interested in the big bud-
get, action-driven type of Hollywood film.6 Verhoeven moved to Hollywood after
the critical acclaim of Soldaat van Oranje / Soldier of Orange (1977) and the
unappreciative film climate in the Netherlands at the beginning of the 1980s.
Although the similarities between Fassbinder and Verhoeven at first glance seem
only superficial, Elsaesser’s analyses of the complex ways in which European cin-
ema and Hollywood mutually influence each other as a sort of “two-way mirror”
allows for a more nuanced reading of the Hollywood connections between the
German and the Dutch director.7
In “German Cinema Face to Face with Hollywood” Elsaesser argues against
stereotypical models of influence or counterbalance in which Europe stands for
culture and America signifies commerce. He unpacks the ambiguities in the of-
ten-quoted phrase from Wim Wender’s Im Lauf der Zeit / Kings of the Road
(1976) “the Yanks have colonized our subconscious” and demonstrates how after
the success of the revival of 1930s fashion and fascism that started with the film
Cabaret (Bob Fosse, 1972) and the NBC series Holocaust (1978/1979), Holly-
wood has played an important role in “profiling German film culture to its own
identity.”8 Edgar Reitz most explicitly addressed this issue when he made his
television series Heimat (1984) declaring that “with Holocaust the Americans
have taken away our history.”9 German cinema seems to have a love-hate rela-
tionship with Hollywood that changed in the mid-1980s and the beginning of
the 1990s, when there was an influx of foreign talent into Hollywood, where
they were to make films for a global audience. Now the mirror was reflected
back: German and European directors began reading America through a Euro-
pean lens. This was especially true regarding the issue of “fascinating fascism”
and Nazism, so deeply and traumatically engrained in German national con-
sciousness and the European history of World War II. Hollywood played a role in
“constructing the meaning of Nazism and the Holocaust for Germans them-
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selves and between Germany and the rest of the world.”10 But today’s blockbus-
ters made by European directors also present a “metamorphosed legacy of the
war and Nazism in today’s Hollywood” which can be perceived as another trans-
atlantic cultural transfer.11
According to Elsaesser, Verhoeven’s Starship Troopers (1997) is a very good
example of this metamorphosed legacy of Nazism in Hollywood, where Verhoe-
ven criticizes American superiority and the enjoyment of power in the guise of a
sci-fi monster movie.12 Obviously this position of the mirror directed towards
Hollywood is not fixed because this mirror of mediated cultural identity con-
tinues to flip back and forth across the Atlantic. As Elsaesser indicates, Holly-
wood-Europe should no longer be seen as an opposition of commerce versus art,
but is better seen as a modality, as an “aggregate of states of varying intensities”
or “states of mind” where Europe and America keep a mutual coded identity.13 As
I will further point out, with Black Book’s story set in the Netherlands during
World War II but told in Hollywood style, Verhoeven finds himself on the Euro-
pean side of the mirror again.
Relating to History
Elsaesser argues that while time on the American side of the mirror is “real
time,” European time is history.14 Both Fassbinder and Verhoeven have been
marked by the aftermath of World War II. Fassbinder was born at the end of the
war in 1945 and Verhoeven just before the war in 1938. For Verhoeven, childhood
memories of bombardments and occupied Holland have marked his experience
and led him to do extensive archival research about the war, which he first under-
took for a documentary about Anton Mussert, the leader of the NSB, the party of
Nazi collaborators in the Netherlands (Portret van Anton Adriaan Mussert /
Portrait of Anton Adriaan Mussert, 1968). The research continued as he
worked on Soldier of Orange, which is a film based on the memories of Erik
Hazelhoff Roelfzema, a resistance fighter who went to England and became the
adjutant to the Dutch Queen in exile. With Black Book, Verhoeven returns once
more to the history of the war, presenting the story of Rachel Steinn, a Jewish
woman who survives the end of the war by joining the resistance and infiltrating
the German headquarters.
Many of Verhoeven’s characters are typically morally ambiguous (perhaps as
part of his European sensibility) or at least less heroic or less villainous than one
would expect. Even Mussert, who after the war was executed for his collaboration
with the Nazis, is presented in a nonjudgmental way. The interviews and archival
material make it clear that Mussert, most paradoxically, was acting out of extreme
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patriotism, expecting the Netherlands to become a sort of independent federal
state of Germany (in reality, he was not really taken seriously by the Nazi brass).
In Soldier of Orange, the main character, Erik Lanshof, is more an adventurer
than a resistance fighter by conviction. And in Black Book, Verhoeven shows
how, at the end of the war, the difference between right and wrong had become
completely unclear and that after the liberation, the Dutch demonstrated cruel
tendencies on their part against anyone even slightly suspected of “sleeping with
the enemy.”All of the historical events in Verhoeven’s fiction films are presented
in a Hollywood action-adventure style that gives the films a dynamic and enter-
taining energy. Black Book has been compared to Hitchcock’s Hollywood films
(Hitchcock is, of course, another good example of a Europe-Hollywood exchange)
for its effective use of significant details in the mise-en-scène and its play with
elements of suspense and surprise.15
In his other Dutch films, Verhoeven also makes use of history, albeit in a less
explicit way. With Keetje Tippel / Cathy Tippel (1975) he presents late-nine-
teenth-century Holland via the hardships and survival tactics of a young work-
ing-class girl. Spetters (1980), which was controversial at the time of its release,
is now considered a classic and accurate realistic portrayal of provincial youth in
the early 1980s. Flesh+Blood (1985), the international co-production that
marked Verhoeven’s transition to Hollywood, may not be based on true historical
events (though the historical siege of the city of Münster in 1534 was a source of
inspiration), but Verhoeven did extended research on the customs, morals, and
behavior of sixteenth-century Europeans which he presents in his characteristic
raw realistic style.
Fassbinder’s films also have a strong relation to history. Although they are of-
ten read as auteur films, related to the myth of Fassbinder’s eccentric personality,
Elsaesser sees Fassbinder as a chronicler of German history. In many of his
films, the references to German history are important, but it is the BRD-trilogy
(The Marriage of Maria Braun, Lola and Veronika Voss) together with Lili
Marleen that most strikingly address World War II and its aftermath in the
1950s. On the one hand, these films are – like other films of the New German
Cinema that relate to German history – a response to Hollywood’s vision of Nazi
Germany. On the other hand, Fassbinder presents his unique vision of German
history. Lili Marleen (1980) is the story of a song, “Lili Marleen,” that became
most famous during World War II, and deals with the period 1938-1946. The
Marriage of Maria Braun starts with the marriage of Maria Braun during a
bombing at the end of the war and continues until 1954 (the moment when Ger-
many won the soccer World Cup and Maria Braun finally has her husband Herr-
mann back). Veronika Voss (1981) is set in 1956. Here the war is embodied by
Veronika Voss who had been a famous singer in Nazi Germany (the character is
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based on Sybille Schmitz, once a favorite of Goebbels) but has now become ad-
dicted to heroin. And finally Lola (1981) presents the Germany of 1957 when
pragmatism and capitalism have brought new economic prosperity for the Ger-
mans (Adenauer’s Wirtschaftswunder).
The Marriage of Maria Braun, Fassbinder’s most successful film interna-
tionally, is also his most classically constructed film. As Elsaesser points out:
Generically a melodrama, but one whose rise-and-fall structure also gives it the force
of a morality tale (both might be said to be secular forms of tragedy), Maria Braun
offers an audience enough generic familiarity to encourage direct identification with
the heroine’s ambitions, goals and disappointments. At the same time, enough mys-
tery hovers over the ambiguous ending. The retrospective doubt about Maria Braun’s
motivation (whether Maria blew herself up deliberately or by accident …) can embol-
den the audience to speculate about the deeper meaning of the story, without leaving
the cinema baffled or confused ...16
As Elsaesser further explains, the particular blend of Hollywood and European
art or auteur cinema of Maria Braun invites not just a generic melodramatic
reading of a bittersweet tale of a woman who tries to survive in a man’s world, it
also allows a more metaphorical or allegorical reading where the referent be-
comes “the fate of an entire country, rather than of this particular woman.”17 In
this reading, Maria Braun becomes Fassbinder’s embodiment of the pragmatic,
post-Hitler Germany where a woman “picks herself up from the ashes of a war”
to become a successful business woman. It can also be seen as a metaphor for
the transition that the German nation is undergoing.18 Maria Braun is a cin-
ematic history told from below, through the smaller story of an ordinary person.
It is a film that functions as a trigger of memories: “not so much recalling a
reality, as setting up a chain of associations, stories remembered from one’s par-
ents, pictures seen in the family album, the standard version of the 1950s as
present in the culture at large of the 1970s.”19 In similar ways, the other BRD-
trilogy films plus Lili Marleen offer a mise-en-abyme of German history through
a smaller private story.
It is important to point out that in the films of both Verhoeven and Fassbinder,
history is not only represented by referring to historical events or circumstances;
but they are also filtered through all kinds of internal references to other media.
The references to Hollywood genres have already been mentioned. There are also
other films that are alluded to like The Wild Bunch (Sam Peckinpah, 1969) in
Verhoeven’s Flesh+Blood, Mildred Pierce (Michael Curtiz, 1945) in Fassbin-
der’s Maria Braun, and Der Blaue Engel / The Blue Angel (Josef von Stern-
berg, 1930) in Lola. Elsaesser offers an extended analysis of how other media
such as popular music, sound effects, and radio broadcasts serve as internal med-
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ia references in the BRD trilogy. This appears to be important because it indicates
how popular culture, and especially media, not only reflect historical realities, but
also become a fundamental element of it. However, the most important “med-
ium” for their presentation of history seems to be the way that the female char-
acters embody history, which Fassbinder and Verhoeven have in common.
Woman as “Participating Medium”
Fassbinder believed that women are better “media” for the telling of stories be-
cause they have a wider range of emotions, are more in touch with the sensibil-
ities of a period, are less needful of a social façade, and are more flexible and
adaptable.20 Verhoeven has a similar notion regarding the status of the dramatic
potential of women. When asked about the best moment in the making of Black
Book, he responded by saying that it was undoubtedly when, after over 20 years
of struggling with the script, co-writer Gerard Soeteman called him with the solu-
tion that would make the film work: changing the main character from a man
into a woman.21 The second best moment was when he found actress Carice van
Houten to play the role of Rachel.
Elsaesser addresses more explicitly the question of why Fassbinder thought
that the history of Germany was best told through the fate of women. The possi-
ble allegorical readings that women’s stories encompass have already been men-
tioned. However, this is not without its problems since women have very often
been used as the symbol of a nation. As many feminists have pointed out, this is
very often at the expense of the women themselves who easily disappear in the
allegorical picture of collective history.22 However, Elsaesser points to several ele-
ments in Fassbinder’s portrayal of women that allow for a more nuanced perspec-
tive. First of all, he notices that in crucial scenes in Fassbinder’s trilogy and in
Lili Marleen the women actively give themselves as spectacle. Lola (Barbara
Sukowa) presents herself to be seen and acknowledged by Von Bohm, the muni-
cipal planning director she wants to seduce. Maria (Hannah Schygulla) checks
out how she looks in a bar as she walks up to the soldier who will soon become
her lover. Veronika Vos (Rosel Zech) is in love with the image of her former
spectacular self. And Willie (Hannah Schygulla) sings “Lili Marleen” in spectacu-
larly staged performances. As Elsaesser indicates: “[T]he women in Fassbinder’s
films are all too aware of both a power and a presence that they draw from being
looked at, and are usually prepared to deploy, knowing full well that it is a weapon
that can cut both ways.”23 Elsaesser suggests reading the signifier of “show busi-
ness” that is so prominent in Fassbinder’s historical films as a reference to the
power of woman as image. Again, much has been written in feminist film stu-
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dies about the position of women-to-be-looked-at,24 but Elsaesser demonstrates
that, in Fassbinder’s films, a variety of readings are possible:
the power of self-display, of female exhibitionism, the reification of the image, the
society of the spectacle, the woman trapped in her image or using her image to make
it in the world of men, and thus using the energy contained in the image as the
power of self-alienation. More precisely, the question arises of how in films about
women, and about woman as image, the women are nonetheless perceived as strong,
rather than as victims, exploited and objectified.25
The elements that provide an answer to these questions are related to how the
female characters know how to deal with what Elsaesser calls the “stock exchange
of impossible equivalences.” First of all, this is related to the intelligence of the
protagonists involved, which makes Fassbinder’s characters so fascinating. As
Elsaesser demonstrates in the case of Lola, but which can also be extrapolated to
the other (female) characters as well, “it is the sort of intelligence which enables
the characters to stand by their own contradictions and inconsistencies, in a man-
ner that energizes their capacity for action rather than blocking it.”26 This makes
Lola not a film about moral hypocrisy, blatant opportunism, and corruption but a
film in which characters operate using their political, sensual, and moral intelli-
gence, which allows them to find a modus vivendi, which allows them to move on.
The other films in the trilogy and Lili Marleen are less optimistic, but the intel-
ligence is deployed in a similarly sensitive way.
Two other contradictory elements also need to be mentioned in this respect.
The image of the strong woman that puts herself at the center of the spectacle
(when politics becomes “show business”) is subverted by her capacity to love. At
the same time, love leads to a contract, a deal which comes with the love. This
seems perverse, or negatively opportunistic, but seen slightly differently it is ex-
actly what makes the women in Fassbinder’s films (as well as Verhoeven’s as we
shall see shortly) such strong and intelligent characters. As Elsaesser notes, all of
Fassbinder’s films are love stories, albeit very often unconventional love stories.
Also the history of Germany is told as a love story: “Maria Braun is predicated
on the central relationship remaining unconsummated (but in the minor key
there is Oswald’s love for Maria), Veronika Voss is a love story between two
times two women (with in the minor key, Krohn’s love for Veronika), and Lola is
the love story between sex and power (with the minor key provided by Bohm’s
love for Lola).”27 The love stories in Fassbinder’s Germany films very often lead
to some kind of pact or contract. In both Lola andMaria Braun,many contracts
and business deals are made, which recognize a variety of distinct interests. This
seems very cold, but as Elsaesser points out, there is an exchange between the
strong woman, on the one hand, and a new kind of economic system on the
Lili and Rachel 183
other. For, although the contracts seem to confirm an old tradition where women
are traded between two men (for instance, the pact between Oswald and Her-
mann in maria Braun), the deals are agreed to so openly, and with so much
respect for the woman’s own values, it seems that in the end everybody gets a
good deal, and exchange values can be transformed into gifts. One of the ways in
which the woman maintains her own values is through her intransigence in her
demand of love that she fully realizes as an impossible one, but which coexists
alongside the contracts being agreed to. This is the “stock exchange of impossible
equivalences” which give both Maria Braun and Lola their dynamics: “for only
when human beings no longer need to struggle for their naked survival, only
when they possess, besides an intelligence of the head, the body and the heart,
also a bank account and a business card, can they enter into and entertain an
economy of the gift, as the protagonists of these two films try to create.”28
The elements that make women such excellent participating media in histori-
cal representations, such as the intelligence, love, and pacts that Elsaesser notices
in Fassbinder’s BRD trilogy, also offer the prospect for comparing the women in
Fassbinder’s films with those in Verhoeven’s films. The similarities between
Fassbinder’s Maria and Lola and Verhoeven’s Agnes (Jennifer Jason Leigh) in
Flesh+Blood, Cathy (Monique van de Ven) in Cathy Tippel, and especially
Fientje (Renée Schoutendijk) in Spetters are quite striking. These heroines all
have been called opportunistic ladies who use their bodies to get what they want.
But, upon reassessing them, Verhoeven’s women are also quite intelligent, and
combine their “to-be-looked-at-ness” with a capacity to love, and they follow their
instincts for survival by concluding various contracts that are good deals for
everyone involved.29 A closer look at Lili Marleen and Black Book allows us to
compare the female protagonists more elaborately as both are set in the historical
period of Nazism.
Lili and Rachel
In comparing Lili and Rachel, one has to start with the names. In Lili Marleen
Hannah Schygulla plays a woman named Willie, who sings a song about another
woman, Lili Marleen. When the song (in reality sung during World War II by Lale
Anderson) becomes popular because it speaks to the lonely men in the trenches,
Willie signs photos of Hannah Schygulla with “Lili Marleen.” Elsaesser has
pointed out how Fassbinder here demonstrates the “permanent slippage of ac-
tress, character, name and addressee, organized around something [as] ephem-
eral and banal as a song, albeit one that, like the cinema, commands its own
imaginary and mythological space within history.”30
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Meanwhile, Rachel Steinn in Black Book dyes her hair blond and becomes
Ellis de Vries when she joins the resistance. The character Rachel/Ellis is based
on the life stories of three different Dutch women who joined the resistance,
infiltrated German positions, or had a love affair with various German officers.31
The dynamics involved in the slippages of names, characters, and events are very
different, but like Schygulla, Carice van Houten embodies these different (his-
toric and fictional) women and also manages to create an imaginary space within
history that starts operating of its own accord, while maintaining some links with
the historical events without letting it become an unambiguous allegory.
Another striking similarity between Willie/Lili and Rachel/Ellis is that they
both present the idea of “woman as image,” where the woman presents herself
as a spectacle quite explicitly through the trope of “show business.” As we have
already indicated, Willie becomes a great performer for the Third Reich. Simi-
larly, Rachel/Ellis is a singer who, once she has infiltrated a German headquar-
ters, performs for the officers. However, like Fassbinder and Verhoeven’s other
heroines, Willie and Rachel make the distinction between “lending themselves to
others” and “giving themselves only to themselves.”32 Both Willie and Rachel can
maintain this non-naive stance because of an impossible love. Willie is in love
with the Jew, Robert, whom she continues to see even after she has infiltrated
the highest Nazi ranks. Rachel eventually falls in love with the German officer
Müntze, after she discovers that they share the fact that they have both lost their
entire families and he accepts her despite the fact that she is Jewish. It is this
impossible love that allows them to keep themselves for themselves and not deli-
ver themselves completely to the demands of the system. This is clear from the
fact that both women are also double agents, working for the resistance and the
Nazis at the same time. They do not assume their duties out of idealism or high
moral values, but because they want to survive. When Robert asks Willie whose
side she is on, she replies: “On your side, as long as I live. But I’m not free to
choose how I live in order to survive.” Rachel joins the resistance only because,
after having lost everything, she has nothing more to lose, except her own life.
Like Fassbinder and Verhoeven’s other heroines, Lili and Rachel have to oper-
ate in a world where good and bad come in various degrees and disguises, but
never in a pure form. In Lili Marleen, both the Nazis (with their racial laws) and
the Jews (with their severe family laws) are depicted as fundamentalists. Black
Book shows how nobody is transparent, and everybody should thus be dis-
trusted. This fundamental ambiguity in human relations, and the fact that any-
body can be a double agent, not out of pure evil or heroic idealism, but because
they are forced by historical circumstances, is perhaps the most important of
Fassbinder and Verhoeven’s insights. By transferring and transforming history
through the double mirrors of European and Hollywood cinema, both film-
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makers add new perspectives to the historical imagination. However, it is
through the fate of their female protagonists that they demonstrate an intellec-
tually and emotionally rewarding belief in the cinema – and perhaps in the world,
nonetheless.
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Amsterdamned Global Village
A Cinematic Site of Karaoke Americanism
Jaap Kooijman
Like Thomas Elsaesser in his introduction to Hollywood op straat, I often walk
through the Reguliersbreestraat – located between my home and the university –
which is the street in Amsterdam where Hollywood’s presence is most visible.
On one side, there is the Tuschinski Theater, the grand cinema of the Nether-
lands where all the star-studded premieres take place. On the other side is the
Cineac, a former cinema built in 1934 in the style of the Neue Sachlichkeit.
Thanks to its status as monument, the outside of the building has not been al-
tered, although its function has changed drastically over the years. I clearly re-
member going to the Cineac as a kid to see Walt Disney movies such as The
Aristocats (1970) and Herbie Rides Again (1974), but perhaps my memory is
failing me, because the Cineac used to be a newsreel cinema. During my student
years, the Cineac became a knaakbioscoop, showing old Hollywood movies in con-
tinuous rotation each evening, which one could enter at any time by paying a
knaak (two guilders and fifty cents). I spent many evenings there watching ob-
scure Hollywood genre films in the company of bums who used the cinema as
shelter from the rain. In the late 1990s, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Sylvester
Stallone converted the Cineac into a Planet Hollywood restaurant, only to see it
fail within a few short years. Since then, the Cineac has hosted several trendy
clubs like DJ Tiësto’s The Mansion, which tend to go bankrupt and start up again
somewhere else in the city. However, regardless of its ever-changing interior, the
building remains visible in all its architectonic grandeur, and each time I walk by
it reminds me of Hollywood.
In Hollywood op straat, Thomas Elsaesser takes the Reguliersbreestraat as his
starting point to show how “everything is connected” via cinema culture, not only
explicitly by the presence of the Tuschinski and the Cineac, and two prominent
porn theaters, but also implicitly by the photos of Hollywood stars on the covers
of the glossy magazines sold in the kiosks, the Disney action figures included
with each Happy Meal at McDonald’s, and the hidden presence of surveillance
cameras monitoring our every move. Moreover, Elsaesser uses the street to show
how its historical depth can be explored. Each building, like the Cineac, tells its
own story, often connected to cinema. As Elsaesser points out, the pizzeria was
once the office of the Pathé film company, the now-closed flower shop used to be
the Nöggerath cinema and recently has turned into a Pathé Arthouse cinema,
and just around the corner, on the Rembrandtplein, there was the Rembrandt
Theater, owned by the German Ufa film company, which was burned down by
the Dutch resistance in 1943.1 In this way, the Reguliersbreestraat functions as a
pars pro toto of Hollywood’s omnipresence in Amsterdam, rendering visible both
its drastic changes as well as its significant continuity, making connections over
time and between different cultural spaces and economic sectors.
In this chapter, I will wander beyond the Reguliersbreestraat, through other
streets in Amsterdam, by exploring Dutch films that are situated in Amsterdam
and which are all, in one way or another, connected to Hollywood. My journey
starts with Do Not Disturb (Dick Maas, 1999), a self-proclaimed “dark, off-killer
thriller with more twists and turns than the streets of Amsterdam itself.”2 Subse-
quently, I will race in a speedboat through the canals of Amsterdam in Amster-
damned (Dick Maas, 1988), jump on a bicycle in Turks fruit / Turkish De-
light (Paul Verhoeven, 1973), witness an exhilarating Amsterdam streetcar
chase scene in Naakt over de schutting / Naked over the Fence (Frans
Weisz, 1973), and finally, speed through Amsterdam on a delivery moped in Am-
sterdam Global Village (Johan van der Keuken, 1996) and in the second sit-
com episode of Shouf Shouf (VARA, 2006-2007), the television spin-off of the
hit movie Shouf Shouf Habibi! (Albert ter Heerdt, 2004).3 My theoretical navi-
gator will be the concept of karaoke Americanism, a term coined by Thomas
Elsaesser, enabling me to recognize “Hollywood” in Amsterdam in all of its dif-
ferent manifestations, not merely as an imitation of the American generic exam-
ple, but also as a form of active cultural appropriation, or, citing Elsaesser, “that
doubly coded space of identity as overlap and deferral, as compliment and ca-
mouflage.”4 This eclectic collection of Dutch films resembles the Reguliersbree-
straat in that it can function as a cinematic site, revealing how cinema connects
different strands through both time and place, across a variety of genres, thereby
providing an entrance into the multilayered cityscape of pop-cultural appropria-
tion and the dominant presence of Hollywood in our everyday lives.
Turn Right at Muntplein
Do Not Disturb opens with the arrival of Walter and Cathryn Richmond, played
by the Hollywood actors William Hurt and Jennifer Tilly, and their deaf-mute ten-
year-old daughter Melissa (Francesca Brown) at the Hotel de l’Europe, which is
located between the Reguliersbreestraat and the Nieuwe Doelenstraat, the first
home of the Amsterdam Film and Television Studies department. The street out-
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side of the hotel is crowded with fans of the extravagant pop star Billy Bob Man-
son, a fictional crossing of the real-life American pop stars Marilyn Manson and
Michael Jackson. Inside the hotel, Melissa witnesses the murder of her father’s
business associate and, while her parents are having dinner in the hotel restau-
rant, she is kidnapped by the murderers who continuously threaten to kill her as
well. Conform to the genre conventions of the Hollywood B-movie, the plot of Do
Not Disturb remains thin, predominantly consisting of chase scenes through
Amsterdam at night, reaching a climax when one of the villains, driving an am-
bulance with Melissa tied up in the back while being chased by the police and
Melissa’s father, causes an Amsterdam streetcar to crash quite spectacularly in
the Raadhuisstraat. In the end, the bad guys get punished, and the Richmond
family finally gets to enjoy their stay in Amsterdam, although the way the city is
depicted recycles the worn-out clichés of excessive sex and drugs, quite similar to
recent Hollywood movies set in Amsterdam like Ocean’s Twelve (Steven Soder-
bergh, 2004), EuroTrip (Jeff Schaffer, 2004), and Deuce Bigalow: European
Gigolo (Mike Bigelow, 2005).
Both the conventional chase scenes and the clichéd depiction of Amsterdam
reinforce the film’s imitative character. Unlike other popular movies by Dick
Maas such as De lift / The Elevator (1983), Flodder (1986), and Moordwij-
ven / Killer Ladies (2007), Do Not Disturb was not targeted at a domestic
audience but at an international one and is an obvious example of a non-Ameri-
can movie that tries to imitate Hollywood. As Thomas Elsaesser notes, very few
European films have “the budgets, stars and production values even to try to
reach an international mainstream audience,” concluding that “often enough
these films fail in their aim, not least because they have to disguise themselves
to look and sound as if they were American.”5 That Do Not Disturb proved to be
a commercial and critical failure may be explained by the plausible factor that its
attempt to disguise itself as a “real”American movie is obvious to such an extent
that the film becomes even less convincing to audiences and critics alike. A dec-
ade earlier, Dick Maas released Amsterdamned, a commercially and critically
successful thriller about a serial killer lurking around the canals of Amsterdam.
The film’s spectacular highlight is the scene in which the hero Eric Visser (Huub
Stapel) chases the mysterious killer through the Amsterdam canals in a speed-
boat, yet its Hollywood allure is comically undercut by touches of Dutch cinephi-
lia. Holland’s best-known film critic Simon van Collem peddles by on a water
bike, while director Bert Haanstra is conducting a brass band in a jolly boat, a
clear reference to his classic film Fanfare (1958). Although Amsterdamned also
relies heavily on the often clichéd genre conventions of Hollywood, the film does
not, however, disguise itself as American, but explicitly recognizes its local char-
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acter, appropriating Hollywood within its own Dutch context, rather than trying
to be a mere imitation of the American original.
The cultural appropriation of Hollywood in Do Not Disturb and Amster-
damned can be discussed in reference to Jean Baudrillard, who has suggested
that “America is the original version of modernity,” whereas we in Europe “are
the dubbed or subtitled version.”6 The use of dubbing and subtitling as metaphor
is striking, as the appropriation of Hollywood is most explicitly visible in audio-
visual media. Moreover, dubbing and subtitling can be taken quite literally. With
the exception of dubbed children’s movies, the large majority of the films
watched in the Netherlands are subtitled Hollywood genre movies, making Hol-
lywood the standard film language not only for a Dutch audience but also for
Dutch directors of feature films. Hollywood equals cinema, both metaphorically
and literally. However, this perspective limits the discussion to the question of
whether or not the dubbed or subtitled version is a successful copy of the Amer-
ican original. The use of Elsaesser’s karaoke metaphor, on the contrary, places
emphasis on the performative character of cultural appropriation. Although it
may sound rather pejorative, the concept of karaoke Americanism is an effective
tool to grasp the slippery distinction between sheer imitation and active appro-
priation. As a performance based on clichéd pop-cultural conventions that invites
creative participation, karaoke Americanism signifies both faithful imitation and
playful parody, both mimicry and mockery, enabling an appropriation of Holly-
wood which leaves room for ambiguity. From this perspective, Do Not Disturb
is sheer imitation, whereas Amsterdamned is a karaoke performance, which be-
comes even more overtly pronounced in its international edition, dubbed in Eng-
lish by the original actors speaking with a heavy Dutch accent.7
Turn Left at the Dam
In one famous scene in Turkish Delight, the most popular Dutch film ever,
Erik Vonk (Rutger Hauer) bikes across the Dam and through the streets of Am-
sterdam with Olga (Monique van de Ven) on the backseat. They have just gotten
married in city hall (now the luxurious Hotel the Grand, located on the Oudezijds
Voorburgwal), and, accompanied by a soundtrack by Toots Thielemans on har-
monica, they joyfully play a cat-and-mouse game with a car that is trying to pass
them. Turkish Delight was director Paul Verhoeven’s second feature film (he
eventually would move to Hollywood) and has been widely recognized as the
main representative of a “new wave” in Dutch cinema, in which explicit depic-
tions of sex, bodily functions, and violence were used to attack the Calvinist re-
strictions of Dutch bourgeois culture.8 In addition to its celebration of romance,
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the bicycle scene emphasizes the role of Amsterdam as a bohemian space of
artistic and sexual freedom, in stark contrast to the bourgeois small-mindedness
as represented by the mundane provincial town of Alkmaar where Olga’s parents
run an electronic appliance store.
From an auteur film perspective, Verhoeven’s Turkish Delight has been
compared to other European films such as Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Teorema / The-
orem (1968) and Bernardo Bertolucci’s Ultimo tango a Parigi / Last Tango in
Paris (1972), all of which fit within a tradition of épater les bourgeois through sex-
ual liberation. From the perspective of karaoke Americanism, however, Turkish
Delight could also be perceived as a raunchy version of the Hollywood melodra-
ma Love Story (Arthur Hiller, 1970). Like Oliver (Ryan O’Neal) and Jennifer (Ali
MacGraw), Erik and Olga fall in love despite their being from different social
backgrounds, and like Jennifer, Olga dies of cancer in the end. Moreover, both
movies were extremely popular and have become iconic representations of the
early 1970s. If one views Turkish Delight as “the other face of Love Story,” as
one American critic did, it is tempting to overemphasize the differences between
these two popular love stories as part of the traditional divide between Hollywood
and European cinema.9 Accordingly, as a product of the American studio system,
Love Story is a tearjerker made to move the audience along the lines of predict-
able genre conventions, whereas Turkish Delight is the artistic expression of
one individual director, intended to confront rather than please the audience.
However, as Thomas Elsaesser shows in European Cinema, the two seemingly
antagonistic poles of the Hollywood-Europe divide actually complement each
other, being two sides of the same coin. European national cinemas have devel-
oped not so much in opposition to, but in relation to Hollywood, “existing in a
space set up like a hall of mirrors, in which recognition, imaginary identity and
mis-cognition enjoy equal status, creating value out of pure difference.”10 Instead
of emphasizing the differences, one could also point out the similarities, like how
the bicycle scene in Turkish Delight, intentionally or not, evokes the romantic
sentiment of that other famous scene in Love Story in which Oliver and Jennifer
playfully throw snowballs at each other in New York’s Central Park.
The rigid distinction between Hollywood genre film and European auteur cin-
ema is also challenged by Naked over the Fence, the action thriller by the
Dutch director Frans Weisz, which was released the same year as Turkish De-
light, but never attained the latter’s popularity.11 Naked over the Fence tells
the story of the Amsterdam pigeon keeper and gambling joint owner Rick (Rijk
de Gooyer), who, together with his friends Ed (John Bluming) and Penny (Jenni-
fer Willems), gets entangled in a porn mafia murder scheme. The glamour of
Hollywood is embodied by the femme fatale Lilly Marischka, played by the sen-
sual Silvia Kristel, who would later become Europe’s most famous porn-chic ac-
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tress with her starring role in Emmanuelle (Just Jaeckin, 1974). Amsterdam
plays an important role as the film’s setting, which is emphasized by the film’s
opening sequence, which shows the city from a bird’s-eye view, lingering over
Amsterdam to capture its labyrinthine character. There are several times during
the movie that Penny is riding her moped through the crowded streets of Am-
sterdam while being chased by the mob’s twin brothers Jack and Mack (Hans and
Lodewijk Syses), whose American convertible keeps getting stuck in the city’s
web of one-way streets and narrow bridges. The main chase scene, however,
takes place on the streetcar tracks. When Jack and Mack hijack a streetcar, Rick
and his friends jump on another empty streetcar and chase the twins all over
town, eventually forcing them to surrender. Although the chase scene fits the
conventions of the action thriller, its “realness” is undercut by the main charac-
ters, who are genuinely surprised by the spectacular situation they find them-
selves in, as they cheerfully wave at stunned passengers who are waiting at the
various streetcar stops. For a moment, Amsterdam becomes the location of a
“real” movie, and yet, like in the Amsterdamned chase scene, we are immedi-
ately reminded that we are in Amsterdam, not Hollywood.
Pass Straight through the Vondelpark
The documentary Amsterdam Global Village is built around the young Moroc-
can-Dutch courier Khalid speeding through Amsterdam on his moped delivering
developed rolls of film and pictures to photographers like Erwin Olaf. In between
these deliveries, he meets his friends who hang around the Museumplein where
they chitchat and smoke joints. Throughout the almost four-hour documentary,
shot over a period of twenty months, director Johan van der Keuken uses Khalid’s
delivery route as a thread to connect a wide range of personal stories about be-
longing and exile, showing various ethnicities, nationalities, subcultures, and
lifestyles that exist side-by-side in a relatively small yet international metropolis.
In this way, Amsterdam is presented as a multicultural labyrinth in which the
experiences of people coming from all over the world are linked over time and
space, through both their differences and similarities. As Thomas Elsaesser has
pointed out, the cinematic structure of Amsterdam Global Village was in-
spired by the circular form of the Amsterdam canals.12 Van der Keuken shows
the city and its inhabitants literally from different angles and spaces in all their
heterogeneity, suggesting continuity through disruptive montage, thereby pre-
senting a non-hierarchical structure which makes connections in perpetual mo-
tion, of which Khalid is its most prominent personification. Tellingly, the film
ends with a shot of Khalid on his moped, saying into the camera that he has had
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enough of all this filming, before turning around and speeding off, back into the
city’s labyrinth.
In European Cinema, Elsaesser uses Amsterdam Global Village to discuss
his concept of double occupancy, which exemplifies how all Europeans – and not
just the most recent immigrants – are hyphenated: “There is no European, in
other words, who is not already diasporic in relation to some marker of differ-
ence – be it ethnic, regional, religious, or linguistic – and whose identity is not
always already hyphenated or doubly occupied.”13 Instead of being just another
term for multiculturalism or cultural diversity, double occupancy recognizes the
imbalance of political power between different cultural identities, including both
the experience of being uprooted as well as the possibility of personal alliances
with others in comparable situations. The concept emphasizes the ambiguous
multiplicity of identities, which eventually could lead to the rather utopian “point
where the very notion of national identity will fade from our vocabulary, and be
replaced by other kinds of belonging, relating and being.”14 Amsterdam Global
Village invites its viewers to make such connections between the great variety of
city dwellers (including themselves), suggesting a larger collective sense of be-
longing based on a shared urban living experience. Moreover, as its title implies,
the documentary finds the global in the local, while explicitly leaving the national
out of the picture.
In addition to Amsterdam Global Village, Elsaesser mentions Shouf
Shouf Habibi! as an example of double occupancy. This Dutch comedy about a
group of Moroccan-Dutch and white Dutch youngsters in Amsterdam (which
was the box-office hit of the year 2004) closely follows the genre conventions of
the Hollywood comedy, making fun of both traditional Moroccan immigrant cul-
ture and mainstream white Dutch society. Abdullah (Mimoum Oaïssa) and his
friends are continuously failing to achieve their goal of getting rich without too
much effort, which allows for, as Elsaesser suggests, “a democracy of bunglers
and losers to emerge as the film’s political ideal, in the absence of – or while
waiting for – better options.”15 Although in a different way than Amsterdam
Global Village, Shouf Shouf Habibi! also opens up Amsterdam as a multi-
cultural space in which diverse senses of belonging can come together. Another
link between the two films can be made by looking at the second sitcom episode
of Shouf Shouf, the hit comedy’s television spin-off, in which Abdullah’s
younger brother Driss (Iliass Ojja) rides his moped throughout Amsterdam to
deliver pizzas. In this episode, Driss speeds through the city, going from pizzeria
Pastorale on the Haarlemmerstraat to his favorite client on the Lindengracht, a
beautiful blond older lady who seemingly wants to seduce him. But before he
arrives at her luxurious canal house, Driss rides home to Boutenburg (in Amster-
dam West) to groom himself. Here the moped serves as a vehicle that crosses
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economic and ethnic boundaries within Amsterdam, moving back and forth be-
tween the city’s tourist areas, the blue-collar multi-ethnic neighborhoods, and the
luxurious circle of canals called the Grachtengordel, home to the (predominantly
white) urban upper class. Even though Shouf Shouf is based on the genre con-
ventions of the Hollywood comedy and American sitcom, whereas Amsterdam
Global Village is part of a Dutch documentary tradition, Driss and Khalid func-
tion in a very similar manner. The two young Moroccan-Dutch moped couriers
both race around Amsterdam, constantly making crisscross connections
throughout the cityscape and thereby reinforcing its perpetual transformation.
Go Back to Rembrandtplein
Since the release of Amsterdamned in 1988, film critics and viewers alike have
continued to point out the film’s geographical inconsistency, as several shots of
the film’s famous chase scene feature the Oudegracht, which is the main canal in
the nearby city of Utrecht. Different than the canals in Amsterdam, the Oude-
gracht has quays below street level, where people can sit and relax on terraces
alongside the water. Only in Utrecht could director Dick Maas let the speedboats
jump so spectacularly onto the quay and plow through the tables and chairs on a
full terrace, leaving the unsuspecting tourists in awe. This cinematic freedom is
of course quite common and accepted in movies shot in Hollywood, suggesting
that the repeated claim of inconsistency has been inspired by Amsterdamned’s
explicit local character. Apparently, the break with the realism of local space (leap-
ing from Amsterdam to Utrecht and back in one scene) undermines the credibil-
ity of the film’s fictional world. However, although staying within the city limits
of Amsterdam, the other films discussed in this chapter are also geographically
inconsistent, presenting scenes that leap from one specific place to another,
which in the “real” cityscape are often located far apart. Erik and Olga in Turkish
Delight ride their bicycle from the Muntplein directly onto the Centuurbaan.
The streetcar chase scene in Naked over the Fence moves back and forth from
one Amsterdam neighborhood to another in no logical order. In Do Not Dis-
turb, the ambulance enters the Vondelpark at the Blauwbrug and exits at the
Raadhuisstraat. Even Khalid in the documentary Amsterdam Global Village
makes turns along his route that are impossible according to the city map.
Such geographical inconsistencies are not only acceptable in cinematic space,
they also do not alter the way these specific locations function as real-life refer-
ence points. Like the buildings in the Reguliersbreestraat represent histories
about cinema’s presence in our everyday culture, these films connect me to the
streets of Amsterdam, the city where I was born and have lived most of my life.
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Watching these movies brings back personal memories linked to locations that
keep changing over time, and yet remain remarkably the same. And vice versa:
moving through the city often makes me relive these films, as I find myself hum-
ming the theme of Turkish Delight when biking across the Dam or imagining
streetcars chasing each other until they crash when they pass me by on the We-
teringscircuit. When Jean Baudrillard traveled through the USA, he experienced
how “real” space overlapped with cinematic space: “In America cinema is true
because it is the whole of space, the whole way of life that are cinematic. The
break between the two … does not exist: life is cinema.”16 As a cinematic site of
karaoke Americanism, life in Amsterdam also equals cinema, even if the actual
experience may turn out to be quite different from the American original, repeat-
edly reminding us that we are not in Hollywood after all.
One explicit moment of both Hollywood’s presence and absence brings me
back to the Reguliersbreestraat. In 2000, I attended the glamorous red-carpet
premiere of the Hollywood movie The Perfect Storm (Wolfgang Petersen,
2000) at the Tuschinski Theater, organized by the Benelux branch of Warner
Brothers. Although the film’s two major stars were supposed to be present,
George Clooney called in sick, while Mark Wahlberg was rumored to be smoking
pot in some Amsterdam coffee shop. As the paparazzi were taking pictures of
Dutch soap opera stars and other locally famous media personalities, I could not
help but recognize that we were playing Hollywood in Holland, a true perfor-
mance of karaoke Americanism. After the film was over, we went to the VIP after
party at the Escape, a large discotheque on the Rembrandtplein. Many of the
guests probably did not realize the location’s historical significance. During the
1920s, the Rembrandt Theater had been the city’s most prominent cinema,
showing German silent films that were far more popular than the Hollywood
movies that were showing at the Tuschinski.17 Eight decades later, at the exact
same spot, we were dancing to celebrate the arrival of The Perfect Storm, a
Hollywood blockbuster production, in a former cinema now called the Escape.
Whether we liked it or not, at that moment, right there at the Rembrandtplein,
no escape was possible from Hollywood’s omnipresence in Amsterdam.
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Soundtracks of Double Occupancy
Sampling Sounds and Cultures in Fatih Akin’s Head On
Senta Siewert
Just like in German Punk or Hip Hop, what we are doing here is not a cin-
ema of imitation, but rather a cinema of adaptation.
– Fatih Akin1
In European Cinema, Thomas Elsaesser discusses Fatih Akin amongst other
young contemporary filmmakers who challenge the predominant understanding
of national cinema within film studies.2 Elsaesser’s wide-ranging scholarship
crosses boundaries and coins terms that have established new discourses in film
studies and humanities. One such concept is “double occupancy,” which refers to
“a filmmaking and film-viewing community that crosses cultural and hyphenates
ethnic borders.”3 According to this concept some of the most successful contem-
porary European filmmakers (Fatih Akin, Gurinder Chadha, Abdel Kechiche), all
from different ethnic backgrounds, are doubly occupied, hyphenated Europeans
(German-Turkish, British-Indian, French-Magreb). These directors seem best
suited to address social problems and identify tendencies of change within Euro-
pean society at large. However, Elsaesser stresses that double occupancy can be
applied to “every part of Europe, and to all of us: our identities are multiply de-
fined, multiply experienced.”4 He proposes thinking of a “post-national” Europe
and thereby implies that the common practice of identification according to na-
tionality has become outdated and should make way for the possibility of post-
national subjectivities.5
Alongside films such as La Haine / Hate (Mathieu Kassovitz, 2005), Train-
spotting (Danny Boyle, 1996), Amsterdam Global Village (Johan van der
Keuken, 1996), and Good Bye Lenin (Wolfgang Becker, 2003), which can be
viewed as representing a New European Cinema, Elsaesser also briefly mentions
the film Gegen die Wand / Head On by Fatih Akin (2004). As a “post-national
subject”Akin explicitly refuses to let his work be reduced to his ethnic roots or to
have him typecast as a migrant filmmaker. Akin defines Head On as a European
film, in response to media reactions after his film won the Golden Bear prize at
the Berlin Film Festival. Both the German and Turkish press claimed the prize as
their own success, a reaction which suggested a certain anxiety about defining
national identity.6 In contrast to these critics, Elsaesser focuses on the utopian
dimension of double occupancy when he writes that Head On “draws its power,
its universality, but also its politics, from the spectator following a human rela-
tionship that tries to live by a new socio-sexual contract.”7
In response, my aim here is to build on Elsaesser’s concept of double occu-
pancy and, moreover, add new dimensions to it by focusing on how it works on
the level of sound. My hypothesis is that in New European Cinema it is precisely
in the music that the double occupancy finds its fullest expression.8 In order to
illustrate this point, I will begin by examining two examples of contemporary
European films which depict sampling techniques and technologies in a more
explicit manner, before turning to a close reading of Head On, which reveals a
shift and amplification from musical sampling technique to sampling as an over-
all structuring element. In my analysis of these various sampling techniques, my
main concern is with specific musical forms, audiovisual relations, musical emo-
tion, sonic memory, and the role of the transnational in cinematic soundtracks.
Sampling
Akin’s documentary Crossing the Bridge: The Sound of Istanbul (2005) is
connected to Head On, as some protagonists and musicians appear in both
films. Crossing the Bridge establishes a central role for music in carving out
particular identity patterns and its cultural and geographic implications. It starts
with a proverb by the ancient philosopher Confucius, stating that one must un-
derstand the music of a country in order to understand its culture. One central
theme of the film is the bridging between West and East, Europe and Asia, in
terms of spaces, cultures, and different musical styles. The main protagonist is
Alexander Hacke, a member of the German avant-garde band Einstürzende Neu-
bauten. He can be seen as a flaneur, who tries to capture the diverse sounds of
Istanbul with a microphone.9 In Akin’s film, Hacke functions as a mediator who
reworks these sounds, samples, mixes, and saves them on his computer in order
to produce the soundtrack to the film. Hacke’s sampling technique can be under-
stood as a broader aesthetic characteristic that also recurs in the film Head On
and other European films such as Trainspotting, Hate, and Dans Paris / In-
side Paris (Christophe Honoré, 2006).
In Hate, one particular scene most notably underlines the importance of the
music in contemporary films. Here a DJ opens the windows of his housing estate
flat in the outer suburbs, and his music reaches down to the main protagonists
walking below. The DJ is mixing the song “Sound Of Da Police” by KRS1 with
“Fuck The Police” by Nique Ta Mere (NTM) and a loop of Edith Piaf singing
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“Non! Je Ne Regrette Rien.” The music establishes three cultural backgrounds,
with American hip-hop and French hip-hop confronting a French chanson from
the 1950s and 1960s. This sampling and cut’n’mix technique together with the
lyrics offers a good example for interpreting music in cinema as a form of story-
telling. By appropriating different music styles the songs function as a social
commentary: Piaf’s lyrics of “no regret” provide a justification for attacking the
police. Moreover, Hate connects its narrative to real events and layers past and
present time through its music.10
Head On, like Hate, also constantly blends film and musical traditions by
sampling them and thus requiring that the audience provide a special kind of
musicality and a way of understanding historical references. Sampling, as a form
of discontinuity that is used in hip-hop and drum’n’bass, among others styles of
music, can best be described as a way to adapt, appropriate, recycle, and remedi-
ate pre-recorded material. In Head On, Akin samples seemingly diverse and
contrary musical sounds from different cultures, times, genres, and styles. The
music in the film functions as a sound bridge, which transcends cultural borders
and reveals a state of double occupancy.
Sound and Image
In order to understand the referential and experiential function of music one
must recognize that in film studies there is a tendency to focus more on the
visual than on sound and music. One reason for neglecting the music could be
that the soundtrack is generally considered secondary since most films are vir-
tually complete before being passed on to the composer for scoring. Traditionally,
composed music functions as a tool to underline the narrative and mood; this
music is meant to remain “unheard” as film scholar Claudia Gorbman has fa-
mously stated.11 However, this tendency is slowly being reversed as a growing
number of contemporary directors have already chosen the songs during the
scriptwriting stage; this was also the case with Head On. This phenomenon,
which is manifested in the soundtrack practice, suggests a shift in contemporary
European films from a reliance on original background scores to foregrounding
pre-existing songs. This is also reflected by the fact that the music supervisor of
Head On, Klaus Maeck, has become increasingly influential over the years and
was even hired as the producer of Akin’s latest film Auf der anderen Seite / On
the Other Side (2007).12
Another reason why music has been neglected in film studies could be due to
the significant differences between sound and image in film. One important dis-
tinction is that, unlike one’s eyes, it is difficult to close one’s ears to sound. More-
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over, the sound vibrations in the space of reception have the potential of going
right into a spectator’s body. Is this why film theory tends to ignore sound, be-
cause sound cannot be easily objectified? Does this originate in the associations
of the visual as linked to the rational and the mind, while the auditory has often
been linked to the irrational and the body?13 By contrast, I would like to highlight
that sound can affect the body of the audience, with its tone appealing to the
emotions, even without the literal elements of the lyrics. This means that music
can be seen as a powerful device for reorganizing the affective relationship be-
tween film and the spectator and can also convey a kind of presence.
Many critics have agreed that Head On has an intense wrenching effect on its
audience. This can be partly attributed to the narrative of the characters’ struggle
in life and also to the rapid changes in locations, raw digital aesthetics, colors,
atmosphere, moods but most of all, to the film’s usage of various musical styles.
In order to illustrate the dynamics of the music, which stresses the dual back-
ground of the characters and the director, I will now introduce several key scenes
from Head On in more detail.
The film opens with a postcard view of Istanbul facing the shore of the Bos-
porus. A band is placed tableaux-like, sitting on top of oriental carpets, looking
into the camera and playing the traditional Turkish song “Saniye’M,” which is
dominated by the sounds of a clarinet and violin.14 A Turkish singer is wearing a
red evening dress, and, as we can read in the subtitles, she is singing about a
failed love affair. After seeing these warm exterior colors, a quick cut to an artifi-
cially lit nightclub in Hamburg provides a vivid contrast. The protagonist Cahit
(Birol Ünel) is introduced via a shaky hand-held camera shot. He is stumbling
around, picking up glasses, and drinking leftover beer. He has long dirty hair
and a desperate, frustrated facial expression. He seems to be on the verge of an
emotional outburst when he begins talking to a friend in Turkish and then to
others in German. After he moves to a different club featuring German punk
rock, he starts a fight and gets kicked out and then drives his old car head on
into a wall.15
This scene enacts an episode of the unexperienceable, a near-death experience.
The audiovisual texture is complex: the squealing tires irritate and the flickering
lights on the wall of the tunnel seem to anticipate this moment between life and
death. The visual beat sets up an aural beat, which changes into the song “I Feel
You” by Depeche Mode.16 The jump cuts of Cahit’s changing facial expressions
from hysterical laughter to crying are juxtaposed with POV shots of Cahit driving
his car zigzagstyle, to emphasize his drunken, desperate state of mind. While the
song can be heard non-diegetically without any ruptures, the editing and the driv-
ing increase time’s velocity.
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The audience has to comprehend a lot simultaneously, moving quickly from
Istanbul to Hamburg, from traditional Turkish music to alternative German
punk rock and an international song. Apart from the complex negotiations in the
dynamic between the crossover of western pop rock music and oriental music,
the audience also visually experiences the intensity of Cahit’s suicidal behavior.
The narrative does not explain the main character’s motivations. Instead, the only
thing the audience has to go on is the audiovisual texture. For this reason, view-
ers may have to listen more closely to the sound, which means that the beat and
lyrics provide further narrative explanation. The lyrics in “I Feel You” resemble
those in the beginning of the Turkish song, in that they tell us about the end of an
unfulfilled relationship: “This is the morning of our love, it’s just the dawning of
our love.” Listening to the clash of musical styles opens up facets of the charac-
ters, which words and images alone cannot explain.
As Elsaesser has noted about Head On: “After a near-death accident, the male
protagonist, having cancelled all obligations even to the proposition of staying
alive, eventually agrees to enter into a kind of contract, with an almost equally
post-mortem young woman.”17 Like Cahit, the female protagonist Sibel (Sibel
Kekilli) is also accompanied by a multifaceted soundtrack. She is introduced in a
close-up, not unlike a classic melodrama. However, a single camera pan move-
ment quickly shows the audience her wrists, indicating that she is a psychiatric
patient who has also survived a suicide attempt. From the moment she first ap-
pears, she offers a strong unapologetic seductive gaze into the camera, which is
addressed to Cahit, who is also in the clinic. After she discovers that Cahit is
Turkish, she tries to persuade him to marry her so that she can flee her strict
Muslim parent’s home. Later, at their traditional wedding they take cocaine and
dance excessively to traditional Turkish wedding music. Sibel moves into Cahit’s
anarchic and dirty apartment. She cooks and cleans, but maintains her indepen-
dence from him while she leads a liberated sex life, with many different partners.
Sibel redecorates Cahit’s apartment, leaving behind only one single reminder of
his past, a poster of the 1980s punk rock band Siouxies and the Banshees on the
door. In this way, pop music is also part of the visuals in the form of a poster of a
band as a reference to the identity patterns of the male protagonist. Moreover, a
hospital doctor attempts to relate to Cahit by referring to a pop band and their
lyrics. He asks if Cahit knows the band The The and their line: “If you can’t
change the world, change your world.”18 This reference to pop music functions
as a communication bridge between two people from different cultural back-
grounds.
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Enhancing Emotions with Diegetic Music
In another scene, the importance that music has for the characters becomes ap-
parent, which one experiences on the level of diegetic music. Soon after their
marriage, Sibel comes back to their home and dances to the song “Temple Of
Love,” joined by Cahit. The song, originally by The Sisters of Mercy, represents
the 1980s western rock tradition, and in the film it is mixed with Middle Eastern
musical styles, including the haunting voice of Israeli singer Ofra Haza.19 With
her dancing, Sibel combines typical 1980s German head banging with Turkish
dance. At the song’s climax the image freezes, fixing Cahit in his wildest dance
move, resembling the image of a pop star. As the song continues, Sibel and Cahit
are now suddenly shown in a nightclub and still dancing to the same song. As
Sibel is seen seducing a man, Cahit’s jealousy marks the beginning of their pas-
sionate yet destructive love affair. When Cahit later becomes aware of his feel-
ings, he is shown dancing in another club with his arms in the air covered in
blood.
In the film, these extreme feelings are manifested in alcohol and drug use, in
dancing and self-inflicted wounds, and always accompanied by a specific sound-
track. This is illustrated in a later scene, after Cahit has accidentally killed Sibel’s
former lover in a fight. When Sibel returns home alone after this incident she
puts on music that matches her grieving mood and the impossible love relation-
ship she has with Cahit. She now puts on the Turkish song “Agla Sevdam.”20
This enhances her emotions, and she begins to cut herself to feel even more
pain. This pain is visualized as she watches her own blood flow all over her and
is further emphasized by the melodramatic music. The “empathetic music”
matches the mood of the action.21 Both Cahit and Sibel live a life of ecstatic suf-
fering, which is called kara sevda in Turkish, which describes people who are
either in ecstasy or agony and who long to see and feel their blood in order to
intensify their feelings. This particular behavior is rooted in an oriental tradition
of suffering for love, as Feridun Zaimoglu has observed.22 Based on these exam-
ples, which show that diegetic music plays a key role in enhancing feelings, the
next section shows diegetic music as a sonic memory device.
Musical Codes / Sonic Memory
After the fatal incident, Cahit is sent to prison, and Sibel flees to Istanbul. There
she is seen entering a nightclub, where she takes drugs (this time the “oriental”
drug opium), dancing and turning in spirals on her own with her eyes closed.
This scene, seems to show her trying to escape the space of the Turkish nightclub
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by transferring herself to a virtual space via excessive dancing until she collapses
and subsequently is violently assaulted. Here the song “I Feel You” by Depeche
Mode is played diegetically, the same song that was played as a soundtrack as
Cahit drove headfirst into a wall. The song connects two different locations
(Hamburg and Istanbul) and two people (Cahit and Sibel), who are both experi-
encing extreme physical pain and emotional despair. The song, like feedback,
functions here as a “cue” for the audience, enabling them to predict an imminent
disaster. By this time, the audience can sense what is going to happen next via the
soundtrack. The song refers to a particular mood of a previous event and also to a
shared sonic memory for audience members. When well-known songs are played
in familiar spaces – such as nightclubs or cars – the participation of the audience
is at its highest level. In these familiar spaces where everyone has had their own
personal experiences with dancing in the past, the sonic memory is the most
intense because personal experiences, combined with scenes from the film, blur
the lines between actual and virtual, fantasy and reality. Just as the consumption
of energetic and hallucinogenic drugs brings one into a non-space, a space out-
side the body, dancing can evoke a delocalization of the body that suspends nor-
mal affective relationships and perception of the self.
When coupled with memory, this sound experience can be described as the
sonic equivalent to the déjà vu. Steve Goodman has coined the term “déjà enten-
du” to describe the sonic memory as something that has resonated before with
some part of one’s body.23 He calls it “an unfolded acoustic memory, which is
latent, virulent” and is waiting to be activated by a trigger, which stimulates an
embodied memory. Déjà entendu implies the enhancement of chronological time
by active memory. This goes beyond the somatic experience of the aural and the
visual to a deeper personal resonance of the body. Goodman notes that one has to
consider both the referential and the experiential function of music.
Transcultural Soundtrack
In Head On it does not matter on what level one understands all the German,
Turkish, or English lyrics, because the beat, rhythm, and tone of voice all have an
effect regardless of their cultural reference points. This border-crossing quality of
music is also described by Simon Frith, who has suggested that “sounds carry
across fences and walls and oceans, across classes, races and nations.”24 Musicol-
ogist John Sloboda also argues that, as an emotional response, music is transcul-
tural.25 If one takes into account all of the qualities of music that have thus far
been mentioned, then Elsaesser’s concept of double occupancy helps us to under-
stand the characters and the director, their affinity with both pop and traditional
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music from various cultures. Audiences are also doubly occupied or even multi-
occupied, as they share certain of the film’s musical codes, because they live in,
with and through these codes. This means that the viewers can sense what affects
the characters in the film. The function of music is to captivate the audience:
their bodies are affected by the rhythms that are transmitted via vibrant bodily
experiences, which shows that music, enhanced by camera work, recreates and
simulates an experience in a way that the mere sequencing of images cannot.
In this way, the music acts as a bridge for the spectator, whose experience of
extreme states usually does not involve the slashing of one’s wrists, trying to
commit suicide or escaping an oppressive Turkish family life, but that via well-
known spaces (nightclubs, cars, etc.) – that combine both familiarity and extra-
territoriality – the spectator’s access is therefore enhanced, which is equal to the
extreme emotional states, where ecstasy and agony are so closely commingled.
The extreme emotional states denote the particular types of protagonists found
in Head On as well as other contemporary European films such as Trainspot-
ting, Hate, and Inside Paris. In these films, the protagonists escape the binary
narrative of either succeeding or failing; they are neither rebels nor conformists;
instead they can be seen as survivors, who live a life with risky cutting-edge ex-
periences like racing at extreme speeds in a car, dancing excessively, or taking
drugs. Elsaesser also describes similar contemporary protagonists when he intro-
duces them as “abject heroes” (referring to Julia Kristeva’s26 famous term), here
delineating a utopian dimension of double occupancy, because these abject
heroes tell us something about “the conditions of [the] possibility of a counter-
image of what it means to be human.”27 In the case ofHead On, Elsaesser points
to a special kind of abject heroes: the post-mortem heroes, who have “cancelled
all obligations even to the proposition of staying alive.”28
In other words, here the extreme states of the characters place them in a no
man’s land, from which they are brought back to life by the various affective,
semantic, and historical references embedded in the music. When “Life’s What
You Make It” by Talk Talk29 is heard at the end of the film, it functions as a classic
déjà entendu, because Cahit had played this same melody earlier in the film on
the piano. Here it is obvious that songs can even serve as lifesavers, because
through the lyrics, rhythm, and the tone of voice, the song offers a glimpse of
hope for the protagonists and for the audience, who have to recover from the
tour de force of the soundtrack. This strategy of considering the music in a film
shows that the dichotomies of doubleness one first recognizes in Head On (Ger-
man vs. Turkish, Occident vs. Orient, western pop music vs. Turkish “traditional”
music) are undermined and therefore display a post-national Europe. This is
linked to the multi-defined identities of all Europeans, whose identities are al-
ready hyphenated, with respect to regional, societal, and gender aspects.
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Generally speaking, the films of the New European Cinema let the audience
experience new perceptual modes, subjectivities along a specifically sonic kind of
bodily memory. The concept of double occupancy helps develop an audiovisual
analysis that fully apprehends the combination of cinema and popular music,
which has either been overlooked or been inadequately classified. Even though
the films are situated in and draw on local cultures, subcultures, and patterns of
identity formations, these national or regional peculiarities are best understood
within broader “European” or even global patterns of identity formation, co-habi-
tation and conflict resolution among the young and their relation to pop music.
Notes
1. “Aber wie im deutschen Punk oder Hip-Hop ist das, was wir hier machen, kein Kino
der Imitation, sondern der Adaption. Wir übernehmen etwas, um es auf uns selbst
zu übertragen – und dann etwas Eigenes daraus zu machen.” Fatih Akin in an inter-
view with Michael Ranze about his film Solino (2002): “Heimat ist ein mentaler
Zustand,” epd Film 11 (2002).
2. Thomas Elsaesser, European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood (Amsterdam: Am-
sterdam University Press 2005). For other discourses on national cinema, see An-
drew Higson, “The Concept of National Cinema,” Screen 30.4 (1989); Sabine Hake,
German National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002); and for concepts such as “mi-
grant and diasporic cinema,” “cinema de métissage,” “accented cinema,” or “border
crossing identities,” see Hamid Naficy, An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Film-
making (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
3. Elsaesser, European Cinema 27.
4. Elsaesser, European Cinema 109.
5. He further claims that the concept of double occupancy intends to provisionally suc-
ceed that of the historical imaginary, by suggesting that “mirror-relations and forms of
‘othering’ typical of a previous period may be in [the] process of being superseded, as
identity politics through boundary-drawing gives way to [a] general recognition of co-
habitation, mutual interference and mutual responsibility as necessary forms of a
new solidarity and sense of co-existence.” Elsaesser, European Cinema 27.
6. In Germany, people were proud that a “German” won the Golden Bear for the first
time in eighteen years, while in Turkey they celebrated the first success of a Turkish
filmmaker in forty years. (There were other critics, who focused on the porn back-
ground of the female protagonist Sibel Kekilli.) “I don’t do migrant cinema. I don’t
accept this categorization for my films. They don’t talk about migrancy, they talk
about me and my life.” Fatih Akin interviewed by Asu Aksoy, “Reality: Check,” Vertigo
2 (2005). Akin later talks about an identity in motion. Fatih Akin in an interview with
Andreas Kilb and Peter Körte, “Der Islamismus in der Türkei macht mir keine
Angst,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (3 Sept. 2007).
7. Elsaesser, European Cinema 125.
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8. Some critics refer to different cinematic traditions in connection with Head On and
found similarities to Turkish cinema or the New German Cinema. Asuman Suner
compares Head On to the films of Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Asuman Suner, “Dark
Passion,” Sight and Sound (March 2005). This reference to Fassbinder is very appar-
ent, especially when we think of the music used inMartha (1974) or In a Year of 13
Moons (1978) where pop music was already being juxtaposed with classical music
and original scores. See Senta Siewert, Entgrenzung im Film bei Rainer Werner Fassbin-
der, unpublished MA thesis (Freie Universität Berlin, 1999). In Akin’s film Auf der
anderen Seite / On the Other Side (2007) one of the main characters plays Han-
na Schygulla, a favorite Fassbinder actress. In my current research, I have explored
pop music in such contemporary European films as Trainspotting, 24 Hour Party
People, Velvet Goldmine, Lola rennt / Run, Lola, Run, Sonnenalle / Sun Al-
ley, La Haine / Hate, Clubbed to Death, and Dans Paris / Inside Paris.
9. The soundtrack of Crossing the Bridge is comprised of Turkish hip-hop and Turk-
ish rock music, which refer to the Western tradition; and arabesque and Gypsy mu-
sic, which relate to the Middle Eastern world. Akin’s films not only refer to New Ger-
man Cinema director Fassbinder; there are also references to WimWenders, because
Crossing the Bridge is reminiscent of Buena Vista Social Club (1999), where
the main protagonist, Ray Cooder, is also a flâneur, and pop songs are used as life-
savers (like in Wenders’s earlier films).
10. The beginning of the film shows scenes of violence from actual television footage of
youth riots against the French police after they shot a sixteen-year-old boy. This mon-
tage of found footage is underscored by Bob Marley’s song “Burnin’ and Lootin’,”
which seems to connect the images to broader post-colonial struggles against sup-
pression. This sampling of images allows the tragic shooting to become part of the
fictional story. Moreover, it is as if the past and the present are simultaneously being
experienced through the song.
11. Claudia Gorbman, Unheard Melodies: Narrative Film Music (London, BFI, 1987).
12. Klaus Maeck is the founder of the music distribution company Freibank, the man-
ager of Einstürzenden Neubauten, music supervisor for Head On, Kebab Connec-
tions (Anno Saul, screenplay by Fatih Akin, 2005), and the producer of Crossing
the Bridge and Auf der anderen Seite.
13. This perceived tension has a long philosophical tradition, as seen in The Birth of Tra-
gedy where Friedrich Nietzsche describes this conflict, referring to Apollo’s victory for
the rational control over Dionysus’s emotional excess, which shows that a body out of
control was considered to be subjected to all types of dangerous excesses, associated
with drugs and the sublime. Compare to Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
14. Saniye’M (Selim Sesler, Alexander Hacke), Selim Sesler and Orchestra, Idel Üner. See
also Fatih Akin, Gegen die Wand: Das Buch zum Film (Cologne: Kiepenhauer &
Witsch, 2004).
15. This scene refers to the original German title Gegen die Wand, and means literally
“against the wall.”
16. “I Feel You” by Depeche Mode on Songs of Faith and Devotion (Virgin / EMI, 1993).
17. Elsaesser, European Cinema 125.
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18. “Lonely Planet” by The The on Dusk (Sony Music, 1993). Cahit even switches to Eng-
lish in other scenes, citing song titles in order to communicate his feelings.
19. “Temple of Love,” Sisters of Mercy, touched by the hand of Ofra Haza. The original
song dates from 1983 on Some Girls Wander By Mistake (Wea), the remix version with
Ofra Haza from 1992.
20. “Agla Sevdam” (Attila Özdemiroglu, Aysel Gürel), Agir Roman. The lyrics of the song
refer to her failed love.
21. Michel Chion would call this an experience of “empathetic sound, where the mood of
the music matches the mood of the action.” See Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound
on Screen (New York: Columbia University Press 1994).
22. See Feridun Zaimoglu, “Lebenswut, Herzhitze,” Tagesspiegel (10 March 2004). In
Turkey, some ecstatic fans still cut themselves at pop concerts, similar to what Cahit
does in the film. This emotion can be described as “an overwhelming condition ex-
perienced almost like an incurable illness, from which the ‘victim’ can never re-
cover.” Compare to Asuman Suner “Sex, Suicide, Romantic Abandon and Hard Rock
Collide in Head-On, Fatih Akin’s Electrifying Exploration of the Changing Dynamics
of German-Turkish Identity,” Sight and Sound (March 2005).
23. Steve Goodman, “Déjà Entendu: On the Virology of Acoustic Time Anomalies.” In a
presentation on aural virology, at the Sonic Interventions Conference Amsterdam
2005.
24. See Simon Frith, Music and Identity (London: Sage 1996).
25. See John Sloboda and Patrick N. Juslin, eds., Music and Emotion: Theory and Research
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
26. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982).
27. Elsaesser, European Cinema 125: “Abject heroes or heroines in European cinema are
not only symptomatic for what they tell us about a society and subjectivity that no
longer has a social contract about what count as the minimum conditions of value
and use, labor and affective work in a given society or community.”
28. Elsaesser, European Cinema 125. See also Thomas Elsaesser, “Was wäre, wenn du
schon tot bist? Vom ‘postmodern’ zum ‘post-mortem’-Kino am Beispiel von Christo-
pher Nolans Memento,” Zeitsprünge. Wie Filme Geschichte(n) erzählen, ed. Christine
Rüffert, Irmbert Schenk, Karl-Heinz Schmid, and Alfred Tews (Berlin: Bertz, 2004).
29. “Life Is What You Make It” by Talk Talk on It’s My Life (EMI UK 1984). The song is
performed by Zinoba in the film.
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Hollywood Face to Face with the World
The Globalization of Hollywood and its Human Capital
Melis Behlil
Non-American filmmakers, ranging from Charlie Chaplin and Billy Wilder to
Milos Forman and John Woo, have directed some of the most admired classics
of Hollywood cinema. During the writing of my dissertation about some of these
directors, two articles by Thomas Elsaesser inspired me the most. Spanning a
great period of time, the first article “Ethnicity, Authenticity, and Exile: A Coun-
terfeit Trade?” reinvestigates why so many talented European filmmakers from
the very earliest days of cinema have ended up in Hollywood.1 The second article
was about contemporary directors, “German Cinema Face to Face with Holly-
wood: Looking into a Two-Way Mirror,” in which Elsaesser proposes an emula-
tion / emigration model which was adopted by German filmmakers to break en-
try barriers into Hollywood.2 In this chapter, I will use these two articles as my
starting point to develop a new paradigm to look at the world’s directorial talents
in Hollywood. My aim is to position blockbuster-era global directors within a
wider historical context of émigré talent. My use of the term “global” directors
instead of “émigré” or “foreign” is deliberate for a number of reasons. I do not
use the term émigré because I want to distinguish my work from the research
done on the earlier generation of filmmakers who emigrated to the US in the
1930s and the early 1940s, and also because émigré connotes an act of relocating
for good or leaving the old country behind. Many of the directors, especially in
the post-1975 era, have chosen to move between countries.3 The use of foreign to
describe these filmmakers has been quite common in the last decades, as they
work outside of their nation of origin, and to do so they need a special permit to
work in the US. Nonetheless, as Hollywood has become global, the paradigms
that rely on emigration, whether for political or economic reasons, no longer
function.
While the political émigré narrative is insufficient to explain the talent flows of
today, it may have already been inadequate as far back as the silent period. In
“Ethnicity, Authenticity, and Exile: A Counterfeit Trade?,” Elsaesser extends the
emigration period backwards to cover those directors from the 1920s, and brings
trade and competition into the picture, aiming to “complicate the picture” set
forth by the political émigré thesis.4 This is essential for an analysis of the migra-
tion flows of recent eras, since the political motives have been practically nonexis-
tent since the time of the émigré Czech directors of the 1970s. Even from the
countries that may be considered to be totalitarian regimes, where the state im-
poses limitations on filmmakers, like China, there has been very little emigration
based on political reasons. Elsaesser’s emulation/emigration model proposes that
some European, in this case German, directors such as Roland Emmerich and
Wolfgang Petersen adopted a Hollywood-like style to make it possible for them
to be noticed by American studios. Elsaesser argues that “these directors and
directors of photography … practiced a deliberate and open emulation of Holly-
wood: their dream was to make films that either found a large popular audience
or pleased an American distributor, in order then to set off and emigrate to New
York and Los Angeles.”5 Although I agree with the emulation aspect of this mod-
el, my research has shown that the migration to Hollywood is not a final one, nor
does it always require a physical relocation. Contemporary directors who have
moved to the US in order to work in Hollywood can and do return to their home
countries to make other films. This has been the case for Alejandro Amenabar,
Paul Verhoeven, as well as a number of Hong Kong directors like Ringo Lam,
Hark Tsui, and even John Woo.6 With the globalization of Hollywood, there have
been changes in the flow of talent which have apparently not been sufficiently
analyzed in the existing literature.
Talent Flows Then and Now
A periodization of Hollywood history in terms of the influx of global directing
talent, not surprisingly, turns out to be parallel to one based on the ups and
downs of the studios. Roughly, the first period corresponds to the “golden age” of
Hollywood, in which studios functioned in a vertically integrated system from the
early 1910s until the mid-1940s. This period can be divided into two periods: the
1920s, when studio heads made regular trips to Europe to hunt for talent like
Murnau and Stiller, and the late 1930s and 1940s, when most of the European
directors came to the US for political reasons. Whatever the underlying reasons,
this period is characterized by an immense number of notable European direc-
tors who relocated to Hollywood. The second period is the “slump,” when the
studios tried to adjust to the new realities brought on by a combination of forces
such as the Paramount decree and the coming of television. From the mid-1940s
to the mid-1970s, with a few exceptions (Richardson, Reisz, Forman, Passer), the
talent flow to Hollywood not only diminished, but in certain cases (Lester, Ku-
brick) was reversed. The final period is the era with which I am concerned,
namely the New Hollywood era starting in the mid-1970s. During this time,
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some of the most renowned names in European art cinema such as Ken Russell
and Richard Attenborough from the UK, Louis Malle from France, and Wim
Wenders from Germany worked on various projects in Hollywood. This reflects
a similar pattern to the 1920s, when importing artsy European directors was a
source of prestige for the studios. Similarly, most of these directors did not find
critical or commercial success in Hollywood, demonstrating the validity of El-
saesser’s emulation/emigration model: because their native work was not an
emulation of Hollywood movies, their studio ventures turned out to be outsider
works as well.
During the so-called blockbuster era which emerged in the mid-1970s, there
were quite a few filmmakers who garnered attention, for instance Ridley and
Tony Scott (UK), Ang Lee (Taiwan), John Woo (Hong Kong), Roland Emmerich
and Wolfgang Petersen (Germany), and Paul Verhoeven (the Netherlands). The
cinema-going public might know that Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), Inde-
pendence Day (Roland Emmerich, 1996), Starship Troopers (Paul Verhoeven,
1997), or Face/Off (John Woo, 1997) were directed by global directors, even
though this is not really an attribute that is highlighted in the marketing of any
of these films. It is very unlikely, however, that anyone in the audience would be
aware that the following films were debuts by non-American Hollywood direc-
tors: the martial arts movie Double Team (Hark Tsui, 1997), the Oscar-nomi-
nated racial conflict dramaMonster’s Ball (Marc Forster, 2001), and the comedy
hit Legally Blonde (Robert Luketic, 2001).7 These films are only a few of the
dozens of Hollywood titles directed by global filmmakers every year, and clearly,
they have no thematic or stylistic resemblance to one another, other than their
being a part of the Hollywood system.
Looking at the number of non-American directors, one can see that a divide
occurred in the late-1970s. Not surprisingly, this divide coincided with New Hol-
lywood, as well as the increasing globalization of world economies and film in-
dustries. The number of directors who make their first Hollywood film in any
given year started to increase during the mid-1970s and reached a level of at least
six to eight directors per year by the early 1980s.8 Many of the directors who
arrived in the 1980s continued to work in Hollywood for at least several years,
and their numbers increased. The number of Hollywood films made by global
directors each year has increased over the last three decades, and occasionally
approaches fifty. Out of approximately 450 new films released annually in the
US, about 250 are domestic.9 These figures show that the proportion made by
global directors should not be underestimated: it varies roughly between ten and
twenty percent. The number of films made by global directors reached an all-
time high in the late 1990s and stabilized thereafter. This indicates that there
appears to be a large turnover in global talent in Hollywood; if all the filmmakers
Hollywood Face to Face with the World 211
had continued their careers in Hollywood, the number of films made by global
directors would continue to increase, assuming they continued to make films at
their usual pace. This turnover is one of the greatest factors that differentiates
contemporary non-American filmmakers in Hollywood from earlier generations.
Another major difference in recent years is that the source for new talent is no
longer limited to Europe and now covers almost the entire globe. While there was
no flow toward Hollywood from anywhere outside Europe until the 1980s, this
has changed with the boom in the Australian film industry. The next continent
was Asia, which revealed a similar migration pattern. The dominant Hong Kong
film industry especially saw its directors move to Hollywood, either early on (Cor-
ey Yuen, John Woo) or after the transfer of sovereignty to China (Hark Tsui, Stan-
ley Tong, Ronny Yu). Although most of these directors did eventually return to
Hong Kong, their influence on young American filmmakers is still visible. Lately,
Latin American directors, especially from Mexico, such as Luis Mandoki, Alfonso
Cuaron, and Guillermo Del Toro have begun to claim their share of Hollywood’s
globalized labor.
These changes over the past few years are the natural results of globalization
and technological developments. Technology has also facilitated the ability of di-
rectors to move between continents and alternate between production bases. The
distance that separates continents has been reduced to a few hours by plane or
none at all, if one takes the new communication technologies into consideration.
Furthermore, films are now frequently shot on locations in numerous different
countries. This mobility allows directors (such as Michael Apted, Marco Brambil-
la, and Del Toro) to work in entirely different styles in almost the same year. The
post-WWII changes within the studio system have also facilitated this mobility.
While in the classical studio era the studios kept a director on a payroll, or made
multiple-picture deals with filmmakers, they now work on individual projects.
Globalization of Hollywood
In his introduction to Hollywood Abroad, Richard Maltby discusses the reception
of Hollywood productions by audiences across the globe, and the extent to which
these films are construed as American. He argues that throughout its history,
Hollywood has been identified as American largely by its competitors, and by
European cultural nationalists, while American supporters, as well as critics of
Hollywood, “do not perceive these products as part of a specifically national cul-
ture.”10 This is a sentiment echoed by more and more film scholars, especially in
recent years. Andrew Higson has argued that Hollywood, in addition to being
“the most internationally powerful cinema,” has been “for many years … an inte-
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gral and naturalized part of the national culture, or the popular imagination, of
most countries in which cinema is an established entertainment form.”11 And
Thomas Elsaesser and Warren Buckland have pointed out that “Hollywood cin-
ema is a world industry, just as much as it is a world language, a powerful, stable,
perfected system of visual communication.”12
As a location, Hollywood is a district of Los Angeles. But with the move of the
motion picture industry from the East Coast to the West Coast, the terms “Holly-
wood” and “American film industry” have been used interchangeably since the
mid-1920s.13 However, not all of these studios are American owned. The Austra-
lian media mogul Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation started this trend in 1985,
when he purchased Twentieth Century Fox. MCA, the parent company of Univer-
sal Studios, was purchased in 1990 by the Japanese Matsushita company, then in
1995, by the Canadian Seagram’s company, and subsequently, Seagram’s was
purchased in 2000 by the French company Vivendi. Universal then merged with
NBC in 2004. Sony acquired Columbia Pictures Entertainment, including two
studios (Columbia Pictures and TriStar Pictures), as well as home video distribu-
tion, a movie theater chain, and an extensive film library in 1989.14 The last
stand-alone studio was MGM, which was also finally purchased by Sony in the
summer of 2005. Warner Bros. is a subsidiary of Time Warner, Inc., whose chair-
man in 2000 stated: “We do not want to be viewed as an American company. We
think globally.”15 In view of these changes, Hollywood at the level of ownership
no longer equals American either.
While an American film industry does include a large part of the Hollywood
companies and is centralized there, Hollywood goes beyond the US and is spread
across the globe. Hollywood has become transnational, and its films are distribu-
ted globally by the studios themselves or by their subsidiaries. Among the leading
distribution companies is United Pictures International (UIP), which is jointly
owned by Paramount and Universal, based in London, with offices in twenty-six
countries, with representation in twenty-three others, and business involvement
in a total of two hundred countries.16 That the exhibition of these films is also
global hardly needs any explanation.
The terms “studios” or “majors” are also frequently used in the same sense as
“Hollywood.” As Ben Goldsmith and Tom O’Regan proposed in their study of
contemporary international studios, a “Hollywood studio” now refers not “to the
physical plant but to the ‘command and control’ distribution and financing opera-
tions of the Hollywood majors.”17 Especially since the mid-1970s, when major
studios started being acquired by transnational media corporations, it has be-
come almost impossible to call Hollywood films “American.” Frederick Wasser
argues that Hollywood studios “ceased to be institutions of national culture”
around the mid-1970s.18 He points out that long before Japanese corporations
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started buying American studios, European producers like Dino DeLaurentiis,
Arnon Milchan, and Mario Kassar were producing films in Hollywood, largely
funded by European money. These were “‘Hollywood’ pictures independent of
American companies and of American financing.”19 Because these were event
films, blockbusters with enormous budgets, they needed to do well not only in
the US, but globally as well.
Within this context, what I mean by working in Hollywood is making a film
that is being produced by a production company from within the Hollywood sys-
tem. Working in / with / for Hollywood does not necessarily mean working phy-
sically in Southern California. Hollywood studios make films across the globe,
and directors who become a part of this world work wherever the production
takes place. In this sense, one can employ the term transnational for Hollywood,
as analogous to the transnational corporations that own the Hollywood studios.
Transnational corporations have been defined by the United Nations using four
criteria: size, their oligarchic nature, having a large number of foreign subsidi-
aries and branch offices, and their origins are in developed countries.20 The med-
ia conglomerates which now own Hollywood studios are transnational corpora-
tions, and Hollywood has always employed talent from around the globe and
increasingly does so. Hence, despite the current connotations of the term, trans-
national cinema is also, perhaps even more so, applicable to Hollywood.
In the introduction to their comprehensive transnational cinema reader, Eliza-
beth Ezra and Terry Rowden define transnational as “the global forces that link
people or institutions across nations” and assert that it comprises globalization,
“in cinematic terms, Hollywood’s domination of world film markets.”21 Similarly,
my use of the term transnational aims to draw attention to this domination,
aligning Hollywood with transnational corporations and the global capitalist
world order. Elsaesser has also made note of this issue, calling Hollywood “an
engine of global hegemony” that “propagate[s] and advertise[s] very specific tastes
and attitudes”; and posits that Hollywood declares a national agenda as univer-
sal.22 I would argue that this is not a “national” agenda, but in fact a corporate
one. Globalization is criticized foremost for allowing corporate interests to take
precedence over all else, and Hollywood in its blockbuster era is the manifesta-
tion of this corporate capitalist system. Therefore, it certainly makes sense to look
at talent flows within this context and to explain them using the same approaches
that are used to discuss the mobility of other global skilled labor within transna-
tional networks.
Hollywood functions as a network of connections, and as in most industries –
but here more than in others – it is who you know that is the key to survival. In
an industry that is primarily dependent on relationships, the producers and the
agents play some of the most important roles. In a three-leveled model of admin-
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istrative, above- and below-the-line labor, the administrative departments are lo-
cated in and around Hollywood, because that is where the deals are made; it is
the command and control center, and directors are among the most mobile of the
above-the-line workers. For these members of the filmmaking community, actual
presence in Hollywood can be delegated through agents. Membership in the Di-
rectors Guild (DGA), which is located in Los Angeles, is another type of delega-
tion. As members, directors maintain a presence in Hollywood, even if they are
not there physically. This allows them a level of mobility that is akin to the execu-
tives working for transnational corporations, a recognized new professional class
that has arisen from within the processes of globalization.23
To alter the discussions of the new transnational capitalist class, Richard Flor-
ida adds creativity to the definition of this new class, which basically eliminates
business executives.24 Thus we find the global directors of Hollywood in this
creative class. Florida explains that the “migratory patterns of the creative class
cut across the lines of race, nationality and sexual orientation.”25 Like the nation-
ality of a film, the nationality of individuals is no longer (if it ever was) a simple
matter. Recent debates regarding citizenship have centered around the alterna-
tive notions of belonging. The internationalization of capital has led to a denatio-
nalization process, especially in the larger cities where capital is concentrated. In
a world where the nation-state is no longer fixed and immutable, passports be-
come “less and less attestations of citizenship, let alone of loyalty to a protective
nation-state than of claims to participation in labor markets.”26 Hollywood’s glob-
al directors no longer need to make “American” films, as long as they make films
that succeed at the box office.
Conclusion
As I stated at the beginning of this article, my aim was to (re)conceptualize the
international flow of directors toward Hollywood. I proposed that we look at the
global director through the lens of transnational structures. Hollywood has al-
ways been international, as the examples from the 1920s have already demon-
strated. Nevertheless, its current transnationality extends to ownership, produc-
tion (including pre- and post-), distribution, exhibition, and reception. Within
this global network, filmmakers are more analogous to mobile human capital
which is employed by transnational corporations than they are to the émigré di-
rectors of the earlier decades. Since the émigré paradigm is no longer valid, and
the global mobility of international talent has become the norm, there is no rea-
son why the filmmakers in question should not be treated as any other member
of a global, mobile, transnational creative class; or indeed, as CEOs or other lead-
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ing executives of multinational corporations. Unlike their émigré-era counter-
parts, global directors today do not need to be tied down to a single location.
They are denationalized both in terms of citizenship and in terms of workplace.
If they seek to work in the US, all they need is a valid work visa and membership
in the DGA, both of which can be temporary. In transnational Hollywood, ques-
tions of nationality no longer work as a paradigm, although they still matter, be-
cause they continue to be the point of entry to many debates, including this very
article.
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To Be or Not to Be Post-Classical
Eleftheria Thanouli
Thomas Elsaesser’s fascination with word plays and double meanings was what
perturbed me the most when I started attending his theory and history classes in
the Master’s program at the University of Amsterdam. Having no background in
film studies at the time and being as pragmatic as I am, I had very little use for
terms like “mise en abyme,” “deep structure” or “sliding signifiers.” Gradually,
however, as I began to understand the value of metaphors and rhetorical strate-
gies in the theoretical discourse, I found it intriguing to analyze and dissect El-
saesser’s own writings with the very same tools he used to analyze films. After
a several-year-long practice, I sometimes now feel that I can crack his code and
find the algorithms that copiously produce such meandering and far-reaching
reflections.
In this article, I would like to venture a decryption by focusing on one of El-
saesser’s major areas of interest: Hollywood cinema in the post-studio era from
the 1970s to this day. In film studies, this amounts to a highly contested terrain
that has traditionally forced scholars to divide into two opposing camps; the one
would accommodate those who wished to assert an almost seamless continuity
between the classical and the post-1960s Hollywood filmmaking, while the other
would shelter those who detected a significant break between the two phases.
From the outset, Elsaesser was eager to succumb to the allure of “what is differ-
ent” in contemporary American films rather than adhere to “what is still the
same,” and thus chose to take a clear, albeit nuanced, position in the debate at
the time.
By 1975, he had already published a seminal essay entitled “The Pathos of Fail-
ure: Notes on the Unmotivated Hero,”1 where he launched a compelling rhetoric
that called attention to a number of innovations that the younger generation of
filmmakers had brought to New Hollywood. Without the privilege of historical
distance and emotional detachment, Elsaesser observed a number of changes
that were under way and elaborated on the finer nuances of this transitional per-
iod with unprecedented insight. For him, the films of New Hollywood were the
instigators of a double play; they manipulated a number of classical signifiers in
order to create a meta-cinematic layer where the New could voice a critical reflec-
tion on the Old. One of the salient features of this trend was the combination of
the classical motif of the journey with heroes that lacked clear-cut motivation.
Using examples such as Two-lane blacktop (1971), Five easy pieces (1970),
The last detail (1973) and California split (1974), he distinguished a tension
between the familiar formula of the journey, which by convention bears a strong
logic of purpose and intention, and the characters in these films, who failed to
embody a determinate goal. According to Elsaesser, the lack of motive in the
characters’ actions and the loose progression of the plot were indicative of a skep-
ticism towards the ideals of American society and its traditional belief in personal
initiative. Whereas classical Hollywood maintained a solid faith in human agency
and the ability to accomplish any mission, the emerging sensibility of New Holly-
wood adopted a more pessimistic stance about the possibility to solve all prob-
lems, to face all obstacles.
However, as the rebelliousness of the 1970s wore off and Hollywood returned
to the more familiar paths of studio dominance in a post-Fordist model at this
time, the unmotivated heroes soon gave way to diehard males who not only re-
claimed their motivations but also reveled in the mass-market fanfare of the con-
glomerated New New Hollywood.2 At that point, Elsaesser once more had to face
the question of whether there is a difference between these contemporary films
and their classical Hollywood antecedents. Again, he responded with a stubborn
“yes.” It is this response that I would like to scrutinize here in order to serve a
twofold goal; on the one hand, I would like to critically engage “the code” used by
Elsaesser to theorize post-classical cinema, while, on the other, I would like to
verify its validity through the analysis of an example of the most recent Holly-
wood output.
Inside Post-Classical Hollywood
When Elsaesser decided to conceptualize the developments in American cinema
of the 1980s and 1990s, he not only maintained his focus on “what is different”
but also sought to craft a consistent method for constructing a post-classical read-
ing of popular blockbusters. In a lengthy chapter entitled “Classical/Post-Classi-
cal Narrative” in the book Studying Contemporary American Film3 he carried out a
very carefully balanced analysis of a blockbuster hit, John McTiernan’s Die
Hard, as a typical Hollywood product of the late 1980s.
The working hypothesis for his investigation was that the film can be both
classical and post-classical depending on the analyst’s theoretical and conceptual
agenda. In order to demonstrate how different questions about the same film can
generate entirely different answers, Elsaesser ventured on a rather lengthy expo-
sition of some of the key theoretical approaches to classical cinema, namely Da-
vid Bordwell’s neo-formalist poetics and the structuralist approach inspired by
Vladimir Propp and Claude Lévi-Strauss. With these theories and their respective
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methodological tools in hand, Elsaesser was able to trace all of the traditional
classical elements in Die Hard. The thorough reading of the film’s narrative
construction showed that it constituted a textbook case of classical cinema, as it
faithfully incorporated all the norms and principles of classical filmmaking: the
three-act structure, the goal-oriented hero who has to accomplish a mission and
win the heart of a woman, the oedipal trajectory, the enigmas and the repetitions,
to name but a few. Thus, Elsaesser’s analysis of this popular blockbuster explicitly
confirmed the claims of Bordwell and others about the continuity of the classical
formulas in contemporary cinema and the resilience of classical narration over
the course of time.
And yet, despite the persistence of formal classicism in contemporary films,
Elsaesser’s long-standing interest in “what is different” made him test the limits
of his intellectual resources in an effort to map a set of differences in a sea of
overwhelming similarities. A minute reading of Die Hard with the help of a
multifaceted conceptual sieve led him to formulate the following five key obser-
vations:
a. The post-classical narratives do not reject the canonical story format, but entail
a multiple layering of plotlines and characters that can be readily transferred
to a video game format.
b. They express a kind of “knowingness” about the heuristic distinction between
surface and deep structure, and in a literal sense they play with these concep-
tual categories.
c. They address issues of race, gender and the male body more openly and ex-
plicitly, although not necessarily in a more progressive way.
d. They acknowledge their presence in a transnational/post-colonial/globalized
world and simultaneously provide a commentary on the situation at the same
time, thus adopting an inside-outside position.
e. They are replete with sliding signifiers, i.e., verbal and visual puns that denote
the sophistication and professionalism of New Hollywood.4
All of these aspects constituted different facets of the quintessential quality of
post-classical cinema, its “knowingness,” described as “a special sort of aware-
ness of the codes that govern classical representation and its genre conventions,
along with a willingness to display this knowingness and make the audience
share it, by letting it in on the game.”5 In other words, post-classical Hollywood
has absorbed the classical rules to such a degree that the only way it can use them
anymore is through an excessive mastery and display.
Elsaesser’s scheme for constructing a post-classical reading of Hollywood
films, despite its sophistication and insight, has thus far not reached a canonical
status in film theory. Elsaesser himself has not supported this theory any further
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in other publications, which is partly due to the fact that he has already moved on
to other concepts, like “world cinema” or “mind-game film,” and partly due to his
own dissatisfaction with the term and his search for a post-post-classical cin-
ema.6 However, I would like to cling to this “post-classical” a little bit longer.
Having built my own academic identity with Bordwell and Elsaesser as my two
father figures, I would like to use the former’s persistence to support the latter’s
claims about post-classical cinema.7 My motivation is not based on any obligation
but on genuine belief. In fact, the more I watch contemporary Hollywood
blockbusters, the more impressed I am by the acuteness of Elsaesser’s observa-
tions. For that reason, I would like to examine a recent Hollywood release to see
how effective the five-tier method of post-classical analysis holds up after almost
two decades of New New Hollywood filmmaking.
Into Inside Man
Inside Man is Spike Lee’s latest full-length film released in 2006 by Universal
Pictures. It was produced by the Academy Award-winning producer Brian Grazer
on a budget of $45 million, which was more than amply recuperated at the box
office.8 Even though Lee has occasionally attempted more alternative formulas,
here he delivers a typical crime thriller, featuring an acclaimed cast of Hollywood
actors in a story about a bank robbery. The plot is not easy to summarize due to
the various generic twists and turns but the main lines of action go like this.
Dalton Russell (Clive Owen) leads a group of robbers into the Manhattan Trust
bank posing as painters. They take everyone in the building hostage, forcing
everyone to wear identical uniforms so that villains and victims look identical for
the cameras. The NYPD puts Detective Keith Frazier (Denzel Washington) in
charge of the hostage negotiations. Frazier tries to figure out the eccentric plan
of the robbers and deal with this critical situation. Parallel to these developments,
we see the founder of the bank, Arthur Case (Christopher Plummer), being in-
formed about the heist who then takes things into his own hands. He promptly
hires a power broker named Madeleine White (Jodie Foster) to protect the con-
tents of his safety deposit box, which seems of exceptional value to him. These
four key players, who all have their own agendas in the case, meet and interact
with one another throughout the 129-minute film in order to resolve the situa-
tion. Russell’s plan works, and he walks out of the bank with his loot, Frazier gets
promoted as he solves the case without any apparent casualties, White adds an-
other successful deal to her résumé, while Case is condemned for his sinful past
after his secret leaks out.
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These main plot elements attest to the presence of a conventional Hollywood
formula that builds a suspenseful story through the careful arrangement of clas-
sical compositional and generic elements such as character-centered causality, a
tight causal chain of events, a series of twists and reversals, a cat-and-mouse
chase between the cops and the villains and, finally, a clear resolution or even a
happy ending. In other words, if we employed the analytical tool of narrative
analysis à la Bordwell, we would be happy to conclude that Inside Man is an-
other instance of classical narration that abides, to a large extent, to the same
norms of narrative construction that crystallized in the studio period from 1917
to 1960. There is nothing wrong with this line of reasoning, since it faithfully
serves the principles of historical poetics, which strictly measures the poetic ele-
ments of a film and the way they evolve in history. But this is not the only thing
we should analyze here, and this is where Elsaesser’s theory comes in handy. By
subjecting Inside Man to the post-classical method of inquiry, its true nature
becomes more than manifest. In the following, I will structure my reading of
Lee’s film based on Elsaesser’s five criteria.
a. Narrative Structure
Even though the plot development largely follows the classical trajectory of Expo-
sition, Conflict, Complication, Crisis and Denouement, the film layers its charac-
ters and entangles their actions in a way that surpasses the linear logic of the
classical storylines and allows the various plot components to relate laterally as if
they formed a network with interconnected nodes. The four main characters –
Russell, Frazier, Case and White – offer the viewer separate entry points into the
story, as the plot allows each one of them sufficient screen time to unfold their
plans and claim their stakes in the robbery case, which turns out to be a game rife
with opportunities. The plot becomes difficult to summarize precisely because its
classical premises can be reconfigured in various ways depending on which char-
acter you place in charge and which link you choose to follow every time these
four people meet to negotiate. The story can be about an ingenious and self-as-
sured robber who implements the perfect plan or about a decent cop who gets a
second chance or about a corrupt banker who is finally exposed or about a fero-
cious power broker who works on the margins of legitimacy, running immensely
profitable errands for the rich and the powerful.
The painstakingly layered screenplay allows the four protagonists to take turns
in the villain-victim position, creating a tension that is never fully resolved. Is
Russell the real villain, or is he the savior who punishes a Nazi collaborator and
even rewards Frazier with a diamond? Is Case the ultimate villain since he built
his empire on stealing from the Jews during the Second World War or should
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years of philanthropy have cleansed him of his guilt? Is Frazier the honest cop, or
is he gradually seduced by the cleverness of Russell’s plan and thus turned into
an accomplice? And finally, is White the one who quintessentially poses the di-
lemma of agency with her never quite being guilty of anything while she as a
hired hand facilitates the dubious activities of people with blood – or at least dirt
– on their hands? Overall, the multiple layers in the narrative structure of the film
seem to confirm Elsaesser’s claim that post-classical cinema might not have abol-
ished the canonical story format but has imbued it with a nodal logic that facil-
itates the convergence of the filmic narrative with the ones we find in new media
and, particularly, video games.
b. Surface Structure and Deep Structure
When we look at Inside Man, the heuristic distinction between “surface struc-
ture,” which amounts to the characters’ actions, and “deep structure,” which re-
gards the characters’ hidden desires, becomes particularly tangible through the
ingenious play between false appearances and hidden truths from start to finish.
The notion of a character’s oedipal trajectory is here played out in the open, as the
plot offers us the obvious plan of the bank robbery as a façade for a deeper and
darker story which is not revealed to us until the closing moments. Russell’s
scheme is not to empty the bank’s treasury, as we initially assumed; it is to steal
the contents of a tiny portion of that wealth and, at the same time, atone for his
crime by uncovering the crime of the respectable, respected banker who stands
in for the Law. Thus, the hero almost literally displaces the Father to satisfy his
Oedipus complex and then takes his position in the symbolic order, i.e., he serves
the purposes of civil society where the good are rewarded (Frazier) and the bad
are punished (Case). In other words, a post-classical film like this dares to depict
an almost literal realization of the oedipal trajectory by emulating, at the plot
level, the distinction between “surface structure” and “deep structure,” which in
classical films was usually identified at the level of interpretation.
In addition to the oedipal trajectory, Lee’s film plays with other psychoanalyti-
cal concepts that were applied in the analysis of classical Hollywood cinema.
Firstly, there is a post-classical femme fatale, Madeleine White, who bears all the
characteristics of her classical archetype, such as charm, elegance and wit com-
bined with a predatory attitude, but the subliminal threat to male masculinity and
the fear of castration that she embodies here become verbally exposed on numer-
ous occasions and particularly when the profane Mayor tells her: “You are a mag-
nificent cunt.” The same explicitness is brought to the fore regarding Lacan’s
notions of “voyeurism” and “misrecognition.” The use of masks and disguises as
well as the staging of a false murder, in an outspoken manner, seems to aid in the
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investigation of the problematics of the look and the identification process that it
instigates. By using the masks or manipulating the surveillance cameras, Russell
consciously blocks the gaze of the police and denies them access to the reality of
the moment. He as both a hero and as our frame narrator seeks to problematize
the deeper issue of identification by preventing the actual identification of the
robbers and by triggering off, from the start, a game of constant misrecognition:
nobody and nothing in this film are what they appear to be. In view of these
dramaturgical strategies, Inside Man seems to display a profound knowingness
by performing in a self-conscious way what was previously reserved for the un-
conscious.
c. Race, Gender and the Male Body
One of the most salient features of the film is the wide racial palette of its char-
acters. The various hostages in the bank, the policemen and the passersby com-
prise a broad racial mix, which is regularly foregrounded in the dialogues, espe-
cially during the interrogation process. Apart from the fact that the very core of
the story – the Holocaust – hinges on the issue of racism, the film relentlessly
evokes the problematics of race and stirs up an overt discussion not only about
multi-raciality but also the use of politically correct registers. When a police offi-
cer begins to tell the story of a shooting using the word “spic” to refer to a Span-
ish-American, Frazier asks him to “tone down the color commentary” and forces
him to carry on his account using the politically correct hyphenated terminology.
When it comes to gender, the agenda is equally crammed with explicit refer-
ences to femininity and masculinity, starting with White’s aggressive behavior,
which, combined with Jodie Foster’s lesbian profile, creates a very ambiguous
sexual identity. However, what pervades the entire story is the jocular homoeroti-
cism between Russell and Frazier and the sexually loaded phrases they constantly
use. The following verbal exchange is indicative.
Russell: “Soon I’m gonna be sucking down piña coladas in a hot tub with six girls
named Amber and Tiffany.”
Frazier: “No, it’s more like in the shower with two guys named Jamal and Jesus... and
here’s the bad news; that thing you’re sucking on? It’s not a piña colada!”
The selection of names in this quote also confirms the constant slippage or
“trade-off”9 between race and gender in contemporary Hollywood that becomes
even more palpable in the following dialogue between Frazier and White:
White: “Don’t take this personally, but I don’t think you can afford me.”
Frazier: “Don’t take this personally, Miss White, but kiss my black ass.”
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The characters’ preoccupation with their racial and sexual characteristics perme-
ates the creative options in ways that I could not possibly hope to cover in this
essay. But it would certainly provide the “race-gender studies” people with a field
day, to paraphrase Elsaesser once more.10
d. The transnational/Post-colonial/Globalization Theme
If we look at Inside Man through the prism of this fourth analytical pillar, the
observations we generate are again copious. Set in a post-9/11 New York City, the
film consciously seeks to acknowledge its place in a multicultural and globalized
environment where all nationalities co-exist but not without friction or prejudice.
In downtown Manhattan, you can find an Albanian-speaking person just around
any corner, and anyone wearing a turban is immediately considered an Arab,
hence a threat. Lee pays his respect to the 9/11 victims by foregrounding a “we
will never forget” poster, but he offers a scathing critique of the paranoia
against the Arabs that followed this tragedy. In addition to the initial fear that the
heist might be an Al-Qaeda job, the film stages another relevant incident with a
hostage named Vikram Walia. When he exits the bank, the police start to harass
him and take his turban, all the while calling him “a fucking Arab.” Walia pro-
tests his treatment and demands his turban back, explaining that he is a Sikh and
wears it as a part of his religion. Later on, during his interrogation, he is offered
the opportunity to voice his resentment against the bias he encounters every-
where he goes.
In general, the characters in the story underline an awareness of the social
reality in the era of post-colonialism and globalization, where borders are blur-
ring, where ethnic identities become hybrid and where traditional binaries such
as friend/enemy or, most importantly, inside/outside collapse.
e. Sliding Signifiers
The title Inside Man is itself the key sliding signifier of the film, as what is
signified keeps shifting as the various narrative twists unfold. Initially, we as-
sume that Russell is a lawbreaker or a blackmailer who wants to rob the bank,
but as the plot thickens and Case’s dubious past emerges, we begin to wonder
whether this “inside man” is not some sort of a double agent. However, the final
revelations offer a very different view, attributing to the title a strictly literal mean-
ing, i.e. the man who stays inside. In fact, Russell has prepared us from the very
start. In the opening scene, he warns: “Pay strict attention to what I say because I
choose my words very carefully.” He earnestly describes his whereabouts as a
“prison cell” and rushes to explain that there is “a vast difference between being
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stuck in a tiny cell and being in prison.” This wordplay is accompanied by its
visual equivalent that shows Russell confined in a tiny space that resembles a
prison cell. This image haunts us throughout the film, encouraging us to believe
that Russell is eventually imprisoned. It is only in the final moments that we
come to realize the “vast difference” between the two places he had pointed out.
This preoccupation with space stimulates various other verbal puns, but I will
mention here just two. Firstly, the robbers use a van with a fake company logo
which says, “Perfectly Planned Painting: We Never Leave Until the Job Is Done,”
foreshadowing Russell’s escape plan to remain inside until the job is done. Sec-
ondly, the line “When there’s blood on the streets, buy property” is repeated twice
and refers to how Case profited during WWII, while, in fact, its signification
slides over another more contemporary figure, namely Bin Laden’s nephew, who
is supposedly buying a co-op in Park Avenue. This double entendre is particularly
difficult to miss, especially given the aforementioned post-9/11 atmosphere in
New York.
These few examples indeed denote the sophistication of the professionals in
New New Hollywood who, apart from the usual film references,11 manage to im-
bue the films’ basic compositional elements with multiple signifieds, which as-
cribe the film with an exceedingly dense texture and flaunt the knowingness of
what Elsaesser calls “the classical-plus.”12
Epilogue
Elsaesser’s post-classical method of analysis enabled me to perform a close analy-
sis of Inside Man and bring to the surface a series of elements that would go
unnoticed using the standard tools of narrative analysis. The five criteria above
function as a conceptual grid that isolates the differences between contemporary
American films and their classical origins and further highlights the relation be-
tween the cinematic discourse and the wider historical and cultural context. It is
important to keep all five of these criteria together and apply them complementa-
rily because, otherwise, we risk undermining their heuristic value and reducing
them to minor distinctive features that easily lose their critical value under the
pressure of the similarities at the level of narration. This was the strategy that
Bordwell deployed to debunk Elsaesser’s theory in his latest book entitled The
Way Hollywood Tells It (2006), where he once again tried to sustain his standard
thesis about the stability of the classical Hollywood system to this very day. In his
critique, Bordwell concentrated almost exclusively on the issue of “playful know-
ingness,” claiming that this element called “knowingness” was as old as the (Hol-
lywood) hills, as it could be found in many Marx Brothers films or even in Bugs
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Bunny cartoons.13 Ironically enough, neither slapstick comedy nor animation has
ever been regarded as quintessentially classical. Quite the contrary. Both of these
genres have regularly underlined the weaknesses of the classical mode of narra-
tion and its tight cause-and-effect logic. The fact that Elsaesser’s argument about
knowingness reminded Bordwell of some of the most anomalous instances in
the history of classical studio filmmaking is quite indicative of the nerve that the
former’s theory is able to touch.
At any rate, contemporary Hollywood will continue to be a battleground for
some of the most fascinating theoretical struggles, and the line between the clas-
sical and the post-classical will continue to be redrawn. With each charting, what
matters is the consistency of the methodological tools and the application of the
theoretical premises to a sufficient sample of films. Thomas Elsaesser ensured
the former with the clarity and precision that characterizes his “Classical/Post-
Classical Narrative” account. Hopefully, my analysis of Inside Man will contri-
bute to the latter.
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Bumper Stories
The Framing of Commercial Blocks on Dutch Public Television
Charles Forceville1
Introduction
In “Reclame: markt en betekenis” (“Advertising: Market and Meaning”), Thomas
Elsaesser sketches the pervasiveness and impact of advertising on daily life.2 He
argues that audiences willingly and knowingly surrender to its promise of iden-
tity-building novelty and exoticness, suggesting that advertising is ultimately a
flattering mirror. Elsaesser also refers to the “Wag-the-Dog” principle, reminding
us that, particularly on commercial television, advertising is the tail that wags the
dog called “programs” by paying the bills. Although television programs are
made to entertain or inform, they are also effective tools to reach a broad audi-
ence and to assure that viewers will watch the commercials. Elsaesser cites the
notion that “television does not bring programs to viewers, but viewers to adver-
tisers,” a quote based on Richard Serra’s renowned art video “Television Delivers
People” (1973).3
In this chapter, I focus on one specific element of advertising on television: the
so-called “advertising bumper,” the audiovisual logo that brackets a block of com-
mercials, thereby helping viewers to distinguish between commercials and televi-
sion programs. Although media-literate audiences may believe that they are im-
mune to the persuasive force of commercials, Dutch law finds it necessary to
warn television viewers when they are going to see a block of commercials, and
when the commercials are over. The prototypical warning, deployed both on pub-
lic and commercial channels, is the advertising bumper. By analyzing fourteen
specific cases of advertising bumpers on Dutch public television, ranging from
1976 to 2007, I will argue that in the course of its (in this case, Dutch) history,
bumpers have become systematically less distinctive both visually and aurally
and, as a consequence, have lost much of their function of patrolling the borders
between commercials and programming.4 My findings can contribute to a better
understanding of the “Wag-the-Dog” principle that Elsaesser recognized in adver-
tising on Dutch television.
Background: “Bumpers” and the Genre of Television
Commercials
Dutch television, which had its first complete broadcast (a soccer match) in Sep-
tember 1948, has featured commercial advertising since 1967.5 The selling and
monitoring of advertising slots on the publicly funded television channels – Ne-
derland 1, Nederland 2, and, since 1988, Nederland 3 – as well as on public radio
and on any related websites has always been handled by the STER (Stichting Ether
Reclame). Together with public funding and subscription fees, this has helped pay
for programs. From the late 1980s onwards, the publicly funded channels have
faced increasing competition from a variety of commercial broadcasting compa-
nies, which depend entirely on advertising for their revenues.
Dutch media law specifies a number of criteria that advertising must adhere
to. An important regulation is that a commercial block “is clearly recognizable as
such by optical and acoustic means from the regular programs.”6 The Stichting
Reclame Code, founded by the advertising industry itself to enhance self-regula-
tion and to provide a forum for complaints by the public, similarly emphasizes
that a commercial must be identifiable as such, forbidding “the use of elements
from a radio or TV program in a commercial … if it can be reasonably assumed
that viewers or listeners would thereby be misled or confused.”7 The basic idea is
clearly that audiences should be cautioned whether and when they are con-
fronted with advertising, so that they realize that an agency with a financial self-
interest is trying to persuade them to buy consumer goods or services. Indeed,
people need to be able to “frame” events correctly to be able to respond to them in
an appropriate manner.8 When “events” assume the form of representations or
discourses, attributing “genre” is a crucial aspect of this framing activity. Decid-
ing what genre a text belongs to activates certain interpretation strategies.9
During the first five years of television advertising, a block was announced by
images of ocean waves. From 1972 until halfway into the 1990s, the puppet ani-
mation of Loeki de Leeuw (Loeki the Lion), created by Joop Geesink, featured in
the opening and closing bumpers of commercial blocks, together with his friends
Piep the mouse, lioness Roos, Guusje the little duck, and Filiep the blue ele-
phant. Loeki also played a role in short (4” to 5”) separators between commercials
in a block.10 From the mid-1990s onwards, Loeki no longer “bracketed” a block,
although until 2004 he still occasionally performed in clips separating commer-
cials. Loeki – a lion because of this animal’s prominence in Holland’s heraldry –
featured in more than 7,000 bumpers,11 and became a national icon. His disap-
pearance was widely mourned by the television audiences that had grown up
with him.
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The success of the commercial channels in the 1990s meant that the advertis-
ing revenues of the public channels began to dwindle. Loeki’s disappearance was
part of an extensive restyling and repositioning process of the public channels.
This process was completed in 2006, when the three public channels were pro-
filed as catering to the entire family (Nederland 1), providing content and reflec-
tion (Nederland 2), and addressing a younger audience (Nederland 3).12 This pro-
filing also had an impact on the design of the bumpers for the three channels.
While the system of framing a commercial block may be beneficial in activat-
ing viewers’ alertness to the persuasive nature of the messages they are going to
watch, it is not, of course, necessarily in the interest of advertisers. It is a well-
known fact that many viewers use commercial breaks to interrupt their viewing.
For this reason, the boundary area between what is “regular” television program-
ming and what is a series of commercials is of special interest. I will consider
more closely the audiovisual advertising bumpers that Dutch media law insists
on to mark the boundaries of a commercial block. More specifically, I will first
chart salient dimensions in which bumpers surrounding commercial blocks on
public TV may differ from one another. Subsequently, I will suggest how changes
in bumpers potentially affect their boundary function. This article can serve as a
blueprint for a much larger, systematic project, involving the commercial chan-
nels as well; here I cannot do much beyond sketch some contours.
Method of Analysis and Case Studies
The bumpers are analyzed in chronological order, but since they are not widely
available, I have made a practical, and hence eclectic, selection. Some samples of
difficult to find, older commercial blocks have been located online (YouTube),
and these have been complemented with more recent material in my possession.
My claims depend on the assumption that a bumper in a given commercial is
representative of its use over a longer period. Obviously, I cannot claim to have
charted all of the salient changes in the history of advertising bumpers on Dutch
public television; I do maintain, however, that the present approach allows for the
identification of certain trends. Here are the questions I have asked for each of
the case studies, followed by these case studies themselves.
1. How long are the opening and closing bumpers? This is measured in terms of
the number of seconds.
2. How can the opening and closing bumper be described? A crucial issue is
whether the bumpers are the same visually and/or aurally.
3. Is there a distinctive melody or tune detectable in the bumpers?
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4. What other elements, if any, occur within the commercial blocks apart from
the commercials themselves that may affect the “framing” of the genre as
advertising?
Case 1 (30 March 1976)13
Opening: Loeki, playing the standard opening melody on a trumpet, walks past
flowers whose squarish heads change from dark to an eye-like circle. The flowers
turn their heads to maintain their gaze on him. At the end, the eye-like circles
transform into STER logos. A super, with “Nederland 1,” in plain text, is visible
for a few seconds (duration: 10”).
Closing: Loeki, playing the trumpet, stands in front of the flowers. On the rhythm
of the standard closing melody, the flowers’ STER logos switch off (duration: 7”).
Music/sound: Loeki performs the standard melodic tune, the beginning of which
is the same in opening and closing bumpers, while the ending differs.
Notable features: There is the suggestion of the flowers “waking up” in the open-
ing, and “going to sleep” in the closing bumper. In the closing bumper Loeki
waves to the viewers. The length of the opening and closing bumpers differs (10”
versus 7”). All of the commercials in this commercial block are alternately sepa-
rated by Loeki mini-narratives (duration: 4-5”) or by abstract separators (duration:
2”).
Case 2 (17 May 1983)14
Opening: Loeki, in a picnic scene, plays the pan flute, accompanied by seven vio-
lin-playing daisies. In the background, the sun containing the STER logo rises.
Piep, the mouse, ends the scene by appearing from a picnic basket and sounding
the final note on a triangle. Super as in case 1 (9”).
Closing: Same picnic scene. The sun is setting as it becomes dark (9”).
Music/sound: Same as in case 1 but with different instruments.
Notable features: Beginning and end of a picnic are suggested. In the closing bum-
per, Loeki and Piep wave goodbye to the viewer. The commercials are separated
by (non-Loeki) mini-narratives with live-action characters, taking place on a film
set, varying in length between about 4” and 9”.
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Case 3 (19 January 1986)15
Opening: Loeki, standing on the drawbridge of a castle in medieval attire, plays
the trumpet – from which a banner with the STER logo unfolds – accompanied
by Piep on the violin. Super “Nederland 2” as in case 1 (10”).
Closing: Same scene (10”).
Music/sound: With different instruments as in cases 1 and 2.
Notable features: In the closing bumper, Roos appears in a castle window, all three
characters wave to the viewer, and Loeki’s helmet falls over his eyes on the last
notes. All of the commercials within this block are separated by Loeki mini-narra-
tives (4-5”), except once, when a more abstract STER logo separator is used (2”).
Case 4 (February 1987)16
Opening: Loeki, Piep and Roos, dressed up as performers, play winding instru-
ments on a theatre stage; the STER logo becomes visible in the background.
Super “Nederland 1” as in case 1 (9”).
Closing: Same scene (9”).
Music/sound: As in cases 1-3.
Notable features: All three characters wave goodbye to the viewers. The commer-
cials within the block are alternately separated by Loeki mini-narratives (4”) and
abstract STER logos (2”). In one mini-narrative Loeki exclaims “Asjemenou!”
(“Well-well-well!”), an utterance that became uniquely associated with him.
Case 5 (8 September 1989)17
Opening: A playground scene in which the camera pans past various familiar Loe-
ki characters enjoying themselves, ending with Loeki on the swing. The STER
logo is visible on a rolling barrel. There is no super indicating the channel (10”).
Closing: Same scene, different events. There is no STER logo (10”).
Music/sound: As in cases 1 to 4.
Notable features: Loeki and Roos wave to viewers. The commercials are separated
by Loeki mini-narratives (4”) or abstract separators (2” each). Moreover, Loeki
and his friends no longer play the music themselves.
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Case 6 (May 1992)18
Opening: Loeki and Piep are driving a manually operated railroad wagon as they
turn the corner on an ordinary road. The STER logo is visible on top of a build-
ing. There is no super indicating the channel (4”).
Closing: Same scene, but now they go in the other direction.
Music/sound: The standard melodic opening tune and the standard closing tune.
The difference from the earlier cases is that now the part of the tune that was the
same in opening and closing bumpers has been deleted, so that the two are to-
tally different – and shorter.
Notable features: In the closing bumper, Loeki waves goodbye to the viewers. The
commercials are separated by a Loeki mini-narrative (4”), or by a black screen
with a duration of less than 1”.
Case 7 (20 August 1994)19
Opening: Loeki, wearing a white cowboy hat, drives past in a big American car,
with Roos in the passenger seat waving (!) at the viewer (4”). There is no indica-
tion of the channel and also no STER logo visible.
Closing: Loeki reaches up for a chain to draw the blinds over the STER logo (4”).
Music/sound: As in case 6.
Notable features: The opening and closing scenes have no relationship. The clos-
ing bumper cues the disappearance of the STER logo. All the commercials within
the block are separated by black screens lasting less than 1”.
Case 8 (4 January 1997)20
Opening: Loeki and Piep are on skates, waiting for Roos to fire the starter’s gun,
but Loeki falls. No indication of channel. The STER logo appears against a tree
(4”).
Closing: Same scene, no STER logo. Various Loeki characters wave to viewers
(4”).
Music/sound: As in cases 6 and 7.
Notable features: The one remaining Loeki mini-narrative within the block retains
the skating scene of the opening, but here Loeki falls through a hole in the ice.
All the commercials within the block are separated by black screens lasting less
than 1”, except for one Loeki mini-narrative (4”). “MisterCrash1984,” who up-
loaded the commercial on YouTube notes that this commercial block was broad-
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cast immediately before a sports program that showed the finish of the skaters in
Holland’s most famous long-distance skating race, the Elfstedentocht. Almost all
of the commercials in the block play on the theme by cueing “skating,” “snow
and ice,” “cold,” and Friesland (the province where the Elfstedentocht takes place).
Case 9 (22 April 2004)
Opening: A split screen. On the left side, we see people on a moving escalator,
going up from left to right. On the right side, a boat, filmed from above, also
moves from left to right. The Nederland 2 logo, a “2” in a yellow diamond, strad-
dles the two sides of the split screen bottom center. After some four seconds, this
logo disappears, and the STER logo appears instead in the right bottom corner
for less than two seconds ( 6”).
Closing: Exactly the same scene as in the opening. The only difference is that the
STER logo (which appears now in the left side of the screen) disappears and is
replaced by the centered Nederland 2 logo (6”).
Music/sound: The same tune occurs in both bumpers.
Notable features: All the commercials within the block are separated by black
screens lasting a split second.
Case 10 (17 May 2004)
Opening: An elderly couple, delicately intimate, in a field of grass, against trees.
The red Nederland 1 logo appears in pixelized form in the left-hand bottom cor-
ner and gives way, during the last two seconds, to the centralized STER logo (8”).
Closing: Same scene with marginally different images from the opening bumper.
After two seconds, the STER logo is replaced by the Nederland 1 logo (8”).
Music/sound: The same tune occurs in both bumpers, but it is a different tune
than the one in case 9.
Notable features: All of the commercials within the block are separated by black
screens lasting a split second. There are also inserts: an announcement for the
program Op Reis met Felderhof; an announcement of programming pertain-
ing to “Europe” on Nederland 2; and a non-commercial exhortation to participate
in the National Sponsor Lottery, a charity.
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Case 11 (18 October 2004)
Opening: Man holds woman, both are lying back on a field of grass. Nederland 1
and STER logos as in case 10 (8”).
Closing: Same scene. Camera zooms out and reveals the field is full of people.
Logos as in case 10 (8”).
Music/sound: Tune as in case 10.
Notable features: The closing bumper uses a surprise: the couple is far from alone.
All of the commercials in this block are separated by black screens lasting a split
second.
Case 12 (13 February 2007)
Opening: High angle shot of sunny market square in historical center of a Dutch
city, people walking leisurely across it. Dozens of the “Nederland 1” logo (a “1” in
red diamond) calmly whirl across the upper part of the screen, as if blown by the
wind. There is a slightly noticeable pan to the right. During the last 3”, the STER
logo appears, via quick fade-in, in the bottom right-hand corner of the screen (7”).
Closing: Extreme long shot of the lit glass wing of a building, against an evening
sky. Nederland 1 logos whirl across the upper part of the screen (with their shad-
ows visible in the glass of the building). The STER logo in the bottom right-hand
corner disappears after 3”. There is a barely noticeable track-out (7”).
Music/sound: The music is a soothing, minimal tune, played partly on guitar, and
is the same in the opening and closing bumper, but with marginally different
instrumentation. There is no diegetic sound.
Notable features: The swirl of three-dimensional “Nederland 1” logos, the appear-
ance/disappearance of the “STER” logo, and the tune, with its various instrumen-
tations, is a standard recurring feature of all of the Nederland 1 STER bumpers
from this era. There are different visuals; sometimes the same visuals are used in
the opening and closing bumpers. No fixed combinations between opening and
closing bumpers exist either in the visuals or in the tune.
Case 13 (22 February 2007)
Opening: Long shot of two adolescent pupils sitting in the first row in a class-
room. The boy looks out the window at the square outside. At about the place of
the window, a big, transparent version of the Nederland 2 logo (a blue “2” in a
diamond) enters from screen right, acting as a magnifying glass for the scene
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outside. The camera pans left, along with the viewing direction of the boy. The
STER logo appears in the bottom left-hand corner and is visible for the last 2”
(7”).
Closing: A beach scene with a young girl and boy playing in the sand. Factory
chimneys are visible in the background. The same “magnifying” Nederland 2
logo drifts into the scene, now from screen left. The STER logo in the bottom
right-hand corner disappears in about 2” (7”).
Music/sound: A soothing tune; the opening and closing tunes are the same, but
they differ slightly in their instrumentation. In both cases, faint diegetic sounds
are audible.
Notable features: In 2006, the Nederland 2 logo changed from yellow to blue.21
The magnifying transparent logo, the appearing/disappearing STER logo, and
the tune were all recurrent elements in the Nederland 2 bumpers from this peri-
od, but were later replaced by the regular logo with the blue “2” appearing in
unexpected places. These barely noticeable stable factors combine with a range
of different films, in varying combinations – as in case 12.
Case 14 (13 April 2007)
Opening: Using computer animation techniques, the Nederland 3 logo (a green
“3” tilted rightward in a tilted-rightward rectangle, with a green border around a
white field) disintegrates quickly and turns into a car which bumps up and down
a few times, disappears from the screen, re-appears, and drives off into the dis-
tance. The STER logo appears in the bottom left-hand corner and is visible for the
last 2” (7”).
Closing: An animated green track is followed quickly, as if the point-of-view is
from a car in a rollercoaster, and ends in the “Nederland 3” logo. The STER logo
in the right-hand bottom corner disappears after 2” (7”).
Music/sound. Percussion sound effects simulate the movements of the car using
Mickey-Mousing effects; there is no tune. Opening and closing sounds are vir-
tually the same.
Notable features: Green is usually the dominant color in this era’s Nederland 3
bumpers. Within this particular block, one clip shows a number of Dutch politi-
cians along with soundbites, followed by the phrase, “Altijd bij 2” (“Always on 2”)
– the “2” being the Nederland 2 logo. Although no program is explicitly men-
tioned, it alludes to political commentary programs on Nederland 2 such as Net-
werk and Nova.
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Analysis of the Fourteen Cases
Although conclusions must be drawn with great caution because of the nonsyste-
matic nature of the corpus of case studies investigated, the general trend appears
clear: through a variety of techniques, the opening and closing bumpers of com-
mercial blocks on Dutch public television channels have, in the course of their
history, changed in an ever higher tempo, and moreover, have become increas-
ingly interchangeable. Let me briefly recapitulate some aspects of this develop-
ment.
First, in the long period when opening and closing bumpers used the Loeki
animations, his adventures clearly separated the commercial block from its sur-
roundings. The most important reason for this was that the opening and closing
bumpers were not identical either visually or musically. When their length was
reduced from some 10” to some 4”, this distinction was retained. Although
sometimes the two greatly resembled one another, the closing bumper always
had one or more of the characters waving to the audience, something which
usually did not happen in the opening bumper. Moreover, in the early Loeki peri-
od, the commercials within the block were often separated by Loeki mini-narra-
tives – and otherwise, by one of a series of abstract or STER logo separators.
Gradually, Loeki became a rarer occurrence within the block – allegedly because
producing the animations was a very costly business and because they occupied
lucrative advertising seconds – while the abstract separators became black
screens. These screens also became shorter than the earlier abstract separators:
at first somewhat under a second, and later a mere split second.
When Loeki stopped bracketing the blocks, things changed even more radi-
cally, no doubt because of the competition from the growing number of commer-
cial television channels. Using a range of subtle devices (specific visuals some-
times used as opening, sometimes as closing bumpers; a variety of different and
identical bumpers used for both opening and closing bumpers; a (near) identical,
unobtrusive tune used for both opening and closing bumper; a wide variety of
different clips for blocks on the same channel, alternation between diegetic
sound/no diegetic sound), the opening and closing bumpers of commercial
blocks on public television became almost indistinguishable, the brief appear-
ance/disappearance of the STER logo (and of the channel logo, in reverse) being
the only remaining distinctive feature.
The indistinguishability of the opening and closing bumpers is significant, I
propose, because of viewers’ zapping habits. During the Loeki era, a bracketing
bumper was identifiable as either an opening or closing bumper because of var-
ious audiovisual cues, but these cues have now virtually all disappeared. As a
consequence, zapping viewers can no longer be certain whether a bumper they
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zap into marks the beginning or the end of a commercial block, with a greater
chance that they will see (at least the beginning of) a commercial than back when
they did know.
The bumper’s length has varied over time. It was initially curtailed to match
the shorter bumpers of the commercial channels, and then became longer again.
Arguably, this lengthening occurred because the bumpers now serve not merely
to separate commercial from noncommercial footage, but also act as “brand iden-
tifiers”: they remind viewers that they are watching one of the three public televi-
sion channels and help promote, via the bumper film styles, the channel’s pro-
file. However, this means that bumpers lose even more of their separator
function, also because the unobtrusive STER logo is visible for no more than 2”.
This tendency is further reinforced nowadays because the blocks on Nederland 1,
2, and 3, unlike in the Loeki era, increasingly contain noncommercial content:
trailers for programs broadcast later in the evening on the same channel, or on
the other two public channels; brief announcements of cultural events in theaters
and museums; public service announcements about national anniversaries (e.g.,
World War II Memorial and Liberation Day on 4 and 5 May). Since these “inserts”
regularly feature presenters and anchors of regular programs, they help further
lower the distinction between programs and commercials. There are other, even
more subtle devices that appear to achieve this effect. In 2007, a series of bum-
pers on Nederland 2 displayed familiar institutional settings: a school square, a
church, a studio, a court of law. Since there are so many different bumpers to
choose from, specific bumpers can be selected to “match” the contents of preced-
ing or following programs (a phenomenon, incidentally, that is also the case for
specific commercials within a block). On one occasion (17 September 2007), an
opening bumper shows people entering a theater and features a poster with the
words “new dance.” This poster is actually a still from another bumper. More-
over, the commercial block is immediately followed by an announcement for a
ballet performance to be broadcast later that evening. Another subtlety is that
one bumper from the Nederland 2 series features a journalist, Ron Fresen, who
is a regularly commentator on the NOS national news programs. Other devices I
have noticed include channel logos remaining in the same part of the screen
during the transition from program (announcement) to the opening bumper
(e.g., in the lower corner), and the introduction of the opening bumper tune be-
fore the bumper has started – or its use during other times of the day, early in the
morning, when there are no programs, for instance, when only a clock is visible.
All these devices, I claim, are aimed at lowering people’s awareness of the transi-
tion to or from commercial blocks.
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Coda
To what extent such a trend indeed has a “lowering awareness” effect on viewers
can only be assessed in experimental research. One could, after all, disagree and
argue that over the past few decades viewers have become considerably more
visually literate, and thus have learned to signal the persuasive goals underlying
the audiovisual styles in advertising bumpers. But even if this should turn out to
be true for certain groups of viewers (adolescents, young adults), it may not be
true for others (children, elderly people). Moreover, some of the techniques sig-
naled above may even qualify as instances of the “subliminal techniques” in ad-
vertising that the Media Law prohibits (Mediawet, paragraph 50.8). Their surrep-
titious effectiveness may become all the greater precisely because of their infinite
variety, and their unsystematic and short-lived use: advertising bumpers are con-
tinually being altered in a variety of ways, far exceeding the variety of the Loeki
era.
Advertising bumpers have become ever less distinctive as warning separators
between commercials and programs, and have therefore lost much of their func-
tion as guards against unforeseen commercial attacks. Whereas the advertising
tail has always wagged the dog of programming, as Thomas Elsaesser pointed
out, nowadays the dog begins to look ever more like one big tail itself. In contem-
porary audiovisual media culture, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish
between content and advertisement, between television program and commer-
cial. The growing inconspicuousness of the advertising bumper is a telling symp-
tom of this development.
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Reflections in a Laserdisc
Toward a Cosmology of Cinema
Michael Punt
I first met Thomas Elsaesser in 1989 at the University of East Anglia where,
among many other things, he was trying to work out what Laserdisc technology
could mean for Film Studies. Very soon after, I was helping him and working on
a Bellourian analysis of Rear Window as I was also coming to grips with some
ideas about cinema and its very early years. Our association continued along
these twin tracks in Amsterdam over the next decade and engulfed those rather
confused years around 1995 when the cinema had its “soft focus” centenary. Dis-
cussions arose about when the cinema was actually invented and by whom, but
before satisfying answers were given the celebrations were over and forgotten. In
Amsterdam, I wondered not so much who had invented cinema and when, but
how and why it was invented in the first place. By 2000, I had come to some
conclusions about the necromantic allure of the technology. In his generous re-
sponse at my defense, Elsaesser reminded us that in choosing to work with La-
serdisc we had backed the wrong technology. Well maybe, but maybe not: per-
haps the world backed the wrong technology. As a medium for moving image
storage, the Laserdisc is far superior to its usurper – the more compact DVD –
but, nonetheless, in the same year that I defended my thesis, Paramount (accord-
ing to legend) released its last title on Laserdisc Bringing Out the Dead. I
could not have asked for a sweeter piece of poetic justice between the beginning
and the end of that particular act. Since I am now, so to speak, writing from
beyond the grave, it is perhaps to be expected that this essay is a bold, and possi-
bly academically reckless, gift to Elsaesser who always encouraged me to take the
“Martian view.”
To state the obvious, the priority of the invention of cinema would not be an
interesting question if it had not become the movies. Consequently now, after all
that work on chronologies, archaeologies, and genealogies, we know that the
“when,” “how,” and “who” of the invention of cinema (as with any technology)
are really not the most interesting questions. Thinking about the cinema as tech-
nology – before it became the movies, exactly when rather astute men such as
Etienne-Jules Marey, Thomas A. Edison, and the Lumière brothers thought “the
cinema an invention with doubtful prospects”– suggests more far-reaching ques-
tions about the cinématographe and its forebears.1 For example, if they had no idea
of cinema as an entertainment form (as clearly they could not have), what on
earth could the various inventors, the various promoters, and most of all the
audiences have been thinking when they saw the first moving images and found
them interesting? How was it that such a simple mechanism attained such a uni-
versal interpretation in such a short time? What was it that made the “non-inven-
tors” think that something very special was at stake in the impoverished visual
experience that drew audiences over and over again? We know that the impera-
tive of pictorial realism does not coincide with what the cinema was in 1896 or
was to become in the future. We know that the delight or shock of a technological
attraction is a dubious explanation given the sophistication of the popular under-
standing of science and technology and the extravagant spectacles offered on city
streets and elsewhere. Even the lure of recovering the dead seems, at second
glance, to be a late-twentieth-century bourgeois colonization of a technology
which was predominantly supported by a working class for whom life was hardly
an unmitigated joy. Perhaps we should start again and ask what could Ottomar
Anschütz, Albert Londe, Eadweard Muybridge, Marey, Lucien Bull, Georges De-
menÿ, the Skladanowsky brothers, and the host of other souls fiddling around
with lamps, gears, and ribbons of celluloid have in common with the entrepre-
neurs and the masses who flocked to the séances over and over again?
In one of his later considerations of some of these questions, Thomas Elsaes-
ser, as ever, raises the ante, suggesting that Louis Lumière may have been the
cinema’s first “virtualist.” He concludes this discussion by asking us to “salute
Louis Lumière as one of its [virtuality’s] ancestors and begetters.” And then (as if
the stakes were not high enough) he asks:
what would this salute mean? That we recognize, and therefore “know” in what ways
Lumière and his epoch had, as the German historian Leopold Ranke would say, their
own immediate access to God Almighty, or does it signal that we know how to explain
Louis Lumière to himself, giving his particular past its own truth – restore him to full
knowledge, so to speak, which he could not have had without the historian?2
Indeed, a historian may be needed here to restore Lumière to himself; perhaps
not a historian of cinema (since that was yet to be invented), but maybe a Martian
who, confronted with one of the first films that the clever and sophisticated Lu-
mière brothers made by pointing an early version of the cinématographe at their
own front door, asks with “naïve” candor: is this the most interesting thing these
scientists could think of? These two who sold 15 million photographic plates a
year, ran a business in Lyon that employed 300 people, had a worldwide network
of agents, who reinvented the structure of a carbon atom, and endowed a univer-
sity, who consorted with Lippmann, Marey, the Curies, and Bergson in the Col-
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lège de France and the Sorbonne and went on to further our understanding of
cancer: Were their own factory gates the most interesting thing they could “film”
with this brilliant machine?
It is the contention of this essay that the answer to this question is yes it was,
and that in doing so, they not only demonstrated the cinématographe but also
invented the cinema. As Elsaesser suggests, it did have something to do with
God Almighty – at least the version of God as something “up there” in the hea-
vens. I want to suggest that the filming of the world and the projection of moving
images of that world in an auditorium replicated a technological cosmology that
began its life in the emerging science at the start of the eighteenth century. I want
to claim, perhaps more boldly, that the origins of the cinema are not found in the
infinite regressions of Javanese shadow plays and experiments in ancient Greece
with photosynthesis, but can be located quite precisely in 1704, with Prince Eu-
gene of Savoy’s commission for a clockwork instrument that was nurtured in the
hands of the 4th Earl of Orrery in the following years.
In 1712, John Rowley, possibly with the help of clockmaker Thomas Tompian
and copying George Graham’s model designed in 1704, built a mechanical device
demonstrating the relative positions and motions of bodies in the solar system to
the 4th Earl of Orrery, Charles Boyle (1674-1731). According to most histories, by
this time the so-called Scientific Revolution sparked by Nicolaus Copernicus and
fuelled by Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler was well underway and in the safe
hands of Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, and Robert Hooke. Certainly in this baton
race to reinstall man as the pivot of the universe, after having been so ignomi-
niously dislodged from the center of God’s eye (despite the resistance of the
Church and the vigilance and abuses of the Inquisition), the significance of the
4th Earl of Orrery is worth revisiting. Charles Boyle, however, did far more to
recentralize man since his clockwork, the orrery, is a three-dimensional sche-
matic which places the observer in a very special position outside the universe, a
position later replicated in the subject/object relationship in the cinema.
Science, as it has developed in a post-Baconian world view, is an essentially
anthropocentric practice which places man at the center of an epistemological
enterprise. Once it became clear that God, as it was understood at the time, could
be largely indifferent to human affairs (at least as far as Bacon understood it) –
that is, unconcerned with telling us everything that we needed to know – so the
task of re-establishing the centrality of man was devolved, not to those qualities
that were the undeniable locus of an almighty – omniscience, omnipotence and
omnipresence – but to a quality that no self-respecting supreme being could
have: curiosity. In this sense the scientific revolution was one in which each new
discovery, theorem, and principle was not only a triumph of the intellect but also
evidence of the special quality of selfless curiosity that, in the whole universe, was
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essentially human. As a consequence, the practice of scientific research after Co-
pernicus progressively became an affirmation of a state of mind which in the pro-
cess reveals the supremacy of man quite apart from the useful insights it yields.
George Graham and Charles Boyle have a special place in this version of history
because the orrery marks a cosmology that insists on the rejection of animism
and anthropomorphism, replacing it with a clockwork expression of a new
anthropocentrism; one which places the observer outside of the solar system and
in the realm of the aerolites and comets.
There were, of course, many ways in which this dynamic schematic could have
been represented apart from clockwork. But it was chosen because, apart from
being a convenient technology to transfer, store, and release energy in a regulated
way, clocks expressed the dominant idea of how the universe and human intelli-
gence coexisted. Public clocks had become widespread in Europe from their in-
ception in the late thirteenth century. However, during the sixteenth century, the
mechanism which had been exposed as an intrinsic part of the apparatus was
increasingly concealed. At the same time, as Steven Shapin observes, they “be-
came more and more complex in the effects that they could produce and more
and more integrated into the practical life of the community.”3 Shapin’s argu-
ment is that the increasing complexity of the clockwork mechanisms, which of-
ten showed celestial cycles as well as the time, was not the inevitable conse-
quence of progressive knowledge but evidence of “the power relations of an early
European society whose patterns of living, producing, and political ordering were
undergoing massive changes as feudalism gave way to early capitalism.”4 A tech-
nological example of this can be found in the changes to the face of the clock
from a 24 to 12 hour division. Tompian, Graham, and earlier French and German
clockmakers had begun this process by building superior movements with 12-
hour dials which ran from midnight to noon to midnight; these overwhelmed
the less “accurate” timepieces with 24-hour dials, which ran from sunset to sun-
set. Superior engineering was the vehicle that detached time from the earth and
situated it in the known mechanics of the solar system. This social revolution was
also marked by a shift toward mechanical philosophy in which the natural world
could be understood as a clock. At the core of this philosophy was the appearance
of a purposive agent (the clock) which was known to be the product of a human
clockmaker. It was a system in which human ingenuity could produce a mechan-
ism that convincingly appeared to have intelligence. In this system there was a
place for both the inquisitive scientist and an omniscient God. The orrery can be
regarded, perhaps, as a philosophical instrument which leaves the question of
agency open to debate since it simultaneously suggests the supremacy of human
curiosity by detaching God’s eye and implanting it into the human. What is more
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certain is that the orrery was not only a description of the solar system, but also a
philosophical system expressed in a mechanism.
The genealogy of the orrery in the representation of time duplicates the evi-
dence of the shifting social relations evident in the depiction of space. In the pre-
scientific era, European cartography typically narrativized the topography to ac-
commodate both an aerial vision and terrestrial human desire. Fifteenth-century
maps overtly told a story of what was significant, what could be significant, and
how that sat in a cosmology. Viewing a map was to know a land and enter into the
consciousness of the cartographer and his patron by bisecting the angle between
man and the almighty. From about the middle of the sixteenth century, maps
progressively adopted the point of view of an aerial observer who is (quite fortui-
tously) always sufficiently distant to provide the appropriate resolution to allow
the reader to know what needs to be known. By the seventeenth century, however,
the subjective desire of the mapmaker was concealed in the prevailing orthodoxy
of an essential discontinuity between mind and body as a guarantee of truth. It
formed the foundation for instrumental truth. For Galileo, whose insights de-
rived largely from his own observational drawing, the telescope, which mediates
the observer’s eye, provided the guarantee of objectivity on which to base his
truth claims. With such confidence he could peer up at the heavens and conduct
an over-the-shoulder dialogue with God in a rapid shot/reverse shot (to coin a
phrase from Hollywood) to depict the heavens as though God was looking at
them from Galileo’s position. Little wonder that he was shown the instruments
of the Inquisition, and little wonder that he changed his point of view when the
metaphysical enormity of his gesture was made clear.
Charles Boyle, on the other hand, had no such reservations. His commission
to Graham was for heavens that he could look at from the outside as though he
were a detached God, the intelligent agent that furnished the illusion of purpo-
sive agency to the universe. The paradox of this – a God inspecting his own work
which by definition was him – would not have been missed by Boyle who had
been a distinguished student at Christ Church, Oxford, and a man of letters. The
orrery of 1712 made by Rowley was a copy of an earlier model which was commis-
sioned by Boyle’s contemporary, Prince Eugene of Savoy, from George Graham.
Prince Eugene was Principal Imperial Commander alongside the Duke of Marl-
borough in the War of Spanish Succession in which Boyle rose to the rank of
Major General. Boyle was also connected with Marlborough through family, and
through his academic battles with Richard Bentley. The copy of the orrery, made
shortly after his succession on the death of his brother, was clearly not an extra-
vagant whim or a fashionable “toy” but an extension of his academic and worldly
activities as a significant intellectual. It supported a mechanical philosophy that
was nothing short of a metaphysics which separated matter from life. It refuted
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naturalist tendencies, which could extend the supernatural powers of a recog-
nized God to include all manner of spiritist forces.
The orrery proposed the contemporary problematic of new science. At the
same time, as it clearly acknowledged the possibility of purposive agency in the
universe, it simultaneously deprived it of autonomy in a demonstration of the
metaphysics of mechanical philosophy summed up by Robert Boyle in the two
principles of matter and motion.5 The cusp of this problem was where to position
God in a rational system while at the same time excluding naturalist explanations
of the material world. The orrery seemed to satisfy a broad spectrum of interest
in and responses to science since, for all its mechanistic appearance, it was an
“open” text. Although it appeared to present a precisely scaled model of an obser-
vable material reality in reducing the scale of the planets, the causal authority of
clockwork detached time from matter with mechanical inevitability and so ac-
quired the license to accelerate the diurnal and seasonal cycles.
The speculative significance of the orrery is illustrated in Joseph Wright of
Derby’s painting A Philosopher giving that Lecture on the Orrery, in which a lamp is
put in place of the Sun (1766). Although he painted portraits, landscapes, and
genre subjects, Wright is perhaps best known for a few paintings of scientific
experiments influenced by Rembrandt’s lighting. He was intimately connected
with the leading scientists in Britain largely through his membership in the Lu-
nar Society and numbered key scientists among his friends and associates. He
also lived close to the clock maker John Whitehurst, and through him it is sus-
pected he was invited to see a lecture similar to the one depicted in his painting.
Here, a lecturer has positioned a lamp in place of the sun and is presumably
providing a dynamic explanation of an eclipse. Around the orrery are positioned
spectators who, with various degrees of fascination, look into the universe while
the lecturer observes a man apparently taking notes. As with other Wright paint-
ings the initial impression of scientific triumphalism, conveyed by the dramatic
light (“enlightenment”) emanating from a mechanical proof, is subtly under-
mined by a closer inspection of the human participants. The youngest appear to
be in the thrall of a spectacle, while a certain passive – even skeptical air is dis-
tributed among the rest of the audience. Most curious too is the insecurity of the
lecturer overseeing the notes. For all of Wright’s association with Enlightenment
science, his paintings remind us of the fundamental fragility of the scientific
knowledge-base in the eighteenth century. Ultimately, the picture expresses am-
bivalence and uncertainty in the face of mechanical philosophy. However, what is
clear, in this and his other scientific paintings, is that Wright combines art,
science, and philosophy in a single gesture and places mortal man in a com-
manding position relative to nature and the universe.
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Wright, it seems, has responded to the orrery as an idea rather than an instru-
ment, and in it he saw a new observer, one who could remove himself from the
terrestrial observatory to occupy a place outside the planets in the autochthonic
position of their own creator. The paradox and instability of this point of view –
observing oneself from outside of the system – formed a key question in the
following century. Jonathan Crary has argued that the observer was reconstructed
in the nineteenth century to regard perception as a combination of external sti-
muli and properties intrinsic to the human perceptual apparatus.6 He cites ex-
periments by Goethe in 1811 (using pressure on the eyes) and Wheatstone’s
stereoscopic apparatus of 1838 to show how instrumental observation displaced
human perception as reliable indices of truth. The photographic camera, Crary
claims, became invaluable as an epistemological object not because it replicated
the human eye, but because it displaced the act of observation from the human
body and devolved it to an external instrument. Instrumentation, personal ambi-
tion, and the restriction of legitimate topics became the preoccupations of scien-
tists to the extent that, by the close of the nineteenth century, mainstream scien-
tific enquiry was exclusively confined to professionals who had access to
sophisticated apparatus. The predominantly instrumental materialist vision,
which excluded lay participation, was countered by an opposition, largely sup-
ported by the arts and lay audiences, which manifested itself in a resurgence of
the very belief systems that the Enlightenment and rationalism had striven so
hard to dispel as superstition. Such a renaissance of an ethereal dimension in
the mid-nineteenth century was short-lived. The repression of research into tele-
pathy by scientists and a reinterpretation of the photograph as it entered the pub-
lic domain as a substitute for reality (as, for example, in portraiture and pictorial-
ism) meant that scientific naturalism penetrated all aspects of life. Nonetheless,
while some leading scientists (Davy and Faraday for example) concealed their
concern for spiritual matters until much later in life, many in the emerging pro-
fession of technologists retained an intellectual engagement with matters that we
may now call spiritualist. There were many reasons for this, ranging from an
antagonism to professional scientists who had expelled them from their ranks, to
the daily engagement with the “stuff” of science as technological conduits for
human interaction. The most important was that practical technicians often un-
derstood behaviors in advance of their theoretical comprehension. In the technol-
ogist’s experience, technology, like medicine, was the “art” of science. In chemis-
try the rationality of physics at the time also did not seem to provide satisfactory
explanations for the formation and behavior of atoms.
Carbon in particular seemed to lie outside the laws of physics as they were
understood in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Two scientists who were
also accomplished technicians, Auguste and Louis Lumière, became convinced
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that another dimension was required in order to understand the complexity of
the structure of the atom so as to explain the variety of combinations of connec-
tions that produced the various carbon forms. Apart from being chemists specia-
lizing in dye technologies, the Lumière brothers also had a stake in producing
photographic materials for the amateur market. These interests converged in a
fascination for three-dimensional photography, and they developed a number of
strategies for producing images that were not confined to two-dimensional de-
scriptions. One of these was to photograph in such a way that one of the key
perceptual indicators of form (inference drawn from movement and overlap)
was perpetually present in the image. Arguably, this network of interests pro-
vided the stimulus for the cinématographe; a small rat-trap camera (not so very
different from the ones devised by photographic pioneer William Fox-Talbot)
which could make a photographic record by rapid sampling, print it and project
it such that the viewer perceived three dimensionality through apparent move-
ment. In short, it was from a dissatisfaction with two dimensions that the Lumi-
ère brothers invented the apparatus now used in the cinema, not (as is often
suggested) the imperative of photographic realism.
The innovation and enthusiasm with which their little machine was received
surprised them, and within two years there had been more than 880,000 perfor-
mances of the cinématographe alone. The Lumière’s machines were mostly de-
monstrated in the context of a technological wonder, but other machines and
other exhibitors integrated them with magic lantern slide shows which were very
popular and widespread across Europe at the time. In retrospect, we might see
the reception of moving images in a cultural environment in the thrall not of
realism but more possibly in what we might now call non-locality and ethereal
information (that is, the interconnection of systems and the occurrences outside
normal causality). In the context of the magic lantern show, however, it formed
an instructional and amusing component of a carefully constructed programme
which mixed fantastic narration with travelogues and scientific instruction
(which could include mechanical astrolabe slides).
The cinématographe and its derivatives laid claim to a cosmology which was as
paradoxical, but no less satisfying than the orrery. The viewer regarded events
from a point of view outside the universe in which they lived – whether it was
the narration of a short story, the passage across a foreign land, or a moving im-
age of the planets. Its special place, in the story told here, is that it technologizes
the point of view of a super deity and provides an industrial apparatus in which
the pleasures of the distribution of knowledge (in a narrative film for example)
have sustained a nearly universal experience – the pleasures and discourses of
which can be shared across time and space. The more or less unchallenged inter-
pretation of the cinématographe as a “séance machine” which induced a collective
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experience can be linked to a very particular subject position that kinetic celestial
mapping in three dimensions offers. Like the orrery, it produced a fairly particu-
lar cosmology, which found popular form in a version of cinema that had an
indexical relationship with the everyday perception of the world it was projected
into. The Lumière brothers were, after all, scientists at heart, and the little rat-trap
box that could take, print, and project kinetic three-dimensional models of the
world was a scientific instrument that closely modeled its own epistemology.
This may be just a view from the cosmos by a straying Martian, but one attrac-
tion of a cosmological explanation for the invention of cinema is that it does
account for the very similar reactions to a technological arrangement that in-
vented the cinema, even though they were experienced in different social and
cultural contexts. It may also offer some explanation for the Lumières’ decision
to point the cinématographe at the doors of its origin, as well as the fatal attraction
of technological miniaturization and the subsequent relegation of the Laserdisc
to the museum of dead media. At very least, regarding the cinema as a cosmology
provides us with an opportunity to peer through the rear window and look back
in time and space and the universe from which we set off.
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S/M
Wanda Strauven
A Schicksalsschlacht for the Germans, a “miracle” for the French, the Battle of the
Marne turned French commander-in-chief Joseph Joffre into one of the most
popular figures of the First World War, endowing him with the nickname Papa
Joffre. The mythical battle, which took place from 5 to 12 September 1914, forced
the Germans to retreat in front of the “apparently almost defeated” French and
British armies that Joffre had regrouped. As true counterfactual historians,
“many German contemporaries believed that, without that retreat, without the
lost Battle of the Marne, the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ would have worked, and Germany
would have won the war of 1914.”1 From the French side, the battle also provides
a nice example of deliberate myth building, in that Joffre marginalized the role of
his own mentor Joseph Gallieni, the military governor of Paris, to whose strategic
offsite perception the victory of the Allies in September 1914 could be largely
accredited.2 But because of his charming personality, it was Joffre who became
the “hero of the Marne,” not only in the eyes of the French and even the Amer-
ican public, but also – and that is most pertinent for the argument I want to
develop in this essay – in the creative writing of the Italian poet Filippo Tommaso
Marinetti, founder and leader of the Futurist movement.
In 1915, Marinetti composed a so-called tavola parolibera or poster poem, ori-
ginally entitled Montagne + Vallate + Strade × Joffre (Mountains + Valleys + Roads
× Joffre), also known as Après la Marne, Joffre visita le front en auto (After the
Marne, Joffre Visited the Front by Car).3 Marinetti’s free-word homage visualizes
Joffre’s journey along mountains and valleys in a landscape without horizon and
fixed coordinates, as if the poet (or the general) is exploring a new time-space
dimension. At least two different, diametrically opposed perspectives are com-
bined: while the curving letters S stand for a path seen from above (bird’s-eye
view), the form of the letters M suggests the vertical section of mountains and
valleys observed from below (frog’s-eye view). It is especially thanks to the typo-
graphic curves of the S’s that motion is introduced into the poem. In some parts
of the poster we see the effects of superimposition which are due to the techni-
que of collage, that is, the cut-and-paste of words or ready-made pieces of text on
the field of letters. So, the free(d) word vitesssssxxxxxsssss (velocity) is placed
over, or rather through, the letters S and M.4 As a dynamic synthesis of multiple
views, Montagne + Vallate + Strade × Joffre displays an undeniable cinematic qual-
ity, which requires the reader to shift his or her “act of reading” to an “act of
viewing.” One could also assert that Marinetti’s eye is a kino-eye avant la lettre,
alternating and superimposing high angles, low angles, acceleration, and sound
montage, and thus perceiving the front as a filmic spectacle or, better yet, as an
alternative cinematic dispositif, as a cinema outside the cinema.
More generally speaking, Marinetti can be considered a film practitioner sui
generis, who intuitively applied and even theorized about montage techniques,
cinematic framing, animation, fast motion, and other special effects in his nu-
merous writings, manifestos, and theater plays.5 Whether or not Marinetti was
really, directly influenced by the new medium remains difficult to verify, but – as
I will try to point out – some of his cinematic affinities are to be ascribed to the
S/M practices of cinema, as identified by Thomas Elsaesser. In one of his various
attempts to rethink film history as “media archaeology,” Elsaesser states that it is
the film historian’s task “to map this field as a network, rather than as discrete
units.”And he confesses to being “struck by the existence of what could be called
(but finally are not) the S/M ‘perversions’ of the cinematic apparatus. Among
these normally-abnormal dispositifs one could name: science and medicine, sur-
veillance and the military, sensory-motor coordination in the ‘movement image,’
and maybe [also] ‘GMS’ and ‘MMS,’ to include the mobile phone.”6 The benefit
of a notion such as S/M practices is that it forces us to think about the existence
of cinema (its techniques, technologies, inventions, applications, etc.) beyond the
borders of its entertainment (and even artistic) value, that is, beyond the walls of
its institution as “movies.” Thus, no sex and murder can be expected here, at
least not as the (obligatory) ingredients of the screen’s story. On the contrary,
following Elsaesser’s advice to describe film history “as a series of discontinuous
snapshots,”7 I will draw attention to some Italian pioneers who have operated in
the various S/M dispositifs listed above and, where possible, read them in the light
of the Futurist legacy.
Science and Medicine
I would like to begin my inventory with the somewhat forgotten Italian documen-
tary filmmaker Roberto Omegna (1876-1948), who started his film career with
reporting sports events – more specifically the first and second Susa-Moncenisio
automobile races of 1904 and 1905 – and shooting exotic footage. Omegna is
most famous for Caccia al leopardo / Leopard Hunting (1908), which he
filmed in Eritrea “without telephoto lenses, at a few meters distance from the
wild beasts.”8 This film could have inspired Marinetti’s statement in his manifes-
to “Destruction of Syntax” (1913) regarding the cinema’s function as multiplier of
the sense of ubiquity, as it permits an ordinary person to participate in long-dis-
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tance events of Futurist bravura. According to Marinetti: “The pusillanimous and
sedentary inhabitant of any provincial town can allow himself the inebriation of
danger by going to the movies and watching a great hunt in the Congo.”9 See also
the manifesto “The Futurist Cinema” (1916), co-signed by Marinetti, where the
only contemporary films worth mentioning are “films of travel, hunting, wars.”10
Years before the well-known French pioneer of scientific cinema, Jean Pain-
levé, started filming the wonders of marine life, Omegna made a series of ento-
mological documentaries, such as La vita delle farfalle / The Life of the
Butterflies (1908-1911), La vita del grillo campestre / The Life of the
Cross-Country Cricket (1923-1925), and La vita delle api / The Life of the
Bees (1924-1925). In these scientific films, he used time-lapse photography to
render the life of several days in a few minutes, to microscopically capture the
metamorphosis of the insect, “from the grub leaving its cocoon to the spreading
of its wings.”11 Here again, Marinetti’s “Destruction of Syntax” can be cited, more
particularly the passage where he sentences “the literary I” to death and invites
the new generation of poets to explore “matter and molecular life”: “To rid our-
selves of this obsessive ‘I,’ we must abandon the habit of humanizing nature,
attributing human preoccupations and emotions to animals, plants, waters,
stones, and clouds. Instead we should express the infinite smallness that sur-
rounds us, the imperceptible, the invisible, the agitation of atoms, Brownian
movements, all the passionate hypothesis and all the dominions explored by
high-powered microscopes.” But Marinetti’s aspirations were not purely scienti-
fic, as he made clear with the following explanation: “I want to introduce infinite
molecular life into poetry not as a scientific document, but as an intuitive ele-
ment. It should be mixed in with art works, with spectacles and dramas of what
is infinitely grand, since the fusion of both constitutes the integral synthesis of
life.”12
Besides scientific filmmaking, Omegna is also the “first” to make medical doc-
umentaries in Italy. In 1908, he filmed La nevropatologia / Neuropathology
for the teaching purposes of Professor Camillo Negro at the University of Turin.
As observed by the local press at the first screening on 17 February, the film
transformed the white screen into a “vertical anatomic table” in order to show “a
living sample book of the best neuropathic cases.” The reviewer also emphasized
Professor Negro’s intention to use the cinema as a didactic tool “in smaller uni-
versities, where there was a shortage of ‘living’ clinical material.”13 This filmic
experiment became world news when six days later The New York Times pub-
lished the announcement “Moving Pictures of Clinics: Prof. Negro Successfully
Uses Them in Demonstrating Nervous Diseases,” which was telegraphed from
Rome to Clifden, Ireland, on 22 February and then transmitted to New York by
Marconi Transatlantic Wireless Telegraph. According to The New York Times:
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“Particularly striking have been [Prof. Negro’s] demonstrations of cases of organ-
ic hysterical hemiplegia, epileptic seizures, and attacks of chorea.”14 Further-
more, the American newspaper pointed out that the cinematograph was much
more suitable than “a simple photographic plate” since it could render each clin-
ical case “in all the peculiar movements.” Thus, in 1908, Omegna’s experiment is
received as an improvement of Albert Londe’s pioneering (chrono)photographic
work, undertaken at the end of the 19th century at the Salpêtrière Hospital in
Paris at the service of Jean-Martin Charcot’s studies of hysteria.
From a more artistic point of view, Giuliana Bruno discusses how, in 1995,
Omegna’s footage was given an afterlife by Douglas Gordon in his double screen
video installation Hysterical, performing “two loops – one moving at normal
speed, the other in slow motion – whose rhythms occasionally and casually meet
up.” In this way, La nevropatologia positions itself in a typical Gordonian gen-
ealogy that “exhibits the very representational grounds upon which the filmic
bodyscape itself was built and mobilized.”15
Surveillance and the Military
From Jeremy Bentham’s circular all-vision prison model to CCTV and the possi-
ble future of Google Earth as a worldwide “electronic panopticon,”16applications
of the cinematic apparatus as surveillance system are innumerable. As for the
Futurist legacy, Marinetti’s central concepts of ubiquity and simultaneity can also
be seen, to a certain degree, in the surveillance tradition, although they should be
considered in terms of (Bergsonian) interpenetration rather than (Foucauldian)
power of knowledge. A nice illustration of Futurist omnipresence, connected to
the new telecommunication technologies, is found in Marinetti’s recently discov-
ered screenplay Velocità (Speed, ca. 1918). In the last of eleven tableaux, Marinetti
imagines the Futurist man in the future, that is, 100 years later. The Futurist man
is a politician who has his office in a high-speed train, equipped with a “tele-
graphic keyboard and countless telephone receivers.” During the telecommuni-
cation transmission, one of the receivers transforms itself into a series of remote
sites: “the interior of a workshop, a board room, an elegant drawing-room, an
astronomical observatory, a room of the Stock market, an arsenal, the tent of a
five-star general.”17 This flow of images seems to decode the phone call into a
continuous moving from one place to another, into an incessant “zapping”
through space. Besides this visual ubiquity, the voice of the Futurist man is in-
stantaneously radioed – via the telephone – across the entire country. It is easy to
detect in this description the proto-Fascist motif of demagogic power, which is
not so much to be linked to the surveillance (all-seeing, all-knowing) capacities of
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the telecommunication system, but rather to its materialization of ubiquity (all-
being).
Marinetti’s cinematic perception in connection with the military, on the other
hand, constitutes the most obvious and straightforward S/M lineage of Futurism
and could be treated at great length. I will confine myself here to the lesser-
known – because it was censored by the major scholars of Futurist cinema –
manifesto “The Fascist Morale of Cinema” that Marinetti published in 1934 in
Sant’Elia, a Futurist journal of anti-Semitic tendencies. Instead of expressing
himself on the racial issue (which he never embraced as such), Marinetti dis-
cusses the use of the cinematograph in the Fascist school system, listing six
“marvelous educational virtues” and four “demoralizing vices,” that obviously
should be destroyed, hence the launching of seven new virtues, among which
“the aesthetics of the war in all its splendor of masses and machines, on the
ground and in the air, and in all its excitement of the highest human nobility.”18
It is important to underscore that this military and bellicose aesthetics is re-
garded by Marinetti as a remedy for the “idiotic aesthetics of the American
crime,” which he lists among the “demoralizing vices” of contemporary cinema
and which might refer to the pre-noir productions of Michael Curtiz, Joseph von
Sternberg, Howard Hawks, and so on, that were invading the silver screen dur-
ing that time. What is intrinsic to Marinetti’s aesthetics of the war is not only the
visual spectacle of bombardments and explosions, that most modern and dy-
namic “feast” which reveals the true Futurist nature of things, but also the neces-
sity of heroism and the purification of those in action. Therefore, Marinetti, in
the same manifesto, rejects the fake war documentary, or better yet, the war
documentary made by “fake fighters who did not know how to control their own
fear.”19
In this respect, attention should be paid to another pioneer of Italian documen-
tary filmmaking, Luca Comerio (1878-1940), labeled by Italian film historian
Gian Piero Brunetta as one of the “apostles of the new visual verb.”20 In contrast
to many Lumière cameramen, Comerio and his fellow operatori, such as Roberto
Omegna, Giovanni Vitrotti, Vittorio Calcina, and some others, did not remain in
the darkness of anonymity, eager as they were to “transmit the sense of an experi-
ence lived in first person.”21 Driven by the demons of risk, ubiquity, and speed,
they perfectly embodied the Futurist ideology in formation and awakened the
bourgeois audience with heroic “films of travel, hunting, wars” (cf. supra). Ac-
cording to Brunetta (and Paul Virilio), Comerio was probably the one “most in
tune with Marinetti’s spirit,” revealing himself as a true artist of the cinematic
war spectacle.22 In 1911, Comerio left for Libya to film the Turkish-Italian conflict;
closely participating in the entire expedition, he recorded the various phases,
from debarkation to pacification, and made about twenty films documenting the
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“reality of war,” not only its battles, but also “the discomforts and the waiting, the
everyday lives of the soldiers and the refugees.”23 Moreover, Comerio mounted
his camera on an airplane to record the battlefield, following Marinetti’s advice,
“from a new vantage point, no longer head on or from behind but straight down,
foreshortened.”24 When the First World War broke out, Comerio went again to
the front to shoot other violent images, some of which were actually censored
because they were considered too raw, too realistic. He lived the war spectacle
from inside, as he filmed the battlefield by moving around not only in an ar-
mored vehicle constructed for this purpose by engineer Navarro, but also on
foot, in the trenches, in the forefront of the battle. A literal avant-garde film-
maker, Comerio, more than anyone else, was pushed by a truly Futurist élan,
that is, by “the love of danger, the habit of energy and fearlessness” sung by Mar-
inetti in his founding manifesto of 1909.25 In other words, he was a real S/M-er
avant la lettre.
Sensory-Motoring
Two interrelated pre-cyborgian concepts introduced by Marinetti in his literary
manifestos are relevant to the sensory-motoring lineage (and possibly also to to-
day’s medical and engineering studies on immortality). Firstly, the notion of the
“mechanical man with interchangeable parts” that is presented in the “Technical
Manifesto of Futurist Literature” as the “beginning of the reign of the machine,”
can be read in terms of automotive mechanics as well as robotics, preceding Dzi-
ga Vertov’s formula of film montage by ten years: “From one person I take the
hands, the strongest and most dexterous; from another I take the legs, the swift-
est and most shapely; from the third, the most beautiful and expressive head –
and through montage I create a new, perfect man.”26 Secondly, Marinetti’s idea of
the “man multiplied by the machine” is to be understood as a first step towards
the perfect fusion between the human and the mechanical in a sort of heart-mo-
tor that will allow mankind to defeat sleep and, eventually, death: “New mechan-
ical sense, a fusion of instinct with the output of a motor and forces con-
quered.”27
A wonderful incarnation of this Futurist “sensibility” can be found on the vari-
ety theater stage, more precisely in the figure of Leopoldo Fregoli (1867-1936).
World-famous at the turn of the last century, this Roman conjurer dominated the
theater scene of many metropolises with his protean art. His variety shows gen-
erally comprised more than sixty characters, all of whom he performed himself,
by continuously changing his costumes, his voice, and his gender; his success
was indeed largely related to his qualities as a female impersonator.28 Without
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any mechanical intervention, Fregoli was an unprecedented master of montage.
His spectacle unfolded perfectly timed and executed, a non-stop chain of short
attractions that were often little exercises in montage themselves. For instance,
the attraction of the cake-walk consisted of a cross-cutting between a frivolous
young lady and a dandy, like in an early chase film, with the only difference being
that both roles were played by one and the same man.29 Another famous attrac-
tion was the so-called “reversed theater,” where Fregoli revealed his secret of
quick-change artist to the public. This meant performing for a fake audience
with his face turned towards the back of the stage (which represented a theater
with imaginary spectators); on the proscenium he would then carry out his trans-
formations, before the real audience, with the help of his assistants quickly un-
dressing and dressing him. Unlike Alfred Borden in Christopher Nolan’s The
Prestige (2006), Fregoli had no twin brother or look-alike. He was a machine-
man, or better yet, a “living cinematograph,”30 epitomizing the Futurist princi-
ples of dynamism, rapidity, and movement. It is therefore no coincidence that
Marinetti was among his admirers. The Futurist leader went to visit him in per-
son, during one of his tournées in Naples, and included two direct references to
Fregoli in his important manifesto “The Variety Theater” (1913).
After his encounter with the Lumière brothers in 1897, Fregoli also started
integrating films in his variety shows. During the projection he would hide in
the wings, next to the screen, and recite the lines of the different on-screen char-
acters, thus obtaining a perfect synchronism and the title of the “forerunner of
the sound film.”31 Eventually Fregoli decided to make his own films, and with the
help of war reporter Luca Comerio (!), he recorded several of his conjuring and
transformation tricks as well as the above described “reversed theater” act.32 The
Fregoligraph, as the projection screen was called, turned Fregoli quite literally
into a “man multiplied by the machine,” provoking a tension between the stage
and the screen, the trick-less Fregoli and his tricked double, dismembered and X-
rayed in the film Fregoli dopo morto / Living Dead Fregoli (ca. 1898), which
shows us – by means of white stripes on a black background – the dance of a
“joyful skeleton.”33 Thanks to Fregoli’s cinematic alter ego, some of his protean
grandeur still survives to this very day.
SMS
Lastly, instead of addressing the Global System for Mobile communication
(GSM) and its Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) that together form the last
S/M “perversion” listed by Elsaesser, I would like to briefly discuss the popular
phenomenon of texting among mobile phone users by means of the communica-
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tion protocol Short Message Service (SMS). Initially conceived of as a one-way
communication system whereby call centers could send short messages such as
voice mail notification to their subscribers, the industry could never have fore-
seen the immense success this protocol would have had as a point-to-point appli-
cation, turning receivers into senders, talkers into writers. Indeed, “the decidedly
unsexy SMS was of little interest to an industry bent on promoting itself as exclu-
sive and futuristic.”34 Yet the development of a new argot – that is, the SMS
“shorthand,” characterized by the omission of subject pronouns and the use of
abbreviations such as CUL8R (“see you later”), acronyms such as LOL (“lots of
laughter”), and text-based emoticons such as :-), :-(, :-0, 8-), ;-), not to forget the
mathematical kisses (×××) – seems to follow quite literally Marinetti’s Futurist
poetics as theorized in the early 1910s. To render life in a more dynamic and
synthetic way, Marinetti pleads for the destruction of traditional syntax and the
creation of “a living style that creates itself, without the absurd pauses of commas
and periods.” And he adds: “To accentuate certain movements and indicate their
directions, mathematical signs will be used: + - × : = >, along with musical nota-
tions.”35 Marinetti’s (theoretical) dislike of nouns “sandwiched” between adjec-
tives and verbs and his preference for a speedy, telegraphic language that has
recourse to the “abstract aridity” of mathematical symbols and other “very brief
or anonymous” signs sound incredibly modern and progressive in the light of
today’s media usage. Conversely, thanks to the SMS protocol’s restrictions, that
is, its limit of 160 characters and its rather complex multi-tap writing method,
many (young) mobile phone users across the world have become the Futurist
poets of the 21st century, some of them manifesting actual physiological changes
in their thumbs.36
Hence, SMS can be inscribed in the Kittlerian genealogy of writing systems,
from the telegraph and phonograph to the cinematograph and the typewriter, all
of which could be read in the light of “Spiritualism and Mediumship,” an addi-
tional S/M “perversion” already explored by Friedrich Kittler himself and
others.37 Among the 1900 writing systems, special attention should be given to
the wireless telegraph, invented in 1895 by Guglielmo Marconi (1874-1937). As
Timothy Campbell has pointed out, the wireless must be distinguished from the
radio, in that the former is a technology based on the inscription of sounds while
the latter is a system of voice transmission.38 The wireless operation system
should therefore be addressed as a process of writing, through the “medium” of
the wireless operator, who often trans- or deformed the coded message, due to
mishearings and/or misspellings. Marconi’s wireless telegraphy, known in
French and Italian as T.S.F. (télégraphie sans fils, telegrafo senza fili), is at the very
source of Marinetti’s concept of “wireless imagination” (immaginazione senza fili)
and a recurring motif in his free-word poetry. Marinetti’s abolition of proper syn-
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tax and proper spelling can be explained in wireless terms, as suggested by
Campbell: “Spelling will go the way of syntax, conjugated verbs, and the adverb,
mere clutter on the highway to a more abstract symbolic encoding of the real.
Interestingly, previously correct spellings of words also undergo a change, a de-
formation that occurs in the act of transmission by a wireless imagination to the
writing hand. They are the material proof that a transmission is taking or has
taken place.”39
Z
If I now look back at the free-word poster poem singing the glories of Joffre’s
dynamic journey to the Marne, I am struck by the presence of two smaller Z’s
that could be “decoded” not only as the zigzagging of hairpin bends in a moun-
tain road but also as misspelled S’s. Or is the S a misspelled/mirrored Z? Accord-
ing to Roland Barthes, “Z is the letter of mutilation: phonetically, Z stings like a
chastising lash, an avenging insect; graphically, cast slantwise by the hand across
the blank regularity of the page, amid the curves of the alphabet, like an oblique
and illicit blade, it cuts, slashes, or, as we say in French, zebras; from a Balzacian
viewpoint, this Z (which appears in Balzac’s name [and in the Dutch spelling of
Alsacian: Elzasser]) is the letter of deviation.”40
In Futurist terms, Z’s are preferred over S’s, because they combine straight
lines instead of curved lines. In “Destruction of Syntax,” Marinetti eulogizes the
straight line for its synthetic visualization of speed and connects it to the move-
ment of trains and cars through tunnels, which could be interpreted as an impli-
cit reference to the early film genre of the “phantom ride.”41 This confirms, once
more, Marinetti’s cinematic perspicacity outside the institution of cinema. Mole-
cular life, visual ubiquity, war aesthetics, mechanically multiplied men, tele-
graphic poetry, and the sharp-edged Z of Zpeed, these are all S/M ingredients of
a true Futurist cinema, an “art-action” dispositif, that was never fully achieved dur-
ing the heyday of Futurism but that appears to have penetrated our present-day
media landscape all the more.
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Consumer Technology after Surveillance
Theory
Richard Rogers1
Picture a prison in a Hollywood film, with long lanes of adjacent cells full of
prisoners. The prisoners are shouting and smashing their dinner trays against
the bars. But then, the Nokia ring tone pierces the corridor. The guard checks his
pockets, but his phone is not ringing. All of the prisoners simultaneously reach
into their overalls, and one pulls out a ringing phone. The idea of prisoners being
called by their friends on the outside or even fellow prisoners is shocking, sug-
gesting that they are completely beyond control.
Aside from the consumer-prisoner scenario described above, affix the word
consumer to the otherwise disciplined, and consider some events of the recent
past. The consumer-soldier provided the Abu Ghraib torture shots, for example.
The consumer-worker writes a blog that criticizes the corporation. The consu-
mer-student uses his own laptop and provider, avoiding the university’s server
and its log files. The consumer-patient looks at her chart and Googles her condi-
tion, checking the prescribed treatment against postings in the patient discussion
forum. In other words, the Foucauldian subjects of surveillance now own and use
consumer technology, which makes them unruly. Michel Foucault described how
surveillance disciplined people in enclosed spaces – the prison, the barracks, the
hospital, the factory, and the school. Design as well as techniques (the institu-
tion’s daily “regime”) eventually reformed bodies and made them docile.2 In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the periods analyzed by Foucault, people
will have had consumer technology, or personal objects foreign to the institu-
tional regime. Thus far, however, the personal objects carried and accessed by
the subjects under surveillance have barely been considered.
Does surveillance theory currently take the consumer-prisoner, consumer-
soldier, consumer-worker, consumer-student, and consumer-patient into ac-
count? It does take the consumer into account, at least. According to surveillance
theory after Foucault, consumers are enticed into participating in the act of being
watched in exchange for product, as Mark Poster and Greg Elmer have noted.3
Participatory surveillance describes how the consumer must leave traces and
thereby becomes subject to dataveillance, as Roger Clarke has termed it, the cur-
rent state of which is described below.4 Click-and-agree as well as click-and-buy
have an intermediary step, however, where it is noted in the scroll-down what
information is collected about you. Michael Stevenson sums it all up in a new
media project called “The whatever button.”5 The Firefox extension replaces com-
mand confirmation buttons with “whatever.” Normally, one simply clicks
through the various buttons (“I agree,” “I accept,” “I confirm”), and receives the
product. In response to the interactions in between, one would simply say, “what-
ever.” There is a sense of docility and perhaps futility in Stevenson’s notion,
which surveillance theorists keep in mind, as well. To participate in consumer
society, you have to be watched. It is not so much that resistance is futile. It has
more to do with the fact that there is just too much interactivity. Elmer writes that
turning cookies off blackens out much of the Web’s access for the surfer.6 Having
to confirm every cookie, after setting advanced privacy preferences, unleashes a
barrage of browser alerts. Eventually, one yields back to the default setting, and
carries on with “whatever.” Click-and-buy has one of its finer moments in the
patented “1-click” purchasing system by Amazon, which frees the consumer
from the “whatever” step. To be able to consume products even faster, in a single
click, you must have all your data pre-filled, well formed, and fresh. Thomas El-
saesser has suggested that our data body – the set of stored personal details that
grants us access to product or space – must remain well groomed, so as to get it
ready for the day, like brushing one’s teeth in the morning.7
Theorists and consumers alike are already familiar with consuming at a quick-
ened pace. As Manuel Castells points out, for some time now surveillance has
allowed the docile to consume not simply products but space, as through airports
to the next remote comfort lounge.8 Docile bodies moving quickly is an unfami-
liar image, for we are more accustomed to the Orwellian motion pictures –
hordes of the similarly clad, ambulating like sleepwalkers, whether in factory out-
fits or in late 1940s business suits, hats, and shoes.9 The backdrop is Pittsburgh’s
dense smog. Surveillance and disciplining regimes once used to drain energy,
and slow commerce. To become human again after mechanization, and to resist,
factory workers would “pace” themselves, and perhaps strike. That is to say, the
watchful, disciplining regime eventually would slow down money and people.
Nowadays, it speeds things up.
As in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, those worth watching and under
the highest levels of surveillance are the “kinetic elite,” who are able to consume
dedicated flow space by passing quickly through its gateways.10 The “space of
flows,” as Castells termed it, consists of three layers: the hardware and its electro-
nic impulses, the network topology of cable links, and the organization of space
for the managerial elite.11 It is the third layer that is of interest in the access
society, a term employed by Jeremy Rifkin.12 Those under less surveillance – like
Orwell’s Progs who do not merit watching – sadly wait in line by economy class
check-in, with too much luggage. Their flow is impeded. They hurry up and wait,
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caught repeatedly by Deleuzian fencing. Gilles Deleuze took issue with Foucault,
saying that the password society has superceded the panoptic society.13 Surveil-
lance no longer reforms bodies, it grants physical access to bodies of various
sizes instead. One need not be in shape, physically, though looks remain impor-
tant. Those passing through controls most swiftly have their data bodies well
formed, like good code. As Peter Adey writes, waiting at customs at Amsterdam
Schiphol Airport and watching businessmen arch their necks for the Privium
eye-scanner is a Deleuzian moment.14 It is not so much that a given elite has its
own lounges, passageways, and gateways, in a Castellsian sense (like royalty had
its own waiting rooms, entrances, and exits at train stations); it is more that flow
space is a result of “privileges.” One’s achieved “level” unlocks free space – as in a
computer or video game.
The “data body” was coined by the Critical Art Ensemble, taking a cue from
Mark Poster’s data double. The Critical Art Ensemble (CAE) defined it as “the
total collection of files connected to an individual” – a collection “in service” to
corporations and the state.15 While Poster believes that the data double impov-
erishes the self by reducing it to fields in a database with character length limits,
the CAE actually thinks it becomes far richer. All data are in play: “No detail of
social life is too insignificant to record and to scrutinize.”16 Wendy Chun has
discussed how the Internet has brought with it not only the idea of a “freedom
frontier,” but also that of a “dark machine of [state] control.” The latter myth, she
writes, “screens the impossibility of storing, accessing and analyzing every-
thing… Even the US National Security Agency (NSA) admits this impossibility.”17
In other words, the question nowadays is not so much whether data are collected
and stored, but rather how they are indexed and made queriable. Firstly, with
respect to its collection, there was the issue of the ephemerality of data. The
memory rot that so worries digital librarians and archivists, combined with the
maintenance of old machines to view the content in something like its original
setting, are less the issue than query machines just stopping, when the scripts
break. One normally concerns oneself with exploits, and subsequent inrushes of
spam and the editbots, automatically changing Wikipedia pages.18 Networked
content is at risk. Who forgot to turn the filter back on after the re-install? Now
look at the mess.
But, secondly, the data sets are becoming increasingly bounded by time in
ways different from digital decay. When privacy advocates negotiate data reten-
tion durations, they are also creating limited query windows. How long should
the police keep video surveillance data? How long should a search engine keep
user data? In 2007, Google, for example, agreed to anonymize user data that was
over 18 months old, changing an earlier proposal that read “18 to 24 months,”
as Peter Fleicher, the company’s Global Privacy Counsel, writes on the official
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Google blog.19 Whilst the 6-month difference is banal (but may also be a product
of Google’s organizational culture – their servers also last 18 months), the time-
frame creates new urgencies for the query machines seeking, as Fleicher con-
tinues in bullet points:
– to defend our systems from malicious access and exploitation attempts;
– to maintain the integrity of our systems by fighting click fraud and web spam;
– to protect our users from threats like spam and phishing; [and]
– to respond to valid legal orders from law enforcement as they investigate and
prosecute serious crimes like child exploitation.20
The study of anonymized profiles of users is only just beginning, and their cur-
rent constitution in search engine space is not well interrogated. The famous
case of the release of AOL search engine query data in 2006 made news for its
“disturbing glimpse into users’ lives.”21 Later, it became an item in the US House
of Representatives, where the Congressman from Massachusetts remarked: “We
must stop companies from unnecessarily storing the building blocks of Ameri-
can citizens’ private lives.”22 Here is how Declan McCullagh, the staff writer at
CNET News, introduces the story of a person sharing his life in his search
strings, including his queries:
AOL user 311045 apparently owns a Scion XB automobile in need of new brake pads
that is in the process of being upgraded with performance oil filters. User 311045,
possibly a Florida resident, is preoccupied with another topic as well:
how to change brake pads on scion xb 2005
us open cup florida state champions
how to get revenge on a ex
how to get revenge on a ex girlfriend
how to get revenge on a friend who f—ed you over
replacement bumper for scion xb
florida department of law enforcement
crime stoppers florida23
Further questions arise beyond what users may expect from search engines.
These now also have to do with the everyday disappearance of the query environ-
ment as well as the results. The server logs keep the queries, as well as the
clicked-on items (not shown above), but not all of the results that were offered.
Moreover, they remain ephemeral; one cannot recreate search engine query re-
sults from the past. This allows search engines to shift the blame and responsi-
bility to the users.
But anonymized, 18-month-old profiles of exploiters, spammers, phishers,
frauds, and other anomalous users also raise somewhat different questions from
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those previously put forward by database philosophers who were critically con-
cerned with aberrance as a normal outcome of algorithmic queries of large,
stored collections of data. Profiles are slices of norms, and generate niches as
well as “niche envy,” as Joseph Turow writes.24 The Internet has changed adver-
tising as an art form for the masses (on TV and billboards) back to that of the
pedestrian “direct advertising” of the weary door-to-door salesman, lugging pro-
duct. “Direct,” to use the short form, now relies on the collection of individual
data, knowing not the customer, as in the past, but the customer type. Demo-
graphics, although important, are merely broad indicators compared to the speci-
fic purchase histories in what Elmer has termed the personal information econo-
my. “Customers who bought this item also bought…” is one form of
recommendation that thrives on anonymous users.
Turow’s “niche envy” is a concern not so much for the daily grooming of the
data body that Elsaesser discussed, resulting in the ability to consume product
and space rapidly, but more about people knowing other people’s data bodies,
and desiring them. The constant uproars amongst Facebook users are cases in
point. The social software continues to increase the number of sticky events in
the social network. Previously, one’s edits to a Facebook page or to friends’ pages
were not broadcasted, until early September 2006, when a student posting from
the Campus Progress blog appeared on Slashdot:
So-and-so is “no longer single.” Someone else removed “the Hubble Telescope” from
their interests. Apparently, 10 of my friends “care about the End the Genocide in
Darfur campaign issue.” For those who haven’t logged on, not to mention the poor
souls who aren’t on Facebook, here’s what the networking site introduced just after
midnight, California time, last night: The site now records the minutia of everyone’s
moment-by-moment activities on Facebook, and aggregates them all to a handy
“News Feed” page, and a “Mini-Feed” on every profile.25
After user protest, the feeds became an option, instead of the default. More re-
cently, another default versus global opt-out episode unfolded. Beacon, intro-
duced by Facebook in December 2007, takes feed analysis to a new level of niche
marketing. Whereas in the past one’s anonymized purchases were logged on a
single site and recommended to others (Amazon), with Beacon a Facebook user
is alerted to friends’ purchases from multiple sites (via their captured and aggre-
gated feeds). The backlash came from Moveon.org, the online, political progres-
sive organizer, with a campaign and a petition, where one Moveon.org member
and Facebook user wrote: “Oh my gosh, my cousin’s entire Christmas shopping
list this week was displayed on the [Facebook News] feed.”26 Whilst the outcry
was smaller (0.1% of users joined the Moveon.org campaign as opposed to 7%
joining the earlier protest group, “Students against Facebook News Feed”), Face-
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book yielded once more, allowing users to opt out of what it describes as organic
and social promotion of product – by adding just three lines of code.27
What to do? To theorists, artists, activists, and NGOs, awareness may bring
change. We should know how much we are participating in the surveillance so-
ciety, and that not possessing the local supermarket’s loyalty card is the equiva-
lent in surveillance thought to being punished (as without the loyalty card one
pays more). It becomes expensive when one tries to avoid participating in the
surveillance society. To raise consumer consciousness, Michael Stevenson pro-
poses that supermarkets install an additional viewing screen. As soon as the loy-
alty card is scanned and you are rewarded with your discounted items, you also
see the dynamic back-end, or what Lev Manovich has called new media: capture,
store, interface, search, to which may be added: algorithm and recommend.28
Perhaps consumers would like to see their shopper profiles when they check out,
and be made aware of how collective profiles shape (shelf) space. Products are
recommended (and shelved) on the basis of collective past purchases; new pro-
ducts are “related,” in a relational database sense, to ones well consumed by the
profiles passing through the supermarket. Corporate research departments also
scout awareness-raising projects, which are often initiated by artists. It is in this
context that Eric Kluitenberg refers to artist-designer projects as accidental, un-
paid beta testing.29 In December 2007, a Google query for “RFID workshop”
Amsterdam returned 880 results, many of which referred to a series of radio
frequency identification (RFID) tag events, attended by hackers, artists, thinkers,
programmers, and facilitators. For example at the PICNIC’07-event in Amster-
dam, people tagged themselves in the hope that an application would be hacked
together to enable the like-minded, or similarly interested, to locate each other.
Interest fields in the database would network people live. Social life would imitate
new media.
Another strategy for dealing with the surveillance society lies in data body self-
help. The aware and profiled consumer may try to reassert his idiosyncrasy, be-
coming less like consumer shop-alikes, or algorithmically social networkers with
related interest tags, and more a unique, special individual. Looking at the profil-
ing machine with a transparent back-end, the shopper may ask: “Can I escape
from this particular rendering of myself? Can I recompile my data self?” First,
here’s a poignant example of how the self is taken over by data capture, storage,
algorithm, and recommendation, and how the consumer tries to reassert him-
self, armed with knowledge of how his TV and digital video recorder store inter-
actions and subsequently recommend content. In 2002, the Wall Street Journal
wrote:
Mr. Iwanyk, 32 years old, first suspected that his TiVo thought he was gay, since it
inexplicably kept recording programs with gay themes. A film studio executive in Los
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Angeles and the self-described “straightest guy on earth,” he tried to tame TiVo’s gay
fixation by recording war movies and other “guy stuff.” … “The problem was, I over-
compensated,” he says. “It started giving me documentaries on Joseph Goebbels and
Adolf Eichmann. It stopped thinking I was gay and decided I was a crazy guy remi-
niscing about the Third Reich.”30
Of course the user may not like what a machine has captured, stored, and algor-
ithmically recommended. He may try to make his data body cooperate with his
current preferences, so as to improve his future profile. (There is yourself, and a
simulation of a future self, as William Bogard writes.31 The simself is a surveil-
lance product of great value.) The question concerns whether consumer technol-
ogy will allow him to reestablish himself. For example, can he really clear his
history? Previously expressed preferences may cast unwanted shadows on the
future.
The larger question for consumer technology has to do with whether it needs
to know you in order for you to consume it. This is familiar ground. To consume
space, you can no longer simply remain anonymous, like Walter Benjamin’s flâ-
neur once was.32 The flâneur was able to blend into the urban crowd. Up until the
1950s, one could board an ocean liner, and just disappear. Board an airplane
these days and you re-appear. The current impossibility of anonymous move-
ment has been captured in the notion of the “disappearance of disappearance,”
as Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson put it.33
The disappearance of disappearance is evident in the consumer safety city, as
the flâneur and the anonymous shopper are on the verge of extinction. Moreover,
in consuming product, as opposed to space, surveillance is no longer limited to
the (kinetic) elite. Everyday people, the under-surveilled progs in Orwell’s terms,
or the data body-challenged queued up in airports, the dividuals in Deleuzian
terms, are increasingly the subjects of surveillance. The question remains
whether the unruly consumer-prisoner, consumer-soldier, consumer-patient,
consumer-worker, and consumer-student are using products without surveillance
built in. Which consumer technology is still available without it? (Consider buy-
ing professional grade technology, and set mode to manual.)
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A fabulous painting by Marlene Dumas titled Neighbor (2004) depicts the figure
of a migrant.1 In many subtle ways his migratory status is evoked within the im-
age. The depicted man is not just, say, Middle Eastern. It is not just the jelabba he
is wearing underneath his western jacket. There is something in his face – a
shadow of a dark beard, and it is especially his eyes that suggest “foreignness” or
more specifically, “Arabness.” Not a beard but the shadow of one; a jelabba as well
as a jacket. There are more details that indicate the figure of the migrant. One of
his bare feet points to the viewer, the other to the side, for example, as if he is
either hesitant to leave or stay. Combined with the title – always important ele-
ments of the paintings in the case of Dumas – it reinforces the notion that this is
an instance of what I have been calling “migratory aesthetics.”
This term indicates an aesthetic of migratory culture, which is the term used to
indicate a Western European (or North American for that matter) culture that is
in constant transformation under the influence of the increased phenomena of
migrancy. The neighbor opens his coat with a theatrical gesture of sincerity, in
order to show that no bombs are hidden underneath it. The gesture accords well
with the straightforward look with which he addresses the viewers. Both are vehi-
cles of a “rhetoric of sincerity.” 2 This painting suggests and critiques the confla-
tion of the migratory and the terroristic that is so strong in contemporary mythol-
ogy in the West. Invoking the paranoia concerning “Middle-Eastern looking”
men, the painting tells us that settled people “make” terrorists simply by project-
ing onto “neighbors” the very media- and state-managed fear of otherness that
has congealed around some of the groups of former Gastarbeiters at Mercedes
Benz and other industrial giants.
Thematically, this is where my interests join those of Thomas Elsaesser; where
his work inspires me. When I was invited to contribute to this tribute, I immedi-
ately decided that I would focus on the beautiful small publication Terrorisme,
mythes et représentations, on the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) and two films about
this terrorist group, Deutschland im Herbst / Germany in Autumn (Rainer
Werner Fassbinder, Volker Schlöndorff, et al., 1978) and Todesspiel / Death
Game (Heinrich Breloer, 1997).3 But thematic interest is only part of what brings
Elsaesser’s work within my orbit. The other part is conceptual – and that is where
a more lasting congeniality lies. Elsaesser wisely declined to define terrorism.
This negative act has already brought the concept closer to my view of the useful-
ness of concepts for interdisciplinary cultural analysis. I had already been inter-
ested in the productive looseness or “traveling” of concepts for quite a while,
which is actually a variation on the “weak thought” of the 1980s.4
In a similar vein, Elsaesser went through the case at hand, the double case of
the history of the RAF and the films devoted to the movement, to list the many
varied, often contradictory, facets of that instance of “terrorism.” The analysis of
the events, the discourses, and the films together as political history and media
representation form a third reason why I have taken this as my starting point,
and why I consider the essay an exemplary instance of cultural analysis. The pas-
sionate commitment to foreground the politics of culture and the culture of poli-
tics, as well as the continuity to the present, is a fourth. Thus, Elsaesser makes an
utterly convincing and original case for the integration of cultural analysis with
the political thinking that should be integral to it but so seldom is.
I am most interested in the conceptual moves in the essay. Clearly, we had a
non-concept here; a concept that was best left “traveling,” mobile. In the spirit of
that productive negativity, I put my interest in the “migratory” and Elsaesser’s in
“terrorism” together. I will try to develop a connection between his work on ter-
rorism and mine on the migratory. I extend the latter to the conceptual level, as I
claim Elsaesser does with the former. “Migratory,” then, refers less to the actual
movement of people, even if that movement is of crucial social-political impor-
tance, but to the qualifications this movement places with the assumed certain-
ties, including conceptual ones, by which we live. Elsaesser’s “moving” way, of
diffusing the concept of terrorism through mapping its ramifications, is similarly
a way of un-fixing. On the basis of this common interest in critically engaging the
myths and representations of what the West has been taught to fear, I will peruse
his essay not out of thematic interest but primarily for how the “migratoriness” of
the conceptual moves helps us to understand “terrorism” as a constructive con-
ceptual tool.
The starting point and justification for this approach are simple. Furthermore,
in Elsaesser’s essay the concept of terrorism is made to “migrate” over twenty
times, bridging an equal number of differences or oppositions. If in the end it
offers a clear and analytically helpful meaning, it is because of the restraint of the
compulsion to define, to fix and narrow down meaning. Thus, the concept re-
mains open to what the “case” can tell us about it. I will simply follow the migra-
tory line of the article, reconstructing, in terms of migratoriness, the moves El-
saesser makes to do justice to the complexity of the social phenomenon he
studies and the artistic manifestations through which we can know it. I will put




The first cluster of migratory moves concerns generations. From the vantage point
of today, the RAF period in the 1970s is positioned right in between Germany’s
most problematic period, the 1940s during which the RAF members’ parents
made their political choices, and the 2000s when “terrorism” has once again
become an urgent issue, an excuse for violence, persecution, and a nouvelle vague
of colonialism. Moving constantly between the beginning and end of these three
key decades, and the familial genealogies involved, Elsaesser seeks to understand
the multiplicity of the political ramifications to which the brief yet endless history
of the RAF points only obliquely: “Neither the films nor a slew of books managed
to lay the episode to rest, though … because they also inscribed themselves in
several other histories … to recover their possible significance for the 1990s.”5
This generational migration of the kinds of politics that might lead up to ter-
rorism implies two other forms of conceptual migration. First, Elsaesser includes
in this reflection on generational tensions a vision of the constant “migration”
between “private” situations of children growing up in a country riddled with
ambivalence, and “public” history of a country dealing with a past that is literally
unspeakable, hence, traumatogenic on a collective level. I would maintain that this
is a (conceptual) migration rather than a merging because although there is no
harmonious integration, there is a constant tension and escape from the one into
the other. This is how and why a child can become violent out of anger toward a
parent and commit acts of terrorism that kill countless others they have never
met. These connections between the two domains of social history – political
history and the history of the family – run through the essay inconspicuously but
forcefully. For me, they offer a template for understanding the youthful terrorism
of today. Only in extreme historical situations do these connections come to the
fore strongly enough to inform the political behavior of people who, from the
vantage point of others, have everything to live for – whether they come from
well-to-do families and have a future as brilliant professionals, or whether they
are simply young and “promising,” like many contemporary radicals – but prefer
to endanger or willfully destroy their lives.
The second generational implication concerns the status of the nation. The
RAF happened in the former West Germany, the Federal Republic, which was at
that time still strictly separated from East Germany, the DDR (GDR, German
Democratic Republic). But the two films Elsaesser discusses were made before
(Germany in Autumn) and after (Death Game) the fall of the Berlin Wall, that
moment when the “great divide” collapsed, and Germany, never quite certain of
its unity, became a political unity once again. Hence, the concept of terrorism
migrates within the nation, between not only two states of the nation-state(s) but
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also between two states of the world – the one when the world was divided into
capitalist and communist states, and the one when, for a brief moment, it ap-
peared unified. Subsequently, as Elsaesser points out, the “raison d’Etat” takes
over, and new hostilities fall into place.
In relation to these partial shifts, Elsaesser introduces the myth of Antigone
and its importance in Germany in Autumn. This myth is often used for political
purposes, which is understandable given that it is concerned with just this issue
of politics versus family. At the same time, by using this myth as Germany in
Autumn does, it already tips the balance in the direction of such a raison d’Etat.
Elsaesser writes:
The appearance of Antigone in Germany in Autumn is thus over-determined: it
raises the question whether the film, by pointing to her presence, already specifies a
particular reading of the historical-political dimension of the events with which Ger-
many in Autumn is concerned.6
On the one hand, the object proposes an interpretation that can only follow this
very interpretation. On the other, it opens up the conceptual reflection that all too
often prescribes and delimits what the object can say.
On the level of content, and to connect this historical shift with my interest in
today’s migratory aesthetics, I see a heterogeneity-in-continuity here. Between
the two moments in which “terrorism” became an acutely real issue – between
the collapse of the communism/capitalism divide and the current migratory cul-
ture, another collapse of boundaries – the world shifted. And when the traditional
enemy vanished, the necessary creation of its us/them divides from communism
shifted as well. From the profound, but not-profound-enough changes within
Germany(s), we can learn what makes state terror tick, and how individual initia-
tives emerge within it.7
Domains of Thought
A second cluster of moves in the essay concerns the bond, inextricable as much
as problematic, between politics, aesthetics, and ontology. As in the generational
issue, this is not a simple merging but a constant back and forth movement,
which brings the baggage from one domain into the concerns of the other. Here,
the concept of terrorism migrates back and forth several times, demonstrating in
the process that Elsaesser’s keen sense of the political in cultural analysis is ex-
tremely timely.
Elsaesser characterizes with great sensitivity the reception of the two key films
he discusses, Germany in Autumn and Death Game, as engaged in a sad sym-
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pathy for the terrorists, combined with a general feeling of paranoia of being
(seen as) a terrorist, and empathy for the perspective of the State and the victims,
respectively.8 This is more than a political characterization. It also indicates an
aesthetic appeal that informs the former without becoming one with it. Elsaesser
recalls his own, personal frisson upon learning of the first RAF events in 1972, the
“Bonnie-and-Clyde-ness” of it. Mediated, aestheticized, yet politically real.
Another set of migratory movements between politics and aesthetics can be
deducted from Elsaesser’s almost casual mentioning of the fact that some of the
RAF principals moved with apparent ease from the extreme left to the extreme
right politically. To explain this political flexibility, Elsaesser invokes another
myth, that of the deeply patriarchal and Oedipal myth of Hamlet:
Such an emphasis of father-son relations … was itself symptomatic of the fact that the
movement of contestation was anti-authoritarian rather than egalitarian, that despite
its Marxist political discourse it was caught in the ruses of patriarchy, which the wo-
men owed it to themselves to escape from, perhaps by contesting this “Hamletiza-
tion” of German history of after the war through “antagonizing” it instead for itself.9
In addition to suggesting the political inconsistency of the individuals, this indi-
cates how the divisions between left and right are no longer tenable. The state of
the world today confirms this. This does not mean that labor issues and other
leftist political issues are obsolete – no more, say, than the silly notion of “post-
feminism” makes rape an obsolete issue. Rather, it is no longer consistently on
the left that we can hope that these issues will be addressed, or anywhere else on
the traditional political spectrum. This need for regrouping around issues rede-
fines aesthetics. Where Elsaesser deploys the tension between the use of the
myths of Antigone and Hamlet, I see contemporary artists deploying similar
forms of intertextuality to regroup various political positions. One example is a
recent video work by Canadian artist Stan Douglas, Vidéo (2007), which, instead
of myths, deploys the classics of film history to do this.
While writing this essay, I was watching this film intensely. Just like Elsaesser’s
Terrorisme book it was produced on the occasion of an exhibition at the Centre
Pompidou devoted to a single artist, this time not Fassbinder but Samuel Beckett.
Douglas responds to Beckett’s Film, probing and updating the ontological ques-
tion of being (defined as being perceived). Douglas articulates the ontological
question, aesthetically followed through in the way he films consistently from
behind, narratively through a reworking of Orson Welles’ Le Procès / The Trial
(1962).
10 Like Elsaesser in his balancing act on the cusp of Antigone and Ham-
let, Douglas thus knots together the individual and the social, the political, the
aesthetic, and the ontological questions of our time – the question of whether
identity, for example, is ontological or discursively constructed. The main charac-
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ter of the film, a young black woman, whose face we never get to see, is sense-
lessly persecuted and perhaps executed, like Kafka’s anti-hero. Since the voices
are never audible, we fail to know how the harsh demand of identity papers, and
its subsequent shrugging off as irrelevant when the woman extends her passport,
articulates her identity, and how the latter pertains to the men’s attempt at her
objectification.
While the scholar deploys such concepts as migratory, the artist uses aesthetics
with a similar migratory thrust. But here again, an apparent division fails to hold.
In one of the boldest passages of his text, Elsaesser claims an aesthetic function
of the RAFmembers:
Perhaps the RAF was trying to produce a different kind of “art” altogether: not spec-
tacular, but “conceptual,” by making visible deeper, irreconcilable contradictions, ar-
ticulating a series of “deadlocks” in the body politic, in the fabric of democracy it-
self?11
Conversely, Douglas is an artist, but his deployment of the intertextual relations
to three canonical works from the history of cinema, all three concerned with
attempts at objectification, can arguably be seen as equally conceptual, even if
the incredibly precise cinematic aesthetic is his tool to achieve this.
In the French version of the passage quoted above, Elsaesser uses the word
“vraiment” (“truly”) – a casual reference to a form of authenticity. He mentions
authenticity more explicitly in relation to that preoccupation with Germany and
things German. He points out that the loud anti-American and pro-Vietnam dis-
course, shibboleths of leftism at the time, were only “authenticated” by turning
the attention inward, to Germany itself and its political stocktaking in this post-
war period: “Though stridently anti-American and pro-Vietnam, it became
‘authentic’ only where it referred itself to Germany and its political post-war re-
cord.”12 This is right after the confession of his own shivers of the Bonnie-and-
Clydeness in the aesthetics of the RAF actions. I am fascinated by this moment in
the text, where the author’s personal involvement in the historical culture he is
describing folds into an authenticity defined as closeness and personal involve-
ment, as a form of Germanness. This move points to the need for self-involve-
ment indeed – in the wake of Habermas, we called it self-reflection – in an at-
tempt to understand “terrorism” in all of the cultural and the political, the
aesthetic and the ontological aspects of it together. “Paranoia” may be the key;
that emotion, or neurosis that focuses on the individual’s response to the world
without making any pronouncements on the (ontological) reality of the persecu-
tion feared. To be a terrorist or to be considered one becomes a blurry ontological
area. Withholding ontological judgments is necessary in order to understand any
political action, and terrorism more than any other.
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In other words, the knot where politics, aesthetics, and ontology must not be
disentangled is the site where the migratory concept of terrorism is at its densest.
Importantly, then, the move Elsaesser makes here is a (provisionally) stabilizing
one, keeping together in the bargain both past and present, both self and other,
but never in harmony. This is why the conceptual metaphor of the migratory is
helpful. When thinking about migratoriness, this knot is crucial. Without it, we
inevitably fall back into an exoticizing form of othering – of migrants who are
neighbors or of terrorists who are compatriots – that precludes an understanding
of contemporary culture, including European culture.
Revisiting Taxonomy
A third cluster of migratory reflections on terrorism congeals around categories.
Critical of Breloer’s simplifications in Death Game of complexities in the emo-
tional responses emerging from the social fabric, Elsaesser points to the stream-
lining effects of genre, to its inevitable complicities. This is the first among cate-
gorical migrations. His sentence “The docudrama exudes the gravity of the
reason of state” introduces the notion that genres are always already bound up in
politics, whether or not this politics is recognizable as state or party politics.13
Due to its realistic claims, yet allowance of fiction within it, docudrama is an
excellent example of this.
This reflection introduces the section on Antigone’s role in Germany in Au-
tumn mentioned above, where the “official” opposition between family and state
is carefully challenged, so that a hermeneutics of Antigone becomes central to
the argument. For me, the “raison d’Etat” and its counterpart, the “raison de fa-
mille” so to speak, are among the most powerful areas of conceptual migration.
The earlier reflections on generational tensions substantiate this need to open up
the boundary between these two domains because family is itself a raison d’Etat,
as is the private-public division. Here it becomes clear what they really are: cate-
gories as political tools. This is the second taxonomic migration.
Meanwhile, the question of hermeneutics introduces a third migratory move
in this cluster, the one between text and interpretation, again a move back-and-
forth rather than a merging. This is very important, because the facile merging of
these two categories allows for the escape from and the obscuring of the real
issue; and this is something Elsaesser would never fall for. Thus, he rhetorically
asks, would Antigone be a hermeneutics, a key to understanding Germany in
Autumn as an allegory of modern German history? Instead, Elsaesser moves
between text and interpretation. For example, when he brings in classic cate-
gories such as class – when discussing the bourgeois backgrounds of RAF mem-
Migratory Terrorism 303
bers – he pulls it into the realm of provisional and historically specific indetermi-
nacy. Much later, a similar move occurs between history (or History) and herme-
neutics, when, with reference to Jacques Rancière, the author reminds us that in
the face of history, there always occurs a move that turns us into political sub-
jects: “What sort of ‘we’ is symbolizable in a civic, political sense?”14
This, in turn, brings in the moment where migration in the literal sense sub-
verts the category from within. Discussing the large percentage of workers with
foreigner status in the Mercedes Benz factory (whose director Schleyer was a
prominent RAF victim), Elsaesser recalls the connection between this moment
in the 1970s and, on the one hand, the requisition of “slaves” during Nazism
and, on the other, the “future transformation of those workers into undesirable
foreigners.”15 From the RAF activist present, with Nazism as the past, and cur-
rent migration policies as the future, a rather bleak blurring of categories appears
to occur. Here, in the way Elsaesser complicates that most reliable of historical
concepts, class, by merging Nazi slaves, Mercedes Benz workers, and current
“étrangers indésirables,” the connection between terrorism – the phenomenon as
well as the concept – and migratoriness becomes highly over-determined. Cate-
gories, then, remain useful only when they are not rigidified in a positivist grid.
Instead, phenomena that elude and question categories demonstrate, through
the dynamic relationship they maintain and to the taxonomies, that far from un-
dermining the production of knowledge, they stimulate it; and far from being
evidence of “sloppiness”, they help integrate dynamic with rigorous thought.
Domains of Experience
This brings me to the fourth cluster of conceptual migrations, perhaps best char-
acterized as domains of experience. This most closely resembles my use of migra-
tory aesthetics as an instance of a traveling concept. Experience has been a pro-
ductive, yet problematic concept in cultural analysis, especially in feminist and
postcolonial thought.16 The experiences of underprivileged and subaltern groups
have been systematically under-illuminated in the production of knowledge, but
an appeal to identity politics alone fails to explain and remedy this situation.17
Harking back to his earlier thoughts on generational confusing, Elsaesser’s essay
moves from the figure of Antigone to that of Hamlet, and further pursues the
family metaphor by way of fathers and sons among historical political figures
(here, Rommel and Schleyer).18
This metaphor is brought to the foreground and developed in Germany in
autumn, and Elsaesser is sensitive to its Oedipal overtones and the exclusionary
consequences these never fail to generate. As indicated earlier, Elsaesser argues
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that the film attempts to Oedipalize the political past, by a “Hamletization” (diag-
onally from father to son) and then argues that the women in the movement
owed to themselves a “[re-]Antigonizing” of Germany’s post-war history. This is
how the two myths inspire a host of analytical moves. But these increasingly
complex plays with family metaphors are also anchored in the domains of experi-
ence where positions can and must be swapped.
First, the distinction between spectator and spectacle nearly collapses when the
machinery of surveillance makes everyone both spectator and spectacle, a theme
Fassbinder elaborates in his section of Germany in Autumn. The use of that
machinery to produce “surveillance effects” in the film turns the director into a
figure of complicity, so that the implication of the viewer can be shown in the
same move as his or her exclusion. Complicity is itself a category of experience
that, when ignored, muddles the political waters while, when acknowledged, can
be politically productive, as it overcomes the illusion of the possibility to step out-
side of ideology. This argument concerning complicity recalls the early cinematic
experiments with “phantom rides” where cameras mounted on the roofs of trains
would produce an automated recording of a journey, so that cinema became in-
evitably entangled in conquest and state control.19
Later, the distinction between life and theater is the domain of migratory con-
ceptualization. Drawing attention, first, to the RAFmembers’ theatricality as well
as their opponents’ behavior, the text recalls the public theatricality of the cultur-
al-historical moment, not only of certain suspense films but also of happenings
and performances, street theater and other forms of behavior that suspend the
firm distinction between fiction and reality. The analysis of the iconography of
revolution, the media exploitation of images such as a child carriage pushed in
front of Schleyer’s car to force the driver to stop, and the police information and
disinformation all sensitize the reader in a mere page and a half to the dramatic
mise-en-scène that frames the events.20
The importance of this analysis of the artistic aspects of the phenomenon can
be found in a few distinct elements. First, understanding how “art” shapes these
real actions helps us be aware of the pre-programmed nature of response as well.
The earlier connection between genre and state had already made that clear. Sec-
ond, utterances such as citation (of Eisenstein’s 1925 film Battleship Potemp-
kin) and invention (scenes of perverted maternity) to suggest the inhumanness
of the terrorists are speech acts in the true sense, doing things with words (or
images, as the case may be) and hence, at least partly, performatives. This clears
space for an endorsement of the performative effect and solicits reflection on the
desire to believe. Third, the analysis itself becomes a depiction of the stage, its
backdrops, props, and characters, so that we are able to vividly imagine what the
scene of terrorism looked like. This concrete quality of the analysis helps us to
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understand how the migratory movement between the real and the imaginary,
belief and enjoyment, acceptance and doubt is continuously wavering. As a re-
sult, “we” – the readers of this essay, the users of cultural analysis, and the critics
of history – are placed inside the historical “otherness” that is the subject matter
of this essay.
Elsaesser also discusses another instance of aesthetical experience related to
the notion of the performative. Invoking an autobiographical essay on the RAF
by Michael Dreyer, he demonstrates how the RAF was experienced as music:
“For Dreyer, the RAF’s street violence was not only street theatre, it was a kind of
‘music’ (‘no more/mere words’).”21 With music, he draws attention to the non-
signifying aspect of language – its sensate, bodily aspect, which produces what he
calls a “new subjective space.” Dreyer describes the sensations of the rupture of
monotony that the RAF actions caused in children bored by the cocoons of their
nuclear families. In this sense, the rupturing of such monotonies by way of pub-
lic violence becomes a political aesthetization, much like certain kinds of rock
music at the time. Signs without proper meaning, although material, the sounds,
colors, and forms became a forceful “super band” on which street credibility
could be projected as a desirable commodity.
Within this cluster of moves, the migratoriness also plays on the dual level of
conceptualization and critical social analysis when the distinction between poli-
tics and space is set in movement. Here, when discussing public space and the
public sphere, two facets of an entangled whole, the “topography of visual signs”
of an “urban theater in movement,” the essay is couched in a contemporary voca-
bulary of ghettoized suburbs. This brings his text ever so close to my own interest
in contemporary migratory culture, so much so that its formulation strikes me
with a new actuality. Space itself, then, Elsaesser reminds us, becomes a political
category.22
Mediatizations
This leads to the final cluster of moves in this non-exhaustive list. Here, the
moves play out conceptual and social migratory aspects between spatial categories
within the mediatic domain. One concerns a superposition of interiority and exter-
iority, when the city becomes the theater of a concerted invisibility. Surveillance is
an aspect of this superposition, and this is the “natural” environment of the RAF,
and so is hiding (the victim of kidnapping). The distinction that is suspended
here is the one between “natural” and “critical” – between, that is, belonging and
creating an artificial space. When the example of airport security is cited, I cannot
help but think of Marc Augé’s analysis of airports as non-spaces; spaces where
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people neither “live” nor “dwell” but merely pass through; and where the quality
of not-belonging is so predominant that security as an artificially produced non-
habitat overrules the peace of ordinary passers-by.23
In this context, Elsaesser raises the question of the symbolic status of terrorist
acts – of the possibility of speaking of a “language” in this respect. Many of the
moves already mentioned recur here. This additive strategy makes the (non-)con-
cept of terrorism ever denser. At this point, the essay raises what is for me the
most important suspension; and here, the use of quotation marks signals Elsaes-
ser’s hesitance to define and decide, as well as to escape in conceptual finesse.
Recalling the theater, he writes that the “art” of the RAF may very well be of a
different kind, namely “conceptual.” Thus, it becomes an art of the migratory
itself: a form of expression geared toward making visible the most profound,
irreconcilable, aporetic contradictions at the heart of democracy itself. These in-
clude the place of terroristic threat in an over-securitized society, and that of the
invention of the information-saturated world; the role of surveillance in relation
to civil rights and freedom, and the subliminal tension of historical Nachträglich-
keit: “[The RAF] involved in a situation of Nachtraglichkeit, engaged in making up
for something that had been omitted in the past, desirous to assume a role,
across a historical gap, that was marked by shame, guilt, self-hatred.”24 As Elsaes-
ser explains, by making up for what the Nation failed to do during Nazism, the
RAF was not only attacking the State, but also “addressing” it.
On the basis of this conceptual reflection regarding these contradictions, the
position of the contemporary cultural analyst comes into focus. When all is said
and done, “terrorism” must remain undefined so that the concept is able to ab-
sorb historical change, the mode of staying “inside” – inside Germany, inside the
times, then and now, and inside the domain where political and conceptual
thinking must remain bound together. This gives Terrorism, mythes et représenta-
tions the force de frappe it has. This is cultural analysis as it should be: critical with
complicity, historical in the contemporary, and profoundly migratory in mode of
thinking. Terrorism, then, is a concept that can only be productively understood
under conditions of migratory interiority. Only then, I contend, can it be a
“neighbor” à la Dumas: close by and held at bay at the same time.
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The Echo Chamber of History
Frank van Vree
... uns, die wir vorbeisehen an den Dingen neben uns,
und nicht hören, daß der Schrei nicht verstummt.1
Ambiguities
Early in 2001, Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, was al-
most outrun by history. While acting as a witness in a trial against a former
member of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), Hans-Joachim Klein, he was severely
attacked by Bettina Röhl, a journalist and daughter of RAF-leader Ulrike Mein-
hof. Working on a critical biography of the leader of the Grünen party, Röhl
claimed to have discovered some pictures showing Fischer and his radical
friends, among them Hans-Joachim Klein, fighting with the police during a de-
monstration. Although these photographs had been published before by the
Frankfurter Allgemeine in 1973, she sold them as new to the conservative weekly
Stern and the Bild tabloid. It did not work out well. Röhl lost her credibility and
was accused of conducting a crusade against Fischer out of frustration with her
own troubled past as daughter of a violent revolutionary who had committed sui-
cide.
In the midst of this commotion a film was released that dealt with this very
subject – being the daughter of violent radicals. Die innere Sicherheit / The
State I Am In (2000) by the young film director Christian Petzold tells the story
of a girl’s coming of age while being on the run with her family. Her parents,
members of a non-specified terrorist organization, had escaped to Portugal but
are forced to return to Germany many years later. The State I Am In aroused
few political debates, which is quite remarkable when one compares it to other
events related to the memory of left-wing violence such as the fierce debates con-
cerning, for instance, the legitimacy of the exhibition Regarding Terror at the In-
stitute for Contemporary Art in Berlin in 2005 and the pardoning and release in
2007 of former RAFmembers from prison.
According to Thomas Elsaesser, the story of the RAF is a Vexierbild of the (med-
ia) history of the former West German Bundesrepublik: a puzzling picture in
which one might alternately and unexpectedly see various images.2 Although the
violent revolutionary movement had entirely lost its political significance and had
become part of the German past, memories of the RAF never disappeared, in
fact, its name has continued to roam around like a ghost, “wie ein Gespenst.”3 The
story entered a new phase just before the turn of the century, the upbeat of which
took place even before April 20, 1998 – Adolf Hitler’s birthday – when an eight-
page typewritten letter landed on the desk of the Reuters news agency, signed
“RAF” with the machine-gun red star, declaring that the group had voluntarily
dissolved, ending its “project of liberation” through urban guerrilla warfare. A
few months earlier, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) had screened the prize-
winning docudrama Todesspiel / Death Game (1997), a miniseries by Heinrich
Breloer dealing with the bloody events that had taken place two decades earlier
during the “German Autumn,” but this time from the perspective of the victim
and the authorities.4 Thomas Elsaesser has analyzed this shift in perspective
from sympathy for the RAF in his analysis of Deutschland im Herbst / Ger-
many in Autumn (Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Volker Schlöndorff, et al., 1978)
and Death Game.5
Death Game marked a new beginning of a “history returning as art,” with a
prominent role for the cinema. The memory of the RAF became fiktionstauglich,
“fit to be fictionalized,” as Petzold aptly put it.6 Volker Schlöndorff – who had
already been working on the issue while being in the middle of it, producing two
important films, Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum / The Lost Honor
of Katharina Blum (1975) and Germany in Autumn – took up the thread in
1999, directing Die Stille nach dem Schuß / The Legend of Rita. The film,
partly based on the life of RAFmember Inge Viett, portrays the vanity of left-wing
and violent radicalism as well as the failings of the DDR (GDR, German Demo-
cratic Republic). The Legend of Rita tells the story of Rita Vogt, a member of an
unnamed terrorist group who manages to escape after a bank robbery and some
shooting incidents to settle down in East Germany with a new identity provided
by the secret police, the Stasi. Through the eyes of Vogt’s “real existing social-
ism,” though not completely depicted in black and white, appears a society ruled
by indifference, conformism, and an all-pervading stagnation, while she herself
lives in constant fear that her cover will be blown – which happens, eventually,
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, when she is mortally wounded trying to escape at
a checkpoint.
While The Legend of Rita evoked critical and even sharp responses – some
critics accused Schlöndorff of portraying East Germany and its secret police too
positively, whereas others complained that he was too harsh or, on the contrary,
too gentle in his judgment of the RAF7 – The State I Am In, released only one
year later, as mentioned earlier, aroused very little political discussion. Petzold
takes a considerably different stand than Schlöndorff does. The State I Am In
chooses the perspective of a fifteen-year-old girl discovering the world and find-
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ing her own way, after a childhood with her parents, living underground, in exile
among anonymous tourists on the Portuguese coast, conscientiously avoiding
behavior that could lead to her being caught. This lifestyle has dramatic effects
on the family with the parents vaguely maintaining their old beliefs but living
with their back to the world. Meanwhile, Jeanne, their daughter, is cut off from a
normal social life at school with her peers. The situation changes dramatically
when a small oversight forces them to change their plans, and they have to return
to Germany instead of emigrating to Brazil to start a new life. On the run again,
hiding in Hamburg, Jeanne starts to make her own way, to discover the world
and to establish her own “inner certainty.” She falls in love, a forbidden love with
Heinrich who she had met earlier in Portugal and to whom she decided to be
honest: she tells him about her parents’ illegal activities. This turns out to be a
sincere and fatal moment for the family.
The State I Am In aims at a more universal reading, not only through its very
theme but also by deliberately avoiding political issues and historical clues, a
choice that was partly forced upon Petzold by the broadcasting companies as he
himself admitted. Nevertheless, the film was generally understood as related to
the history of the RAF.8 The viewer really didn’t need to know anything about the
historical background or the key source of Petzold and his co-author Harun Far-
ocki – namely texts written by RAF member Wolfgang Grams, who was shot in
1993 – he could not have missed this interpretation. Critics went on at length
about the issue and some insiders noticed more details that pointed to the RAF,
in the mise-en-scène as well as some scenes.9 The way Petzold revealed the gun
of the father in his Portuguese hotel room, for instance, was inspired by pictures
of the gun that Andreas Baader used to commit suicide. And when the family
secretly meets an old acquaintance, they use an old RAF symbol, Herman Mel-
ville’s novel Moby Dick, the story of the heroic hunters chasing the white whale
with whom the RAF identified and whose names they adopted – tailing their own
whale as a metaphor for the State.10
Avoiding historical references and focusing on the private side of life, particu-
larly of Jeanne, a teenager in search of her stolen youth, The State I Am In finds
itself stuck in ambiguity. In that respect, the film illustrates the idea of the Ger-
man (film) history as a Vexierbild perfectly with the film alternately denying and
confirming, according to one’s point of view, the presence of this history of vio-
lence, fear, and sorrow. Although it is obvious that the film could not have been
made – or even screened – without these actual events, it appears to attempt to
escape from the past and the memories, leaving many urgent questions unan-
swered.
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The same deliberate ambiguity is encountered in the scene in which Jeanne, after
having stolen some CDs, is seen roaming around Hamburg-Bergedorf, when
suddenly she finds herself in a classroom. Having asked a girl standing in front
of a school for a cigarette, she is taken along into the building and for the first
time in her life Jeanne enters a classroom, where a documentary on concentra-
tion camps is being shown. Initially, we hear only the music and the voice-over of
a commentator, while the camera observes the young spectators in the classroom,
for a few seconds, before switching to the screen. We see the end of the film
through Jeanne’s eyes: an open green field, some scattered bushes, and in the
background, some barracks, while the camera dwells for a moment on a broken
staircase, then a second sequence showing the remains of a concrete building,
followed by pictures of another ruin, shot from the side and below in a long
sequence, culminating in rather abstract images. The scene – in total, a little less
than ninety seconds – has a quiet ambience, a feeling that is reinforced by the
rather melodious music.
The voice-over, however, leaves no doubt about what we are viewing: the rem-
nants of a site of horror, grass growing at the Appelplatz and around the blocks,
“like an abandoned village, still full of menace.”11 The pile of concrete is the cre-
matorium, a landscape haunted by millions of dead victims. And while another
ruined building appears, the voice-over tells:
Who among us is standing watch and warns us when the new executioners come?
Do they really have a face different from ours? … And there is us, who, when looking
at this rubble, sincerely believe that the racial mania is forever buried underneath
there, us who see this image vanishing and act as if we were creating a new hope, as
if we really believed that all that belongs to one time and one country, us, who look
past the things next to us and don’t listen that the scream is not silenced. 12
At the ending of this film, Alain Resnais’s Nuit et Brouillard / Night and Fog
(1956), the teacher, obviously the same age as Jeanne’s parents, wants to know
her name and warns her that he is going to have to talk to her parents, only to
burst into complaints about students not attending his classes (except when he
shows films) and never learning anything from their history books. And then he
asks Jeanne to tell him something about the film: “Was it a color film? Was it a
sound film?” Jeanne leaves the class.
The screening of the film is the most explicit reference in The State I Am In
to the history of the representation of left-wing German terrorism. It is “eine
Szene … die eine Art Archäologie des Terrorismus enthält”13– a kind of archaeology –
although of a peculiar kind. The scene refers directly to Die Bleierne Zeit /
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German Sisters, Margarethe von Trotta’s prizewinning 1981 film, which is
loosely based on the life of Gudrun Ensslin, one of the founders of the RAF, and
her sister Christiane, a feminist journalist. The film parallels the real lives of the
Ensslin sisters, from the rise of the Baader-Meinhof Group through to the suicide
of Gudrun Ensslin in the Stammheim prison in 1977. It avoids any reference to
specific historical facts, however, choosing instead to dramatize the relationship
of the two sisters and their everyday lives.
In a flashback to their youth, halfway through the film, the spectator sees two
adolescent girls, Juliane and Marianne, in a setting that resembles The State I
Am In, watching the German version of the same documentary, Night and Fog.
The sisters, who appear to be quite close, are the children of a decent protestant
family, born in the last years of the war, who grow up in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Juliane, who is the main protagonist of the film who remembers, is also
clearly the rebel in the family, provoking her strict father and her teachers with
her choice of clothes, her behavior, and her attitude. She reads Sartre and prefers
Celan and Brecht over Rilke, whose poems she ostentatiously denounces as
kitsch.14 The younger sister, on the other hand, is more quiet and obedient, a
daddy’s girl, at least until that moment, as the film suggests, because seeing
Night and Fog becomes a turning point in Marianne’s life. To the question of
how this soft-hearted and idealistic girl became radicalized to the point of decid-
ing to join a terrorist organization, the film offers just two closely connected
clues: the screening of Night and Fog and some news footage of Vietnam, with
shocking images of napalm bombings and dying children, people in despair, and
destroyed villages.
The excerpt from Night and Fog in Von Trotta’s film is more than just a
quote: it lasts for more than three-and-a-half minutes, at least as far as the film’s
sound is concerned, since the camera turns away several times to the audience
and the two sisters in particular. Moreover, the sequence is relatively long consid-
ering the total length of Resnais’s documentary (32 minutes). The scene begins
with an overview of the concentration camps, mentioning their immense size
and their exploitation by large German industrial companies. What follows are
horrible images of corpses, skulls, emaciated people with terrified eyes, a bulldo-
zer ruthlessly shoving piles of bodies into a mass grave, SS guards, women and
men taken prisoner – a sequence that leads to images of Nazi defendants on trial:
I am not responsible, says the kapo
[“Ich bin nicht schuld” in Celan’s translation15]
I am not responsible, says the officer
I am not responsible
Who is responsible, then?
[Wer also ist schuld?]
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Piles of corpses again, jumbles of naked, emaciated, mutilated human bodies.
As I talk to you the water soaks into the death chambers
Water of marsh and ruins
It is cold and turbid as our bad memory
“The war only slumbers” – and at this point, we reach the same scene Petzold
cited in his film: the remnants of the site of horror, the green grass of the Appel-
platz, the ruins, with the voice-over reading:
Who of us is standing watch …
[Wer von uns wacht hier …]
Right at this point, in the middle of that sentence, the commentary and the music
of Night and Fog cease, while the image of Marianne’s face in front of her sister
in the prison meeting room appears. But even before that moment we, the view-
ers of German Sisters, have already left Night and Fog behind as we only
heard the last part of the commentary and the music since Marianne, deeply nau-
seated, escaped to the bathroom at the moment when the voice-over refers to “the
water cold and turbid as our bad memory,” and is followed by her sister Juliane.
While we observe the two girls in the bathroom, we hear the final quote “Wer von
uns wacht hier…”
Situating the screening of Night and Fog in the heart of the story, German
Sisters links the origins of left-wing terrorism directly to a deeply felt guilt and
shame about the Nazi past, coupled with a serious vow to never make the same
mistake again: “Who of us is standing watch” – in the case of Vietnam, for in-
stance, as the second screening within the film makes clear. In this respect, Von
Trotta, with her preference for personalizing conflicts, definitely went beyond “a
reduction of the political and social to psychological categories,” for which Elsaes-
ser and others have criticized her work.16 German Sisters stresses the notion of
the inescapable bearing that the past has on us as much as the idea of repression
of memories, lasting from the 1950s till the days of the German Autumn.17 It
even derives its German title from this silence – these were “the leaden years”
(die bleierne Zeit – a phrase borrowed from a Hölderlin poem), when the children
grew up fully aware of Germany’s immense guilt, as this scene illustrates. When
Night and Fog is shown, Marianne and Juliane’s father, Pastor Klein, is stand-
ing behind the projector, watching his daughters, but he is obviously unable to
talk about the events portrayed.18 He does not associate the recent past to his own
rather dictatorial behavior toward his children. He is in the same situation of
“leaden” silence as Juliane’s teacher was, sending her out of the classroom when
she ostentatiously demands to read Paul Celan’s “Todesfuge” and Bertolt Brecht’s
“Ballade von der Judenhure Marie Sanders,” a poem that criticizes the Nurem-
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berg Laws (for which Hanns Eisler, the composer of Night and Fog, also wrote
the music). From this perspective, terrorism might seem to be – in the words of
Paul Coates – “a cry in the echo chamber of the Nazi past.”19
At this point, we can return to the episode in The State I Am In where Night
and Fog was screened. What at first sight seemed to be a casual though deliber-
ate reference to an earlier film on terrorism – ‘eine Art Archäologie des Terrorismus’
– turns out to be its opposite. The State I Am In takes up Resnais’s documentary
at the very moment that Juliane in Trotta’s film flees the room, because she can-
not bear the images any more. In contrast to German Sisters, the sequences in
Petzold’s film do not contain any shocking images but only the long tracking
shots searching the landscape for ruins and barracks. Through Jeanne’s eyes we
perceive the most aesthetic and abstract parts of the documentary, a choice that
seems to underscore Petzold’s refusal to consider the historical source of radical-
ism20 and to relate various historical events.21 It even opens up the way for a
more malicious interpretation, suggesting that the new executioners we need to
be warned about, according to Night and Fog – “Who of us is standing watch
when the new executioners come” – are the radical left itself.
Indigestible Images
While the spectators of The State I Am In are prevented from seeing the horri-
ble scenes in Night and Fog, viewers of Von Trotta’s film have no choice but to
watch these images, through the eyes of the two sisters and the other youngsters
in the late 1950s. Times, however, had changed between these years and the re-
lease of German Sisters in 1981. From the 1960s on, the Nazi policy of destruc-
tion and annihilation had begun to move toward the center of the prevailing com-
memoration culture, a process that was broadened and accelerated by the
broadcast of the American docu-drama Holocaust (Marvin J. Chomsky, 1978),
televised in Germany in early 1979, an event that was breathlessly followed by the
rest of the world.22
A year earlier in 1978, German television broadcast Night and Fog. By that
time, however, the documentary had become part of the collective memory of a
whole generation. Following the well-known incident at the Cannes Festival in
April 1956, when the film was withdrawn due to German diplomatic pressure, it
was widely screened in schools, youth clubs, parish halls, police stations, and at
union meetings, particularly in the northern states of Germany.23 The scene in
German Sisters may thus be considered to be illustrative of the experience of
those growing up in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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At first sight, the wide distribution of Resnais’s film would appear to contradict
the generally accepted view that, during these “leaden years,” Germany – in the
words of Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich – was “unable to mourn.”24 It
should be understood, however, that the Mitscherlichs were criticizing the wide-
spread attitude of sheer materialism and indifference, on a political as well as a
personal level, of the German people. They criticized the prevailing tendency to
deny collective and personal guilt, to acknowledge the losses, including the loss
of millions of killed Jews, and to refuse “remembering, repeating and working-
through,” which was needed in order to be healed, according to Freud.25
But there were, of course, also people who seriously promoted a policy of active
denazification and the reinforcement of democratic and humanist values.26 It
was these circles who urged the prompt release of Night and Fog in Germany.
The Berlin Senate took the initiative to have it screened at the Berlinale in early
July 1955. Upon this occasion, the president of the Berlin House of Representa-
tives, Willy Brandt, denounced a diplomatic move of the government to ban the
movie and argued that Germans “should not forget, to have other people forget
what has been brought upon them.”27 The German version of the film used a
delicate translation and recording of the voice-over text by the young acclaimed
poet Paul Celan and was released in early 1957. However, the original French
version had already been shown in Germany before then. There were approxi-
mately two hundred copies of Night and Fog, almost all 16mm and in black
and white, available for rental from various government agencies. There is no
doubt that these copies circulated widely, particularly in Germany’s northern
states, where the film was screened in the upper classes of the secondary schools
through to late in the 1960s.28
Therefore, the key scene in German Sisters may have caused a shock of re-
cognition among German viewers of Marianne and Juliane’s generation – includ-
ing their physical reaction to the pictures of the anus mundi Resnais portrayed: the
images were literally indigestible, revolting and sickening and eventually forced
Marianne to leave the room. The German writer Anne Duden (born 1942) con-
siders the film to be the beginning of a trauma and a turning point in her life.
She watched Night and Fog when she was thirteen years old: “I saw how the
piles of corpses in Bergen-Belsen were shoveled away. We were forced to watch
the film at school, but nothing was explained.” There were rumors, according to
Duden, about concentration camps and gassing, and suddenly they saw these
horrible images – she would never be able to put them out of her mind.29 This is
also true of subsequent generations: when Christiane Peitz (born 1959), a critic at
the Tageszeitung newspaper, interviewed Petzold (born 1960), they discussed
their shared experience of watching Night and Fog as sixteen-year-olds: “we
were traumatized for weeks.”30
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The obligation to watch these horrors of the past on the screen, to which Anne
Duden and others including Von Trotta refer, was no invention of German anti-
Nazi pedagogues of the 1950s and 1960s. Forcing people to watch was an essen-
tial element in the educational strategy of the Allies during the early postwar
years.31 The inhabitants of Weimar were summoned by a US General and forced
to view Buchenwald first hand immediately after its liberation – and they did so,
thousands of them, in a long row, often dressed in their Sunday best. The same
occurred elsewhere as well. Short documentaries, produced by the Allies, known
in Germany as Anklagefilme (“accusation films”), such as Die Todesmühlen /
Death Mills (Hanus Burger, 1945) – which includes scenes of the Weimar peo-
ple visiting Buchenwald32 – and Deutschland Erwache / Germany Awake (US
Army Signal Corps, 1945)33 were screened all over Germany. These measures
were taken by the Allies to convince the German population that these crimes
had actually occurred. This is also why the trials at the International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg were broadcast on the radio and published in the press. This
was certainly not an unnecessary measure, considering the fact that two years
after the war about half of the German population still believed “that National
Socialism had been a good idea badly carried out,” while less than one-third
viewed it as a “bad idea.”34
The screenings of Night and Fog in the 1950s and 1960s strongly resembles
the forced visits to the concentration camps and the screening of documentaries
such as Death Mills directly after the war.35 First of all, the viewers were, in part,
shown identical images, since Resnais used many scenes, particularly the most
terrifying ones, from the Allied documentaries mentioned above. Secondly, one
might argue that the postwar generation, being forced to watch the documentary,
underwent a traumatic experience comparable to that of their parents. This is
even documented because Death Mills contains some scenes in which people
literally turn their heads away, unable to view the dead and mutilated bodies right
at their feet; many held handkerchiefs over their mouths, to minimize the effects
of the stench – which is not unlike Juliane’s gesture in German Sisters when
she leaves the screening because she is nauseated. The horrible scenes of
corpses, skulls, emaciated people with terrified eyes, a bulldozer shoving piles of
bodies into a mass grave, jumbles of naked, emaciated, mutilated human bodies
at the gates of the liberated camps, screened in cinemas in the two or three years
immediately after the war, and then incorporated again into Resnais’s documen-
tary and then quoted again two or three decades later – these images did not only
arouse feelings of anxiety and horror but were actually indigestible and unbearable.
This may have been why these films have largely disappeared from the public
domain. It is true that these and other documentaries can be found online at the
Steven Spielberg Film and Video Archive Collection at the Holocaust Memorial Mu-
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seum in Washington DC and even on YouTube, but they are seldom shown to the
general public anymore, and similar photographs are sparingly used in books,
magazines, and newspapers, even in studies about the death camps.
In contemporary art, a variety of strategies are exploited to keep the memory of
the horrors of annihilation and destruction alive without explicitly exposing these
images – strategies that aim to preserve the overwhelming and petrifying quali-
ties of the original images. As places of memory, however, these works of art –
fictional films, novels, documentaries, exhibitions, monuments – and the indi-
gestible footage are interdependent, as Adolphe Nysenholc has argued in relation
to Lanzmann’s criticism of Night and Fog and his plea for withholding these
images of destruction.36 Because in the end, the screening of this footage in our
imagination is a prerequisite for these works of art to be effective. However, one
may wonder whether younger generations, who may not be aware of the exis-
tence of these images, will have the same experience. If not, then these images
may very easily end up fading into oblivion.
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Displacing the Colonial Archive
How Fiona Tan Shows Us “Things We Don’t Know We Know”
Julia Noordegraaf
Emotions, one could argue, ought to belong to any engagement with matters of life
and death on the part of both those whom history has given the role of spectators and
those who are charged with passing on compassion and preserving memory.1
In recent years, the archive has become a major trope in the humanities. Ar-
chives are no longer simply neutral bodies aimed at collecting, ordering, and
storing our documentary heritage, they are now viewed more as cultural artifacts
that actively shape the nature of that heritage and its use. From sites of knowl-
edge retrieval, archives have come to be seen as sites of knowledge production.2
The documents that archives hold – as those that have been lost or neglected –
form the basis for the way we remember the past and thus play a crucial role in
the formation of individual and collective identity.3 In this sense, the archive ac-
tively shapes the way we see ourselves and how we situate ourselves between
past, present, and future. As art historian and critic Hal Foster has pointed out,
contemporary artists also have shown a renewed interest in the archive as a
source and topic for their work.4 For these artists, the archive serves as a site for
developing alternative memories or reconstructing forgotten pasts. They achieve
this by elaborating on the found image, object, and text and presenting them in a
new form.
In this article, I discuss the reuse of colonial and ethnographic footage from
the Dutch East-Indies (present-day Indonesia) in the film and video installations
Smoke Screen (1997) and Facing Forward (1999) by Amsterdam-based visual
artist Fiona Tan (Indonesia, 1966). The analysis of these two cases aims to inves-
tigate how the works situate viewers towards the archival footage and the people
and pasts it documents. In doing so, I depart from Thomas Elsaesser’s analysis of
“subject positions” and “speaking positions” as articulated in his work on post-
Second World War representations of the Holocaust and fascism in film.5 I ana-
lyze the installations with respect to the subject positions they create, and the
speaking positions from which they articulate their perspective on the Dutch co-
lonial past. Tan’s treatment of the colonial footage results in a deconstruction of
the unified subject positions assumed in the original films. I argue that her work
implicates the spectator in the very construction of the subject positions vis-à-vis
the archival footage, eventually with the purpose of establishing an affective rela-
tion with the footage and the people it documents. Tan’s work thus transforms
the subject position into a speaking position, where the spectator becomes the co-
creator of the work. In this sense, the analysis of the two cases aims to demon-
strate how the reuse of archival footage in film and video installations can offer a
different perspective on the dynamics of subject positions and speaking positions
in relation to audiovisual media.
Editing as a Window Cleaner
Fiona Tan was born in Indonesia in 1966 to a Chinese-Indonesian father and an
Australian mother. She was raised in Australia, left for Amsterdam when she was
eighteen and has been living and working there ever since. In her work – mostly
film and video installations – identity is a central theme, especially as defined in
relation to time and place. Tan often works with “found footage” that she com-
bines into compilation films that are usually presented as film or video projec-
tions in the gallery space.6 Since compilation films use archival material not as
illustrations of real events but as images that draw attention to the constructed
nature of media productions, these films have the potential to critique, challenge,
and possibly also subvert the power of cinematic representation.7 As Tan puts it:
“The recycling of film fragments or photos breathes new life into the images;
they are liberated from the harness of their original context. Recycling makes it
possible to see images in a new way. Recycling creates new images. Editing as a
window cleaner.”8
With this particular interest in working with existing footage, Tan can be con-
sidered an artist working from what Foster has termed “an archival impulse.” In
his discussion of Thomas Hirschhorn, Tacita Dean, and Sam Durant as exem-
plars of artists working from this archival impulse, Foster indicates that these
artists present their archival materials “as active, even unstable – open to eruptive
returns and entropic collapses, stylistic repackagings and critical revisions.”9 The
aim of these works is to “fashion distracted viewers into engaged discussants.”10
Artists do so by elaborating on the images, objects, and texts and presenting
them in a new order that deliberately avoids the taxonomies of the “official” ar-
chive. Tan’s film installation Smoke Screen illustrates how the displacement of
archival footage from the archive to the gallery can be a means to critically engage
viewers with the images and the history they represent.
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Deconstructing Colonial Subject Positions
In 1926, the Dutch cameraman Iep Ochse recorded a fascinating scene on the
island of Bali, Indonesia: three toddlers cheerfully smoking a cigarette. The brief
shot – it lasts eleven seconds – shows three naked children that fill the frame;
they are seated facing the camera, the youngest sitting on the eldest boy’s lap.
The latter vigorously inhales and exhales, creating a cloud of smoke that fills the
screen. He then passes on the cigarette to the boy to his right and lovingly
grooms the lock of hair of the youngest child.
This shot was first used in a film made by the Dutch newsreel production
company Polygoon (Naar Tropisch Nederland / A Trip to the Tropical
Netherlands, 1926) that offered a portrait of the Dutch colony in the form of a
boat trip from the Netherlands to Batavia (present-day Jakarta), visiting various
parts of the archipelago along the way. The original film is lost, but in the 1940
remake Tropisch Nederland / The Tropical Netherlands the scene is ac-
companied by a voice-over that says, “These babies take advantage of the fact that
mother went shopping.”11 The scene is thus explained as an example of innocent,
naughty behavior that occurs when mothers leave their children unattended.
The Tropical Netherlands clearly refers to Indonesia from the position of
the colonizer. The footage was shot by a Dutch cameraman who regarded the
Indonesian customs and traditions with interest and affect but was by definition
bound to his outsider perspective.12 Moreover, the film was commissioned by a
Dutch company for the Dutch market. It propagates life and work in the colony
by alternating scenes of the benefits of colonization – in particular in the field of
education and health care – with scenes that emphasize the exoticism of the In-
donesian landscapes, people, and local customs, such as the shot of the smoking
children, which is edited in between shots of Balinese men and women in a kam-
pong and of a baby rocking in a so-called slendang, a baby carrier made of tradi-
tionally dyed cloth.13 This exoticism emphasizes the difference between, on the
one hand, the indigenous population and, on the other, the Europeans who live
and work there, like the ones who live in the “motherland.” The boat trip itself
mimics the “discovery” of Indonesia by the Dutch and the visits to the various
islands during its subsequent colonization. In that sense, the spectator of this
film is witnessing the creation of a colonial empire. The film thus constructs a
unified subject position of the inhabitant of the Netherlands as part of a blossom-
ing, colonial nation, where the differences between “East” and “West” remain
clearly delineated.
In her film installation Smoke Screen,Tan deconstructs this unifying, colonial
subject position. She edited the shot in a short compilation film that is supposed
to be played in a continuous loop. In the beginning, her film uses the traditional
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documentary format: we see the shot, followed by a title card that explains the
place and estimated date of the recording: “Indonesia, maybe 1930.” The second
title card repeats the 1940s reading of the shot: babies taking advantage of the
fact that mother went shopping. After that, however, the film becomes more am-
biguous. Again we see the toddlers, now followed by the enigmatic title card
“Boys will be men.” This text seems to suggest that smoking is part of a ritual
marking the transition from childhood to manhood, and invites reflections on
the fact that these children have since grown up to be men. The following title
card offers yet another perspective on the material: “With my own eyes.” Whose
eyes have actually witnessed this scene? From the first title card we know that the
shot is archival footage, so the scene cannot have been witnessed by the artist
herself. But then who did see and record it? Or does the text perhaps refer to the
viewer, who is confronted by the filmic documentation of the scene and thus sees
it “with her own eyes?” Finally, the film shows the artist herself, with a toy cam-
era held before her right eye. She seems to be reenacting the recording of the
original situation with a toy camera: we are now watching the artist mimicking
the cameraman who filmed these three Indonesian children.
Then the film starts over again, and by now the viewer knows that the texts and
images are highly ambiguous. The contrast between the old, archival footage and
the new, self-reflexive texts and images invites the viewer to adopt a more distant
standpoint. The relation between the camera, the people filmed, the artist, and
the viewer is being questioned from this standpoint. Who are these children?
Where does the footage come from? To what extent was it staged? What has be-
come of these kids? But also: Why are we looking at it now? How do we relate to
these images of colonial Indonesia?
Shared Speaking Positions in the Gallery Space
Obviously, the speaking position in Tan’s piece is entirely different from that of
the original film. Being herself of Chinese-Indonesian-Australian descent, and
having lived in Europe for most of her life, Tan speaks from the position of the
migrant.14 Moreover, she is speaking from the position of the artist, who takes
the freedom to rearrange images and texts in a form that deliberately avoids a
unified perspective on the archival material, and that underscores her personal
involvement in the interpretation of it. As literary scholar Ernst van Alphen states
with regards to another of Tan’s works, Linnaeus’ Flower Clock (1998): “This
striking juxtaposition of obviously old and new footage emphasizes Tan’s act of
placing herself in the image. Like Alice in Wonderland she has found access to
an imaginary world. She appropriates the old images into her present.”15 The
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insert of the shot of the artist with a toy camera in Smoke Screen similarly
serves to underline the artist’s contemporary, subjective perspective on the foo-
tage of the toddlers.
In addition, the shot of the artist directs the viewer’s attention to the con-
structed nature of Tan’s film and of cinematic representations in general, as to
the viewer’s active role in making sense of the images. When looking at the artist
“looking” at the shot of the three Balinese children, the viewer begins to question
his or her own relation to the material, and to the conditions in which it was
originally shot: “Tan’s videos and films all reflect on how the medium functions
as an agent that creates specific relationships between the viewer and the im-
age.”16 The work thus creates an unstable subject position from which the viewer
is invited to actively participate in the artist’s montage in order to make sense of
the images. In this sense, Tan invites the spectator to join her at the speaking
position of the artist.
The fact that Tan’s works are usually presented as film or video projections in
the gallery space further underlines the active role of the viewer in the interpreta-
tion of the archival material. Contrary to cinematic spectatorship, where viewers
are more or less required to sit still and watch the film as it unfolds over time, in
the gallery space both the images and the spectator are mobile. German thinker
Boris Groys explains that “a video or movie installation in a museum neutralizes
the ban of motion that determines the viewing of these pictures in a movie sys-
tem. Pictures and spectators are allowed to move at the same time.”17 Conse-
quently, compared to the cinema spectator, the viewer of film and video installa-
tions in the gallery switches “from a passive position to a more interactive one,
from an observer separate from the apparatus to a participant.”18 According to
film scholar Raymond Bellour, installations guide the viewer towards the com-
posing and recomposing of the images and words being presented.19 In the
space of the gallery, then, the physical displacement of the viewer is required to
make sense of the work.20
Tan’s video installation Tuareg (1999) is a case in point. This work is based on
a black-and-white shot of a group of twelve Tuareg children posing in front of a
tent, which is supposed to be projected on a transparent screen that divides two
separate rooms. In that way, the viewer can literally approach the same image
from two sides: on the one side you see the image as it is, on the other side of
the screen it is reversed. There is a different soundtrack for each side – on the
one side, we hear the sounds of birds, flies, and the chatter of children; on the
other, the more ominous sound of a howling wind – which emphasizes the
changing perspective of the image by the viewer’s physical displacement in
space.
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Facing Forward with Found Footage: Showing “Things We Don’t
Know We Know”
The displacement of the viewer in the gallery space parallels the physical displa-
cement of the footage, from the geographical location where it was shot, to the
original film, to the archive, and then to the gallery space. This displacement in
space also entails a displacement in time: from the moment of recording and
editing to the inclusion and storage in the archive and the subsequent appropria-
tion of the material in the artist’s and viewer’s presence. One of the attractions of
working with archival material is that it presents the opportunity to investigate
the relevance of past events for our present and future. As Foster indicates, the
archival elements reused in contemporary visual art works serve as “found arks
of lost moments in which the here-and-now of the work serves as a possible por-
tal between an unfinished past and a reopened future.”21 This connection be-
tween past, present, and future is achieved through “affective association.”22 In
that sense, archival art works refer to the past in a way similar to how memory
works: images of past people, places, and events are combined and recombined
in constantly changing constellations. As a consequence, our interpretation of the
objects and events from the past is constantly changing as well; each time we
approach them from a different perspective.
The re-presentation of history as memory is certainly not limited to art works.
Elsaesser argues that the traditional conception of history is presently in crisis, in
large part because it has become a past that cinema and television “can ‘master’
for us by digitally remastering archival material.” The effect of this constant re-
presentation of the past in the form of its audiovisual documentation is that “the
line where memory passes into history has becomes [sic] uncertain, and … the
divide is being crossed and recrossed in either direction.”23 He argues that the
process of making sense of the past has become a therapeutic activity, where
developing a unified story about the past has been replaced by “acts of re-telling,
re-membering, and repeating,” acts that point towards obsession, fantasy, and
trauma.24 Elsewhere, Elsaesser describes the traumatic dimension of our con-
temporary engagement with the past as “the things we don’t know we know.”25
This category hints at
a version of the past and our knowledge of it, which includes forgetting, repressing,
and disavowal, that is, aspects of the workings of an unconscious, or of a knowledge
of which the individual is not in control, where language and memory speak to us,
where the discourse determines the subject, and where there is acknowledgment of
the discontinuous, shock-like de-contextualizing and re-contextualizing power of
both memory and amnesia.26
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It is precisely this traumatic aspect of colonial history that Tan addresses in her
work. In re-presenting and re-contextualizing filmic documents that remind us
of the exploitation of the indigenous population in the former Dutch colony, she
makes us face a history that we would rather forget – she reminds us of “what we
don’t know we know.” And the preoccupation of the Dutch with their colonial
past in Indonesia – and by extension, that of all Western nations and their colo-
nial pasts – certainly is of a traumatic nature. As historian Frank van Vree has
pointed out, the culture of memory in the Netherlands has been dominated by
romantic constructions of colonial history. Even the more critical documentaries
and fiction films display a sense of nostalgia for this “lost paradise” or tend to
portray the colonizers as victims (in particular of the Japanese occupation of In-
donesia during World War II).27
Tan’s video installation Facing Forward addresses this current preoccupation
with history as (traumatic) memory by showing how the past is always present in
our audiovisual memory of it. For this work, she chose ethnographic footage
from the collection of the Netherlands Filmmuseum and edited it into an eleven-
minute film that is usually projected onto a gallery wall. The film opens with a
black-and-white shot of a large group of non-western (Indonesian?) men who
face the camera as if they were having their portrait taken. In the middle, three
white men (missionaries?) are seated, flanked by other white men in army uni-
forms and leisure wear. This shot is followed by other shots of (Indonesian) men
and women staring silently into the camera. This scenario is repeated throughout
the rest of the film. We see different shots of people from various parts of the
world who appear to be coerced into posing before the camera. This impression
is reinforced by the inclusion of shots of a white man operating a film camera
who is wearing a headband decorated with four feathers. A shot of two African
women wearing face masks epitomizes the contrived nature of the footage: wo-
men who do not want their faces to be seen are being forced to “face forward.”
The work stimulates a reflection on the relation between past and present by
way of a voice-over that narrates parts of the hypothetical conversations between
the traveler Marco Polo and the emperor Kublai Khan from Italo Calvino’s book
Invisible Cities – a text about traveling through time and space.28 In the beginning
of the film, the voice-over cites Marco Polo, who explains to Kublai Khan “that
what he sought was always something lying ahead, even if it was a matter of the
past. Arriving at each new city, the traveler finds again a past of his that he did not
know he had: the foreignness of what you no longer are or no longer possess lies
in wait for you in foreign, unpossessed places.”29 The film ends with the com-
ment that “By now, from that real or hypothetical past of his, Marco is excluded;
he cannot stop; he must go on to another city, where another of his pasts awaits
him, or something perhaps that had been a possible future of his and is now
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someone else’s present.” In Marco Polo’s view, the past, present, and future no
longer form a linear continuity; in fact, the past can only be reached in the pres-
ent or the future.30 There is a conflation between places from the past and places
in the present; in each new city, he finds a past he “did not know he knew.”
Marco Polo’s reflection on his travels can be seen as metaphoric for the displa-
cement of the footage from the archive to Tan’s video installation. Tan uses archi-
val material from other times and places in order to stimulate critical reflection
on the viewer’s contemporary perspective of the past, and its relevance for his or
her future. In that sense, Facing Forward demonstrates how “relating to the
past as well as to distance is always a matter of alterity (times as well as spaces
are different) and a matter of identity (the past, the distance as such, being part of
our present culture).”31
As in Smoke Screen, the repetition of shots and the use of self-reflexive texts
and images here prevent the formation of a stable, coherent subject position. Be-
sides, the almost exclusive use of medium-shots and close-ups of people staring
into the camera, such as the inclusion of the shot of the white cameraman with
his ridiculous feather headband, instigate a play of gazes, where the positions of
the subject observed and the observing subject are eventually reversed. This radi-
cal destabilization of the position of the viewing subject opens a space for enga-
ging with the otherness of colonialism. As Elsaesser states: “fracturing the view-
ers’ identity is the very condition that makes the radical otherness of an extreme
historical experience representable.”32 In that sense, Tan’s installations address
“the affect of concern,” a concept that indicates “recognizing oneself to be emo-
tionally called upon to respond, act, react.” As such, they try “to convey subject
positions that … touch a point where the self itself knows and can experience
otherness.”33 The purpose of Tan’s works in the end is “to make one see things
which are not on screen and listen to voices speaking from within oneself.”34
Conclusion
As I have argued above, the fact that Tan’s film and video installations invite view-
ers to listen to their “inner voices” has consequences for the positions from
which one speaks or is spoken to about the Dutch colonial past. The specific
form in which Tan re-presents colonial footage not only deconstructs the unifying
subject position of the original films, but makes the formation of subject posi-
tions vis-à-vis this material the very center of the work. The fragmented nature of
her compilation films, supported by the viewer’s mobility in the gallery space,
invite spectators to actively construct a perspective on the meaning of those
images. The result is that the artist vacates her speaking position for each indivi-
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dual viewer, who becomes the co-creator of the work. The aim of this move is to
establish “the affect of concern” that urges viewers to investigate the relevance of
the colonial past for their own present and future. In this sense film and video
installations based on archival footage can function as forms of cultural memory
that try to counter the history of the “winners” by “shifting the balance of power
from victors to vanquished, giving voice to the silenced, and admitting mute tes-
timony as evidence.”35
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Found Footage, Performance, Reenactment
A Case for Repetition
Jennifer Steetskamp
... in the paradigm of the event, images, signs and statements contribute to
allowing the world to happen.
– Maurizio Lazzarato, 20031
Almost everyone with even a slight interest in soccer will remember the moment
in the final of the FIFA World Cup in 2006 when France’s star player Zinedine
Zidane gave the Italian player Marco Materazzi his famous headbutt. As such,
the event would have gone relatively unnoticed – bending the rules is somehow
part of the game, and body contact of this kind is fairly common. However, in this
particular situation, the incident turned into what could be called an unpredicted
event, with its reruns in the media becoming unavoidable. Not only did the
images become news, but other television formats, such as sports programs and
talk shows, also evaluated the possible reasons for the action. It was Zinedine
Zidane’s imminent retirement and his third-time election as FIFA World Player
of the Year that made what he did even more incomprehensible. The action was
not a strategic foul that served the team, but seemed to be personally motivated.
The speculation of what words were exchanged between the two players to cause
this confrontation kept the images in the media for a long time. On YouTube and
similar websites, one can still find many fragments, often as a parody of the
broadcast images themselves, replacing the figure of Zidane with a video game
monster or questioning national perspectives on the subject matter.2 There is
even a self-pronounced Zidane World Cup Headbutt Animation Festival online.3
By relating what happened to the types of action found in video or computer
games, these animations address the game-character of soccer and at once indi-
cate that the event-character of the headbutt is preconditioned by the existence of
another type of game entirely dependent on the digital domain, whose rules –
defining what constitutes a permitted action – differs from most processes that
occur on the pitch. In other words: it seems as if this rash, seemingly unpreme-
ditated moment attains its full meaning and determinacy only in a context in
which the media function not only as a catalyst of actions around the world, but
also as a platform on which formerly incommensurable events turn into compre-
hensible information, precisely by producing as many repetitions as permuta-
tions.
At first glance, it seems as if Harun Farocki’s adaptation of the match between
Italy and France in the context of Documenta 12 is perfectly in line with a para-
digm in which the dominance of media representation over other forms of
world-disclosure remains largely unquestioned. It may even appear that with
Deep Play Farocki is carrying this paradigm to an extreme. Whereas the YouTube
iterations of the headbutt point to the way the event surpasses the primary rules
and expectations of the soccer game, exhibiting the degree to which the game is
framed and conditioned by the media, while simultaneously leaving the distinc-
tion between actual game and media representation intact, Farocki’s installation
is apparently an even bolder gesture, seemingly equating game and simulation,
reality and digital media representation, perception and analysis. This happens to
such an extent that not only do they become inseparable, also they are increas-
ingly identical. On twelve plasma screens in the rotunda of the Fridericianum,
television footage of the game and its context was combined with simulations
and analyses of the game, including an animation of Zidane’s headbutt. To do
this, Farocki made use of HALCON machine vision software by a company called
MVTec, a major global player in the area of automated vision (also including face
recognition software frequently employed in the context of surveillance). The
software had been customized by a research group of the Technische Universität
München in order to be applied to match analyses.4 In that way, Farocki not only
shows how “traditional” media like television are irreducibly framing the game,
but also raises the question of how the perception of sports events has changed
and will change in the digital era, thus documenting a process as much as en-
abling prospective vision. However, this strange intertwinement of the old and
the new, what is already there and what is possible, indicates that the equation
made above, i.e., between the match and its representation, eventually does not
hold in the case of Deep Play, including both simulation (projecting the possible)
and analysis (reading the existing). In this light, the work does not represent a
paradigm carried to an extreme but rather indicates a paradigm shift with respect
to the paradigm as such.
Strikingly, the presupposed epistemological distinction between the real event
and its mediated appearance is actually maintained within the realm of the digi-
tal. In an almost paradoxical fashion, the machine vision application as employed
in Deep Play seems to confirm differences that constitute themselves as distinc-
tions between human perception, human perception framed by the media, auto-
mated vision, and human perception determined by automated vision (without
necessarily claiming the primordial nature of human vision, that is). The digital
does not constitute a fusion of binarisms (like presence and representation) or
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modes of experience (like human and machine vision), but demonstrates that the
differences underlying these abstracted patterns are fundamentally irreducible,
even if the binarisms themselves are rendered problematic as exclusive cate-
gories. That is not to say that everything is contained in what I here call “the
digital”; instead, it implies that the digital – from the concrete perspective of a
work of art and its reflexive potential – is allowed to address its own limitations
on the level of experience. This is not totally unlike saying that there is a differ-
ence between the participation in the “live” event in a stadium and experiencing
the “live” broadcasting of the event, without confirming an essential distinction.
The difference does not implode, but exclusive distinction is rendered proble-
matic. A similar irreducibility can be traced on an ontological level, where the
different material settings point towards differentiation or differential iteration
rather than a confirmation of ultimate categories of what is constituted as imme-
diately given and what appears as its mere supplement. Even more so, because
that which is immediately given (the concrete material context) is not a character-
istic of a primary event which initiates the series of secondary, “immaterial” re-
presentations or media events, but both a condition and effect of every single
(singular) event in the series. This is exactly what media events, especially in the
context of art or other cultural appropriations, might be capable of: the showing
of the continuous discontinuity of these occurrences in an epistemological and
ontological fashion, as a series of intelligible events that include a fundamental
incommensurability with the intelligible. In that respect, Deep Play has more in
common with the YouTube reenactments of the headbutt than one might think:
they both confirm differences as much as they seem to erase them.
This paradoxical movement in Deep Play is far from new; even in its apparent
technological discontinuity with Farocki’s other work, reaching from his early
film practice to the later film and video installations, Deep Play is somehow symp-
tomatic of a way of working, in which media practice is repeatedly questioned
and negotiated. Appearing as a culmination of an oeuvre, in which cinema and
art, documentation and assemblage take turns, the digital framing of television
and the televised experience of sports events are rather indicative of a more gen-
eral tendency in Farocki’s work, enabling an intertwinement of these layers by
affirming their difference. In what follows, I would like to situate Farocki’s earlier
oeuvre in the art context it leads up to, and show a couple of relations with the art
practice of others, taking the ideas of Thomas Elsaesser on Farocki and Johan
Grimonprez (another artist presented in the context of a Documenta exhibition)
as a point of departure. In this way, I want not only to broaden the perspective of
how one could understand the type of work both Farocki and Grimonprez are
producing, but to try to reach conclusions that count for other art manifestations
as well, such as performance which struggles with a range of epistemological and
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ontological problems related to the possibility or impossibility of repetition. At
this point, I would like to mention that, looking at these problems from the per-
spective of art, having a specific work – Deep Play – in mind (and thus working
from within a contemporary context), there is always the risk of brushing both
Elsaesser and Farocki (too much) against the grain. However, in the attempt to
establish an oscillating movement between the old and the new as well as be-
tween art and cinema, I would like to approach a situation in which both sides
can benefit each other.
Considering his general oeuvre, Harun Farocki is undoubtedly one of the most
important exponents of what is called found footage film (and video), which can
be understood in the context of film and cinema as well as in relation to art.
Being closely linked to the art historical notion of the objet trouvé, found footage
describes a method of film (and video) making, according to which already exist-
ing material is recombined, re-edited and re-sampled to generate different con-
texts of meaning. The method as such could be seen as an exemplification of the
montage principle, reflecting on the avant-gardist tradition of the collage (includ-
ing the reference to Lautréamont’s notorious pre-surrealist dictum5) as well as on
the technological conditions of filmmaking itself (and, more specifically, on cer-
tain traditions in the history of film).6 In this sense, every practice that involves
found footage could be called meta-film or, in cases where mainly television ma-
terial is involved, meta-television or meta-video, according to the medium-speci-
fic principles exposed in the rearrangement of the footage (in television-based
video works, the editing often simulates the viewer activity of “zapping”7). Basi-
cally, every medium involves the possibility of re-sampling, drawing either upon
pictorial collage or upon filmic montage, and sometimes upon both. The move-
ment induced by these rearrangement techniques leads to what Nicolas Bour-
riaud, former director and founder of the Palais de Tokyo in Paris, described in
2000 as a symptom of the more general phenomenon of “sampling culture.”8
Some of the contemporary practices described by Bourriaud actually relate
back to earlier movements, one of which is the “appropriation art” of the 1970s
and 1980s. The notion of “appropriation” is not restricted to a specific medium
or art form; it applies to photography as much as to installation art. The most
important characteristic is the recycling and re-arrangement of already existing
imagery, objects, codes, and signs. There were actually (at least) two directions
that determined these practices of appropriation. First of all, there were artists
who were introducing elements from a non-art context to the domain of art (the
Duchampian moment of displacement), and secondly, there were artists who
were quoting other artists (to the degree the “copy” became indistinguishable
from the “original,” constituting the second Duchampian moment, that is, the
moment of the “artistic” readymade). It is almost unnecessary to say that the con-
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stitutive gesture of these works is the Benjaminian event of reproduction, being
based on a more fundamental reproducibility which functions as the general con-
dition of art and media in the twentieth century.9 Furthermore, appropriation art
practices are often embedded in a cultural discourse on the role of the “copy” or
“simulacrum,” explicitly or implicitly referring to the ideas of Jean Baudrillard.
Hal Foster, in his Return of the Real (1996), refers in this context to a short text
by the artist Barbara Kruger published in Screen in 1982, together with some of
her “photo-texts,” which was the first time they were reproduced in a British
magazine. According to Foster, Kruger’s text implies that “appropriation art” had
a double bias by moving back and forth between ideology critique and “decon-
struction.” Its aim was, on the one hand, to expose “reality” as “representation”
and to raise issues of “authorship” and “property” (like certain variants of “decon-
struction” do) and, on the other, to make an attempt to reveal the “truth” under-
neath or behind representation (which is a central concern of ideology critique). 10
If one follows the reading of Foster, it almost seems as if Kruger is taking a “con-
structivist” stance, by being concerned with or exposing the concern of appropria-
tion art with reality as representation. In a way, the position of philosophical con-
structivism (not to be confused with the constructivism of Soviet art and cinema)
is typical for its time: it signifies a line of thought that, in its most radical muta-
tions, turns out to be almost a reversal of the “quasi-Platonism” sustained by
classical ideology critique, postulating the primordiality of “simulation” or “repre-
sentation.” I would like to propose another, maybe more subtle reading of Kru-
ger, as the “deconstruction” she is talking about is not only related to problems of
“authorship” and “pastiche” but refers to a mode of repetition that includes “alter-
nation” and the performative act of “making explicit” (announcing itself both as a
process of “externalization” and as a “declarative” speech act).11 This, however,
casts a rather different light on the appropriation practices of the 1970s and
1980s, which seem to confirm the “concept” of iteration much more than the
“constructivist” idea of all-inclusive representation – at least in the context of Bar-
bara Kruger’s work.
Thomas Elsaesser seems to implicitly react to these earlier discussions in a
recent essay on the cultural “doubles” of Alfred Hitchcock, one of the – if not the
– most quoted filmmaker ever. In that respect, it is important to note that Elsaes-
ser does not ascribe the moment of “doubling” to the Baudrillardian scene, but to
(a specific reading of) the Foucauldian relation between words and things. This
position acknowledges the difference between images and things, signs and ob-
jects, but simultaneously emphasizes their similarity (rather than their resem-
blance).12 In this way, the epistemological paradigm of the “copy” (that even after
canceling out the “original” still relies heavily on its presentia in absentia) under-
goes an ontological turn. As much as the thing is an image, the image is a thing
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(at least as long as one acknowledges the necessity of “hardware” for the image to
exist13). However, the difference between the two is not entirely cancelled out, as
an image and a thing – as paradoxical as it might sound – are different things,
different images. That is, cinematic reality enters life in a more profound way
than just absorbing life into the regime of images: life events actually mimic
cinematic events, as much as cinematic events mimic life.14 The mimicking ges-
ture is already a poetical act.
It is rather significant that Elsaesser redefines the connection between cinema
and life as an ontological association (or Verbund, to follow Farocki) in the context
of the recent work of Johan Grimonprez on Hitchcock, which arises from a fasci-
nation with the multiplicity of Hitchcock look- and sound-alikes, including the
artist’s own father. Not so much because of the Looking for Alfred (2005)
project itself (the implications of that are rather obvious), but because of an ear-
lier work by Grimonprez that left its imprint on our art historical memory: the
found-footage video Dial H-i-s-t-o-r-y (1997). As large as its impact was when it
was presented at Documenta X, this does not begin to hint at its later, even great-
er success, which can be ascribed to its apparent prophetic qualities, recapitulat-
ing the history of plane-hijackings in relation to terrorism. After a work like this,
the 9/11 attacks actually seemed like reenactments of television events and cin-
ematic realities, which seemed to leave philosophers like Baudrillard in a state of
metaphysical crisis, because everything suddenly became “so real.” At the same
time, it is also quite interesting that the media events and the video work not only
predict and precede what happened after, but that the work, functioning as an
archive, constitutes a series of events in itself. It is as if (this type of) found-foo-
tage work exemplifies an iterability that is already both epistemological and onto-
logical. The 9/11 event, especially when considered as a “media event,” is in that
sense just another event in this series, whose beginning and end can never be
determined definitively, the only criterion of affiliation being a rather indetermi-
nate sense of “family relations,” as it were.
Elsaesser’s observations concerning Grimonprez are also interesting with re-
spect to Farocki: not only in the context of Deep Play, in relation to the reading I
have suggested above, but also regarding his earlier work. In his introduction to
the volumeHarun Farocki: Working on the Sight-Lines, Elsaesser states that Farocki
is basically working “on realities already constituted: replaying them for the sake
of the small differences, the small deferrals, so that something (else) may become
visible ... in the repetition.”15 This method is at once connected to the “material-
ity” of the medium. In reference to Farocki’s Nicht löschbares Feuer / Inex-
tinguishable Fire (1968/69), which broaches the issue of the American na-
palm bomb attacks during the Vietnam War, Elsaesser focuses on the radical act
the filmmaker exhibits in one of the scenes. Just before the (f)act, Farocki states:
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“When we show you pictures of napalm burns, you’ll close your eyes. First you’ll
close your eyes to the pictures. Then you’ll close your eyes to the memory. Then
you’ll close your eyes to the facts. Then you’ll close your eyes to the entire con-
text.”16 A moment later and totally unprepared, the spectator becomes a witness
to an unexpected violent action, as Farocki extinguishes his cigarette on the back
of his hand. In this context, Elsaesser refers to one of Christa Blümlinger’s essays
in the same volume, in which the relation between this gesture, or rather of the
scar that remains, and the indexicality of celluloid becomes evident,17 an indexi-
cality that is questioned by video technology and the later digital imaging techni-
ques. In this way, Farocki’s metaphorical gesture transforms itself into a com-
mentary on the conditions and end of cinema. Hence, it is obviously not the
“materiality” of film that becomes visible as an “event,” but the loss of its (imag-
ined) purity (paralleled by the absence of the key image of the napalm attacks18),
exposed by a metaphorical image. At the same time, the image itself is not “im-
material”: what seems lost is also contained with its self-difference constituting
its self-similarity.
This paradoxical juxtaposition of the “similar” as a relation of difference ap-
pears to form the very basis of Farocki’s method, also on the level of images com-
bined with each other. As Elsaesser writes:
Juxtaposing apparent opposites and if necessary, torturing them until they yield a
hidden identity or an unsuspected similarity, provide the (temporary) moments of
closure for his trains of thought. In this sense, metaphoric equivalence and (almost
as often) metaphoric discrepancy (catachresis) establish Farocki’s poetics as well as
his politics.19
“Metaphoric equivalence” (which, in its strictest sense, is a contradiction in
terms) and “metaphoric discrepancy” (which is almost as contradictory, referring
to an unavoidable failure of images and signs in producing analogies) are syn-
chronous movements in two different directions, two tendencies within one dif-
ferential domain. It is as if the utilization of metaphor in order to establish med-
ium-reflexivity (rather than medium-specificity) leads to a situation in which the
principle of an ontological iterability (so to speak) becomes somehow evident as a
pattern. It is a constant movement, in which one position is simultaneously sta-
bilized and destabilized by the next with every image – every new image – con-
firming and at once undermining the previous image. Consequently, the move-
ment between equivalence and discrepancy is mirrored on a formal level:
“making connections on the basis of having taken something apart is thus where
the rhetoric of the metaphor meets the technique of filmic montage.”20 This is
possibly also how the “information feedback loop” that is established in Farocki’s
work has to be understood. According to Elsaesser, it is a Verbund, in which any
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sudden excess is absorbed by the next cycle of (meaning) production, leading to
what he describes as an “uncanny timeliness” of Farocki’s work. 21
The oscillation between equivalence and discrepancy is paralleled by the move-
ment between over- and underexposure on the level of information. Inextin-
guishable Fire does not provide an actual image of the historical event it refers
to (the American napalm bomb attacks in Vietnam). Instead, the metaphorical
image functions as a stand-in. In this context, Elsaesser mentions Farocki’s com-
ment on the air show disaster at the Rammstein airbase on 28 August 1988,
which designates the “cut” to be the “revenge” of television makers trying to deal
with the pseudo-events that surround actual catastrophes. In that specific case,
there was a cut just before the planes collided, and instead of the accident one
could see the image of the press conference. The event as such only exists as an
“afterimage,” supplemented by the viewer’s imagination. In Inextinguishable
Fire, withholding images of the actual event is accompanied by the staging of a
subversive gesture, whose “inadequacy,” as Elsaesser states, “demonstrates the
fundamental need for metaphor,” and thus the necessity of art and aesthetic prac-
tice,22 turning around what has been constituted as “media reality” in the afterlife
of cinema.23
However, the interplay of visibility and invisibility can also take a rather differ-
ent direction in Farocki’s work when he uses the effects of “sudden exposure,” as
in Videograms of a Revolution (1992, together with Andrei Ujica), a video/
film project frequently referred to in the context of art and aesthetic theory. It
famously documents the Rumanian revolution of 1989, when demonstrators oc-
cupied a television station, thus turning it into a historical site; the work is often
discussed in the context of the framing or a presupposed loss of framing. With-
out going too deeply into the discussions surrounding this work, it is worth men-
tioning that the dynamics of becoming visible is associated here with an ambig-
uous answer to the question of what kind of status “visibility” should have in
general. Both the leaving-invisible and the making-visible (or even the “involun-
tary” becoming-visible) seem to be predestined to fulfill their function in the
rhetoric of public media events. In relation with this, one could refer once again
to Grimonprez’ Dial H-i-s-t-o-r-y, which includes footage of interviews with
plane hijackers, elaborating their motivations. Grimonprez states that, from the
Reagan era onward, live images of the terrorists’ faces were no longer included in
public broadcasts – they no longer had a voice.24 Tracing these changes was one
of the main objectives of the Dial H-i-s-t-o-r-y project. Both the rendering-visi-
ble and the turning-invisible are always part of the politics of the image. What
happens to these strategies depends on the context.
The reason why I am referring to this “dialectics” is the way disappearance in
terms of keeping the event invisible has played an important role in the theories
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and debates related to early performance art. Both performance artists and theor-
ists have prevalently emphasized the importance of the artistic event to be
ephemeral, to eventually disappear, which has often been based on a predilection
for the “here and now.” It has to be considered “unrepeatable” to preserve its
“performative” character. In order not to corrupt the “ontology” of the performa-
tive event, it has to be kept invisible as an image. Performance documentation is
therefore considered unacceptable, or at least problematic.25 Although a closer
evaluation of these – in my opinion rather questionable – assumptions has to
take place elsewhere, I would like to focus on one specific aspect of this point of
view: the idea that the so-called “dematerialization” of art, which supposedly took
place in the 1960s and 1970s, defies the logic of the market economy, which is
based on the possibility of exchanging commodity objects.26 With respect to per-
formance art, video or photo documentation (although it was frequently done and
is therefore a fact that cannot be neglected, especially if one wants to be able to
talk about the phenomenon anyway) is often regarded as something that would
follow the logic of this very economy, which forces difference to become equiva-
lence to safeguard exchangeability. The problem, however, is that not document-
ing these events often means that they are forgotten, as they are irretrievably lost
as moments in which this order could be subverted and, vice versa, the attempt to
preserve the “uniqueness” of the artistic event increasingly follows commercial
concerns, trying to protect “copyrights.” Furthermore, one could argue that docu-
mentation is not necessarily subscribing to the order of equivalence and value
exchange, because, as it both includes and excludes what it preserves, it trans-
gresses the possibility of taking one as the other. Instead of erasing difference, it
actually exposes difference as similarity (or self-difference as self-similarity): what
I see is not the same, but remains somehow recognizable.27 It is singular as an
event, yet “plural” as a series.
In this context, a second strategy of keeping the memory of early performance
art alive has to be considered, that of performance reenactments (both “live” and
on video or film). It is merely in the non-identical repetition of both reenactment
and documentation (including the documentation of the reenactment itself) that
staging and restaging are identified as one of the possible strategies of perfor-
mance art, if not as a core strategy of performance per se.28 Strikingly, the repeti-
tion of performances as a specific type of transformative event (which is currently
taken as far as the placeless grounds of Second Life) could in that way be seen as
belonging to a particular type of “appropriation art,” including reenactments of
earlier art pieces as well as other historical events.29 But if reenactments are ap-
propriation art and found footage film and video a subcategory of this art form,
could one also speak of found footage in terms of reenactment, then? There are
certainly examples of found-footage films and videos that rather explicitly make
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use of reenactments, cross-cutting between television and film footage and the
recordings of reenacted events.30 But even in the case of Farocki’s Inextinguish-
able Fire (which is actually not a found-footage film), one could make this con-
nection, as his self-harming gesture could be seen as a metaphorical reenactment
of the napalm bomb attacks in Vietnam. Strikingly, this gesture seems to even
establish a rather direct relation with prevailing transgressive performance and
body art practices, around the time or the years after Inextinguishable Fire
was made. On this level, as well, one could detect iterability, understood in terms
of non-identical repetition in various contexts. But thinking this through, one
could even draw the conclusion that the appropriation of found footage itself is a
form of reenactment, since it is also a way of re-staging historical events. By
transferring an image and thing from one context to another, its reoccurrence
can be seen as an event in itself, as it is reflected in the German word Ereignis
with its double bind of appropriation (Aneignung) and disappropriation
(Zueignung). Where something is gained, something is lost; where something is
similar, something is also different. This event is maybe what establishes the
“uncanny timeliness” Elsaesser accredits to Farocki’s work. In this way his work
establishes an alternative economy, in which the principle of the Verbund not only
relates to the surplus value created within an economic feedback system, in
which every excess is reabsorbed to increase profit, but in which the excess itself
exceeds the very idea of exchangeability by exposing a simultaneous loss.
This Verbund, which is also between art and cinema, performance and film, is
what becomes visible in Deep Play, like in the earlier work of Farocki referring to
the thematic as well as to the form of the work and to its technological and cultur-
al context. The “arranged marriage”31 between television and digital image pro-
cessing is such an associative relationship or circuit that produces surplus value.
Thus, one could say, there might even be love in an arranged marriage. Following
this conclusion, it may be quite symptomatic that The New York Times compares
seeing the 2006 movie Zidane: A 21st Century Portrait (made by the visual
artists Douglas Gordon and Philippe Parreno) – in some ways the exact opposite
of Deep Play due to its lack of any “match analysis” – to performance art.32 In that
respect, it is not only cinema and film that supplement performance, but also
performance (or whatever image one might have of it) that facilitates experiences
appropriated by cinema, which, in itself, is based on the plurality of its performa-
tive reenactment in time and space. Maybe there is only one thing left to say,
then: if soccer is our life (as Diedrich Diederichsen states in the Documenta XII
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Digital Convergence Ten Years Later
Broadcast Your Selves and Web Karaoke
Jeroen de Kloet and Jan Teurlings
Introduction
Almost a decade ago, Thomas Elsaesser co-edited Cinema Futures: Cain, Abel, or
Cable?, a volume devoted to digital convergence and its consequences for cinema
and television.1 Although techno-optimism was at its highpoint in 1998 – the
Internet bubble had not burst yet, and Al Gore was the prophet of the informa-
tion highway rather than of global warming – the volume is characterized by its
rather sober perspective on the “digital revolution” that was then taking place.
Media archaeologists are indeed weary of the language of breaks, ruptures, and
revolutions, because they know the “new” is always a product of the past. No
technology comes into being without first being dreamt up, a point already made
in 1974 by Raymond Williams.2 The media archaeologist also knows that a med-
ium – be it cinema, television, or the computer – does not follow a linear history,
with technological innovations preceding actual practices (what Bruno Latour
calls the “summing up” of nonhuman and human actors3). Rather, history shows
that each new medium has many parents, with a fair amount of promiscuity
between them. Moreover, media archaeology reveals that a medium is never a
singular thing, that its meanings are multiple: depending on the context, a TV
set can be a tool for state propaganda, an entertainment device, or a surveillance
tool – or all three at the same time, of course.
All this does not mean that digitization and convergence had no consequences
for the culture industries. On the contrary, the essays in Cinema Futures: Cain,
Abel, or Cable? attest to the observation that the culture industries are in constant
flux, continuously reinventing themselves, and digitization does have its role to
play in the process (which is not the same as saying it is causing these changes).
As Elsaesser states in his introduction to the volume:
Digitization is in fact a contradictory factor: there is no denying that in the film in-
dustries it is significantly altering the relation production and postproduction, input
and output. But it has not by itself changed the way films are made, nor how viewers
understand them. Neither, however, is digitization quite as neutral.4
We are now ten years later, and digitization has continued its advance. Accounts
in the media claim that we are living in the Web 2.0 age, which assumes a radical
break with the 1990s. This seems like a good reason to investigate what kind of
impact digitization has had on contemporary media culture. Therefore, we will
apply some (Elsaesserian) ideas from the 1998 volume to two contemporary
cases: the popular digital video website YouTube and the emergence of interactive
technologies in the People’s Republic of China. But we would like to start with a
brief example that will help to begin the questioning of the possibilities of new
technologies to turn audiences into producers.
Producing Audiences
The rise of new technologies tends to be accompanied by utopian and dystopian
claims. Dystopian views on new technologies stress assumed dangers: it may iso-
late people, it may lead to verbal or sexual abuse, and it may alienate the new
generation. Utopian readings, on the other hand, point out that new virtual com-
munities will emerge, with possibilities for online activism.5 The denial-of-ser-
vice attacks at the WTO site during the Seattle conference in 1999 is just one of
the examples of online activism. Both utopian and dystopian readings tend to
proliferate during a time when new technologies are being introduced, be it the
telephone, radio, video, or the Internet.6
While straddling between these two poles, we would like to first zoom in on
YouTube, which is, along with companies like Google, Ebay, Amazon, and My-
space, one of the select Internet companies that have become part of the collec-
tive consciousness. It has done so, moreover, at a remarkably fast pace. The com-
pany was only founded in 2005, which makes it barely three years old at the time
of this writing. In 2006, the website was purchased by Google, undoubtedly one
of the most talked-about purchases of that year. Nielsen Netratings estimated that
in June 2006 the website attracted 19.6 million unique visitors, after being on-
line for only one year.7 Users can upload their own video movies, rate, subscribe
to, and comment upon other users’ movies – like little Berlusconis they can cre-
ate their own “channel” – and users can also post video responses.
It is tempting to interpret the arrival of YouTube as the dawn of a new era, one
in which the deficiencies and power relationships of the old mass media have
finally been overcome. This is indeed what YouTube’s slogan, “Broadcast Your-
self,” plays on: We no longer need to depend on the media professionals who
own and control access to the media; we can now produce and distribute our
own content. Thus, YouTube promises to unleash the creative energies of the
masses, making everybody producer and consumer at the same time. YouTube
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did not “invent” this emancipatory discourse. It goes back to a long tradition in
Western thought that sees technology as a liberating, empowering force that will
set us free from the limitations of today.
One example may help to illustrate the potential of YouTube to turn audiences
into producers. Patrick Jered is a Netherlands-based folktronica (a genre combin-
ing folk with electronic music) singer. At the beginning of 2008, he released his
second CD, titled Tykhana. On a song called “Hikikomori,” he collaborated on-
line with a Japanese vocalist, Yosshi, and with Mintra, a DJ and visual artist from
Thailand who made the corresponding MTV clip. The clip was uploaded on You-
Tube and used to promote Patrick Jered’s work.8 Simultaneously, he launched a
website to sell his work through his own record company.9 He explains how new
technologies have enabled new ways of making music:
The last few years the possibilities have expanded dramatically. It is a fantastic thing,
that one song I put on YouTube could not have been done without Internet technol-
ogy. The translation and vocals are done in Japan, and also the guy in Thailand I have
never met, I got in contact through YouTube. The whole thing is completely created
through Internet connections with people.10
Furthermore, Jered claims YouTube is more democratic, as AR managers from
record companies are no longer listening to demo tapes anymore, but instead
they are checking out YouTube and Myspace. He explains: “There is a more de-
mocratic thing going on now, AR managers take note of the number of times a
song is downloaded, so that serves as a kind of measure for them to assess the
impact of unknown artists in the world.”11 Jered is not the only one to take advan-
tage of new web technologies. Other examples come to mind, most notably the
Arctic Monkeys, heralded as one of the first cases of a band coming to the pub-
lic’s attention through the Internet, thus paving new ways for the promotion and
marketing of music.12
Both the Arctic Monkeys as well as Patrick Jered are part of what Henry Jen-
kins labels “participatory culture,” a term “which contrasts with older notions of
passive media spectatorship. Rather than talking about media producers and con-
sumers as occupying separate roles, we might now see them as participants who
interact with each other according to a new set of rules that none of us fully
understands.”13 This, to Jenkins, results in a convergence culture, which will
cause a paradigm shift for the media industry. Convergence is “both a top-down
corporate-driven process and a bottom-up consumer-driven process.”14 Resonat-
ing with his earlier work on fan culture, Jenkins claims that the altering of the
relationships between producer, content, and audience may prove empowering
for audiences, while he also points to the dangers inherent in commodification.15
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In this essay, we would like to further explore how empowerment and commo-
dification are related on video websites like YouTube. Following Matt Hills, we do
not see resistance and complicity as mutually exclusive;16 instead we will look at
how they are intimately intertwined, and take it as our task to disentangle the
issues at stake. We do this by taking two steps. First, we turn to media archaeol-
ogy as a methodological tool, and we place YouTube firmly within the history of
the culture industries, emphasizing historical continuity rather than the radical
break. We will thus show that YouTube merely represents the latest step in a
process that has always driven the cultural industries, namely a combination of
cost reduction and audience maximalization. From a political-economic point of
view, then, there is nothing radical or empowering about YouTube. Second, we
look at what is actually being broadcast on YouTube and similar websites, which
will offer a more nuanced perspective, which we will substantiate with our case
study of Tudou, which resonates with the examples of Patrick Jered and the Arctic
Monkeys.
YouTube: Broadcast Yourself
To understand the political economy of YouTube, it is worth returning to Elsaes-
ser’s essay on Fantasy Island, the quirky 1970s show in which two guests would
have their fantasy fulfilled every week.17 Elsaesser links the emergence of textual
properties to the economic context out of which they emerge. His analysis of
Fantasy Island shows how the peculiar, dreamlike, even uncanny logic of the
show is actually the result of two interlocking interests – the studios owning stu-
dio space and accumulated props, and the stars having to pitch their latest re-
leases. Fantasy Island (the production) thus maximizes investments that had al-
ready been made:
The guest-celebrity is allowed to live any fantasy whatsoever – so long as it coincides
with a “property” the studio owns, that is to say, so long as it can be “made real” with
the various prepainted sets, props and costumes that the studio has on the lot. ...
Fantasy Island ... use[s] property personnel and time when such an expensively main-
tained, well-organized production site with costly overheads would otherwise stand
idle.18
That media corporations are profit-oriented is hardly an outrageous statement.
The strength of the essay, however, lies in that it shows that media companies go
to remarkable lengths when devising strategies for maximizing return-on-invest-
ments, and the peculiar textual forms that are a result of this (dream-like surreal-
ist collages in Fantasy Island, or grainy images in the case of Reality TV). The
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economic principle behind it, however, is straightforward: to create surplus value
by reducing costs. One strategy for doing so is by making the audience bear part
of the production and distribution costs. The introduction of television, for exam-
ple, not only represented a change in technology (from film to electromagnetic
waves), it also implied a change in distribution relations because, unlike cinema,
the new technology required that the “consumer” make an initial investment,
namely the cost of the TV set (at the time substantial). In other words, whereas
the cinematic mode of distribution required the media companies to fully bear
the costs of the distribution infrastructure, television (and the business model
that was put forward) made the audience bear at least part of the expenses of the
reproductive infrastructure. With the arrival of the personal computer in the
1980s, the user had to bear an additional part of the costs: not only one’s pur-
chase of the hardware (a computer), but also the cost of the content or software
(often in the form of licenses). The advent of the internet, finally, added to the
users’ costs the monthly subscription fee, making cable TV rather than the major
networks the business model for the new millennium.
This short overview of the twentieth century shows that, from their earliest
beginnings, media corporations have tried to make the audience bear as much of
the costs for production and distribution as they could possibly get away with.
With each successive “innovation” consumers were made to bear an increasing
part of the distribution and reproduction costs. And it is at exactly this point that
the connection with YouTube becomes apparent, since it represents the next step
in the industry’s century-old aspiration: the minimalization of production and
distribution costs.
Until the arrival of YouTube, media production companies had two ways to
earn their money: either by selling media content directly to the consumers (cin-
ema, cable TV, CDs, iTunes), or by making the audience watch ads and receiving
money from advertisers in return (commercial TV and radio, most websites).
What is crucial in both of these approaches is that one way or another the media
company had to “yield” some content to be watched or listened to; and this con-
tent had to be created (and thus paid for) by the media companies. YouTube
breaks with this economic model, in that it is no longer the media company that
provides the content that is collectively watched and commented upon. YouTube
(the company) does not produce a single second of the millions of hours of video
on its website, but relies on its collective user base to generate its content. As a
result, YouTube has managed to reduce its production costs to zero, only bearing
a portion of the distribution costs, which is – roughly – comprised of server costs
and software development. And the main party doing the creative work, supply-
ing artistic content, as well as executing technical chores, is the audience.
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The Audience and Immaterial Labor
Instead of a radical and emancipatory break that challenges existing power rela-
tions between producers and consumers, then, YouTube represents a gradual
perfection of its business model. Like Reality TV, it reduces above-the-line costs
to a strict minimum.19 The role played by the audience in this new ecosystem is
no longer the limited role of “the consumer”; rather, the new system joins produ-
cer and consumer into a single role – the role of prosumer so often heralded by
futurists and business gurus alike. But this also means that the audience is no
longer passively laboring away, as Dallas Smythe already famously argued in
1977.20 In this new system, the audience labors in a very real way, by providing
the creative labor that YouTube transforms into exchange value.
Following the French-Italian Marxist tradition of the journal Multitudes, the
concept that best describes this type of labor is “immaterial labor.” This is the
term they use for characterizing the changes that capitalist production has under-
gone in the core countries during the last forty years. According to Maurizio Laz-
zarato, in order for labor to be categorized as immaterial it needs to fulfill two
conditions.21 First, it needs to have an informational or communicational compo-
nent. In this sense, almost all work in industrial societies has become increas-
ingly “immaterial,” in that most jobs require their workers to manipulate sym-
bols, mostly by means of a computer.22 Second, immaterial labor is usually not
recognized as “work” as such, because it concerns activities that are not asso-
ciated with the traditional sphere of production. Here we should think of those
aspects of life that we associate with leisure: cultural and artistic activities, life-
style choices, (sub)cultural activities and tastes, social relationships and network-
ing – in short, every type of activity that we usually do when we are actually not
working. In other words, Lazzarato argues that capitalism has managed to absorb
more and more aspects of social life into its processes of value creation. But this
process is not visible as such to immaterial laborers, since the latter do not feel
like they are actually “working” but are merely “having fun,” “expressing identi-
ties,” or “socializing.” That is also why André Gorz claims that contemporary
companies produce “fausses marchandises”: they market products that they did
not produce themselves, effectively selling us back the products we have made
ourselves.23
It is clear that immaterial labor is an accurate description of what YouTube
users do: not only are they in the business of manipulating symbols via a compu-
ter, they also do not experience it as work, thus providing the company with the
free labor it subsequently valorizes on the advertising market. Or, as Tiziana Ter-
ranova puts it, YouTube users provide labor that is simultaneously “voluntarily
given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited.”24 YouTube videos are the very embo-
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diment of Gorz’s “fausses marchandises,” as we are being sold our own collective
audiovisual products. But there is more to YouTube than the fact that users pro-
duce the content they watch; just as important is the fact that it exploits the crea-
tive capacities of the crowd. For example, written in the software is the promotion
of controversy and conflict. The video response feature incites us to immediately
respond to a statement or video, leading to entire generations of arguments
stacked upon each other – each of them just a click away. We are also encouraged
to add extra layers of meaning to existing videos, by rating them, or adding com-
ments, or putting them into our favorites. Even the purely “passive” use of the
YouTube website – the mere watching of a video – will increase its play count,
and thus adds information – and thus value – to the website.
Thus, YouTube’s slogan “Broadcast Yourself” not only has to be taken literally –
we have indeed become broadcasters – it also has to be truncated and pluralized
to read “Broadcast Your Selves.” When we are watching and posting videos, re-
cording video responses, adding comments, looking into each others’ favorites
and so on, we are in a very real sense broadcasting our selves: we add something
of our personalities and idiosyncrasies to the website – for free, of course. More-
over, the collective “self cloud” that results is a fascinating and ever-changing
dynamic system that perfectly manages to capture our attention time and time
again.
Censoring, Copying, and Mimicry
The media business is doing well not just in “the West” – itself a problematic
homogenizing label – but also in that equally problematic construct “China.” On
the wave of transnational capitalism currently sweeping over Mainland China,
two entrepreneurs, Dutch investor Marc van der Chijs and his Chinese counter-
part Gary Wang, founded the video-sharing site Tudou. At a conference in Am-
sterdam in September 2007, Gary Wang claimed that Tudou streams 15 billion
minutes of footage a month, compared to 3.5 billion minutes a month for You-
Tube.25 Unreliable figures are used to prove success, producing yet another story
that feeds into global fantasies that are saturated with hyperboles, depicting Chi-
na in terms of amazing growth, a massive consumer market, global power and
the like.26 Van der Chijs is referred to on the Internet as a Dutch hero, able to
conquer the Chinese market.27 Van der Chijs himself proudly claims Tudou to be
the biggest video-sharing site in China.28 Quantitative “facts” such as unique hits
and minutes of use are invoked as the new authenticators of the World Wide
Web, seemingly making the impact of a site tangible. In line with our previous
analysis of YouTube, the operations of Tudou are driven by a marketing logic,
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meant to attract advertisers and investors, just like the online performances of
the Chinese audiences can be interpreted as cheap, immaterial labor. However,
to avoid the danger of economic reductionism, we will now explore the cultural
and political implications. Tudou provides an important case in point, as do per-
sonal weblogs in China.
While the archaeological approach generally inspires a temporal analysis, we
would like to place more emphasis on its spatial dimension. When moving to
China to explore the working of new technologies, we run the danger of position-
ing China in a different time zone, belonging either to the past (the primitive
Other) or the future (symbolizing a techno-utopia or dystopia). This would be
quite wrong, as China is, like us, simply here (rather than there) and now (rather
than then). While insisting on China’s coevalness, to use Johannes Fabian’s
term,29 we would like to see how new technologies may have both similar and
different implications in another location, China. When discussing the impor-
tance and impact of new technologies like Tudou and blogging in the context of
China, three interrelated issues come to mind: state censorship, piracy, and web
karaoke. All of these issues urge us to take an approach in which public, text,
producer, and authorities are mutually constitutive of each another, propelling an
endless circulation of capital, regulations, images, and sounds.
First, state censorship. The Chinese state generally keeps a close eye on media
content. This does not render the domain of media completely unfree; differ-
ences between, for example, the People’s Daily and the Southern Weekly are vast,
the latter taking a far more critical approach towards the government. However,
as different journalists explained to us in November 2007, under Hu Jintao, the
successor of Jiang Zemin, media control has indeed increased. The picture that
China is on a one-way road to more openness seems hasty and perhaps inaccu-
rate. However, new technologies have made it increasingly difficult for the Chi-
nese state to control media content. On Douban 9, a popular blogsite in China,
bloggers revealed the case of slavery labor in Shanxi in 2007, which caused a
national and international scandal. Bloggers like Zhai Minglai, Gua Daxia, Bei-
feng, Michael Anti and Wang Xiaofeng – to name but a few – frequently publish
critical pieces, challenging the state.30 For example, in a humorous blog, Wang
Xiaofeng ridiculed the attempts of local authorities in Beijing to civilize the peo-
ple in the wake of the Olympic Games. He poked fun at the authorities’ attempts
to make Beijingers speak Putonghua, rather than their own dialect. Blogging
gives more linguistic freedom, allows one to explore the boundaries of the per-
missible and to circumvent the censors. He explains this in an interview:
There is a principle in my blog in that my posts must be different from what is
published in the printed media. I wanted to write those words that the editors were
not used to, or else I would lose interest in writing altogether. But I discovered that
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this space is very huge. I am not limited by the printed media and I can let myself
go.31
In the same interview, he warns us not to exaggerate the impact of new technolo-
gies, and urges us to question the alleged “new” in new technologies, when he
writes:
a blog is just a recording tool for recording in the digital era for those who wish to
express themselves. In ancient times, literary folks would write words like “Number
One Mountain Under the Means” on the face of stone cliffs; other people may write
“I was here” on a brick wall. No matter what, this is just about how people are chang-
ing their ways of making historical records, no matter if it is on blogs or on bamboo
slips.32
At the same time, Wang Xiaofeng also gained global fame under his blogname
Massage Milk when his blog was removed in March 2006 by the Chinese gov-
ernment, his blog simply stating that “Due to unavoidable reasons with which
everyone is familiar, this blog is temporarily closed.” As he had expected, it was
only a matter of hours before this case of censorship became known worldwide
“news” via the global news channels. Later, he revealed it was a hoax, to put up a
mirror to the Western media that is so obsessively searching for cases of censor-
ship.
A brief detour to the piracy and copyright issue enables us to further explain
the workings of new technologies in China, in particular in relation to the issue
of censorship. New media in China allow for a form of digital citizenship that is
quite unprecedented. Digitization has sped up the already “rampant” practices of
piracy in China. Rampant is a word used by the media industry and the Chinese
government, the latter being increasingly insistent on fighting piracy after its en-
try into the WTO in 2001. The endless duplication of media products in China –
on the streets one can immediately find the latest TV series such as 24, Holly-
wood blockbusters, and the like – produces a never ending flow of global images,
sounds, and texts. Blockbusters as well as art-house movies are on the Chinese
market before the censored versions of the movies appear in the theaters, if they
are ever released at all, or before we can even see them on TV. With current
downloading programs such as bit torrent, TV series and movies have become
even more easily available, for both the pirating industry and the computer-savvy
consumer. This potentially undermines the global media sector, resisting the en-
forcement of copyright regimes that seem to protect the industry more than the
artist. At the same time, it opens up a media world that was previously inaccessi-
ble to Chinese audiences due to import restrictions and censorship policies.
Thus, whereas new technologies allow bloggers in China to voice their opinions,
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and present a partly censored window to the world for Internet users in China
(currently roughly 13% of the total population), they also bring in the outside
world through peer-to-peer downloading technology, further propelling piracy
practices in China, and circumventing the logics of global capitalism and state
censorship policies.
The constant influx of global imagery, which produces an increasingly media-
saturated world, in combination with the possibilities to produce user-generated
content, have resulted in the emergence of not only a politicized, critical blogo-
sphere, but also – in a more entertaining, hilarious sphere –media karaoke. Kar-
aoke can be read as a specific type of sonic and visual mimicry that is believed to
have originated in Japan, and that has never traveled well to the West, apart from
its gay, camp adaptation.33 It is hard to underestimate the cultural significance of
karaoke in China; it serves as the lubricant for business deals, and as the moment
of excess, when one can transcend one’s everyday inhibitions. Karaoke enables
the audience to slip for a few minutes into a star persona, and thus to leave be-
hind one’s everyday self.
In the past, karaoke was pretty much confined to the private space of the kar-
aoke bar or the public town square with its mobile karaoke stand, but the Internet
has enabled the emergence of an online karaoke culture. When the Backdormi-
tory Boys released their first playback clip on Tudou in 2005, they mimicked the
Backstreet Boy’s “I Want It That Way.” They became an instant hit on the main-
land. These college boys from Guangzhou had a facial expression that turned the
original into an absurd love song, the clip is a cultural translation that pokes fun
at the original while not taking itself all too seriously.34 Soon people all over Chi-
na were watching the Backdormitory Boys on the Internet, just as they had ea-
gerly read the sex diaries of female blogger Mu Zimei from the same city.
Whereas the latter became famous for publishing her private life online, the
Backdormitory Boys became famous through their ironic appropriations of “Wes-
tern” (and later also “Chinese”) cultural products. The boys are “typical” Chinese
in that we see them in their dorm room, a place known for its lack of privacy.
Even the third student, sitting in the back of the room, in front of the computer,
became well known in China.
During the World Soccer Cup in Germany in 2006, the Backdormitory Boys
adopted the German language song “Dadada” from the band Trio, a big hit in
Germany in the early 1980s. We see them in “China” soccer T-shirts mimicking
“Dadada” by lip-syncing to “Ich lieb dich nicht, Du liebst mich nicht, aha aha aha.”
The clip provokes questions about cultural difference and authenticity: it is si-
multaneously very “Chinese” (karaoke, the dorm) as well as “Western” (the song,
soccer). More importantly, it pokes fun at both, not taking culture very seriously;
the clip is an act of cheerful copying, masking and fakery. And when one fakes
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the real, the fake becomes the new authenticity. When others tried to mimic the
Backdormitory Boys, comments on YouTube were generally devastating, for ex-
ample:
wannab’s, chineseboys didnt ask for imitaters you know.
this is wannabe the 2 chinese boys!! you’re suck!!!!! chinese boys are much bether!!!
don’t keep try like them because they 2 are the best!35
The new fake, the outcome of cheerful mimicry of the Other, resulting in prac-
tices of web karaoke, have quickly made the Backdormitory Boys famous. In the
clip, they laugh ironically while they sing they don’t love us (Ich lieb dich nicht).
They rejuvenate Oscar Wilde’s nearly worn-out assertion that we “should treat all
the trivial things of life seriously, and all the serious things of life with sincere
and studied triviality.”36 Football, politics, Germany, China, dormitories, study-
ing, censors, copyright, why should we care? What remains is joy – the emotion
so often ignored in academia, but an emotion that travels so well digitally.
The Backdormitory Boys attest to the possibility of the Internet as a place
where one can create one’s own stardom and negotiate a new sensibility of
authenticity, one that resides in the humorous and the banal, rather than the
tragic and the serious. The tragic, being more sacred than the humorous and the
ironic, is more visible in cinematic and other cultural representations, for exam-
ple in the cinema of Tsai Ming-Liang and Zhang Yimou. In other words, digitiza-
tion feeds the comic aspect more than the tragic, propelling a media culture that
thrives on an ironic structure of feeling.
The Industry Strikes Back?
This brief sketch of the Backdormitory Boys hints at important questions of cul-
tural translation, authenticity, and humor. They are also an example of the poten-
tial power of the Internet to turn consumers into producers. In the context of
China, this can be considered a potentially provocative practice: they circumvent
the censors, create themselves as stars and poke fun at the media industry. How-
ever, the industry soon struck back with a vengeance. Their immaterial labor
quickly materialized into financial rewards. The Backdormitory Boys quickly be-
gan performing live and became spokespersons for Motorola and Pepsi. This also
signaled the moment that it seemed to lose its subversive powers of both the
media industry and the state system (the Chinese state does not like these kinds
of performances; it recently moved to ban the popular TV show Idols). Not only
their subversiveness, but also their fame soon began to fade, as part of the attrac-
tion was their virtual mimicry, which authenticated them. They transgressed the
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newly defined limits of authenticity, moving back from the fake towards the real,
from the copy towards the original.
Potentially subversive acts are thus immediately incorporated and implicated
in global capitalism. One further example that underlines the power of global
capital is blogger Michael Anti’s story. The two Chinese characters he chose for
his name mean “peace” (an) and “replacement” (ti), respectively. The synthesis
“anti” means “peaceful alternative.”37 He himself already notes that “In this poli-
tical system, everyone has to compromise … It’s not black and white. Many of the
people who delete my essays are also my friends.”38 And those who delete them
out of political concerns are not necessarily Chinese. In the final days of Decem-
ber 2006, Anti wrote on his blog about the sacking of various discontented and
outspoken journalists at Xin Jing Bao (Beijing News) by the more conservative edi-
tors, and called for a boycott. Microsoft soon thereafter deleted his blog. Michael
Connolly, the team manager of MSN Spaces, justifies this choice:
We are an international service, and we work hard to comply with the local laws (for
illegal content) and local cultural norms (for inappropriate content) in all the markets
we operate in. … In China, there is a unique issue for our entire industry: there are
certain aspects of speech in China that are regulated by the government. We’ve made
a choice to run a service in China, and to do that, we need to adhere to local regula-
tions and laws.39
Thus, “Western” or global companies like Microsoft are deeply implicated in the
aiding and abetting of state censorship in China. Global capitalism works hand in
hand with the communist nation-state to help the nation-state control its citizens
and its media output.40 And this happens in a time of digitization, when new
media are increasingly being credited with empowering its users rather than the
producers. In 1998, Elsaesser had already pointed to the forces that need to be
taken into account when we try to gauge the impact of digitization: processes of
economic concentration on a global scale (Microsoft); geo-political realignments
(global media companies with the communist nation-state), and legal and institu-
tional changes (increased censorship of the Internet in China, the construction of
a national firewall).41 These elements are of pivotal importance if we are to under-
stand the digital mediascape of China, but they need to be understood in con-
junction with the micropolitics of the everyday, in which bloggers use the Web to
articulate a voice that would otherwise remain unheard and that may further
challenge trust in the current regime of representation in China.42
It may be more accurate to read the Backdormitory Boys and the bloggers as
part of a subversive culture that is simultaneously being commodified as well as
incorporated into the business models of the media conglomerates. Whereas ma-
nipulation by the industry is often perceived to be the flipside of cultural appro-
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priation, in practice they feed on one another. The vicious circle of commodifica-
tion and appropriation propels both creativity and the flow of capital. It is possi-
ble to point to moments of subversion, but it is equally possible to trace moments
of compliance.
Conclusion: A Brave New World?
Our analysis has shown that new technologies constitute both a continuation and
a rupture in the media ecology: they can be read as a further extension of the use
of immaterial labor from the audience, as well as enabling audiences to cheer-
fully appropriate cultural forms, poke fun at cultural differences, undermine
copyright regimes, and engage in a pleasurable game that renders the political at
most a laughable domain. It would be too easy to ascribe the different analytical
take on similar technologies – YouTube and Tudou – as caused by spatial and
cultural differences, one coming from the neoliberal West, the other from the
authoritarian East, since this would merely substitute a technological determin-
ism with a societal determinism. Instead, we have used the two case studies to
show the myriad ways in which convergence and digitization have both empow-
ering as well as exploitative effects, often operating simultaneously. Both case
studies also illustrate the fundamental anti-essentialism of media archaeology
(the introduction of a new technology never has exactly the same consequences),
while also pointing to its very real effects (without digitization the industry would
not be able to exploit the audience’s immaterial labor, or the Backdormitory Boys
would not be able to appropriate German pop songs). By doing so, media archae-
ology reveals the radical undecidability of technological introductions, allowing
us to end on a hopeful note: by studying the past, we open up the future.
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